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EVALUATION OF PRIVATIZATION RESULTS FOR 1994
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1. Methodological preconditions for the assessment of the (un-)
successful course of privatization 12. Forms of Privatization 62.1.
Restitution 62.2. "Privatization" of the land 103. Privatization of
state-owned and municipal enterprises (The Transformation and
Privatization of State-Owned and Municipal Enterprises Law -
TPSMEL) 16The supply of state-owned enterprises 16The demand for
state-owned enterprises 18The progress of privatization 25The
employed privatization techniques 30Privatization expenses 32The
revenues from privatization 334. The effect of privatization on
former state-owned enterprises 36
------------------------
1. Methodological preconditions for the
assessment of the (un-) successful course of privatization
Analyses of the results of privatization in Bulgaria typically
consider only denationalization of state-owned and municipal
enterprises under the provisions of the Transformation and
Privatization of State-owned and Municipal Enterprises Law
(TPSMEL). According to Art. 1, Par. 3, privatization constitutes
transfer to natural and legal persons of:
- Shares and interests of companies owned by the state and the
municipalities;
- The ownership of whole enterprises, separate parts thereof,
property of liquidated enterprises or incomplete construction
sites;
- State-owned or municipal non-residential real estate property
which is not part of state-owned or municipal enterprises and is
being used for economic purposes.
As is evident, privatization as defined in the Privatization Law
does not include other important property held by the state and
municipalities and sold under the provisions of other acts of
legislation - the land, petty urban property, housing, the property
of the former Collective Farms.
In the economic literature privatization covers all forms of
transformation of state-owned and municipal property - not only
enterprises but likewise the land, social services (social and
old-age security, health care, education)
*
.
Such a broad conception of privatization best fits its general
definition as a process of denationalization. Privatization in
Bulgaria includes at least three interrelated processes:
- privatization of state-owned and municipal enterprises under
the provisions of the Privatization Law;
- privatization of the land and property of the former Collective
Farms under the provisions of the Ownership and Use of Farmland
Law;
- restitution under the provisions of the package of restitution
laws*.
These three processes combine legal and institutional mechanisms
for the sale and use of different types of state, municipal and
cooperative property. Some authors argue that privatization ought
to include the privatization of public housing. In Bulgaria that
process was completed as early as 1992, when privately owned
housing in the whole country constituted 82% of the total available
housing. This share is among the highest in the world.
Privatization in the social sector is only just beginning in
Bulgaria and reflects the process of withdrawal of the state from
the total monopoly on these social activities. Regrettably, there
lacks any adequate information about the scope of this process.
The general evaluation of the course of privatization usually only
concerns the privatization of the large state-owned enterprises. It
is the aim of the present analysis to outline the progress of
privatization in the reforming Bulgarian economy with all its
diversity and range. Any evaluation of the general course of
privatization has to take into account at least the following
circumstances:
- the actual beginning of the process - there was a completion of
the legal and institutional framework of denationalization. In
fact, Bulgaria did not really begin privatization until the end of
1992, when a considerable part of the legislation and the
subsequent regulations were adopted, when the Privatization Agency
was set up, as well as the respective privatization departments in
the authorities defined under Art. 3 of the Privatization Law. The
evaluation of the progress of privatization therefore has to cover
a two-year period. It is important to note that the whole legal
framework is constantly undergoing further changes in the course of
the process itself as it is quite unfamiliar to the Bulgarian legal
and economic system. Even the latest regulations adopted by the
Government in November are intended to complete the legal framework
of privatization with the adopted market (capital) mechanism, i.e.
without changing the fundamental choice of privatization
method.
- democratic regimes are generally more conservative by nature
and institutional changes are more time-consuming and difficult to
carry out. If that really is the case then Bulgaria should be
regarded as a very democratic country. The lack of strong political
power and the presence of a dynamic and fragile parliamentary
majority in the Bulgarian parliament do not provide sufficient
political support and guarantees for a comprehensive institutional
change such as privatization.
- the state of the country's economy and above all its income
level are crucial in determining the potential for participation in
privatization. Whether it is a low-income or middle-income country
is of great importance as this is what determines the privatization
demand. Bulgaria is a middle-income country, which poses a serious
barrier to capital privatization. Of course, experience (Chile, for
instance) has shown that a successful capital privatization is
possible in such countries as well. The privatization method itself
puts a number of limitations with respect to the speed and effect
of privatization. Capital privatization is generally slower than
the free-of-charge distribution of bonds because it involves
time-consuming procedures for valuation, legal analysis,
negotiations (tenders) and lawsuits. The data indicate that in all
of the reforming countries the speed of the realized transactions
is quite slow. Thus for instance, 47 enterprises were sold in
Poland in 1994, 16 in Slovenia, etc.
In this sense the Bulgarian privatization may be regarded as not
that slow in view of the employed capital method and the
limitations and difficulties ensuing from the as yet not fully
established legal and institutional framework of market economy.
- Level of market development (perfect, imperfect competition).
Unlike the advanced countries, in those undergoing reforms markets
are still characterized by underdevelopment, lack of perfect
competition, preservation of monopolistic structures and building
up of new ones. Free markets, free competition, an advanced market
system are all vital for the realization of lawful price transfer
and for inducing high efficiency of the privatized
enterprises.
The choice of capital privatization under the conditions of
emerging market economy and markets was a serious challenge insofar
as the absence of such conditions and their creation, together with
privatization itself, involve substantial risks, both as regards
obtaining an adequate price for the privatization objects, and with
respect to a sufficiently high privatization demand, to
administrative and bureaucratic difficulties, and political
support. However, not only has the experiment demonstrated that
privatization is possible, but a number of quite profitable
transactions have actually been concluded, at rather advantageous
conditions for both sides; there has been relatively high stability
of the concluded transactions and they are acceptable from a social
point of view. One of the chief obstacles to privatization in
Bulgaria is the absence of developed capital markets. Parliament's
unwillingness to regulate the trade in securities accounts for the
fact that one of the most important laws for the transition to
market economy - the Securities Law - has still not been passed.
The development of capital markets is an important condition for
the success of market (capital) privatization. That is why the sale
of shares of state-owned enterprises is not being used as a
privatization technique.
- An important precondition for privatization is the liquidity
ratio of the companies offered for sale. The fact that the process
was delayed until mid and late 1992 reduced their liquidity, both
on account of running up huge debts, the settlement of which
becomes impossible, and due to the delayed structural adjustment
which cannot be carried out in the absence of clear prospects
regarding ownership. The attempt to settle the non-performing loans
(the so-called "Bad Debt" Law) failed to produce a tangible
positive effect on the liquidity of state-owned enterprises because
they had already incurred debts after 1991 as well. The adoption of
the Ordinance on the Acquisition by Banks of Interests and Shares
of Privatized Enterprises against Debt also had a limited
effect.
- A key precondition for the evaluation of the course of
privatization is the definition of its success. Such a definition
always has specific national dimensions. According to Hachette and
Luders, Chile had a successful and speedy privatization, meaning
that 500 state-owned enterprises and 50% of the farmland were
privatized in the period 1974-1989*.
The Latin-american experience has shown that privatization
initially pursues above all the goals of maximizing the revenues
from privatization and limiting public spending on state-owned
enterprises. Following the first wave of privatization the
countries usually set as a priority the efficiency of the
privatized enterprises. Accordingly, there occurs a transition in
the employed privatization techniques, with controlling interest
being offered to one owner, rather than parcelling out the
ownership.
What does successful privatization imply in Bulgaria? This has not
been defined and there is no concerted privatization strategy. The
selection of privatization objects is made on the principle
"whatever is in demand should be sold". The lack of conception
about what part is to be privatized of the key public sectors, such
as the power industry, public transport, communications, the
extractive industry, social services and others, is not only an
obstacle to privatization itself, but to structural reform as a
whole. Determining the privatization objects within the frames of a
one-year program does not in itself prevent the privatization of
those outside this program. On the other hand, the one-year period
is all too short in the sphere of privatization, which contributes
to the instability and uncertain prospects of Bulgarian
enterprises. Hence, in the absence of clear priorities and goals,
the very meaning of the success of privatization is blurred.
One of the important conditions for privatization is the public and
political support for the process, the leadership, the stable
institutional system. Regrettably, none of those preconditions is
present in Bulgaria and political will itself was put to the test
in the past two years.
Despite all obstacles and limitations, privatization in Bulgaria
has started and already has certain achievements, which are all the
more praiseworthy in view of the difficulties faced. The process
has run without any major political or social opposition and is
unfolding with a balance of interests of the key actors, which is
equally important for its success.
2. Forms of Privatization
2.1. Restitution
One of the elements of privatization in Bulgaria which has been
subject to widest political criticism is restitution. Legislatively
the process was based on the package of so-called restitution laws.
Rather than the advantages and criticisms regarding this
essentially political process, we shall here consider its outcomes,
which are largely of an economic character. However, it is this
very aspect that is usually overlooked.
Restituted properties by September 31, 1993
Type |
Filed Claims Number |
Restituted Objects Number |
Relative Share of Restituted Objects of Total
Claimed Number (%) |
Relative Share of Restituted Area of Total Claimed Number
(%)
|
Relatine Share of Restituted Value of Total Claimed Number
(%)
|
Total |
66,443 |
37,707 |
56.7 |
52.6 |
51.7 |
Shops |
9,966 |
8,163 |
81.9 |
80.4 |
81.5 |
Restaurants |
170 |
141 |
82.9 |
78.2 |
85.2 |
Pharmacies |
79 |
70 |
88.6 |
93.7 |
97.2 |
Hotels |
227 |
144 |
63.4 |
61.4 |
69.3 |
Coach Stations |
11 |
4 |
36.4 |
18.2 |
77.7 |
Garages |
182 |
104 |
57.1 |
54.8 |
59.8 |
Storehouses |
1263 |
927 |
73.4 |
75.4 |
85.3 |
Administrative buildings |
522 |
403 |
77.2 |
73.7 |
84.0 |
Medical and education facilities,
kindergartens |
363 |
261 |
79.2 |
75.4 |
71.1 |
Cultural facilities |
377 |
210 |
55.7 |
79.2 |
86.5 |
Housing |
16,195 |
9,446 |
58.3 |
53.8 |
32.8 |
Flour-mills |
1,093 |
763 |
69.8 |
77.1 |
78.2 |
Bakeries |
163 |
132 |
81.0 |
60.4 |
66.6 |
Dairies |
42 |
26 |
61.9 |
67.4 |
75.3 |
Workshops |
227 |
162 |
71.4 |
56.3 |
60.0 |
Others |
1614 |
1033 |
64.0 |
73.4 |
67.1 |
Industrial objects
Sport facilities |
84 |
38 |
45.2 |
58.5 |
47.3 |
Plots and yards |
26,469 |
12,379 |
46.8 |
47.6 |
46.5 |
Others |
7,396 |
3,295 |
44.6 |
43.5 |
56.9 |
Source: Restitutsiata v Bulgaria 3
(Restitution in Bulgaria), Statistical Publishing House, Sofia
1994, p. 20
As is evident from the data, restitution covers above all housing,
plots and yards. Together they amount to 64.2% of the number of
claimed objects and 62.1% of their total value.
Of the remaining restitution objects, most are businesses. Taking
into account that a significant portion of restituted housing is
converted into shopping or storage area and the fact that its use
following restitution is not always known, we may assume that a
substantial part of the restitution objects - not less than half,
which means about 30,000 - are used for economic purposes. In this
sense, restitution creates the conditions for the formation of a
real estate market, for encouraging free enterprise and the
development of the private sector.
With the adopted restitution approach and the complicated legal
procedures, the data indicate that more than half of the claimed
objects, both in terms of number, and of area and value, have been
restituted. The share of actually restituted housing out of the
total claimed is the smallest (32.8%), together with that of
courtyards (46.5%). This is due both to legal disputes over
ownership, and to the difficult compensation of objects which are
impossible to restitute. Last but not least, the restitution of
social and cultural facilities ran into to opposition from the
general public.
The process of restitution is practically over in the small and
medium-sized business sector with respect to the large part of
shops, storehouses, restaurants, hotels, pharmacies, etc. I.e.,
restitution may be viewed as one of the forms of small-scale
privatization.
The data about regional differences indicate that restitution is
impeded by the same fundamental drawback as privatization.
Restitution is largely dependent on the political will and the
competence of the different institutions. This finds confirmation
in the fact that whereas in some regions restitution is more or
less completed - in the region of Kyustendil (86.2% of the value of
the properties), Bourgas (74..5%), Veliko Turnovo (78.1%), Vratsa
(76.8%), Gabrovo (86.1%), while in others the results are quite
poor - the region of Plovdiv (10.6%), Dobritch (40.0%), Kurdzali
(25%), Varna (47.1%), Pazardhik (47.7%), and others.
The failure to resolve the problems concerning ownership of 49% of
the claimed objects, incl. plots and yards, is among the chief
obstacles to the privatization of state-owned and municipal
enterprises.
In other words, the three forms of privatization - restitution,
the returning of the land, and privatization of state-owned and
cooperative enterprises, have entered into internal contradictions
and conflicts. That is a serious obstacle to the normal course of
the three processes. Thus restitution obstructed and halted
privatization, and the returning of the land also complicated the
legal analysis and transfer of ownership.
One of the reasons is to be found in the failure to provide
adequate mechanisms for maintaining the balance and hierarchy among
the processes (as achieved in East Germany, for instance) in the
Privatization Law itself.
Despite the slow pace the process of restitution proceeded
relatively more successfully than privatization, if we consider -
with certain reservations owing to the methods of price formation
and the time of restitution (respectively, of the sale in the case
of privatization) - the following two criteria:
- the value of the restituted objects amounts to BLV 8.5bn, and
of privatized objects about BLV 2bn.
- objects have been restituted, which means that this process has
in any case created a great many more new owners than
privatization. In this connection, the conclusions about the effect
on the stratification of society and the emergence of a new class
of restitution owners are politically exaggerated. As evident from
the data, the average price of a restituted object is about BLV
225,000, and the average size 549 sq.m. Of course, the market price
of a considerable portion of these objects is much higher, but on
the whole the objects have a limited designation and are of small
economic significance.*
Therefore, leaving aside the political motives and implications of
restitution, from the point of view of the denationalization of
state and municipal property, restitution has created additional
opportunities for the development of the private sector in trade
and services, which facilitates the accumulation of capitals and
the speeding up of privatization in industry. The institutional and
legal problems of restitution, which could have been solved had
there been sufficient political will, delayed the process of
privatization. Financially, the revenues from privatization proved
smaller than expected, and an additional burden was laid on state
institutions and the judicial system which had its financial
implications.
The possible mechanisms for completing the restitution include
indemnifying the former owners and providing financial instruments
for participation in privatization. Naturally, that calls for a
consensus about continuing restitution in the next parliament.
For the purpose of speeding up the process of settling the
restitution claims, the Council of Ministers adopted Decree 198 of
September 22, 1994, on the grounds of Art. 6, paragraph 3 of
Transitional and Final Provisions of the Privatization Law. The CM
adopted an Ordinance on the Procedure of Filing Claims for
Compensation by Investment Bonds of Persons whose Property is to be
Restored under the Restoration of Property Rights in Nationalized
Real Estates Law.
2.2. "Privatization" of the land
Whereas in the privatization of state-owned and cooperative
enterprises the approach is gradual (within the frames of the
annual privatization programs), in the transformation of the land
the approach is more radical and envisions returning the whole
farmland within short terms. While the privatization process was
criticized for being slow and gradual, in the case of the land
restitution criticisms are rather the opposite, against the
destructive approach of full returning of the land within real
boundaries.
The selected procedures and the returning of the land in real
boundaries are conditioned by the traditional organization of
Bulgarian agriculture prior to 1944. The approach was widely
criticized due to the difficulties connected with the transfer of
ownership.
A comparison with the selected approaches to land privatization in
the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe shows that the
process is inevitably painful and time-consuming, and much slower
than expected and desired. Moreover, Bulgaria is not the only
country which has chosen to return the land within real boundaries.
Naturally, the scope of this process in Bulgaria is much larger
insofar as the whole farmland is subject to restitution.
Despite the difficulties and the economic effect on agriculture,
the land restitution in Bulgaria is in itself one of the most
sweeping and comprehensive processes in Central and Eastern Europe.
Its outcomes (using the two criteria - share of privatized land of
the total farmland area and the duration of that transformation)
are among the most significant.
In all of the countries the transformation of ownership directly
affected the organization of agriculture and brought about a
reorientation of the rural population to new forms of farming.
These reforms had the weakest negative impact in the countries
where private ownership of the land predominated (Poland, Hungary),
and affected more seriously those where state and nationalized
cooperative ownership occupied monopolistic positions in
agriculture (Roumania, Bulgaria, Slovakia). The data indicate that
all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (and not just
those engaged in radical ownership reforms in agriculture) are
experiencing great difficulties - fall in output, reduction of
cultivated farmland, negative foreign trade balance in agricultural
produce. For instance, the fall in agricultural output in Hungary
is very high although the ownership reforms are not conducted on
such a large scale as in Bulgaria, owing to the fact that a
considerable part of the land was private or truly cooperative
property even before the outset of the reforms.
The decline in agriculture is quite serious in Slovakia, with a
fall of about 26% in 1992. Although in Poland most of the land was
privately owned before the reforms there is a significant decline
there as well - 12%.
There are consequently no sufficient grounds to claim that the fall
in agricultural output is largely to be accounted for with the
changes in ownership. It is due to the restructuring of
agricultural produce markets and the general decline of the
economy, rather than the transformation of the land into private
property.
Gross Agricultural Output
(annual change in volume %)
|
1991 |
1992 |
1993 |
Roumania |
-0.5 |
0.8 |
-9.2 |
Hungary |
-4.7 |
-17.4 |
-20.0 |
Slovakia |
-10.3 |
-8.5 |
-26.0 |
Poland |
-0.3 |
6.8 |
-12.3 |
Bulgaria |
-6.0 |
-0.3 |
-12.0 |
Source: OECD, Committee for Agriculture,
Trade Committee, Review of Agricultural Policies - country reports
1993
Ownership restructuring in agriculture involved three interrelated
processes which took place in all countries in transition:
- transformation of cooperatives;
- restitution (returning) of the land;
- privatization of state property in agriculture.
The different countries chose different ownership models in
agriculture. Some of the countries have retained large-scale
concentrated economic units, while others are aiming at the
creation of small private economic units.
In
Roumania
a model was chosen of small-scale private agriculture through
restoration of property rights in farmland. In 1993 the number of
private land owners reached 4.9m holding 9.142m hectares arable
land, i.e. an average of about 2 hectares per owner.
In
Hungary
half of the agricultural output before the reforms used to be
produced in private farms. The symbiosis between private and
cooperative land is the reason for the relatively successful
ownership transformation in agriculture in Hungary. After 1989 in
Hungary there was partial compensation and to a lesser degree,
restitution of the land. Restitution itself was carried out through
compensation bonds. Nevertheless, the process proved slower than
expected. By July 1993 only one third of the land in the so-called
compensation fund had been acquired by the owners. Furthermore,
Hungary, similarly to Bulgaria, undertook privatization (selling
off) of all state farms and small firms servicing agriculture. The
collective farms are in the process of transformation.
Structurally, cooperatives are the dominant unit in Hungarian
agriculture.
Czech
agriculture plays a lesser role in the economy than in the other
countries in transition. Nevertheless, the Czech Republic also
experienced a fall in agricultural output. This is above all due to
the reduced demand as a result of increased competition of imported
agricultural produce. Czech reforms in agriculture did not have
such a pronounced negative impact on employment as the structure
and size of the farms were retained.
Slovakia
is also engaged in the process of land restitution, privatization
of state farms and restructuring of cooperatives. The Slovak
approach is rather similar to the Bulgarian one. The changes have
brought about an increase in the number of cooperatives from 630 in
1989 to 968 by mid-1993. The average size of the land held by one
cooperative is 1,755 hectares, though compared to 1989, one
cooperative used to cultivate 2,667 hectares on average. The
management of the new cooperatives, not only in Slovakia but in the
other countries in transition as well, is impeded by the parcelling
out of the property within the frames of the cooperatives and the
significant number of cooperative members who own land but do not
participate in its cultivation. Thus a specific class of land
owners is emerging, who are not involved in production but partake
of the profit of the cooperative through their property. Within the
cooperative managing authorities this group is typically more
inclined to increase dividends at the expense of reinvestment of
the profit. In such a situation the management of the newly created
cooperatives is quite difficult.
Generally speaking, in all of the countries both the restoration of
former property rights and the privatization of state property are
taking place at a much slower pace than expected. The delay of the
reforms in agriculture contributes to the general decline in
agriculture and employment.
The first stage of the land ownership transformation was completed
at the end of 1993. All state farms were handed over to the State
Property Agency. To a great extent this brought the process under
centralized control, depriving the regions of the possibility to
elaborate independent policies although it facilitated a speedier
implementation. As a result of the difficult financial conditions,
for both state-owned and private farms, privatization of the land
is taking place very slowly. By the end of 1993 the State Property
Agency had sold merely 1.3% of the land and had leased 21%. Leasing
has proved to be the most popular privatization method in
agriculture in Poland. Privatization of the state property in that
sector is leading to an expansion of the existing private farms.
In
Bulgaria
the chosen model of ownership transformation is among the most
difficult to implement - closing down the former cooperatives and
restoring the land property in real boundaries. Those processes
were realized following complicated procedures of land division,
legal analysis and actual restoration, which accounted for the
delay of the process and had a serious negative impact on the
development of agriculture. Yet, the restoration of private
ownership of the land and the selling of the property of the former
Collective Farms also had a certain positive effect which is
usually underestimated:
- limiting the public sector in agriculture. There is a serious
methodological problem in estimating the share of the private
sector in farmland ownership. Formally, from a legal point of view
obtaining a title to property is regarded as the final stage of the
transfer of property rights. All analyses of the land restitution
use this criterion and reach the conclusion that the process has
made little progress because only 3,304 title deeds covering about
62,000 decares of land have been issued in the country. To
facilitate and speed up the process, the Council of Ministers
decided that the documents certifying ownership issued by the Land
Boards were to be authenticated in court. From this point of view,
if we assess the progress of land restitution on the basis of the
criterion "decisions of the Land Boards", it proves to have reached
a very advanced stage. As to November 2, 1994, the land boards had
certified ownership of 75.8% (39,757m decares) of the farmland.
About 54.4% of the arable land is not an object of disputes, i.e.
title deeds may be issued.
In any case, farmland is no longer state property, it has assumed
transitional forms in which it is actually used by the private
owners. In other words, regardless of the speculations around the
title deeds, from an economic point of view it is possible to
maintain that the land has been denationalized, moreover, within
extremely short terms - 2-3 years, and despite the decline in
agriculture that ought to be assessed as a significant step forward
in ownership restructuring.
- The creation of new cooperatives based on real private property
is another positive outcome of land ownership transformation. Over
1,000 new cooperatives had been set up by the end of 1993.
Agriculture in Bulgaria will clearly be developing in two forms of
ownership - small and medium-sized private individual or family
farms and large new cooperatives.
A significant small-scale private sector is emerging in
agriculture, which encourages free enterprise.
- Similarly to the privatization of state-owned and municipal
enterprises and the restitution of urban property, in the case of
the land restitution there also appear significant disparities in
the development of the process by regions. This confirms the lack
of a unified policy and control over the process and the absence of
concerted will for its implementation.
As evident from the map (see Appendix) the process of returning the
land is slowest in the region of Russe and most successful in the
Sofia district.
Another important factor accounting for the slow restructuring of
agriculture is the lack of established farmland markets in the
countries in transition. Restrictions on foreign investment in farm
land also contribute to the stagnation in agriculture.
3. Privatization of state-owned and municipal
enterprises (The Transformation and Privatization of State-Owned
and Municipal Enterprises Law - TPSMEL)
In Bulgaria the Privatization Law was not adopted until the
beginning of 1992 and the institutional and legal framework for its
implementation was only finalized in late 1992. In such a situation
one could hardly expect that a great many enterprises would be sold
in two years time. On the other hand, the adopted approach included
only capital privatization - the selling, rather than the
free-of-charge distribution of state property. In this sense, the
course of privatization depends on the supply and demand for
state-owned enterprises. In other words, it is not only the late
start of privatization, but the very logic of market privatization
that makes each transaction time-consuming.
The supply of state-owned
enterprises
An overview of the legal framework of market privatization in the
other countries of Central and Eastern Europe indicates that
Bulgaria has adopted one of the most liberal regulations of the
offer of enterprises for sale. The Law allows for enterprises to be
offered and sold even in the cases when they have not been included
in the annual privatization programs.
An even more flexible mechanism was adopted in the privatization of
municipal enterprises where the offer of privatization objects
depends entirely on the intentions of the municipal councils.
Unlike most countries undergoing reforms, in Bulgaria there are no
restrictions regarding the number of enterprises on offer.
According to Art. 2 of TPSMEL, "the adoption of the annual
privatization program is not a condition for taking the decision to
privatize or the authenticity of the concluded transactions". I.e.,
the program does not limit the scope of privatization.
There are those who believe that the large number of enterprises
offered for sale deflates their price. It is therefore recommended
to limit the supply in order to raise prices. This logical
construction, however, is countered by two important circumstances.
The strategic goal of the reforms is to denationalize within the
shortest possible delays, and a limitation of the enterprises on
offer would further constrict the space of privatization and would
put off in time the transformation of the economy on market
principles. On the other hand, the data about the privatization
transactions refute the claim that the large supply limits
competition in the sale of state-owned enterprises. 83% of the
transactions have been concluded through auctions or tenders, in
the presence of at least two competing buyers. Only 17.9% of the
transactions have been concluded through negotiations with
potential buyers, and even that technique does not exclude
competition between different buyers.
One could hardly argue that the privatization objects are being
sold for less than they are worth, as the price is determined by
the market (naturally, using the market techniques of
privatization) and that is the only real price. On the other hand,
the price does not only depend on purely market, but likewise
other, not price-related factors, such as the general state of the
economy and the microeconomic situation. In other words, the
privatization objects should be treated as a specific category of
goods. In an economically and financially unfavorable environment
it is but natural for the price to fall. Another argument in favor
of the view that the transactions concluded so far have been based
on real market prices and that those prices have been relatively
high is the fact that most privatization transactions include
additional contributions to the economy, such as investments, jobs,
and others.
The demand for state-owned
enterprises
The demand for state-owned and municipal enterprises is determined
by the financial possibilities of the potential buyers and their
access to privatization. Market privatization has not introduced
any restrictions in those respects, with the exception of the cases
stipulated in paragraph 9 of the Transitional and Final Provisions
of TPSMEL. According to it, buyers are required to provide
guarantees that they are participating in privatization with
lawfully acquired financial means.
The data about the transactions for the privatization of
state-owned enterprises concluded so far indicate the following
structure of buyers.
Privatization transactions* by type of
buyer
Type of buyer |
Relative share of total number of transactions
(%) |
Relative share of total revenues (%) |
Foreign companies |
7.2 |
34.3 |
Bulgarian private companies |
60.2 |
53.5 |
Bulgarian natural persons |
8.1 |
0.7 |
Personnel |
19.1 |
5.8 |
Managers |
0.8 |
0.1 |
Others (Investment fund, cooperatives) |
4.6 |
5.6 |
Total |
100.0 |
100.0 |
Note: * refers only to state-owned
enterprises
As evident from the table, capital privatization has created
opportunities for all possible groups of buyers to participate
individually or jointly in the privatization of state-owned
enterprises. I.e. privatization has been open to all types of
buyers, which is its undeniable advantage. The unlimited access is
a condition for equal treatment in privatization and allows the
possibility for competition and obtaining the real market price of
the enterprises in the course of denationalization.
The information about the concluded transactions suggests a
preference for those forms of denationalization where the property
is transferred to an individual owner. The cases of joint buying of
state-owned enterprises with a combination among the above
enumerated types of buyers are more of an exception.
60.5% of the privatization transactions have been concluded with
Bulgarian private companies
, which makes up 53.5% of the value of all transactions. In other
words, the most active and significant buyer of Bulgarian
state-owned enterprises is Bulgarian private business. Its
participation in privatization suggests that it has already
expanded to an extent where possibilities for "green field" growth
have been exhausted. That indicates that the capital accumulations
of private business are considerable and allow participation in
privatization. Bulgarian companies are not only buying small
enterprises, but large ones as well. Several companies have already
bought two enterprises each. The biggest privatization transactions
with Bulgarian companies have been concluded with Multigroup,
Siberia, Burt, Teracon, Fincom.
One of the preconditions for the realization of capital
privatization is the wide access of foreign investors to the
process.
Bulgarian privatization provides for equal treatment of local and
foreign buyers
. Ten state-owned enterprises have been sold to foreign companies,
all but one by the Privatization Agency.
It is interesting to note that the ministries, as privatization
authorities defined in Art. 3 of TPSMEL, have not concluded any
transactions with foreign buyers. These authorities usually account
for that with the weak interest on the part of foreign companies.
The latter are interested chiefly in large enterprises while the
ministries, including those which own large enterprises as well,
sell small ones or separate parts of enterprises.
One possible explanation for this tendency is that the ministries,
as authorities exercising the property rights on the enterprises in
the respective sector, prefer to set up joint ventures, rather than
sell the companies. In this way the Bulgarian enterprise is
preserved, as well as the role of the owner - namely, the
respective ministry. In some countries (Poland) this conflict of
interests has been solved legislatively, with the setting up of
joint ventures being treated as privatization and subject to the
same procedure and regulations.
The
personnel
appears as one of the chief agents in Bulgarian privatization. The
data refute the idea that market privatization does not create
opportunities for participation of the employees.
In fact, the selected privatization approach leads to increased
employee participation in the ownership and control over the
enterprises.
The share of the transactions with companies set up by employees
in the respective enterprise is 19.2 of the total number of
privatization transactions. Those are typically small enterprises
in the trade and services sector. A considerable part of the "small
privatization" is carried out through market mechanisms.
One of the changes in the Privatization Law adopted in June 1994
was aimed at expanding possibilities for the so-called "small
privatization" regulated in Art. 35 of TPSMEL. State-owned and
municipal enterprises with fixed assets under BLV 10m and separate
parts of them under BLV 5m may be bought without auctions or
tenders according to the estimate of their employees or
lease-holders. It is still too early to assess the effect of the
introduction of that new privatization technique. From the very
beginning, however, there arose problems mainly in municipal
privatization as it involves largely objects with a similar asset
value.
The data indicate that in most cases it is only part of the
employees, rather than the personnel as a whole, that participate
in privatization. As will be discussed in the analysis of
postprivatization behavior, the most serious difficulties after
privatization are experienced by the enterprises bought by the
personnel. In a country with a shortage of cash, the employees
frequently get into debt in order to buy shares of their
enterprise.
Encouraging the participation of citizens in privatization may
be done with techniques employed in other countries - providing
automatic long-term loans with zero interest rate and low
taxes.
One of the principal shortcomings of the adopted market
privatization model in the country is the limited participation of
management
in denationalization. The preparation of privatization is reduced
to the preparation of the legal analysis and asset valuation,
without any promotion campaign within the enterprise itself aimed
at involving the personnel and the managers in the process.
Privatization is not preceded by financial recovery and actual
commercialization. A formal transformation is carried out of the
enterprises into companies as defined by the Commercial Law without
this being related to specific measures for stabilization of the
market positions and restructuring of the state-owned enterprises
subject to privatization. This further limits their liquidity.
According to TPSMEL, the management of the enterprise are not
treated differently from the personnel and there are no additional
conditions attached to their participation. The ministries, which
exercise the property rights on state participation in the
respective sectors, tend to have a distrustful attitude to
privatization through management buy-out.
In most countries of Central and Eastern Europe (the Czech
Republic, Poland) the management are required to prepare the
enterprise for privatization and elaborate a specific privatization
project as part of the commercialization of state-owned
enterprises.
In this country managers are isolated from the preparation of
privatization and the procedure for its implementation. In this
way, privatization is deprived of technical and managerial
experience, the managers assume a negative attitude to the process
and therefore very frequently create problems regarding the
provision of information and the access to the enterprises.
Of all privatization transactions concluded by the end of December
only 4 enterprises were bought by managers. In the remaining cases
managers are frequently "concealed" behind personnel buy-outs,
which, as becomes evident from the case studies gives rise to
postprivatization problems in the management of the enterprises.
The equal treatment of managers in the course of personnel buy-outs
makes both the rationalization of the organization and management
structure of the enterprise and the investment policy difficult to
implement. The personnel are typically inclined to reinvest a
smaller part of the profit, leaving a larger part aside for incomes
and social benefits. This gives rise to difficulties in the
restructuring of the privatized enterprise.
The demand for state-owned enterprises is to a great extent
determined by capital accumulation. The data about savings indicate
the presence of considerable financial resources diffused among
numerous small depositors but likewise large potential investors.
These resources could be invested in privatization. Naturally, that
presupposes a favorable economic situation and suitable credit
conditions. The high interest rates do not favor the operation of
companies with loan capital. In other words, a reduction of
interest rates can be expected to bring about more active
participation of citizens in capital privatization.
The demand for enterprises subject to privatization was given a
boost, and buyers were granted new and advantageous payment
conditions through the introduction of two new payment instruments
in privatization - long-term bonds under the "Bad Debt" Law (in
leva and foreign currency) and bonds in the country's external debt
(discount bonds and front loaded interest reduction bonds). The
implementation of these two instruments together with the
possibility for cash payment constitute a unique case in
privatization practice. The effect of their application may be
found not so much directly in privatization itself, but rather in
the settlement of the problems with the internal and external
debts, which are among the chief obstacles to privatization. At the
end of October 1994 the country's internal debt amounted to BLV
258,336.7m, of which BLV 155,199.7m state securities issued for the
settlement of non-performing loans of state-owned companies from
the banks. (Bulgarian National Bank Information Bulletin, N
11/1994).
According to the adopted approach, these two means of payment may
be used for all state-owned enterprises subject to privatization.
In other words, the applicability of one instrument is not
restricted within a specific segment of the market for enterprises.
This means that the two instruments enter into mutual competition.
And despite the stipulation in the Ordinance on the procedure for
participation in privatization through government external debt
bonds, paragraph 2 of the final provisions, that "the use of
external debt bonds cannot restrict the other forms of acquiring
property in enterprises subject to privatization" (State Gazette, N
99, 2 December 1994), the appeal of the internal debt bonds appears
to have declined since the introduction of external debt bonds. On
the other hand, payment by bonds is definitely on the rise at the
expense of cash payments, which will have an unfavorable effect on
revenues from privatization. The total purchasing potential of the
two instruments amounted to BLV 382,408m as to the end of December
1994 (USD 3.5bn external debt bonds and internal debt bonds of BLV
32bn and USD 1.808bn), i.e., assets totalling that value may be
bought with the two instruments. Bearing in mind the fact, that the
assets of state-owned enterprise amount to some USD 17 bn in the
end of 1993, it is obvious that there is a considerable excess
supply of privatization money.
The data indicate that by the end of December 1994 25 transactions
were concluded and paid by internal debt bonds which is about 1/3
of the total privatization revenues.
Revenues from privatization as to December 31, 1994
|
Cash Revenues (BGL m) |
In bonds (BGL m) |
Privatization Agency |
2,244 |
1,029 |
Ministry of Industry |
187 |
89 |
Ministry of Agriculture |
66 |
66 |
Ministry of Construction |
14 |
25 |
Ministry of Trade |
215 |
241 |
Ministry of Transport |
11 |
0 |
Ministry of Culture |
0 |
0 |
Tourism Committee |
29 |
0 |
Post Committee |
2 |
7 |
Energy Committee |
0 |
2 |
Forestry Committee |
0 |
0 |
Total |
2,768 |
1,461 |
The data indicate that 34.5% of the privatized enterprises have
been paid with internal debt bonds. This instrument is popular and
is used by nearly all of the authorities defined in Art. 3 of
TPSMEL, with the exception of the Ministry of Transport and the
Tourism Committee. Compared with the total amount of the bonds
issued under the provisions of the Non-performing Loans Law (BLV
155 bn), the total sum of privatization transactions with such
bonds is merely 0.94%. I.e., at present, there are paying
instruments that can not be absorbed in privatization. This problem
can not be solved entirely even if internal debt bonds are
exchanged for equity.
The first privatization transaction with external debt bonds was
concluded in December 1994 and was probably the first swap
operation in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, the conditions
of the debt-for-property swap in Bulgaria are far more liberal than
the mechanisms adopted in Latin America. The profit repatriation,
the conditions of the privatization contracts are no different than
those for other foreign investors using different instruments of
payment. I.e., there is equal treatment of buyers paying with
external debt bonds and buyers paying in cash or internal debt
bonds. These extremely liberal conditions are supposed to attract
back to Bulgaria withdrawn capitals and on the other hand generate
additional demand for privatization objects. The reduction of the
external debt through debt-for-property swaps will have a positive
effect on the financial stability of the country.
The progress of privatization
The state of the privatization process in this country reflects the
actual correlation between the supply and demand for state-owned
and municipal enterprises. By the end of December 1994 229
state-owned enterprises had been privatized in Bulgaria, which in
terms of numbers amounts to 5% of the state-owned enterprises
*
.
The data about privatized municipal enterprises by the end of
November show increased activity of the municipalities in
privatization. Up to now 431 municipal enterprises have been sold,
with 262 in the period October-November alone. One of the reasons
for that is the positive effect of the changes in TPSMEL in the
part regulating the use of the revenues from municipal
privatization. The fact that 88% of the revenues now remain at the
disposal of the municipal councils motivates them in the
fulfillment of the municipal privatization programs.
Privatization Transactions as to 31 December
1994
|
State owned enterprises
|
Municipal enterprises
|
|
November
|
December
|
November
|
December
|
Privatization Decisions |
877 |
953 |
1124 |
n.a. |
Commissioned valuations |
558 |
620 |
627 |
n.a. |
Concluded transactions |
185 |
229 |
431 |
n.a. |
Total |
1620 |
1802 |
2182 |
n.a. |
Source: Privatization Agency
In general, market privatization is more time-consuming owing to
the time necessary for contracting, assets' valuations,
clarification of the legal status, e.g. The data about initiated
privatization procedures indicate that despite its late start,
Bulgarian privatization is gaining momentum. 166 deals for
state-owned enterprises and 379 for municipal enterprises were
concluded in 1994 aginst 63 and 52 in 1993 respectively. More than
22% of the Bulgarian state-owned enterprises and more than 7% of
the municipal ones are in the process of privatization. 70 deals
were concluded in the last quarter of 1994 , i.e. that much that
were concluded in 1993. Obviously, market privatization is
accelerating and it should not be limited or terminated. On one
hand, it is due to the political will of the care taker goverment
which was in power in the end of 1994; on the other hand it is
comntributed to the established institutional and legislative
framework, too, the accumulated experience and knowledge.
The correlation between the number of taken decisions to privatize
and of concluded transactions suggests that the privatization
process is difficult and time-consuming. On average the conclusion
of a transaction takes from 6 months to more than a year. This is
the major reason for the unsatisfactory number of transactions. The
most time-consuming is the stage between the conclusion of the
asset valuation and the signing of the contract. The reasons for
that delay are well-known:
- The unsettled question of property rights in the buildings
and land of the enterprises subject to privatization. With
Decree 201 of the Council of Ministers of October 25, 1993 about
the transfer of real rights on real estate in the setting up,
transformation and privatization of state-owned enterprises (State
Gazette, N 93 of November 2, 1993) the authorities under Art. 3 of
TPSMEL were granted the right to transfer property rights in the
land and other real estate property part of the balance sheet of
the companies. This change considerably facilitated privatization
insofar as it allowed buyers to acquire the land on which the
enterprises have been built as well.
It is above all the unsettled property rights that account for the
termination of 6 privatization transactions.
- The limited information about the enterprises subject to
privatization. In the course of the last few months there has
appeared a tendency for the enterprises not to provide full and
proper information to potential buyers. Undisclosed at the
conclusion of the transaction debts of the enterprises, unknown
economic problems and others can lead to its termination. On the
other hand, the lack of sufficient information about the
enterprises subject to privatization reduces the interest of
potential buyers. An Ordinance on the conditions and manner of
providing information in the case of sales under TPSMEL was adopted
(Decree 10 of the Council of Ministers of January 22, 1993) with
the aim of solving this problem. Its practical implementation,
however, encounters serious difficulties due to the lack of
interest in carrying out privatization on the part of company
management.
- The absence of a mechanism for settling restitution claims
in privatization.
- The lack of a concerted strategy and coordination among the
authorities under Art. 3 of TPSMEL is a serious obstacle to
speeding up privatization. As we have already stressed, the
lack of political will in some ministries finds confirmation in the
data about concluded privatization transactions and the number of
decisions to initiate privatization. The gap between the
enterprises declared open to privatization and the actually
concluded transactions is widest in the case of the Ministry of
Industry.
Privatization transactions according to the authority
under Art. 3 of TPSMEL as to 31 December 1994
|
Initiated procedures
|
Commissioned valuations
|
Completed valuations
|
Concluded transactions
|
Privatization Agency |
217 |
74 |
76 |
46 |
Ministry of Industry |
144 |
113 |
75 |
24 |
Ministry of Agriculture |
147 |
134 |
86 |
51 |
Ministry of Trade |
202 |
167 |
99 |
72 |
Ministry of Transport |
97 |
59 |
39 |
8 |
Tourism Committee |
75 |
28 |
22 |
7 |
Ministry of Construction |
49 |
37 |
34 |
19 |
Others |
22 |
8 |
4 |
2 |
Total |
953 |
620 |
435 |
229 |
Source: Privatization Agency
The Privatization Agency has the highest number of initiated
procedures - 217. The Ministry of Trade has put up for sale 202
objects. In industry, where the state-owned companies are more than
2,000, the concluded transactions are only 24, i.e. merely 1.2%,
with 144 initiated privatization procedures. When an object is
unsalable, the TPSMEL allows separate parts of it to be sold.
However, this technique is not used often enough. It is more
actively employed at the Ministries of Trade and Agriculture.
- The lack of stable institutional system and continuity in
the work of the authorities under art. 3 of TPSMEL. The
frequent personal changes in these authorities make the process
difficult to implement. The privatization institutions are working
under constant pressure and changes in the managing bodies. The
members of the Advisory Board of the Privatization Agency have been
changed four times in the course of the last year.
- The indebtedness of enterprises. In most cases, in
addition to the obligation to settle restitution claims, the buyer
also takes on the debts of the enterprise. The delay
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