

**CORRUPTION MONITORING BY  
*COALITION 2000***

**March 2004**



## I. METHODOLOGY

Sample: All of the surveys referred to in the present paper were based on random two-stage cluster sampling. Universe: the country's population aged 18 and over. Sample size:

	Fieldwork period	Size of the sample
1.	February 1999	1143
2.	April 1999	1122
3.	September 1999	1110
4.	January 2000	1144
5.	April 2000	1161
6.	September 2000	1158
7.	January 2001	1037
8.	October 2001	971
9.	January 2002	1148
10.	May 2002	1170
11.	October 2002	1079
12.	January 2003	1107
13.	May 2003	1077
14.	July 2003	1057
15.	October 2003	1098
16.	March 2004	1080

Method of registration: Face-to-face interview.

Fieldwork: March 1–16, 2004.

## II. FINDINGS


### 1. PUBLIC IMPORTANCE OF CORRUPTION

Unlike the business sector, which defines corruption as the most important problem to the country, the general population places it fifth in the general ranking. The problems singled out as more pressing are *unemployment*, *low incomes*, and *poverty* (Figure 1). The public is next concerned about *crime* and *corruption*, which continue to be perceived as equally alarming.

The remaining problems preserve their levels of October 2003 without displaying any upward or downward tendencies.

**Figure 1.**

Relative importance of the problems faced by society (%)



Base: All respondents (October N=1098; March N=1080)


Although October 2003 was marked by one of the highest levels of media coverage of the subject of corruption, the assessment of its relative importance set against the other social problems has remained practically unchanged in the past eight months. This points to two things.

First, it confirms the assumption that the number of publications on the subject is not decisive in shaping public assessments of the importance of corruption.

And secondly, it clearly shows that despite their great influence, the media are unable to address the problem of corruption without the intervention of the appropriate state agencies and without the participation of society as a whole. (Figure 2)

**Figure 2.**

Dynamics of media coverage of corruption and assessments of the relative public importance of corruption as a social problem



There persists the tendency observed in previous surveys for people of higher social and financial standing to be more inclined to define corruption as a major problem of society. Its perceived importance is more than twice higher among the respondents with a higher education level and those living in the capital compared to the small town and village residents. (Appendix 3, Table 1)

## 2. LEVEL OF CORRUPTION

When considering the level of corruption in the country, it is crucial to distinguish between its two basic components – the levels of *real* and *potential* corruption. In terms of the reproduction of corrupt practices the “corruption deal offer” itself (requesting or offering to “give something”) is just as important as the very act of “giving and taking” (whether money, a gift or a favor). The committed acts of corruption are designated as “real corruption” and the solicited corruption deals, as “potential corruption”.

The average monthly incidence of acts of corruption in which the citizens have self-reportedly been involved make up the level of real corruption. Potential corruption is measured through the sum of all instances when the

citizens have come under corruption pressure (when the respective official asked for “something”).

### REAL CORRUPTION


The chief problem in assessing the level of real corruption stems from the delicate nature of the information collected on particularly sensitive issues. Although it cannot be measured with absolute precision, the actual number of acts of corruption committed in this country in the course of the past one month directly corresponds to the level of personal involvement of the respondents in various forms of corrupt behavior.

In 2003, the indicator measuring real acts of corruption displayed certain slight fluctuations. Nevertheless, its values remained at a relatively low level and in the long term, display a downward tendency. (Figure 3)

Even measured in absolute terms, the drop in the number of actually concluded corruption deals is significant – by more than 30,000 cases a month. By comparison, the average monthly number of citizens involved in such acts in May 2003 was about 88,000; in July 2003, about 100,000; October 2003, 114 000, and in March 2004, 80,000<sup>1</sup> (1,24% of the country’s adult population) .

**Figure 3.**

Level of corruption (min=0, max=10)




*Base: All respondents*

The decline in the incidence of corruption deals is also evident in terms of the instances when bribes were requested and the number of actually concluded corruption deals over a period of one year (Figure 4). Even if the high values of October 2003 were assumed to be an exception, the data registered in March 2004 are record low for the past year. On average for the period between March 2003 and May 2004, about 400,000 acts of corruption were actually committed. As usual, the number of cases when bribes were solicited directly or it was indicated that some extra, unregulated payment was expected were twice as many (in excess of 800,000).

<sup>1</sup> This estimate is based on the data from the population census of March 2001, according to which the population aged 18 and over was 6,417,869, and thus 1% of the sample corresponds to 64,180 people.

**Figure 4.**

Average annual number of solicited and actually concluded corruption deals



Even if they have been decreasing in number, the value of the corruption deals has been on the rise. Similarly to corruption in the business sector, even among the general population there has been a shift towards higher levels in terms of the amount of the bribes offered in the form of money, gifts, or favors. The corruption deals with a value ranging between 100 and 500 Leva have doubled in number, and the latest survey even registered instances of bribes of 500 to 5,000 Leva. (*Appendix 3, Table 2*)

Unlike business, where corruption is often closely associated with mutual financial benefits for the briber and the bribed, with the general population, the corruption deal is typically not aimed at securing profit but some kind of service or the avoidance of penalties for some violation committed. The different underlying logic determines the different amounts paid informally – with the general population, payments exceeding 1,000 Leva tend to be the exception, while in business, they are considerably more common.

## POTENTIAL CORRUPTION

The latest survey registered some of the lowest values for the corruption pressure exerted directly or indirectly over the citizens by public sector employees. It is yet to be seen whether this level will subsist in the future. Nonetheless, drawing on the stable positive tendency observed over the past year, there is reason to claim that the government's efforts to limit the corruption pressure by the officials over the public are beginning to produce tangible results. (*Figure 3*)

The introduction of a series of specific measures, such as the adoption of codes of ethics and rules for working with the public, as well as the exposure and punishment of corrupt officials, are gradually changing the idea of corruption as an acceptable and unpunished way of "arranging" expedient public services. It is this change in popular perceptions that is the most difficult to achieve and calls for constant efforts on the part of the government to improve the sphere of public services.

## CORRUPTION PRESSURE BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

The past one year has been marked by dynamic change among the various occupational groups in terms of the corruption pressure they exert over the citizens.

Following the upsurge in corruption pressure by *university professors* in the summer of 2003, which brought them out in the lead and stirred a broad public reaction, as of the present, the data about the incidence of corruption pressure are reverting to their usual level for this group. (*Appendix 3, Table 3*)

Similar drastic fluctuations have been registered by the latest survey with respect to *customs officers* and *bankers*. After the enduring decline in the pressure exerted by customs officers achieved over the past two years, they are once again leading the ranking with double the amount of pressure compared to the remaining occupational groups.

A significant change, but one showing a declining tendency, has also occurred with respect to *administrative court officials*, *investigators*, and *prosecutors*. It is worth noting that the incidence of corruption pressure in the judicial system as a whole has been limited tangibly, again following wide public debate and the adoption of specific anti-corruption measures.

With the remaining occupational groups, the tendencies to date have been preserved.


## IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS

Despite the vacillations in public assessments of the Government's anti-corruption efforts, the tendency emerging over a period of two years can be said to be positive.

The high levels of public administration are still perceived as most vulnerable to corruption, but even in this respect, similarly to the business sector and lower-ranking officials, those who believe "the Government is not doing anything" to curb corrupt practices are decreasing substantially in number. (*Figure 5*)

The actual drop in the corruption pressure exerted by public officials is directly reflected in the population's assessment of the Government's anti-corruption activity.

**Figure 5.**  
Perceived impact of the Government's anti-corruption measures \*




\* Relative share of those who answered, "The government is not doing anything"

### 3. EXPECTATIONS REGARDING THE CURBING OF CORRUPTION

The positive change registered under most indicators equally affects the population's assessment of society's capability to deal with corruption. It is gradually becoming ever more optimistic, going back to its usual average level of two years ago.

The achievement of tangible results is restoring Bulgarians' confidence that limiting corruption to a more acceptable and "normal" level is a feasible task after all. (Figure 6)

**Figure 6.**  
Corruption-related expectations (min=0 max=10)



Base: All respondents




## 4. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

### PERCEIVED SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

Though at a modest rate, the perceived spread of corruption has been declining gradually. Nevertheless, it is still at a high average level and it is too early to say whether the measures undertaken by the Government will bring about a lasting limitation of the problem and hence, the respective change in public attitudes and sense of tangible achievements in this sphere. (Figure 7)

**Figure 7.**

Spread of corruption (min=0 max=10)



Base: All respondents

### PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY OF CORRUPTION

A positive downward trend is equally observed under the indicator on the practical efficiency of corruption. Yet its values to date are still high, suggesting that the measures undertaken have set off a positive tendency but are insufficient to radically change the established attitude towards corruption. (Figure 7)

The adoption of tougher penalties and stricter rules for interaction with the public no doubt play an important role in terms of reducing the incidence of, and vulnerability to, corruption pressure. However, these measures are as yet insufficient to produce a permanent anti-corruption attitude and to make it no longer worthwhile for an official or citizen to risk the exposure of their involvement in a corruption deal.

It will be difficult to dispel the perception of corruption as a successful way for citizens to save time, stress, and money in their dealings with the public administration. This would call for consistent implementation of the appropriate measures, enhancing administrative control and the transparency of the work of public administration, as well as reducing the benefits from involvement in corrupt practices.

To citizens and officials alike, the mutual benefit is the crucial motive both for getting involved in, and for covering up, the act of corruption. In order to permanently reduce certain corrupt practices, it is necessary to adopt measures to simplify as far as possible the administrative procedures

and to raise the transparency and the administrative and civic control. This would have a preventive effect in terms of the conditions conducive to corruption and would eliminate some of the benefits for the citizens, which would in turn render pointless the act of corruption itself.

### **SPREAD OF CORRUPTION BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS**

Similarly to previous surveys, even the latest one registered the usual divergence between the population's assessments of the corruptibility of some occupational groups and the pressure actually exerted by them. This applies above all to *customs* and *police officers*, *businesspersons*, *bankers*, and *judges* – all of these groups appeared to exert higher corruption pressure, all while the perceived spread of corruption among them is decreasing. (*Appendix 3, Table 5*)

This tendency shows that it will take some time for people's corruption-related attitudes and assumptions to change.


In this connection, one important factor for changing the popular assumptions is the endurance of any progress made in limiting corruption within a given occupational group. When specific anti-corruption measures are adopted and publicized, and when the public can actually see the efforts made in a given professional community then the drop in corruption pressure is equally reflected in the perceived spread of corruption within this group. Such is the situation with *tax officials*, *university professors and officials*, and *ministers*.

The ranking of the individual groups remains unchanged – *customs officers*, the *representatives of the judicial system*, and the *police*, are still perceived as the most corrupt by the population. They are followed by *politicians and political party leaders* and the *members of parliament*. (*Appendix 3, Table 5*).

Popular perceptions about the corruptibility of a given group are shaped by a number of factors. The latest survey registered a lesser role of *personal experience* and *conversations with family and friends*, which in itself is an indirect, but insufficient, indicator of a certain decrease of the acts of corruption. The role of the *media* remains largely unchanged. More notably, there has been an increase in the number of respondents who could not pinpoint a single decisive factor that had shaped their perceptions about corruption in this country. This would seem to suggest that the subject of corruption transcends the boundaries of the media's influence, the conversations with friends and the comparisons between officials' incomes and standard of living. Corruption-related opinions are now formed under the influence of several significant factors, which is a precondition for a more objective and realistic attitude to the problem (*Figure 8*).

**Figure 8.**

Relative share of the factors shaping the perceived spread of corruption



*Base: All respondents*

#### SPREAD OF CORRUPTION BY INSTITUTIONS

Unlike the occupational groups, where the drop registered in October 2003 proved transient, the perceived spread of corruption among the institutions displays a lasting tendency. With all of the individual institutions, the values declined throughout the past year and at the very least returned to their level of January 2003, with the exception of the assessments of the *Ministry of Healthcare (Table 1)*.

The decrease has been more significant as regards the *Ministry of External Affairs*, the *Customs Agency*, and the *Ministry of Justice*, where the values went back to their lower levels in the period up to October 2003 or show a lasting decline.

It is worth noting the inconsistency between the decrease in the perceived spread of corruption within the individual institutions and the steady upward tendency under the answers “*In all ministries and government agencies*” and “*Throughout the judicial system*”. The persistent popular assumption that “*they’re all corrupt*” in fact does not do justice to those state institutions that are truly making efforts to reform themselves and to limit corruption (*Table 1*).

**Table 1.**

“In your opinion, how widespread is corruption in the following institutions?”

(Respondents could give up to five answers under “Spread of corruption in general” and up to three answers under “Ministries and state agencies” and “Judicial system”, which is why the percentages do not sum up to 100)

	<b>Oct 2002</b>	<b>Jan 2003</b>	<b>May 2003</b>	<b>Jul 2003</b>	<b>Oct 2003</b>	<b>Mar 2004</b>
<b>Spread of corruption in general</b>						
In Customs. Among customs officers.	30,4	53,3	50,0	54,1	49,5	46,3
In court. In the judicial system. In the system of justice. Among lawyers.	28,5	48,2	42,9	45,3	42,0	39,8
In the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (including Traffic Police, the investigation service)	19,9	28,6	30,6	30,9	33,9	26,9
In the healthcare system. In medical care. In the National Health Service.	20,6	27,3	27,6	30,9	27,8	26,7
In the higher ranks of power (Parliament, the Presidency, and the Government). Among the political elite.	30,3	24,7* 23,1** 1,3***	27,6* 27,5** 2,5***	28,5* 28,2** 1,7***	26,1* 26,3** 1,9***	22,8* 24,0** 1,6***
<b>Ministries and government agencies</b>						
Customs Agency	10,9	31,2	31,2	31,5	32,4	28,4
Ministry of Justice	18,1	33,5	31,0	32,1	30,3	26,4
<b>In all ministries and government agencies</b>	-	<b>19,6</b>	<b>21,8</b>	<b>24,6</b>	<b>25,4</b>	<b>23,7</b>
Privatization Agency	22,5	27,2	24,7	21,8	21,7	19,2
Ministry of Healthcare	16,6	16,7	17,0	17,7	14,4	18,8
Ministry of Internal Affairs	15,3	18,4	19,0	18,5	21,2	16,9
<b>Judicial system</b>						
<b>Throughout the judicial system</b>	<b>5,4</b>	<b>33,5</b>	<b>34,4</b>	<b>33,3</b>	<b>37,6</b>	<b>39,8</b>
The courts, the administration of justice	32,1	27,5	29,1	32,5	30,5	24,9
Prosecution	32,0	26,2	25,3	30,0	22,9	19,1
Lawyers, notaries public	16,2	24,9♦ 7,4♦♦	21,8♦ 8,0♦♦	22,5♦ 7,4♦♦	19,7♦ 8,5♦♦	17,1♦ 5,9♦♦
Criminal investigation service	15,7	18,4	17,6	21,5	15,3	12,0

\* Spread of corruption in the government / among ministers / among deputy ministers;

\*\* Spread of corruption in the National Assembly / among MPs;

\*\*\* Spread of corruption in the presidency/ among officials at the presidency;

♦ Spread of corruption among lawyers;

♦♦ Spread of corruption among notaries public.

## FACTORS FAVORING THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

Even the latest survey confirmed the widely held opinion among the population that the chief factors sustaining corruption in this country are the *fast personal enrichment sought by those in power* and their *use of public office for personal gain*. These two factors, together with the *ineffectiveness of the judicial system*, reached record-high values since the beginning of the monitoring (Table 2).

On the other hand, corrupt practices are ever less associated with and justified by the *low salaries in the public sector*, the *moral crisis in the period of transition*, or the *specific characteristics of Bulgarian national culture*.

**Table 2.** Relative share of the major factors accounting for the spread of corruption in this country (%)

	Sep '99	Jan '00	Apr '00	Sep '00	Jan '01	Oct '01	Jan '02	May '02	Oct '02	Jan '03	May '03	July '03	Oct '03	Mar 2004
Fast personal enrichment sought by those in power	54,8	57,0	33,6	57,8	60,8	59,2	58,6	58,6	58,4	60,3	58,5	61,7	62,0	65,1
Ineffectiveness of the judicial system	27,5	24,7	11,8	22,2	27,2	28,5	32,3	31,2	38,0	31,2	34,1	37,1	29,9	42,6
Lack of strict administrative control	33,8	30,8	-	32,3	31,8	35,2	34,5	38,9	34,5	32,3	31,2	33,7	38,6	37,3
Imperfect legislation	37,8	35,1	13,6	40,5	39,1	38,0	43,0	39,7	39,2	34,9	38,0	40,9	32,6	37,1
Intertwinement of official duties and personal interests	28,3	28,3	-	32,6	25,8	31,7	26,7	26,9	28,8	29,1	30,6	31,6	33,5	36,7
Low salaries of officials	43,6	47,2	20,9	41,6	33,7	32,3	38,5	36,0	36,6	31,2	27,6	28,9	28,3	27,0
Moral crisis in the period of transition	19,4	18,2	9,8	17,0	18,9	21,1	18,3	16,3	13,2	15,8	15,6	14,4	16,9	16,2
Specific characteristics of Bulgarian national culture	4,7	5,9	-	4,2	5,9	4,4	5,3	4,3	4,9	5,7	7,0	7,2	5,3	5,8
Problems inherited from the communist past	7,4	7,3	1,8	7,8	4,4	5,8	5,0	6,9	6,3	4,4	3,6	4,3	6,0	5,0

Base: All respondents

The explanatory models used by the respondents to account for its existence of corruption largely indicate the possible ways of curbing it. It is a positive development that corruption is no longer viewed as a collective phenomenon due to the problems inherited from the past and unaffected by any measures. The broad debate on the subject and the exposure of specific cases of corruption considerably contribute to changing the attitude to it. People already realize that in the presence of political will, there are ways to reduce mass corruption and they expect ever more targeted and tangible efforts on the part of the government.


## 5. VALUE SYSTEM AND MORAL PRECONDITIONS FOR CORRUPTION

### ACCEPTABILITY IN PRINCIPLE

The tendency towards moral rejection of corruption continues – since the beginning of 2003, the negative attitudes to informal payments remain unchanged at a relatively low level (*Figure 9*).

**Figure 9.**

Preconditions for the presence of corruption (min=0, max=10)



*Base: All respondents*

## SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CORRUPTION

Although at a slower pace, susceptibility to corruption has also been declining gradually. With the change in some of the main factors up to now used to justify small-scale, mass corruption, such as the low salaries of the officials or the imperfect legislation, the attitude to the payment of extra amounts in order to obtain regular public services has been changing, as well. (*Figure 9*)

With the gradual limitation of the underlying reasons for these traditional excuses, citizens are beginning to feel blackmailed and wronged in their relations with the public administration. It is only when this admittedly small-scale, but pervasive, corruption directed from the public official towards the citizen is significantly reduced that it will be possible to speak of serious progress in the fight against corruption. A task that is quite feasible with the resources of the legislative and the executive branches of power.

The analysis by socio-demographic groups reveals the ever more marked tendency to either completely refuse to pay any extra amounts or to seek alternative ways of resolving arising problems with public officials. Those who say they would pay in any case are decreasing in number. The respondents with *higher education* and *the better off* prove more inclined to seek other ways of dealing with the problem, while those with a lower level of education would simply refuse to pay the requested amount. Both cases are indicative of gradually increasing awareness of civic rights and growing disapproval of extra payments for public services citizens are entitled to by law. (*Appendix 3, Table 6*)

## APPENDIX 1

### Theoretical framework

The Corruption Indexes summarize the basic indicators used by the Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of *Coalition 2000*. Each index sums up several questions posed to the respondents and allows comparative analysis over time. The Corruption Indexes assume values from 0-10. The closer the value of the indexes is to 10, the more negative are the assessments of the current state of corruption in Bulgaria. Index numbers closer to 0 indicate approximation to the ideal of a “corruption-free” society.

The Corruption Indexes are based on a system of indicators exploring corruption-related behavior and attitudes. The theoretical model of corruption underlying the CMS surveys distinguishes between the following aspects and elements of corruption:

#### 1. Acts of corruption.

The acts of corruption fall into two basic types: giving a bribe and accepting a bribe. These occur in two basic kinds of situations: 1.) when citizens offer a bribe to get something they are entitled to by law (“greasing the wheels”), and 2.) when citizens offer a bribe to get something they are not entitled to by law. The registered frequency of acts of corruption shows the level of corruption in this country. The phrasing of the questions is essential when measuring the values of this index. In this respect CMS builds on a number of principles meant to ensure neutrality, objectivity, and anonymity: 1.) instead of using the term “bribe”, the questions refer to the “offer of money, gift, or favor”; 2) the questions focus on whether or not respondents did make such an “offer” and the latter are not asked to provide information concerning how much and whom they paid, etc., in order to have their problem addressed; 3) besides information about the “offer” of bribes, respondents are asked about the incidence of bribe solicitation, i.e., the amount of pressure exerted by public officials.

The Corruption Indexes formed on this basis are the following:

- Personal involvement. This index records the incidence of cases of “offer of money, gift, or favor” in order to have a problem solved as reported by the citizens themselves. Essentially this index registers the level of real corruption in this country over a given period of time.
- Corruption pressure. This index records the incidence of cases when citizens were reportedly asked for “money, gift, or favor” in order to have a problem solved. It measures the level of potential corruption in this country over a given period of time.

It should specifically be noted that the indicators concerning acts of corruption do not reflect evaluations, opinions, or perceptions, but the self-reported incidence of definite kinds of acts. This type of indicators underlies the methodology of the victimization surveys, which have a long history and are used to assess the real crime level in a given country. The term “real” is essential since for a number of reasons not all crimes are registered by the police and only part of those reported to the police actually end up in court.

#### 2. Value system and moral preconditions.

Although they do not directly determine the level of corruption, the value system and moral principles have a significant influence on citizens’ behavior. Of the numerous indicators in this area, CMS monitors the following corruption-related attitudes: 1.) the level of toleration of various forms of corruption; 2.) the degree of awareness of the various types of corruption; 3.)



citizens' inclination to resort to corrupt practices in order to address arising problems.

The Corruption Indexes produced on this basis are the following:

- Acceptability in principle. This index measures the toleration of a range of corrupt practices by MPs and ministry officials.
- Susceptibility to corruption. The index sums up a series of questions intended to assess citizens' inclination to resort to corruption in addressing their daily problems.

Both of the indexes from this group reflect assessments and opinions. Their positive dynamics are indicative of growing rejection of corruption and the reinforcement of moral norms proscribing involvement in acts of corruption.

### 3. Estimated spread of corruption.

Citizens' subjective assessments of the spread of corruption reflect the general social environment and prevailing outlook on corruption, as well as the related image of the institutions and basic occupational groups under the three branches of power. These assessments do not directly reflect the level of corruption since they are the outcome of perceptions and impressions produced by the ongoing public debate, media coverage of corruption, personal preconceptions, etc. In more general terms, they show the extent to which citizens feel that those in power protect public interests or take advantage of their official positions to serve private interests. This aspect of corruption is covered by two indexes:

- Estimated spread of corruption. This index sums up respondents' assessments of the extent to which corruption permeates society (as well as individual institutions and occupational groups).
- Practical efficiency. This index sums up respondents' assessments of the extent to which corruption is an efficient problem-solving instrument. Efficiency is another indicator of the spread of corruption: a high rate of efficiency makes it worth resorting to corruption and implies that corruption is in fact a commonly used means of addressing problems.

### 4. Corruption-related expectations.

The corruption-related expectations reflect the degree of public confidence that the problem of corruption can be dealt with. In this sense, the expectations are the combined reflection of respondents' perception of the political will demonstrated by those in power and their assessment of the magnitude and gravity of the problem of corruption.

## APPENDIX 2

### Corruption Indexes

**Table 1. Acts of Corruption**

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>	<i>Oct '03</i>	<i>Mar '04</i>
<i>Personal involvement</i>	0,7	0,8	0,4	0,8	0,7	0,4	0,5	0,4	0,3	0,4	0,4	0,3
<i>Corruption pressure</i>	1,2	1,5	0,8	1,4	1,4	1,0	1,4	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,1	0,8

**Table 2. Value System and Moral Preconditions**

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>	<i>Oct '03</i>	<i>Mar '04</i>
<i>Acceptability in principle</i>	1,4	1,7	1,3	1,2	1,5	1,4	1,6	1,3	1,3	1,4	1,4	1,4
<i>Susceptibility to corruption</i>	2,7	2,8	2,5	2,6	2,5	2,5	2,7	2,7	2,8	2,6	2,5	2,4

**Table 3. Perceived Spread of Corruption**

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>	<i>Oct '03</i>	<i>Mar '04</i>
<i>Personal involvement</i>	6,1	6,5	6,5	6,5	6,4	5,9	6,7	6,4	6,4	6,6	6,5	6,3
<i>Corruption pressure</i>	6,8	6,6	6,9	6,6	6,4	6,1	6,9	6,9	6,9	6,9	6,6	6,5

**Table 4. Corruption-Related Expectations**

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>	<i>Oct '03</i>	<i>Mar '04</i>
<i>Corruption-related expectations</i>	5,5	5,4	5,6	4,9	5,1	5,2	5,6	5,9	5,8	5,6	5,6	5,5

## APPENDIX 3

**Table 1.**

Assessments of the public importance of corruption as a problem of society by socio-demographic groups (March 2004; %)

	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<b><i>Highest level of education completed</i></b>		
1 Less than primary	84,5	15,5
2 Primary	89,0	11,0
3 Elementary	82,1	17,9
4 Secondary	60,9	39,1
5 College	53,4	46,6
6 University	52,0	48,0
<b><i>Financial situation</i></b>		
1 Poor	76,3	23,7
2	67,6	32,4
3	57,1	42,9
4	37,6	62,4
5 Wealthy	75,1	24,9
<b><i>Social status</i></b>		
1 Lowest social status	75,3	24,7
2	69,9	30,1
3	58,7	41,3
4	47,9	52,1
5 Highest social status	51,0	49,0
<b><i>Principal occupation at present</i></b>		
1 Managers, professors, specialists	50,0	50,0
2 Administrative officials, employed in the retail and services sectors	59,4	40,6
3 Technicians, workers, farmers	63,1	36,9
4 Housewives, retired, unemployed	73,9	26,1
5 Students	75,8	24,2
6 Other employment	87,9	12,1
<b><i>You live in:</i></b>		
1 Sofia	53,4	46,6
2 Large town	66,0	34,0
3 Small town	69,6	30,4
4 Rural area, village	78,9	21,1

**Table 2.**

Total amount of the informally paid bribes and/or gifts to public sector employees in the past 3 months (%)

	<i>January 2003</i>	<i>May 2003</i>	<i>July 2003</i>	<i>October 2003</i>	<i>March 2004</i>
Up to 100 Leva	65,4	50,0	68,6	83,6	<b>65,6</b>
101 to 250 Leva	19,8	29,1	11,7	10,8	<b>22,3</b>
251 to 500 Leva	5,4	8,4	10,6	5,6	<b>8,3</b>
501 to 1000 Leva	8,2	3,8	9,2	-	<b>1,5</b>
1001 to 5000 Leva	1,1	7,5	-	-	<b>1,3</b>
Over 5000 Leva	-	1,2	-	-	-

*Base: Respondents from whom public sector employees asked for, or indicated they expected, money, a gift, or a favor (January 2003 N=95, May 2003 N=77, July 2003 N=71, October 2003 N=77, March 2004 N=72)*

**Table 3.**

Corruption pressure by occupational group (%)

	Sep '00	Jan '01	Oct '01	Jan '02	May '02	Oct '02	Jan '03	May '03	July '03	Oct '03	Mar '04
Customs officer	15,8	22,7	18,4	18,5	25,5	19,4	17,3	16,6	16,4	15,3	<b>22,3</b>
Doctor	22,1	6,1	22,3	18,0	20,2	20,3	12,9	12,8	15,7	16,6	<b>13,2</b>
Police officer	24,0	18,9	18,5	19,9	15,2	22,3	12,0	14,1	17,8	13,9	<b>13,1</b>
Lawyers	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	26,5	10,5	17,4	13,1	13,8	<b>12,9</b>
University professors**	-	-	-	-	-	11,9	14,7	11,8	21,5	16,6	<b>12,7</b>
Judge	9,1	5,8	6,8	7,8	10,7	16,6	2,0	14,0	6,9	8,5	<b>10,7</b>
Businessperson	9,7	11,6	13,4	10,8	9,4	9,6	7,0	9,1	13,6	8,3	<b>10,5</b>
Banker	2,9	4,1	4,1	4,1	5,6	3,9	5,1	9,9	1,2	4,2	<b>8,3</b>
University employees**	-	-	-	-	-	5,6	11,9	3,4	10,9	9,0	<b>8,3</b>
Ministry official	7,0	8,9	5,6	4,9	9,3	5,6	13,8	4,3	10,1	8,2	<b>8,1</b>
Municipal official	10,3	11,2	11,3	10,0	5,5	10,9	4,4	8,4	6,9	6,4	<b>4,7</b>
Politicians and political party leaders	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	7,1	5,0	7,1	6,3	4,1	<b>4,5</b>
Teacher	5,5	3,7	6,1	3,6	3,1	7,4	4,4	3,4	3,4	5,6	<b>3,9</b>
Tax official	8,3	6,4	9,1	5,3	3,8	4,2	4,1	3,1	3,7	5,9	<b>3,8</b>
Mayors and councilors	3,2	2,1	1,4	2,0	2,7	5,3	3,0	4,1	3,4	3,3	<b>3,1</b>
Administrative court official	11,5	13,3	11,3	9,4	11,0	15,9	8,5	4,9	7,7	9,0	<b>1,8</b>
Prosecutor	7,8	7,2	0,8	4,1	8,5	12,3	6,6	9,2	8,2	4,2	<b>1,8</b>
Investigator	6,0	5,5	6,0	4,3	8,2	8,3	4,3	12,8	2,5	9,6	<b>1,7</b>
Ministers	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	6,3	-	3,3	3,4	4,8	-
NGO representative	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5,0	-	4,0	2,6	1,4	-
Member of Parliament	6,4	4,2	2,1	2,1	3,5	2,0	11,2	8,9	-	-	-
Journalist	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1,8	1,4	-	-	-	-
University professor or employee**	13,9	13,2	8,8	14,3	12,0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

*\*Relative share of those who have had contacts with the respective group and have been asked for money, gifts, or favors*

*\*\* Since October 2002, the option has been divided into two separate ones: "University employees" and "University professors".*

**Table 4.**

Factors for the spread of corruption by socio-demographic groups – March 2004 (%)

	<i>Fast personal enrichment sought by those in power</i>	<i>Ineffectiveness of the judicial system</i>	<i>Lack of strict administrative control</i>	<i>Imperfect legislation</i>	<i>Intertwinement of official duties and personal interests</i>	<i>Officials' low salaries</i>
<b><i>Highest level of education completed</i></b>						
1 Less than primary	43,7	21,5	24,8	15,8	12,4	18,5
2 Primary	39,3	24,1	15,4	17,6	17,4	15,4
3 Elementary	60,1	31,4	35,6	30,5	30,6	19,6
4 Secondary	63,1	45,7	36,3	36,8	37,0	27,1
5 College	59,3	35,5	31,6	40,5	35,5	23,9
6 University	54,0	44,4	35,2	41,2	39,3	33,4
<b><i>Financial situation</i></b>						
1 Poor	56,2	31,0	30,8	25,5	30,8	21,0
2	63,3	45,4	33,1	36,1	31,1	26,0
3	55,9	41,0	39,5	41,2	40,4	28,1
4	50,5	63,4	49,5	62,4	11,8	-
5 Wealthy	49,8	-	49,8	49,8	24,9	-
<b><i>Social status</i></b>						
1 Lowest social status	57,1	33,3	28,5	26,3	30,4	20,5
2	60,0	43,2	36,2	35,8	30,3	25,5
3	60,2	40,1	38,0	41,7	39,7	27,6
4	55,0	48,5	47,9	23,8	34,8	20,2
5 Highest social status	51,0	74,5	25,5	76,6	25,5	-
<b><i>Principal occupation at present</i></b>						
Managers, professors, specialists	54,6	51,9	32,4	37,2	43,3	32,5
Administrative officials, employed in the retail and services sectors	54,2	42,3	29,5	45,6	39,9	39,0
Technicians, workers, farmers	63,8	39,7	38,1	36,1	36,4	23,7
Housewives, retired, unemployed	58,3	35,8	32,6	30,6	29,7	20,5
5 Students	48,2	37,9	38,2	24,3	30,6	34,2
6 Other employment	62,5	24,1	50,5	13,2	24,1	24,2
<b><i>You live in:</i></b>						
1 Sofia	55,1	48,1	40,6	41,9	30,2	33,5
2 Large town	61,8	37,5	30,6	38,6	33,9	27,9
3 Small town	58,9	40,5	36,6	30,1	34,7	25,8
4 Rural area, village	56,2	32,6	31,0	26,0	32,0	15,1

**Table 5.**

Spread of corruption by occupational group

<i>Relative share of those who answered, "Nearly all and most are involved in corruption"</i>											
	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>	<i>Oct '03</i>	<i>Mar '04</i>
Customs officers	75,2	74,3	77,3	74,2	70,8	79,2	76,6	74,3	76,9	74,5	<b>70,6</b>
Judges	50,1	50,6	56,4	55,0	50,8	63,0	62,2	59,6	61,8	57,3	<b>56,0</b>
Prosecutors	51,3	50,7	54,8	55,4	51,0	63,0	62,1	59,3	60,6	55,7	<b>54,1</b>
Lawyers	52,9	50,3	55,0	55,5	52,5	62,3	60,1	60,0	57,5	55,8	<b>53,8</b>
Police officers	54,3	51,0	53,7	47,0	50,7	59,6	57,7	57,7	61,4	59,2	<b>52,3</b>
Politicians and leaders of political parties and coalitions	43,8	39,1	40,8	43,0	33,0	54,0	50,7	51,3	50,8	47,6	<b>51,0</b>
MPs	51,7	52,6	43,5	47,8	39,2	56,2	53,5	57,5	56,9	54,5	<b>50,8</b>
Investigators	43,8	43,5	48,4	48,0	43,1	57,5	55,4	53,6	55,4	49,2	<b>48,2</b>
Ministers	55,0	52,3	41,2	45,4	35,6	50,8	49,5	52,6	54,9	52,6	<b>47,2</b>
Doctors	43,6	27,0	46,8	45,7	52,3	54,9	51,0	49,8	53,4	52,9	<b>46,7</b>
Tax officials	53,7	47,3	51,6	51,2	41,9	58,0	52,6	51,8	54,1	49,3	<b>43,0</b>
Businesspersons	42,3	43,6	42,2	41,6	41,4	48,9	52,7	50,9	48,7	47,6	<b>41,2</b>
Mayors and municipal councilors	32,1	30,9	26,3	31,8	23,4	48,3	45,7	43,6	45,0	43,4	<b>37,9</b>
Ministry officials	49,7	43,9	45,8	47,1	36,7	48,3	44,6	44,4	45,1	40,1	<b>36,5</b>
Administrative court officials	40,2	36,8	41,7	41,1	36,5	45,0	42,4	37,5	37,9	33,5	<b>33,2</b>
Municipal officials	41,6	35,9	39,6	39,4	30,0	49,1	40,9	39,8	42,2	36,5	<b>31,6</b>
Bankers	33,5	35,6	32,5	31,7	29,5	37,2	43,4	35,8	37,1	37,3	<b>31,2</b>
University professors and officials	28,1	21,6	27,4	27,7	29,8	33,4* 23,1**	30,8* 20,0**	31,7* 19,0**	34,1* 21,2**	36,5* 23,2**	<b>28,9* 16,3**</b>
NGO representatives	23,9	18,2	19,8	21,8	15,3	21,4	20,2	21,0	21,6	22,3	<b>21,6</b>
Journalists	13,9	11,3	10,5	12,2	9,5	15,3	12,1	13,3	12,9	14,6	<b>9,9</b>
Teachers	10,9	5,8	9,3	9,7	9,8	13,9	9,8	11,6	10,9	11,0	<b>8,6</b>
Local political leaders	36,8	34,2	35,1	34,4	27,1	-	-	-	-	-	-

\* Assessment of the spread of corruption among university professors

\*\* Assessment of the spread of corruption among university officials

**Table 6.**

“If you had an important problem and an official directly asked you for money to solve it, what would you do?” (Distribution by socio-demographic group – March 2004; %)

	<i>I will always pay</i>	<i>I will pay if I can afford it</i>	<i>I won't pay if I can solve the problem by some other means</i>	<i>I will never pay</i>	<i>DK/NA</i>
<b><i>Highest level of education completed</i></b>					
1 Less than primary	-	-	12,4	68,7	18,8
2 Primary	1,1	10,0	18,8	47,8	22,4
3 Elementary	1,8	15,8	29,0	47,8	5,6
4 Secondary	3,1	23,0	40,2	30,6	3,0
5 College	-	7,7	55,4	33,3	3,6
6 University	6,1	15,0	41,0	31,9	5,9
<b><i>Financial situation</i></b>					
1 Poor	1,6	15,8	26,8	46,7	9,1
2	2,3	16,9	39,3	36,5	5,0
3	3,6	20,6	42,9	31,2	1,8
4	12,9	36,6	37,6	-	12,9
5 Wealthy	24,9	-	49,8	-	25,2
<b><i>Social status</i></b>					
1 Lowest social status	1,8	16,2	26,3	45,7	9,9
2	2,5	18,2	34,4	39,7	5,3
3	3,1	18,1	47,3	29,5	1,9
4	3,6	20,8	41,1	30,9	3,6
5 Highest social status	25,5	-	51,0	23,4	-
<b><i>Principal occupation at present</i></b>					
Managers, professors, specialists	3,0	14,3	46,7	30,3	5,6
Administrative officials, employed in the retail and services sectors	2,6	21,1	42,2	29,8	4,4
Technicians, workers, farmers	4,1	24,4	42,4	26,0	3,1
Housewives, retired, unemployed	2,0	15,0	29,9	45,7	7,5
5 Students	7,0	10,6	48,2	30,9	3,3
6 Other employment	-	25,3	13,2	24,1	37,5
<b><i>You live in:</i></b>					
1 Sofia	2,5	15,7	44,2	33,9	3,7
2 Large town	4,1	19,0	35,1	34,6	7,2
3 Small town	2,6	19,0	24,5	47,9	6,0
4 Rural area, village	1,2	15,3	37,2	39,1	7,2