

**CORRUPTION MONITORING BY**  
***COALITION 2000***

**October 2003**



## 2. METHODOLOGY

Sample: All of the surveys referred to in the present paper were based on random two-stage cluster sampling. Universe: the country's population aged 18 and over. Sample size:

	Fieldwork period	Size of the sample
1.	February 1999	1143
2.	April 1999	1122
3.	September 1999	1110
4.	January 2000	1144
5.	April 2000	1161
6.	September 2000	1158
7.	January 2001	1037
8.	October 2001	971
9.	January 2002	1148
10.	May 2002	1170
11.	October 2002	1079
12.	January 2003	1107
13.	May 2003	1077
14.	July 2003	1057
15.	October 2003	1098

Method of registration: Face-to-face interview.


Fieldwork: 10/04/2003 – 10/15/2003.

### 1. PUBLIC IMPORTANCE OF CORRUPTION

The problems of *unemployment*, *low incomes*, and *poverty* continue to be regarded by Bulgarian society as the most critical ones for this country. The actually observed falling rate of unemployment still has not had a tangible impact in terms of the population's standard of living. This finds further confirmation in the heightened sensitivity of the general public to problems such as "*low incomes*" and the "*inadequately functioning economy*" in this country. (Figure 1)

Following immediately behind the most burning social and economic problems are *crime* and *corruption*. Public attention to these problems tends to increase in periods of more intense debates on these issues, as well as in the presence of specific cases exposed in the media. The assessments of crime and corruption prove to change more dynamically than those of the other social problems. Deepening public sensitivity has been registered as regards *crime* in this country, probably as a result of several shocking criminal cases of bomb explosions and blatant murders. In three months alone the perceived importance of this problem has increased by 6 points. The importance attributed to corruption has fallen by nearly as much (5%), reaching one of its lowest values since the beginning of the monitoring. At the present time crime and corruption appear as equally alarming public concerns in this country.

**Figure 1.**  
Relative importance of the problems faced by society (%)




Base: All respondents (July N=1057; October N=1098)

The dynamics of corruption-related coverage in the media does not directly shape popular assessments of the importance of the problem. Even in a period of weaker media coverage, corruption is still singled out as a critical problem to

the country, which points to other, more powerful factors determining popular perceptions and opinions. (Figure 2)

**Figure 2.**  
Dynamics of media coverage of corruption and assessments of the relative public importance of corruption as a social problem



A major tendency observed in previous surveys has been that people of higher social and financial standing prove more inclined to define corruption as a major problem faced by society. As of October 2003 these are again the sections of the population that prove particularly concerned about the problem of corruption. Yet there also appears a certain withdrawal of public attention from this negative phenomenon, which may be due both to an actual restriction of corrupt practices in this country and to the restructured ranking by importance of the various social problems. (Appendix 3, Table 1)

## 2. LEVEL OF CORRUPTION

When considering the level of corruption it is important to distinguish between its two basic components – the levels of “real” and of “potential” corruption. In terms of the reproduction of corrupt practices the “corruption deal offer” itself (requesting or offering to “give something”) is just as important as the very act of “giving and taking” (whether money, a gift or a favor). The committed acts of corruption are designated as “real corruption” and the solicited corruption deals, as “potential corruption”.

The average monthly incidence of acts of corruption in which the citizens have self-reportedly been involved make up the level of real corruption. Potential corruption is measured through the sum of all instances when the citizens have come under corruption pressure (when the respective official asked for “something”).


### REAL CORRUPTION

The chief problem in assessing the level of real corruption stems from the delicate nature of the information collected on particularly sensitive issues. Although it cannot be measured with absolute precision, the actual number of acts of corruption committed in this country in the course of the past one month directly corresponds to the level of personal involvement of the respondents in various forms of corrupt behavior.

In view of the above constraints the values of the indicator measuring real acts of corruption can be assumed to be underrated. As of the present time these values remain at a relatively low level, continuing the tendency towards stabilization that first began in May 2002. (Figure 3)

Despite the continuing stability of the comprehensive indicator measuring real corruption in this country, a closer look at the results obtained reveals an increase in the average monthly incidence of acts of corruption. Whereas in May 2003 the average number of citizens who had been involved in such acts in the course of the past month was about 87,770, and in July, about 99,840 (an increase by more than 12,000), in October 2003 this number became approximately 114,100<sup>1</sup> (1.78 % of the country's adult population), or in other words, there has been an increase by more than 14,000 cases of corruption.

**Figure 3.**  
Level of corruption (min=0, max=10)




Base: All respondents

The average annual number of actually concluded corruption deals and of the cases when officials directly requested, or indicated they expected, “to be given something” also marked an increase. Approximately 600,000 acts of corruption were committed in the period October 2002–October 2003, with twice as many having been solicited (roughly 1,116 thou.). (Figure 4)

<sup>1</sup> This estimate is based on the data from the population census of March 2001, according to which the population aged 18 and over is 6,417,869, and 1% of the sample corresponds to 64,180 people.

**Figure 4.**

Average annual number of solicited and actually concluded corruption deals



The tendency persists towards increasing share of the instances when the “corruption price” ranged up to 100 Leva – eight out of ten respondents who had been asked for a bribe paid unofficially amounts of that order. Naturally, this does not mean that big corruption deals are no longer concluded, but indicates an ever-clearer differentiation of the various types of corrupt practices. The corruption monitoring is essentially aimed at registering and measuring small-scale, daily, and commonly practiced corruption. The big corruption cases can hardly be “detected” through this type of representative national surveys and their exposure calls for special investigations. The mechanism through which they take place is quite different from that of mass corruption and all too often they remain concealed from the general public.

The fact that the respondents did not appear to have made “corruption payments” exceeding 500 Leva is also indicative of a certain progress in the fight against corruption. The influence is perceptible of the extensive discussions on the problem in the media, as well as of the adoption of specific anti-corruption measures. Some state institutions have adopted clear-cut rules and procedures as regards daily operation and the interpretation of controversial cases encountered by the officials in their work. “Talking about” corruption gradually turns into “acting” about it and this to a great extent deters officials from exerting corruption pressure over the citizens, particularly as regards soliciting larger bribes.

On the other hand, the more widespread “petty corruption” at this stage is largely due to the limited ability of the citizens to pay larger amounts (*Appendix 3, Table 2*).

## POTENTIAL CORRUPTION

Notwithstanding the slight increase in October 2003, the corruption pressure exerted directly or indirectly by public sector employees over the citizens has remained relatively stable since the beginning of 2003. (*Figure 3*)

The stabilization of the level of potential corruption observed for more than half a year suggests a threshold of sorts may have been reached, which can only be overcome by different and more radical measures to curb corruption initiatives.

## CORRUPTION PRESSURE BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

The picture of the corruption pressure exerted by the various occupational groups is quite dynamic. (*Appendix 3, Table 3*)

In July 2003 *university professors* were the occupational group that had initiated the largest share of acts of corruption among those who had had contacts with it. Three months later 16.6% of those who had interacted with this group said they had been asked for bribes in some form or another. Despite the drop by 5 points, together with *doctors*, they remain in the leading position in terms of the corruption pressure exerted. This suggests that the ranking obtained in July was not fortuitous and was not only due to the concurrent university entry exams and the summer exam session. In this context it might be more productive to replace the academics' negative emotional reaction to the announced data about the level of corruption in higher education establishments with rational efforts to find and implement constructive anti-corruption steps.

There is a persistent tendency towards falling corruption pressure by *customs and police officers*. Certain shifts have also occurred within the judicial system. In the past year the respondents who have had contacts with *investigators* were subjected to stronger corruption pressure compared to those who, for various reasons, have interacted with the other representatives of the judiciary – *prosecutors* and *judges*. It should be noted that one fourth of the respondents who had reasons to turn to the representatives of the judiciary actually renounced doing so because of their conviction that the judicial system is corrupt.

The survey registered an increasing number of solicited corruption deals by *tax officials, teachers, and bankers*.


## IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS

The ambivalent signals sent out by the Government in terms of the fight against corruption in this country have affected popular assessments of its efforts in this area. Half of the respondents thought the Government was not making any efforts at all to deal with the corrupt practices existing in the high ranks of public administration.

On the other hand, the population's practical confrontation with corruption among lower-ranking officials, which is where "petty corruption" takes place, as evidenced by the higher number of corruption deals concluded and the total amount of the bribes paid, produces negative assessments of the Government's efforts even as regards this type of corruption. (*Figure 5*)

The absence of tangible results and the clash with reality are the decisive factors accounting for the falling trust in the Government and the effectiveness of its anti-corruption efforts.

**Figure 5.**  
Perceived impact of the Government's anti-corruption measures \*




\* Relative share of those who answered, "The government is not doing anything"

### 3. EXPECTATIONS REGARDING THE CURBING OF CORRUPTION

The population's assessment of our society's potential to cope with corruption in this country remains at a stable level, which can be defined as moderately optimistic. Regardless of the negative evaluations of the Government in terms of the results of its anti-corruption efforts, Bulgarians nevertheless still believe that it is feasible to bring down corruption in this country to a "normal" level. (Figure 6)

Although people are confronted with a proliferation of corrupt practices they still see a possibility for a change that will help reduce these acts.

**Figure 6.**  
Corruption-related expectations (min=0 max=10)



Base: All respondents




## 4. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

### PERCEIVED SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

The current year has not been marked by more notable fluctuations in popular perceptions of the spread of corruption. These remain at a constant and relatively high level, despite the slight drop compared to the same period in the previous year. Not even the summer months, when political life and the associated problems, including corruption, tend to be eclipsed by other matters in people's minds, displayed the usual drop in the perceived spread of corruption (Figure 7).

This fact calls for a more detailed analysis since it can hardly be accounted for solely by the political fervor associated with the local elections. It is important to stress that throughout the monitoring conducted up to now, though with slight vacillations, the population's assessments of the spread of corruption have remained consistently high. Indeed, a number of specific steps have been taken to curb corruption: codes of ethics have, for instance, been adopted by different business and professional organizations; rules and procedures have been introduced in connection with the activity of some groups of public officials; administrative control has been enhanced, etc. At the same time, corruption has been a frequent topic and has been broadly commented in the media in the past few years. The discussions on the problem significantly contribute towards focusing public attention on it. More notably, however, the "sense" that the phenomenon is widespread has remained quite strong. And this can hardly be attributed to the influence of the media alone.

**Figure 7.**  
Spread of corruption (min=0 max=10)



*Base: All respondents*

The consistently high perceived spread of corruption and the small size of the informal payments outline the dimensions of a highly interesting phenomenon. By now "petty corruption" has become a parallel mechanism regulating the relations between the citizens and public officials. The low standard of living of the overwhelming majority of the population is the reason why even not too high payments (taxes, fines, permits, etc.) may seem excruciating. On the other hand, the existence of obsolete and controversial legal regulations creates preconditions for abuse by dishonest public officials. In such a context, the mechanism of "petty corruption" is working successfully, proves efficient in practice, and is steadily reproduced.

## PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY OF CORRUPTION

One of the foremost indicators of the actual significance of the phenomenon of corruption is its perceived practical efficiency. Notwithstanding the slight drop compared to the previous quarter, since October 2002 the values of this indicator have remained unchanged at their highest level throughout the period monitored (*Figure 7*).

Clearly, the measures taken to date have been insufficient to reverse the already established image of corruption as an effective means of dealing with private problems. It is still perceived as a practice that saves people time, money, and stress in their interaction with public administration. Most acts of corruption take place under a well-organized scheme of established and infallible efficiency. That is what makes them so difficult to detect and prove.

In order to repudiate this “normality” and justification of corruption there is a call for a deeper understanding of the problem and the reasons causing it. The moral rejection and agreement in principle that corruption affects adversely the country’s development should be taken to the level of specific anti-corruption action. Otherwise “habituation” to corruption is inevitable - whether in terms of discussions of the problem or the assumption that the interaction with public administration entails informal payment that guarantees obtaining the respective administrative service.

When considering the practical efficiency of corruption it is important to make the following distinction between the underlying motives. On the one hand, an act of corruption may be intended to help perpetrate some kind of fraud or administrative violation. On the other hand, at the present time there is also another common type of corrupt practices – forcing citizens and companies to pay money unofficially or make gifts in order to obtain administrative services to which they are entitled by law but which they may not get, by discretion of the respective public official.

And whereas the first type of corruption benefits both of the parties involved, the second one operates entirely to the detriment of the citizens, who, for a number of reasons, such as *weak administrative control* and *ineffectiveness of the judicial system*, would rather pay the money requested and get the service, than expose the respective official.

It is precisely the curbing of the second type of corrupt practices that is the responsibility of the government, which has proclaimed the priority of the fight against corruption. This is feasible through the adoption of clear-cut rules and simplified procedures for the provision of administrative services and by creating conditions for express and effective administrative control over dishonest public officials.

In fact, regardless of the political declarations and the media attention to the issue, so far effective mechanisms have still not been put in place for the prompt punishment of corrupt public officials. On the contrary, all too often the uncorrupt and honest officials at state agencies are “discarded” by the system, since they interfere with its smooth operation.

It is precisely its demonstrated practical efficiency that is one of the main reasons for the persistent high spread of corruption and its perception as an improper, yet inevitable, convenient, and effective, practice.

## SPREAD OF CORRUPTION BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

The latest survey again registered a downward tendency as regards the perceived spread of corruption within the various occupational groups. Yet, the past one year since October 2002 has been marked by the highest values of the assessments of the spread of corruption (*Appendix 3, Table 5*). The latest assessments, though the lowest for 2003, still fall short of the May 2002 levels. This is a serious indicator that the existing corrupt practices among the various groups of public sector employees have not been lastingly and substantially restrained.

All of the occupational groups display a slight drop compared to May 2003, with the exception of *university professors and officials, NGO representatives, and teachers*. Even here, however, the increase is unsubstantial and cannot serve to draw any definitive conclusions about increased incidence of acts of corruption.

There has not been any change in the ordering of the particular groups – *customs officers, the representatives of the judicial system, and police officers* are still perceived as the most corrupt by the population. They are followed by *MPs, doctors, and ministers*. (*Appendix 3, Table 5*).

The survey again registered a certain deviation between respondents' perceptions of the corruptness of some occupational groups and the actual corruption pressure they have exerted over the citizens. This applies above all to the *university professors and officials, ministers, and MPs*, where the two types of assessments tend to diverge considerably.


Within the judicial system, however, there has been a serious restructuring of popular perceptions. In May 2003 only the image of *lawyers* matched the actual corruption pressure exerted by them over the citizens. Nearly half a year later the other magistrates also appear to have exerted stronger corruption pressure over the citizens who have had contacts with them. A deviation between the assessments is now only noticeable with regard to *prosecutors*, who are traditionally perceived as highly corrupt even while this is not evidenced by the data about corruption pressure experienced by the respondents (*Appendix 3, Tables 3 and 5*). The higher perceived spread of corruption may be attributed to a number of factors but no doubt it is in part due to the extensive media coverage of the topic of corruption in the judiciary. It is not uncommon for the increased interest in a given occupational group to encourage the convenient argument “since they all believe we're corrupt and accuse us anyway, we might as well give them a reason”.

One other emerging tendency is equally alarming – increasing corruption pressure appears to be exerted by the representatives of humane professions, who until recently were regarded as highly ethical and incorruptible. These occupations, among which *university professors and officials and doctors*, are gradually losing their favorable image in people's minds.

A definite role in reducing the divergence between the *perceived* and *actual* corruptness of a given occupational group is played by the gradually increasing importance of *personal experience* and *conversations with family and friends* in shaping the assessments. The *media*, though still very influential, tend to fall behind *personal observation*. The fact that in excess of one third of the respondents draw information from real confrontation with an act of corruption – whether personal or involving a friend or relative – is yet another indirect indicator of the high spread of various corrupt practices (*Figure 8*).

**Figure 8.**

Relative share of the factors shaping the perceived spread of corruption



Base: All respondents

### SPREAD OF CORRUPTION BY INSTITUTIONS

As in the case of the occupational groups, the assessments of the spread of corruption by institutions also displayed a decline. However, it is again too weak to speak of any permanent curbing of the problem. Despite certain positive signs, the assessments of the spread of corruption in the Customs Agency and the Ministry of Internal Affairs remain the highest since the beginning of the monitoring (Table 1).

The media focus on the judiciary is reflected in the high perceived spread of corruption in all of its spheres. Nevertheless, the judicial system and its various divisions were deemed less corrupt compared to May 2003, with the registered drop being most notable with regard to the *prosecution* and the *investigation service* (Table 1).

**Table 1.**

“In your opinion, how widespread is corruption in the following institutions?”

(Respondents could give up to five answers under “Spread of corruption in general” and up to three answers under “Ministries and state agencies” and “Judicial system”, which is why the percentages do not sum up to 100)

	May 2002	Oct 2002	January 2003	May 2003	July 2003	Oct 2003
<i>Spread of corruption in general</i>						
<b>In Customs. Among customs officers.</b>	33.2	30.4	53.3	50.0	54.1	49.5
<b>In court. In the judicial system. In the system of justice. Among lawyers.</b>	23.5	28.5	48.2	42.9	45.3	42.0
<b>In the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (including Traffic Police, the investigation service)</b>	20.6	19.9	28.6	30.6	30.9	33.9
<b>In the healthcare system. In medical care. In the National Health Service.</b>	25.6	20.6	27.3	27.6	30.9	27.8
<b>In the higher ranks of power (Parliament, the Presidency, the Government). Among the political elite.</b>	24.1	30.3	24.7* 23.1** 1.3***	27.6* 27.5** 2.5***	28.5* 28.2** 1.7***	26.1* 26.3** 1.9***
<i>Ministries and state agencies</i>						
<b>Ministry of Justice</b>	12.6	10.9	31.2	31.2	31.5	32.4
<b>Customs Agency</b>	15.0	18.1	33.5	31.0	32.1	30.3
<b>In all ministries and state agencies</b>	-	-	19.6	21.8	24.6	25.4
<b>Privatization Agency</b>	22.0	22.5	27.2	24.7	21.8	21.7
<b>Ministry of Internal Affairs</b>	16.2	15.3	18.4	19.0	18.5	21.2
<i>Judicial system</i>						
<b>Throughout the judicial system</b>	3.5	5.4	33.5	34.4	33.3	37.6
<b>The courts, the administration of justice</b>	29.1	32.1	27.5	29.1	32.5	30.5
<b>Prosecution</b>	26.2	32.0	26.2	25.3	30.0	22.9
<b>Lawyers, notaries public</b>	15.3	16.2	24.9***** 7.4*****	21.8***** 8.0*****	22.5***** 7.4*****	19.7***** 8.5*****
<b>Criminal investigation service</b>	15.7	15.7	18.4	17.6	21.5	15.3

\* Spread of corruption in the government / among ministers / among deputy ministers;

\*\* Spread of corruption in the National Assembly / among MPs;

\*\*\* Spread of corruption in the presidency/ among officials at the presidency;

\*\*\*\* Spread of corruption among lawyers;

\*\*\*\*\* Spread of corruption among notaries public.

## FACTORS FAVORING THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

The tendency that emerged in the beginning of the current year towards intensifying critical attitudes to the members of the government and their perception as corrupt and striving after *personal gain through public office* is continuing. The population attributes ever-greater importance for the proliferation of corruption to the pursuit of *fast personal enrichment by those in power* and to the *intertwinement of official duties and personal interests*. Additionally, instead of the expected specific anti-corruption measures, there is growing realization of the *lack of strict administrative control* (Table 2).

**Table 2.**

Relative share of the major factors accounting for the spread of corruption in this country (%)

	Apr '99	Sep '99	Jan '00	Apr '00	Sep '00	Jan '01	Oct '01	Jan '02	May '02	Oct '02	Jan '03	May '03	July '03	Oct '03
Fast personal enrichment sought by those in power	52.9	54.8	57.0	33.6	57.8	60.8	59.2	58.6	58.6	58.4	60.3	58.5	61.7	62.0
Lack of strict administrative control	36.4	33.8	30.8	-	32.3	31.8	35.2	34.5	38.9	34.5	32.3	31.2	33.7	38.6
Intertwinement of official duties and personal interests	25.8	28.3	28.3	-	32.6	25.8	31.7	26.7	26.9	28.8	29.1	30.6	31.6	33.5
Imperfect legislation	38.8	37.8	35.1	13.6	40.5	39.1	38.0	43.0	39.7	39.2	34.9	38.0	40.9	32.6
Ineffectiveness of the judicial system	19.6	27.5	24.7	11.8	22.2	27.2	28.5	32.3	31.2	38.0	31.2	34.1	37.1	29.9
Low salaries	51.5	43.6	47.2	20.9	41.6	33.7	32.3	38.5	36.0	36.6	31.2	27.6	28.9	28.3
Moral crisis in the period of transition	19.4	19.4	18.2	9.8	17.0	18.9	21.1	18.3	16.3	13.2	15.8	15.6	14.4	16.9
Problems inherited from the communist past	6.8	7.4	7.3	1.8	7.8	4.4	5.8	5.0	6.9	6.3	4.4	3.6	4.3	6.0
Specific characteristics of Bulgarian national culture	6.9	4.7	5.9	-	4.2	5.9	4.4	5.3	4.3	4.9	5.7	7.0	7.2	5.3

Base: All respondents

The values of part of the factors, such as *imperfect legislation* and *ineffectiveness of the judicial system*, traditionally referred to in explanation of the spread of corruption, have fallen considerably in the latest survey. The subjective preconditions for the spread of corruption have been brought to the foreground at the expense of the associated objective factors.

Though they still maintain their levels, reasons such as the *low salaries in the public sector* and the *moral crisis in the transition period* tend to lose their importance as explanatory models of corruption. It would seem that an ever more pronounced shift is taking place from collective, to individual, responsibility for the occurrence of, and involvement in, corrupt practices. This is also evidenced by the fluctuations in the values of factors such as the *specific characteristics of Bulgarian national culture* and the *problems inherited from the communist past* – though they are still used to partly account for the phenomenon of corruption, they are gradually being relegated to a less prominent place by the respondents (Table 2).

## 5. VALUE SYSTEM AND MORAL PRECONDITIONS FOR CORRUPTION


### ACCEPTABILITY IN PRINCIPLE

The current year has generally been marked by a pronounced tendency towards growing negative attitudes to, and moral rejection of, corruption. There has been growing disapproval of informal payments as an alternative means of obtaining speedy and high-quality public services (*Figure 9*).

Regardless of the moral condemnation of corruption, however, there still exist a number of objective preconditions for its proliferation. And while until recently “petty corruption” was often justified by the poor remuneration in the public sector and the imperfect legislation, as these conditions change, people are gradually demonstrating ever greater intolerance of dishonest and corrupt officials and employees.

**Figure 9.**

Preconditions for the presence of corruption (min=0, max=10)



Base: All respondents

### SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CORRUPTION

There is equally a clear-cut downward tendency as regards the values of the Susceptibility to Corruption Index (*Figure 9*). Though not uncommonly involved in various corrupt practices, citizens are proving increasingly aware of their rights and options in terms of resisting corruption pressure.

This is equally discernible in the analysis by socio-demographic groups - those with a *higher education level and better material situation* prove inclined to take two opposite courses of action: either to pay in any case or not to pay at all and to seek other ways of solving their problem. This suggests improving awareness of one’s civic rights and the legislation, as well as a clear distinction between the cases when you can “save” yourself the bribe and when the refusal to pay would only entail an unnecessary waste of time and money, without achieving the desired result. (*Appendix 3, Table 6*).

There appears to be growing pragmatism with regard to corruption – even the social groups of more limited financial resources (*housewives, the retired, the unemployed*) demonstrate greater readiness to pay the money requested, even if the amounts are all too often significant by their standards. This would seem to support the observation that some corrupt practices have by now become an established and well-organized part of citizen/public administration relations. And while the so-called “big corruption” is quite difficult to expose and prove,

“petty corruption” among public officials has become so commonplace and patent that it does not need proving, according to the general public. Everyday unofficial payments for a number of administrative services are not only directly detrimental to the citizens, but also seriously undermine trust in the government and their capability to work for the good of the public. The adoption of a series of mechanisms securing transparency and utter simplification of administrative procedures is a perfectly feasible task for any government upholding the fight against corruption as one of its chief priorities. In this sense, from a popular political slogan, the fight against corruption is turning into a daily gauge of the performance of any government.



## APPENDIX 1

### Theoretical framework

The Corruption Indexes summarize the basic indicators used by the Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of *Coalition 2000*. Each index sums up several questions posed to the respondents and allows comparative analysis over time. The Corruption Indexes assume values from 0-10. The closer the value of the indexes is to 10, the more negative are the assessments of the current state of corruption in Bulgaria. Index numbers closer to 0 indicate approximation to the ideal of a “corruption-free” society.

The Corruption Indexes are based on a system of indicators exploring corruption-related behavior and attitudes. The theoretical model of corruption underlying the CMS surveys distinguishes between the following aspects and elements of corruption:

#### 1. Acts of corruption.

The acts of corruption fall into two basic types: giving a bribe and accepting a bribe. These occur in two basic kinds of situations: 1.) when citizens offer a bribe to get something they are entitled to by law (“greasing the wheels”), and 2.) when citizens offer a bribe to get something they are not entitled to by law. The registered frequency of acts of corruption shows the level of corruption in this country. The phrasing of the questions is essential when measuring the values of this index. In this respect CMS builds on a number of principles meant to ensure neutrality, objectivity, and anonymity: 1.) instead of using the term “bribe”, the questions refer to the “offer of money, gift, or favor”; 2) the questions focus on whether or not respondents did make such an “offer” and the latter are not asked to provide information concerning how much and whom they paid, etc., in order to have their problem addressed; 3) besides information about the “offer” of bribes, respondents are asked about the incidence of bribe solicitation, i.e., the amount of pressure exerted by public officials.

The Corruption Indexes formed on this basis are the following:

- Personal involvement. This index records the incidence of cases of “offer of money, gift, or favor” in order to have a problem solved as reported by the citizens themselves. Essentially this index registers the level of real corruption in this country over a given period of time.
- Corruption pressure. This index records the incidence of cases when citizens were reportedly asked for “money, gift, or favor” in order to have a problem solved. It measures the level of potential corruption in this country over a given period of time.

It should specifically be noted that the indicators concerning acts of corruption do not reflect evaluations, opinions, or perceptions, but the self-reported incidence of definite kinds of acts. This type of indicators underlies the methodology of the victimization surveys, which have a long history and are used to assess the real crime level in a given country. The term “real” is essential since for a number of reasons not all crimes are registered by the police and only part of those reported to the police actually end up in court.

#### 2. Value system and moral preconditions.

Although they do not directly determine the level of corruption, the value system and moral principles have a significant influence on citizens’ behavior. Of the numerous indicators in this area, CMS monitors the following corruption-related attitudes: 1.) the level of toleration of various forms of

corruption; 2.) the degree of awareness of the various types of corruption; 3.) citizens' inclination to resort to corrupt practices in order to address arising problems.

The Corruption Indexes produced on this basis are the following:

- Acceptability in principle. This index measures the toleration of a range of corrupt practices by MPs and ministry officials.
- Susceptibility to corruption. The index sums up a series of questions intended to assess citizens' inclination to resort to corruption in addressing their daily problems.

Both of the indexes from this group reflect assessments and opinions. Their positive dynamics are indicative of growing rejection of corruption and the reinforcement of moral norms proscribing involvement in acts of corruption.

### 3. Estimated spread of corruption.

Citizens' subjective assessments of the spread of corruption reflect the general social environment and prevailing outlook on corruption, as well as the related image of the institutions and basic occupational groups under the three branches of power. These assessments do not directly reflect the level of corruption since they are the outcome of perceptions and impressions produced by the ongoing public debate, media coverage of corruption, personal preconceptions, etc. In more general terms, they show the extent to which citizens feel that those in power protect public interests or take advantage of their official positions to serve private interests. This aspect of corruption is covered by two indexes:

- Estimated spread of corruption. This index sums up respondents' assessments of the extent to which corruption permeates society (as well as individual institutions and occupational groups).
- Practical efficiency. This index sums up respondents' assessments of the extent to which corruption is an efficient problem-solving instrument. Efficiency is another indicator of the spread of corruption: a high rate of efficiency makes it worth resorting to corruption and implies that corruption is in fact a commonly used means of addressing problems.

### 4. Corruption-related expectations.

The corruption-related expectations reflect the degree of public confidence that the problem of corruption can be dealt with. In this sense, the expectations are the combined reflection of respondents' perception of the political will demonstrated by those in power and their assessment of the magnitude and gravity of the problem of corruption.

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## APPENDIX 2

### Corruption Indexes

**Table 1. Acts of Corruption**

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Jan '00</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>	<i>Oct '03</i>
<i>Personal involvement</i>	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4
<i>Corruption pressure</i>	1.3	1.2	1.5	0.8	1.4	1.4	1.0	1.4	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1

**Table 2. Value System and Moral Preconditions**

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Jan '00</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>	<i>Oct '03</i>
<i>Acceptability in principle</i>	1.3	1.4	1.7	1.3	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4
<i>Susceptibility to corruption</i>	2.9	2.7	2.8	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.5

**Table 3. Perceived Spread of Corruption**

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Jan '00</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>	<i>Oct '03</i>
<i>Perceived Spread of Corruption</i>	6.4	6.1	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.4	5.9	6.7	6.4	6.4	6.6	6.5
<i>Practical efficiency</i>	6.6	6.8	6.6	6.9	6.6	6.4	6.1	6.9	6.9	6.9	6.9	6.6

**Table 4. Corruption-Related Expectations**

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Jan '00</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>	<i>Oct '03</i>
<i>Corruption-related expectations</i>	5.5	5.5	5.4	5.6	4.9	5.1	5.2	5.6	5.9	5.8	5.6	5.6

APPENDIX 3

**Table 1.**

Assessments of the public importance of corruption as a problem of society by socio-demographic groups (October 2003; %)

	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<b><i>Financial situation</i></b>		
1 Poor	73.7	26.3
2	71.2	28.8
3	55.5	44.5
4	60.8	39.2
5 Wealthy	-	100.0
<b><i>Social status</i></b>		
1 Lowest social status	74.2	25.8
2	72.8	27.2
3	56.6	43.4
4	35.3	64.7
5 Highest social status	31.2	68.8
<b><i>Principal occupation at present</i></b>		
1 Managers, professors, specialists	44.6	55.4
2 Administrative officials, employed in the retail and services sectors	57.2	42.8
3 Technicians, workers, farmers	65.5	34.5
4 Housewives, retired, unemployed	74.3	25.7
5 Students	65.1	34.9
6 Other employment	60.2	39.8
<b><i>You live in:</i></b>		
1 Sofia	64.2	35.8
2 Large town	60.5	39.5
3 Small town	71.4	28.6
4 Rural area, village	75.1	24.9

**Table 2.**

Total amount of the informally paid bribes and/or gifts to public sector employees in the past 3 months (%)

	<i>January 2003</i>	<i>May 2003</i>	<i>July 2003</i>	<i>October 2003</i>
Up to 100 Leva	65.4	50.0	68.6	83.6
101 to 250 Leva	19.8	29.1	11.7	10.8
251 to 500 Leva	5.4	8.4	10.6	5.6
501 to 1000 Leva	8.2	3.8	9.2	-
1001 to 5000 Leva	1.1	7.5	-	-
Over 5000 Leva	-	1.2	-	-

*Base: Respondents from whom public sector employees asked for, or indicated they expected, money, a gift, or a favor (January N=95, May N=77, July N=71, October N=77)*

**Table 3.**

Corruption pressure by occupational group (%)

	<i>Apr</i> <i>'00</i>	<i>Sep</i> <i>'00</i>	<i>Jan</i> <i>'01</i>	<i>Oct</i> <i>'01</i>	<i>Jan</i> <i>'02</i>	<i>May</i> <i>'02</i>	<i>Oct</i> <i>'02</i>	<i>Jan</i> <i>'03</i>	<i>May</i> <i>'03</i>	<i>July</i> <i>'03</i>	<i>Oct</i> <i>'03</i>
University professors	-	-	-	-	-	-	11.9	14.7	11.8	21.5	16.6
Doctors	18.6	22.1	6.1	22.3	18.0	20.2	20.3	12.9	12.8	15.7	16.6
Customs officers	29.1	15.8	22.7	18.4	18.5	25.5	19.4	17.3	16.6	16.4	15.3
Police officers	19.5	24.0	18.9	18.5	19.9	15.2	22.3	12.0	14.1	17.8	13.9
Lawyers	-	-	-	-	-	-	26.5	10.5	17.4	13.1	13.8
Investigators	8.4	6.0	5.5	6.0	4.3	8.2	8.3	4.3	12.8	2.5	9.6
University officials	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.6	11.9	3.4	10.9	9.0
Administrative court officials	10.4	11.5	13.3	11.3	9.4	11.0	15.9	8.5	4.9	7.7	9.0
Judges	7.7	9.1	5.8	6.8	7.8	10.7	16.6	2.0	14.0	6.9	8.5
Businesspersons	11.9	9.7	11.6	13.4	10.8	9.4	9.6	7.0	9.1	13.6	8.3
Ministry officials	3.7	7.0	8.9	5.6	4.9	9.3	5.6	13.8	4.3	10.1	8.2
Municipal officials	11.7	10.3	11.2	11.3	10.0	5.5	10.9	4.4	8.4	6.9	6.4
Tax officials	7.8	8.3	6.4	9.1	5.3	3.8	4.2	4.1	3.1	3.7	5.9
Teachers	3.0	5.5	3.7	6.1	3.6	3.1	7.4	4.4	3.4	3.4	5.6
Ministers	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.3	-	3.3	3.4	4.8
Prosecutors	4.7	7.8	7.2	0.8	4.1	8.5	12.3	6.6	9.2	8.2	4.2
Bankers	1.8	2.9	4.1	4.1	4.1	5.6	3.9	5.1	9.9	1.2	4.2
Politicians and political party leaders	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.1	5.0	7.1	6.3	4.1
Mayors and councilors	5.6	3.2	2.1	1.4	2.0	2.7	5.3	3.0	4.1	3.4	3.3
NGO representatives	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.0	-	4.0	2.6	1.4
MPs	4.5	6.4	4.2	2.1	2.1	3.5	2.0	11.2	8.9	-	-
Journalists	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.8	1.4	-	-	-
University professors or employees	12.6	13.9	13.2	8.8	14.3	12.0	-	-	-	-	-

*\*Relative share of those who have had contacts with the respective group and have been asked for money, gifts, or favors*

**Table 4.**

Factors for the spread of corruption by socio-demographic groups – October 2003. (%)

	<i>Fast personal enrichment sought by those in power</i>	<i>Lack of strict administrative control</i>	<i>Intertwinement of official duties and personal interests</i>	<i>Imperfect legislation</i>	<i>Ineffectiveness of the judicial system</i>	<i>Officials' low salaries</i>
<b>Highest level of completed education</b>						
1 Less than primary	39.9	29.0	10.9	18.0	21.7	10.2
2 Primary	48.5	32.6	16.8	31.2	24.3	24.8
3 Elementary	57.9	40.9	31.4	31.0	28.9	19.4
4 Secondary	69.4	40.0	36.7	32.3	32.7	31.0
5 College	58.7	31.3	46.6	42.5	28.9	33.1
6 University	56.4	36.4	35.8	37.9	27.8	40.9
<b>Financial situation</b>						
1 Poor	58.1	37.0	28.6	30.3	25.1	23.4
2	66.5	42.1	36.0	33.7	32.8	25.4
3	60.5	34.5	35.6	33.7	32.9	38.8
4	63.6	44.3	37.5	46.6	9.1	27.2
5 Wealthy	100.0	100.0	-	100.0	-	-
<b>Social status</b>						
1 Lowest social status	56.6	36.5	31.1	29.9	23.5	20.0
2	67.2	41.5	35.5	32.7	35.4	27.3
3	60.6	36.4	36.5	34.6	30.6	39.6
4	60.8	45.1	26.1	52.5	32.3	22.0
5 Highest social status	68.8	62.4	37.6	31.2	-	31.2
<b>Principal occupation at present</b>						
Managers, professors, specialists	54.6	42.0	36.8	36.8	34.3	42.6
Administrative officials, employed in the retail and services sectors	57.6	38.7	39.6	34.0	27.7	39.4
Technicians, workers, farmers	60.4	43.2	39.5	30.7	32.5	25.7
Housewives, retired, unemployed	65.0	36.8	29.2	31.9	28.8	25.3
5 Students	54.7	32.0	34.1	31.4	38.7	32.4
6 Other employment	60.2	30.0	54.9	63.2	16.5	21.8
<b>You live in:</b>						
1 Sofia	57.5	41.1	28.0	33.8	26.6	43.6
2 Large town	63.5	37.5	38.7	37.4	31.9	30.4
3 Small town	59.0	42.3	40.2	25.9	27.8	24.2
4 Rural area, village	64.5	36.0	26.0	31.8	30.9	22.4

**Table 5.**  
Spread of corruption by occupational group

<i>Relative share of those who answered, "Nearly all and most are involved in corruption"</i>											
	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>	<i>Oct '03</i>
<b>Customs officers</b>	78.6	75.2	74.3	77.3	74.2	70.8	79.2	76.6	74.3	76.9	<b>74.5</b>
<b>Police officers</b>	50.5	54.3	51.0	53.7	47.0	50.7	59.6	57.7	57.7	61.4	<b>59.2</b>
<b>Judges</b>	56.0	50.1	50.6	56.4	55.0	50.8	63.0	62.2	59.6	61.8	<b>57.3</b>
<b>Lawyers</b>	51.9	52.9	50.3	55.0	55.5	52.5	62.3	60.1	60.0	57.5	<b>55.8</b>
<b>Prosecutors</b>	54.4	51.3	50.7	54.8	55.4	51.0	63.0	62.1	59.3	60.6	<b>55.7</b>
<b>MPs</b>	55.1	51.7	52.6	43.5	47.8	39.2	56.2	53.5	57.5	56.9	<b>54.5</b>
<b>Doctors</b>	40.9	43.6	27.0	46.8	45.7	52.3	54.9	51.0	49.8	53.4	<b>52.9</b>
<b>Ministers</b>	53.4	55.0	52.3	41.2	45.4	35.6	50.8	49.5	52.6	54.9	<b>52.6</b>
<b>Tax officials</b>	51.0	53.7	47.3	51.6	51.2	41.9	58.0	52.6	51.8	54.1	<b>49.3</b>
<b>Investigators</b>	48.0	43.8	43.5	48.4	48.0	43.1	57.5	55.4	53.6	55.4	<b>49.2</b>
<b>Businesspersons</b>	51.4	42.3	43.6	42.2	41.6	41.4	48.9	52.7	50.9	48.7	<b>47.6</b>
<b>Politicians and leaders of political parties and coalitions</b>	45.0	43.8	39.1	40.8	43.0	33.0	54.0	50.7	51.3	50.8	<b>47.6</b>
<b>Mayors and municipal councilors</b>	35.2	32.1	30.9	26.3	31.8	23.4	48.3	45.7	43.6	45.0	<b>43.4</b>
<b>Ministry officials</b>	55.1	49.7	43.9	45.8	47.1	36.7	48.3	44.6	44.4	45.1	<b>40.1</b>
<b>Bankers</b>	38.8	33.5	35.6	32.5	31.7	29.5	37.2	43.4	35.8	37.1	<b>37.3</b>
<b>Municipal officials</b>	46.5	41.6	35.9	39.6	39.4	30.0	49.1	40.9	39.8	42.2	<b>36.5</b>
<b>University professors and officials</b>	29.3	28.1	21.6	27.4	27.7	29.8	33.4* 23.1**	30.8* 20.0**	31.7* 19.0**	34.1* 21.2**	<b>36.5* 23.2**</b>
<b>Administrative court officials</b>	45.2	40.2	36.8	41.7	41.1	36.5	45.0	42.4	37.5	37.9	<b>33.5</b>
<b>NGO representatives</b>	18.2	23.9	18.2	19.8	21.8	15.3	21.4	20.2	21.0	21.6	<b>22.3</b>
<b>Journalists</b>	14.1	13.9	11.3	10.5	12.2	9.5	15.3	12.1	13.3	12.9	<b>14.6</b>
<b>Teachers</b>	8.2	10.9	5.8	9.3	9.7	9.8	13.9	9.8	11.6	10.9	<b>11.0</b>
<b>Local political leaders</b>	36.4	36.8	34.2	35.1	34.4	27.1	-	-	-	-	-

\* Assessment of the spread of corruption among university professors

\*\* Assessment of the spread of corruption among university officials



**Table 6.**

“If you have an important problem and an official directly asks you for money to solve it, what would you do?” (Distribution by socio-demographic group – October 2003; %)

	<i>I will always pay</i>	<i>I will pay if I can afford it</i>	<i>I won't pay if I can solve the problem by some other means</i>	<i>I will never pay</i>	<i>DK/NA</i>
<b>Highest level of completed education</b>					
1 Less than primary	2.7	23.5	10.9	52.3	10.6
2 Primary	2.5	17.0	14.2	57.7	8.6
3 Elementary	1.1	18.3	28.1	47.8	4.6
4 Secondary	3.1	22.0	41.8	29.5	3.6
5 College	-	25.5	40.4	34.1	-
6 University	4.2	17.8	43.5	27.3	7.2
<b>Financial situation</b>					
1 Poor	1.9	19.0	26.7	47.3	5.1
2	2.1	20.2	38.5	33.5	5.7
3	3.4	22.5	43.7	28.1	2.3
4	8.5	29.6	35.8	26.1	-
5 Wealthy	100.0	-	-	-	-
<b>Social status</b>					
1 Lowest social status	1.9	18.1	25.7	49.1	5.1
2	1.9	22.4	35.8	34.0	5.9
3	4.2	20.4	44.4	28.9	2.1
4	-	19.6	64.7	12.7	3.0
5 Highest social status	31.2	37.6	-	31.2	-
<b>Principal occupation at present</b>					
Managers, professors, specialists	3.9	17.4	48.2	29.3	1.2
Administrative officials, employed in the retail and services sectors	4.9	22.3	44.6	25.7	2.5
Technicians, workers, farmers	1.2	23.8	45.4	26.8	2.8
Housewives, retired, unemployed	2.2	19.6	28.2	43.7	6.3
5 Students	3.0	19.2	40.2	34.6	2.9
6 Other employment	8.2	15.6	44.7	31.5	-
<b>You live in:</b>					
1 Sofia	4.6	18.2	35.2	35.9	6.1
2 Large town	2.0	17.3	44.9	32.2	3.6
3 Small town	2.3	23.4	33.1	36.9	4.4
4 Rural area, village	2.2	22.9	28.2	41.0	5.7