February 11, 2003

Ms. Tatjana Doncheva, MP, Parliamentary Group of the Coalition for Bulgaria

Ladies and gentlemen, Your Excellencies! I would like to thank the organizers of this conference, although I'm one of them myself, for the opportunity to share with you some considerations about corruption-related problems in this country and ways of addressing them. We all know nobody would confess to being corrupt. We are not an exception ourselves. But for years now we've been hearing from every report about the country's development, and even at this conference, reproaches that the problem with corruption is far too alarming and that there lacks political will to deal with it. Yes, it may have been produced by the objective conditions and processes in Bulgaria after 1990, at the peak of privatization and the property redistribution processes. But I think that today, at the beginning of the 21st century, we really need to reconsider our priorities in dealing with corruption. Because we might otherwise make enormous efforts and yet fail to achieve any notable results.

To me the key to achieving tangible progress is the situation with the judicial system. It's true that we have for years been taught and have traditionally assumed that prevention is just as important as the work of control and law-enforcement authorities. But the quality performance of the control and law-enforcement authorities is a crucial deterring factor. Constitutional amendments need to be justified, first of all, in terms of the common values to which we all adhere and secondly, in terms of the problems that we find there. I don't think we have any problems with the value system. The rule of law and people's wish to be able to say they live in a fair state where justice is also the emblem of the judicial system are essential for a nation's motivation to make progress.

As for the problems of the system, in my opinion the political powers need to reach agreement in this respect. Because these problems will determine the decisions we will have to adopt.

It seems to me that while organizational issues are important, they're not at the core of the problem. To me the most pressing issue and most serious cause for concern is the strong dependence of the judicial system on corporate interests and the already alarmingly frequent use of the mechanisms of the judicial system to deal with business conflicts and problems. Mr. Slavov is right to feel concerned about the limitations on judicial control. But the government is equally right in saying that when certain business interests are so strong that they can get any title they want, the solution cannot be to remain within this vicious circle. And in my opinion, if we all agree that this is a problem, we needn't pass the hot potato back and forth between the field of the executive and of the judiciary. Judicial control is essential and what we should all agree on is what to do about the judicial system. And it is not to exclude it.

Another crucial flaw is the lack of any control and correctives whatsoever within the judicial system. In 1990 many political powers unconditionally embraced the position that it should be left on its own and came to understand its independence as its absolute right to do anything it wants, in any way it wants, without being accountable to anyone. This is absurd. The public cannot accept such a notion of independence. Today it is anachronistic to assume that any form of control of the judicial system is an infringement of its independence and I don't think it is the practice in any sensible country. My concern, as a citizen, is that the Constitutional Court appears to adhere to this view. I think that the people who should be working there and issue rulings should be statesmen, and not regional judges.

It is also necessary to reconsider who and how will take part in forming the other. The executive and the legislative powers are interrelated - one forms the other and can replace it, respectively. This needs to be considered and constitutionally established with regard to all three branches of power.

Another major shortcoming at the present time is the exceedingly closed nature of the judicial system. Back in 1990 it was conceived this way in the belief that this would help safeguard its positive elements. Today the closed character of the system allows the hypertrophy of flaws, which in my opinion, exist in any judicial system but which, in the presence of a natural, let's say, ventilation mechanism, would not turn to tragedy. The executive and legislative powers are exposed to corruption pressure and dependence as well, but the public nature of their operation and the possibility to replace them alleviate the problem. Whereas with the judicial system, as a result of its closed nature, these flaws are allowed to grow out of proportion and distort everything.

The prosecution remains another problem with its excessively hierarchical, centralized structure. They tell us: the prosecution is independent. Yes, it's independent but is the individual prosecutor independent when handling the cases he's been assigned? Because the point of independence is for the prosecutors to be free from any pressure and influences when handling their cases.

Naturally, all of this - even if they are only cursory remarks - brings up the question whether it is possible to solve the problems with cosmetic changes to the Constitution alone. If the answer is "no", and I myself think it's "no", then we, and the political powers above all, need to realize the need for agreement. It may be reminiscent of 1990 but I think it's essential. It should include: agreement on the values, agreement on the problems at hand, and agreement regarding the solutions. The problems will be dictating the solutions. I think these solutions should be far-reaching and should include even the location of the various magistrate institutions, the connections between them, and indispensably, a system of checks and balances because this would ensure social balance and solid foundations. Naturally, we can discuss whether the immunity should be full or functional, whether to reconsider the appointment for life principle, everything may be subject to review. I think this time we should be less bound by the tradition to adopt existing models in their entirety and not let ourselves be too influenced by the lobbying of various institutions. It would be good if we could all realize that this is an urgent matter. The idea of convening a Great National Assembly is just a way of protracting it indefinitely. Bulgaria is faced with a great many problems demanding immediate attention. These amendments should be adopted by the National Assembly and the political powers should reach agreement on this.

I say all this without being concerned about the possible ruling of the Constitutional Court. I think the Constitutional Court should be part of the reform because it's part of the problem. With the constitutional provision that it is to interpret the Constitution we have conferred to the Constitutional Court constituent power that it doesn't have anywhere else and that it is not supposed to have. I will refrain from citing Thatcher; perhaps some might think it inappropriate for a left-wing politician to cite a British Conservative. But I did come across something in the papers last week that seemed very pertinent. I don't think we should fall hostage to a few people's wish to keep their comfortable situation. It's not a problem for our country alone, nor for us as individuals, it's actually a quite common problem. And the politicians of many countries have had to face this challenge.

The right time is now and not tomorrow. The agreement needs to cover serious constitutional issues and ensure a more intelligent reception. This is the only way to meet the expectations of our own nation and those of the countries whose club we want to join - will the political powers muster enough will for a lasting and definitive settlement of anti-corruption issues?