

CORRUPTION MONITORING OF
COALITION 2000

July 2003



2. METHODOLOGY

Sample: All of the surveys referred to in the present paper were based on two-stage cluster sampling. Universe: the country's adult population. Sample size:

	Fieldwork period	Size of the sample
1.	February 1999	1143
2.	April 1999 ã.	1122
3.	September 1999	1110
4.	January 2000	1144
5.	April 2000	1161
6.	September 2000	1158
7.	January 2001	1037
8.	October 2001	971
9.	January 2002	1148
10.	May 2002	1170
11.	October 2002	1079
12.	January 2003	1107
13.	May 2003	1077
14.	July 2003	1057

Method of registration: Face-to-face interview.

Fieldwork: 06/24/2003 – 07/04/2003

1. PUBLIC IMPORTANCE OF CORRUPTION

The problems perceived by the population to be the gravest ones have remained unchanged in recent years. *Unemployment, low incomes, and poverty* have become an invariable part of Bulgarians' lives and are perceived as fundamental problems of present-day Bulgaria. Ranked immediately behind them, corruption is identified as a significant negative social phenomenon. In two months alone its importance in the eyes of the general public increased by 4 points, marking the highest rise and reaching its highest values since October 2002. (Figure 1)


Public opinion appears increasingly concerned about the presence of political instability. It is yet to be established whether this is basically an emotional reaction to the current political events in the state or the beginning of a tendency of deepening public sensitivity on this issue.

It should be noted that the perceived importance of crime is generally moving in the opposite direction, dropping by 4 points.

The general ranking of the major problems faced by Bulgarian society essentially remains unchanged compared to May 2003.

Figure 1.

Relative importance of the problems faced by society (July 2003, %)




Base: All respondents (N=1057)

The population's assessment of the importance of the problem of corruption appears stable set against the dynamics of the media coverage of the subject. It turns out that these two are not directly correlated, which suggests the presence of other, more powerful factors shaping popular perceptions and assessments. (Figure 2)

Figure 2.

Dynamics of media coverage of corruption and assessments of the relative public importance of corruption as a social problem



The people with a higher financial and social standing are more inclined to consider corruption a particularly important problem. This implies that they are probably confronted more often with corrupt practices. (Appendix 3, Table 1).

2. LEVEL OF CORRUPTION

When considering the level of corruption it is important to distinguish between the cases when “something” has been directly or indirectly requested or offered by either the officials or the citizens, and the number of actual corruption deals. The distinction between the so-called “real” and “potential” corruption is important because, regardless of whether or not an act of corruption is actually committed, the very “corruption offer” is itself part of the mechanism that reproduces corruption.

The level of real corruption is measured through the average monthly incidence of acts of corruption in which the citizens have self-reportedly been involved. Potential corruption refers to the sum of all instances when the citizens have been under corruption pressure (when the respective official asked for “something”).

REAL CORRUPTION

Although it cannot be measured with absolute precision, the actual number of acts of corruption in the course of the past one month directly corresponds to the rate of personal involvement of the respondents in various forms of corrupt behavior. Their self-reported involvement in such practices is reflected in the *Acts of Corruption Index*.


In view of the specific nature of the information summed up by this index, as well as public sensitivity to questions concerning the admission of such acts, it is hardly surprising that the values of this indicator have traditionally been the lowest of all other corruption indexes.

The values of the Acts of Corruption Index since the beginning of 2003 can be defined as relatively stable. They moreover appear to have settled at a low level when viewed in the context of the entire period of the monitoring of corruption. (Figure 3)

In fact, however, the average number of citizens who have been involved in acts of corruption in the course of the past month has increased by more than 12,000 and whereas it used to be about 87,770 in May 2003, two months later it reached 99,840¹ (1.56% of the adult population of the country), i.e. an average monthly incidence of at least 99,840 actual corruption deals.

Figure 3.

Level of corruption (min=0, max=10)




Base: All respondents

¹ This estimate is based on the data from the population census of March 2001, according to which the population aged 18 and over is 6,417,869, and 1% of the sample corresponds to 64,180 people.

Since the beginning of the current year there has been a significant decrease in the number of cases of *corruption pressure* (instances when officials directly asked for, or indicated they expected, a bribe). In contrast to this tendency, the incidence of *acts of corruption* (the bribes given in the form of money, gifts, or favors) has risen, reaching its highest values since the beginning of 2003. (Figure 4)

Figure 4.

Average annual number of solicited and actually concluded corruption deals



The majority of the corruption deals concluded involved total amounts of up to 250 Leva. Similarly to the business community, which displays increasing reluctance to pay large sums of money, as of July 2003 there were no citizens who, in the past 3 months, had paid more than 1,000 Leva in order to obtain certain services. (Appendix 3, Table 2)

On the other hand, since the beginning of 2003 bribery involving amounts ranging between 251 and 1,000 Leva has been on the rise.

POTENTIAL CORRUPTION

The pressure exerted directly or indirectly by public sector employees over citizens in order to obtain money, gifts, or favors has been characterized by relative stability since the beginning of 2003. (Figure 3)

The over six-month-long period of stability of the level of potential corruption may imply that a minimum of sorts has been reached and any drop below it would indicate that more serious anti-corruption measures have been undertaken.

CORRUPTION PRESSURE BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

Notwithstanding the stability of the general indicator (the Corruption Pressure Index) there have been certain internal shifts in the positions of the various occupational groups exerting pressure over the population. (*Appendix 3, Table 3*)

The changes have been most significant in the sphere of higher education. Compared to the previous survey, the share of those who said *university professors* had directly or indirectly stated (indicated) they expected money, a gift, or a favor, has increased twofold. This has actually brought this occupational group in the lead among all other groups of public sector employees. In addition, the share of those who claim they have experienced corruption pressure from *university officials* also increased.

Unlike the opinions about *customs officers*, which hardly vary at all, the population's assessments regarding most of the other occupational groups are dynamic. It is these changes that account for the latest shifts within the general ranking compared to the survey of May 2003.

The citizens who have had contacts with representatives of the judicial system considered the *administrative court officials* more likely to initiate acts of corruption than the magistrates – *judges, prosecutors, and investigators*. Public pressure and media exposure have probably affected the conduct of the judicial system representatives. Corruption pressure by all of the groups appeared to have declined in the relatively short time span between the two surveys. Even *lawyers*, perceived as the occupational group exerting the strongest corruption pressure over citizens in the May 2003 survey, were now placed in a more favorable position by the respondents.

A higher number of acts of corruption appeared to have been initiated by *police officers, ministry officials, doctors, and businesspersons*.

IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS


The population's evaluations of government action to curb corruption are characterized by instability. Whereas two months ago a more positive attitude was demonstrated with regard to the measures aimed at business and lower-ranking officials, in July 2003 public opinion again became more negatively inclined. It should be borne in mind that one of the factors shaping these evaluations is people's actual confrontation with corrupt practices. The higher average number of concluded corruption deals is understandably accompanied by heightened popular mistrust in the government's capacity to reduce corruption.

The larger share of those who have paid informally smaller amounts (up to 250 Leva) once more directs the attention to "small-scale" corruption and the lower-ranking officials, leading to more negative evaluations of government efforts in this respect. (*Figure 5*)

Public trust in the government has declined most substantially with regard to the efforts to limit corruption among businesspersons.

Figure 5.

Perceived impact of the government's anti-corruption measures *



* Relative share of those who answered, "The government is not doing anything"


3. EXPECTATIONS REGARDING THE CURBING OF CORRUPTION

Notwithstanding the higher average number of concluded corruption deals and the generally stronger disapproval of government action, on the whole the population demonstrates greater optimism regarding society's capacity to cope with corruption. (Figure 6)

The fact that a new more optimistic outlook seems to be emerging among Bulgarians despite increasing corruption in this country, suggests that, after a period of despair, the public now anticipates certain changes in public and political space in this country that might have a positive impact in terms of curbing corrupt practices.

Figure 6.

Corruption-related expectations (min=0 max=10)



Base: All respondents

3. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION


PERCEIVED SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

Popular perceptions of the spread of corruption demonstrate certain cyclic patterns – the lowest values are typically registered in the summer months, when political life quiets down. The related problems, among which corruption, tend to give way to other popular concerns. (Figure 7)

Unlike previous years, however, this year the problem of corruption remained highly relevant in the context of the government reshuffles and the built-up negative upshots of its policy. The latest survey registered one of the highest values of the index reflecting the perceived spread of corruption.

Figure 7.

Spread of corruption (min=0 max=10)



Base: All respondents

PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY OF CORRUPTION

Unlike the opinions about the spread of corruption, popular perceptions of its practical efficiency demonstrate a clear-cut tendency – since October 2002 these have remained unchanged at their highest level for the period monitored. (Figure 7).

This lack of change is alarming since it points to the fact that, as well as an effective means of addressing problems, corruption is persistently perceived as a “normal”, if informal, mode of interaction between citizens and public officials.

The “trivialization” of corruption – as a subject of public discourse and a habitual practice accompanying administrative services – is a dangerous phenomenon threatening to undermine the anti-corruption efforts made to date.

Regardless of the intensive media coverage on the subject, there still lack effective mechanisms for prompt punishment of corrupt officials. Furthermore, the attitude still predominates that informal payments successfully “fix” arising problems. These are the principal factors maintaining the image of corruption as a not quite legal, but highly expedient and generally tolerated practice.

SPREAD OF CORRUPTION BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

Despite the drop in the perceived spread of corruption by occupational groups in January and May 2003, an examination of the full data from the monitoring shows that the highest values have been registered in the period since October 2002. (*Appendix 3, Table 5*)

The latest survey registered a rise in the perceived spread of corruption in most occupational groups with the exception of *lawyers, MPs and politicians, businesspersons, journalists, and teachers*.

For the remaining groups the registered increase was more substantial with regard to *police officers, tax officials, doctors, and university professors and officials*.

Customs officers, the representatives of the judicial system, and police officers were again placed in the lead. They were joined by *MPs and ministers*. It is worth noting that some of the highest values since the beginning of the monitoring were registered by the July 2003 survey regarding *police officers, university professors, and ministers* (*Appendix 3, Table 5*).

An examination of the tendencies over the longer term shows that some of the occupational groups by now have a firmly established image as “highly corrupt” unlike others, which in fact exert considerable corruption pressure. The former comprise *politicians, ministers, and MPs*, with whom citizens have little contact, with very few cases of actually experienced corruption pressure. Yet they are persistently perceived as highly corrupt.


The situation is similar as regards the representatives of the judiciary – *judges, prosecutors, and investigators*. Along with the widely discussed judicial reforms, the media equally deal extensively with the corruptibility of the magistrates and officials working in the court system. In fact, however, only the image of the *lawyers* matches the actual corruption pressure they exert over citizens. As for the other occupations related to the administration of justice, the real pressure exerted over the citizens who have had contacts with them is far weaker than popularly assumed (*Appendix 3, Tables 3 and 5*).

In contrast, *university professors and officials, as well as doctors*, preserve their image as highly ethical representatives of humane professions despite the registered very high values for corruption pressure exerted over the citizens.

These discrepancies are largely due to the exposure and treatment of the subject of corruption in the mass media. 48% of the people form their opinions based on information received from the *media*. Another major source are *conversations with friends and business partners*, followed by the *observed discrepancy between officials' low incomes and their high standard of living*. *Personal experience* plays a minor role in shaping respondents' perceptions – barely 8.9% referred to it (*Figure 8*).

Figure 8.

Relative share of the factors shaping the perceived spread of corruption



Base: All respondents

SPREAD OF CORRUPTION BY INSTITUTIONS

The perceived spread of corruption has risen with regard to all types of institutions, with the exception of the *Presidency*, *Privatization Agency*, and *Ministry of Internal Affairs*.

A more notable increase was registered in the case of *customs*, *the prosecution*, and *the investigation service* (*Table 1*).

Table 1.

“In your opinion, how widespread is corruption in the following institutions?”

(Respondents could give up to five answers under “Spread of corruption in general” and up to three answers under “Ministries and state agencies” and “Judicial system”, which is why the percentages do not sum up to 100)

	May 2002	October 2002	January 2003	May 2003	July 2003
Spread of corruption in general					
In Customs. Among customs officers.	33.2	30.4	53.3	50.0	54.1
In court. In the judicial system. In the system of justice. Among lawyers.	23.5	28.5	48.2	42.9	45.3
In the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (including Traffic Police, the investigation service)	20.6	19.9	28.6	30.6	30.9
In the healthcare system. In medical care. In the National Health Service.	25.6	20.6	27.3	27.6	30.9
In the higher ranks of power (Parliament, the Presidency, the Government). Among the political elite.	24.1	30.3	24.7* 23.1** 1.3***	27.6* 27.5** 2.5***	28.5* 28.2** 1.7***
Ministries and state agencies					
Ministry of Justice	15.0	18.1	33.5	31.0	32.1
Customs Agency	12.6	10.9	31.2	31.2	31.5
In all ministries and state agencies	-	-	19.6	21.8	24.6
Privatization Agency	22.0	22.5	27.2	24.7	21.8
Ministry of Internal Affairs	16.2	15.3	18.4	19.0	18.5
Judicial system					
Throughout the judicial system	3.5	5.4	33.5	34.4	33.3
The courts, the administration of justice	29.1	32.1	27.5	29.1	32.5
Prosecution	26.2	32.0	26.2	25.3	30.0
Lawyers, notaries public	15.3	16.2	24.9***** 7.4*****	21.8***** 8.0*****	22.5***** 7.4*****
Criminal investigation service	15.7	15.7	18.4	17.6	21.5

* Spread of corruption in the government / among ministers / among deputy ministers;

** Spread of corruption in the National Assembly / among MPs;

*** Spread of corruption in the presidency/ among officials at the presidency;

**** Spread of corruption among lawyers;

***** Spread of corruption among notaries public.

FACTORS FAVORING THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

Traditionally singled out as a major factor accounting for the spread of corruption, in the latest survey *fast personal enrichment sought by those in power* marked its highest values since the beginning of the monitoring (Table 2). Since October 2002 there has been a tendency towards deepening disapproval of those in power who are increasingly perceived as corrupt and striving after *personal gain through their public office*.

Table 2.

Relative share of the major factors accounting for the spread of corruption in this country (%)

	Apr '99	Sep '99	Jan '00	Apr '00	Sep '00	Jan '01	Oct '01	Jan '02	May '02	Oct '02	Jan '03	May '03	July '03
Fast personal enrichment sought by those in power	52.9	54.8	57.0	33.6	57.8	60.8	59.2	58.6	58.6	58.4	60.3	58.5	61.7
Imperfect legislation	38.8	37.8	35.1	13.6	40.5	39.1	38.0	43.0	39.7	39.2	34.9	38.0	40.9
Ineffectiveness of the judicial system	19.6	27.5	24.7	11.8	22.2	27.2	28.5	32.3	31.2	38.0	31.2	34.1	37.1
Lack of strict administrative control	36.4	33.8	30.8	-	32.3	31.8	35.2	34.5	38.9	34.5	32.3	31.2	33.7
Intertwinement of official duties and personal interests	25.8	28.3	28.3	-	32.6	25.8	31.7	26.7	26.9	28.8	29.1	30.6	31.6
Low salaries	51.5	43.6	47.2	20.9	41.6	33.7	32.3	38.5	36.0	36.6	31.2	27.6	28.9
Moral crisis in the period of transition	19.4	19.4	18.2	9.8	17.0	18.9	21.1	18.3	16.3	13.2	15.8	15.6	14.4
Specific characteristics of Bulgarian national culture	6.9	4.7	5.9	-	4.2	5.9	4.4	5.3	4.3	4.9	5.7	7.0	7.2
Problems inherited from the communist past	6.8	7.4	7.3	1.8	7.8	4.4	5.8	5.0	6.9	6.3	4.4	3.6	4.3

Base: All respondents

Although all of the factors marked an increase compared to May 2003, the tendency is particularly conspicuous with regard to the *ineffectiveness of the judicial system*. This factor has been rising in importance since January 2002 and has now reached an all-time high level. Together with the *imperfect legislation* and the *lack of strict administrative control* it forms the second group of important factors conducive to corruption.

Two of the factors – the *low salaries of public sector employees* and the *problems inherited from the communist past* have gradually been declining in importance as explanatory models of corruption. A similar evolution is observed with regard to the *moral crisis in the period of transition*, which has been declining steadily, though at a slower rate.

An interesting development is the rising importance of the factor “*Specific characteristics of Bulgarian national culture*”. It would seem that, in the course of time and with the exhaustion of some of the “objective” explanatory mechanisms, such as the low salaries, society is beginning to look for other models of interpretation and explanation of corruption.

4. VALUE SYSTEM AND MORAL PRECONDITIONS FOR CORRUPTION


ACCEPTABILITY IN PRINCIPLE

Regardless of the actual level of corruption, since the beginning of the current year there has been a marked tendency towards increasing non-tolerance and moral rejection of corruption (*Figure 9*).

A certain “weariness” is emerging with the tacit agreement with public sector employees that the additional, informal payments are the means to obtain speedy and high-quality public services. With the improving remuneration in the public sector and the gradual establishment of the mechanisms of civil society, people are becoming increasingly intolerant of abusive public officials and employees.

Figure 9.

Preconditions for the presence of corruption (min=0, max=10)



Base: All respondents

SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CORRUPTION

The susceptibility to corruption pressure has been on the decline over the long run, though far more hesitantly than the moral acceptability of corruption (*Figure 9*). Even if they do not condone it, citizens are still inclined to resort to corruption when they urgently need to address a certain problem.

Besides moral considerations, the susceptibility to corruption depends on certain objective factors, as well. When unable to find an alternative solution to their problem, those with higher education and better financial situation are ready to pay the requested unofficial price. Quite often it saves them far greater amounts or at the very least, precious time.

In contrast, the respondents with a lower education level and more limited financial resources – housewives, the retired, the unemployed – often cannot afford to pay the requested sum at all, quite apart from any moral considerations. They quite firmly stated they would not pay under any circumstances (*Appendix 3, Table 6*).

The interplay of various factors, subjective attitudes and assumptions makes corruption a complex phenomenon whose irreversible curbing calls for a versatile approach and systematic, consistent measures.

APPENDIX 1

Theoretical framework

The Corruption Indexes summarize the basic indicators used by the Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of *Coalition 2000*. Each index sums up several questions posed to the respondents and allows comparative analysis over time. The Corruption Indexes assume values from 0-10. The closer the value of the indexes is to 10, the more negative are the assessments of the current state of corruption in Bulgaria. Index numbers closer to 0 indicate approximation to the ideal of a “corruption-free” society.

The Corruption Indexes are based on a system of indicators exploring corruption-related behavior and attitudes. The theoretical model of corruption underlying the CMS surveys distinguishes between the following aspects and elements of corruption:

1. Acts of corruption.

The acts of corruption fall into two basic types: giving a bribe and accepting a bribe. These occur in two basic kinds of situations: 1.) when citizens offer a bribe to get something they are entitled to by law (“greasing the wheels”), and 2.) when citizens offer a bribe to get something they are not entitled to by law. The registered frequency of acts of corruption shows the level of corruption in this country. The phrasing of the questions is essential when measuring the values of this index. In this respect CMS builds on a number of principles meant to ensure neutrality, objectivity, and anonymity: 1.) instead of using the term “bribe”, the questions refer to the “offer of money, gift, or favor”; 2) the questions focus on whether or not respondents did make such an “offer” and the latter are not asked to provide information concerning how much and whom they paid, etc., in order to have their problem addressed; 3) besides information about the “offer” of bribes, respondents are asked about the incidence of bribe solicitation, i.e., the amount of pressure exerted by public officials.

The Corruption Indexes formed on this basis are the following:

- Personal involvement. This index records the incidence of cases of “offer of money, gift, or favor” in order to have a problem solved as reported by the citizens themselves. Essentially this index registers the level of real corruption in this country over a given period of time.
- Corruption pressure. This index records the incidence of cases when citizens were reportedly asked for “money, gift, or favor” in order to have a problem solved. It measures the level of potential corruption in this country over a given period of time.

It should specifically be noted that the indicators concerning acts of corruption do not reflect evaluations, opinions, or perceptions, but the self-reported incidence of definite kinds of acts. This type of indicators underlies the methodology of the victimization surveys, which have a long history and are used to assess the real crime level in a given country. The term “real” is essential since for a number of reasons not all crimes are registered by the police and only part of those reported to the police actually end up in court.

2. Value system and moral preconditions.

Although they do not directly determine the level of corruption, the value system and moral principles have a significant influence on citizens’ behavior. Of the numerous indicators in this area, CMS monitors the following corruption-related attitudes: 1.) the level of toleration of various forms of

corruption; 2.) the degree of awareness of the various types of corruption; 3.) citizens' inclination to resort to corrupt practices in order to address arising problems.

The Corruption Indexes produced on this basis are the following:

- Acceptability in principle. This index measures the toleration of a range of corrupt practices by MPs and ministry officials.
- Susceptibility to corruption. The index sums up a series of questions intended to assess citizens' inclination to resort to corruption in addressing their daily problems.

Both of the indexes from this group reflect assessments and opinions. Their positive dynamics are indicative of growing rejection of corruption and the reinforcement of moral norms proscribing involvement in acts of corruption.

3. Estimated spread of corruption.

Citizens' subjective assessments of the spread of corruption reflect the general social environment and prevailing outlook on corruption, as well as the related image of the institutions and basic occupational groups under the three branches of power. These assessments do not directly reflect the level of corruption since they are the outcome of perceptions and impressions produced by the ongoing public debate, media coverage of corruption, personal preconceptions, etc. In more general terms, they show the extent to which citizens feel that those in power protect public interests or take advantage of their official positions to serve private interests. This aspect of corruption is covered by two indexes:

- Estimated spread of corruption. This index sums up respondents' assessments of the extent to which corruption permeates society (as well as individual institutions and occupational groups).
- Practical efficiency. This index sums up respondents' assessments of the extent to which corruption is an efficient problem-solving instrument. Efficiency is another indicator of the spread of corruption: a high rate of efficiency makes it worth resorting to corruption and implies that corruption is in fact a commonly used means of addressing problems.

4. Corruption-related expectations.

The corruption-related expectations reflect the degree of public confidence that the problem of corruption can be dealt with. In this sense, the expectations are the combined reflection of respondents' perception of the political will demonstrated by those in power and their assessment of the magnitude and gravity of the problem of corruption.

APPENDIX 2

Corruption Indexes

Table 1. Acts of Corruption

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Jan '00</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>
<i>Personal involvement</i>	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4
<i>Corruption pressure</i>	1.3	1.2	1.5	0.8	1.4	1.4	1.0	1.4	1.0	1.0	1.0

Table 2. Value System and Moral Preconditions

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Jan '00</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>
<i>Acceptability in principle</i>	1.3	1.4	1.7	1.3	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.4
<i>Susceptibility to corruption</i>	2.9	2.7	2.8	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.6

Table 3. Perceived Spread of Corruption

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Jan '00</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>
<i>Perceived Spread of Corruption</i>	6.4	6.1	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.4	5.9	6.7	6.4	6.4	6.6
<i>Practical efficiency</i>	6.6	6.8	6.6	6.9	6.6	6.4	6.1	6.9	6.9	6.9	6.9

Table 4. Corruption-Related Expectations

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Jan '00</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>
<i>Corruption-related expectations</i>	5.5	5.5	5.4	5.6	4.9	5.1	5.2	5.6	5.9	5.8	5.6

APPENDIX 3

Table 1.

Assessments of the public importance of corruption as a problem of society by socio-demographic groups (July 2003; %)

	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Financial situation</i>		
1 Poor	71.9	28.1
2	62.3	37.7
3	53.3	46.7
4	55.7	44.3
5 Wealthy	-	100.0
<i>Social status</i>		
1 Lowest social status	73.9	26.1
2	63.0	37.0
3	51.5	48.5
4	44.2	55.8
5 Highest social status	-	100.0
<i>Principal occupation at present</i>		
1 Managers, professors, specialists	42.0	58.0
2 Administrative officials, employed in the retail and services sectors	57.3	42.7
3 Technicians, workers, farmers	53.4	46.6
4 Housewives, retired, unemployed	71.7	28.3
5 Students	44.4	55.6
6 Other employment	50.4	49.6
<i>You live in:</i>		
1 Sofia	55.5	44.5
2 Large town	50.0	50.0
3 Small town	64.4	35.6
4 Rural area, village	79.5	20.5

Table 2.

Total value of the informally paid bribes and/or gifts to public sector employees in the past 3 months (%)

	<i>January 2003</i>	<i>May 2003</i>	<i>July 2003</i>
Up to 100 Leva	65.4	50.0	68.6
101 to 250 Leva	19.8	29.1	11.7
251 to 500 Leva	5.4	8.4	10.6
501 to 1000 Leva	8.2	3.8	9.2
1001 to 5000 Leva	1.1	7.5	-
Over 5000 Leva	-	1.2	-

Base: Respondents from whom public sector employees asked for, or indicated they expected, money, a gift, or a favor. (January N=95, May N=77, July N=71)

Table 3.

Corruption pressure by occupational group (%)

	<i>Apr</i> <i>'00</i>	<i>Sep</i> <i>'00</i>	<i>Jan</i> <i>'01</i>	<i>Oct</i> <i>'01</i>	<i>Jan</i> <i>'02</i>	<i>May</i> <i>'02</i>	<i>Oct</i> <i>'02</i>	<i>Jan</i> <i>'03</i>	<i>May</i> <i>'03</i>	<i>July</i> <i>'03</i>
University professors	-	-	-	-	-	-	11.9	14.7	11.8	21.5
Police officers	19.5	24.0	18.9	18.5	19.9	15.2	22.3	12.0	14.1	17.8
Customs officers	29.1	15.8	22.7	18.4	18.5	25.5	19.4	17.3	16.6	16.4
Doctors	18.6	22.1	6.1	22.3	18.0	20.2	20.3	12.9	12.8	15.7
Businesspersons	11.9	9.7	11.6	13.4	10.8	9.4	9.6	7.0	9.1	13.6
Lawyers	-	-	-	-	-	-	26.5	10.5	17.4	13.1
University officials	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.6	11.9	3.4	10.9
Ministry officials	3.7	7.0	8.9	5.6	4.9	9.3	5.6	13.8	4.3	10.1
Prosecutors	4.7	7.8	7.2	0.8	4.1	8.5	12.3	6.6	9.2	8.2
Administrative court officials	10.4	11.5	13.3	11.3	9.4	11.0	15.9	8.5	4.9	7.7
Judges	7.7	9.1	5.8	6.8	7.8	10.7	16.6	2.0	14.0	6.9
Municipal officials	11.7	10.3	11.2	11.3	10.0	5.5	10.9	4.4	8.4	6.9
Politicians and political party leaders	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.1	5.0	7.1	6.3
Tax officials	7.8	8.3	6.4	9.1	5.3	3.8	4.2	4.1	3.1	3.7
Mayors and councilors	5.6	3.2	2.1	1.4	2.0	2.7	5.3	3.0	4.1	3.4
Teachers	3.0	5.5	3.7	6.1	3.6	3.1	7.4	4.4	3.4	3.4
Ministers	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.3	-	3.3	3.4
NGO representatives	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.0	-	4.0	2.6
Investigators	8.4	6.0	5.5	6.0	4.3	8.2	8.3	4.3	12.8	2.5
Bankers	1.8	2.9	4.1	4.1	4.1	5.6	3.9	5.1	9.9	1.2
MPs	4.5	6.4	4.2	2.1	2.1	3.5	2.0	11.2	8.9	-
Journalists	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.8	1.4	-	-
University professors or employees	12.6	13.9	13.2	8.8	14.3	12.0	-	-	-	-

** Relative share of those who have had contacts with the respective group and have been asked for money, gifts, or favors*

Table 4.

Factors for the spread of corruption by socio-demographic groups – July 2003. (%)

	<i>Fast personal enrichment sought by those in power</i>	<i>Imperfect legislation</i>	<i>Ineffectiveness of the judicial system</i>	<i>Lack of strict administrative control</i>	<i>Officials' low salaries</i>
<i>Highest level of completed education</i>					
1 Less than primary	46.4	9.4	13.7	18.8	13.1
2 Primary	49.4	19.6	20.3	24.5	20.3
3 Elementary	66.7	36.3	39.2	40.6	18.2
4 Secondary	63.8	43.9	40.8	32.1	36.2
5 College	51.5	55.4	40.7	54.8	15.4
6 University	57.4	53.6	35.8	31.4	34.3
<i>Financial situation</i>					
1 Poor	63.3	32.4	31.5	28.8	26.0
2	64.0	42.2	42.5	37.3	26.3
3	57.6	50.3	36.6	35.0	36.1
4	21.5	44.3	53.9	34.1	42.0
5 Wealthy	100.0	-	-	100.0	100.0
<i>Social status</i>					
1 Lowest social status	60.8	32.8	34.2	29.4	25.4
2	67.7	40.5	39.2	37.2	28.1
3	56.2	50.7	38.5	36.3	34.4
4	50.2	53.3	48.9	25.8	40.1
5 Highest social status	100.0	-	-	100.0	100.0
<i>Principal occupation at present</i>					
1 Managers, professors, specialists	52.0	61.2	40.2	36.1	24.8
2 Administrative officials, employed in the retail and services sectors	57.8	41.0	33.8	39.2	34.9
3 Technicians, workers, farmers	63.9	47.0	42.9	31.4	31.3
4 Housewives, retired, unemployed	63.9	35.6	35.5	34.9	25.8
5 Students	49.4	51.5	45.8	33.0	46.1
6 Other employment	51.2	44.9	33.8	25.0	40.5
<i>You live in:</i>					
1 Sofia	50.8	40.3	29.5	37.9	40.4
2 Large town	61.5	47.6	42.4	34.4	30.6
3 Small town	64.1	35.6	39.8	36.9	26.6
4 Rural area, village	64.6	37.6	32.9	29.2	24.1

Table 5.

Spread of corruption by occupational group

<i>Relative share of those who answered, "All and nearly all are involved in corruption"</i>										
	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>
Customs officers	78.6	75.2	74.3	77.3	74.2	70.8	79.2	76.6	74.3	76.9
Judges	56.0	50.1	50.6	56.4	55.0	50.8	63.0	62.2	59.6	61.8
Police officers	50.5	54.3	51.0	53.7	47.0	50.7	59.6	57.7	57.7	61.4
Prosecutors	54.4	51.3	50.7	54.8	55.4	51.0	63.0	62.1	59.3	60.6
Lawyers	51.9	52.9	50.3	55.0	55.5	52.5	62.3	60.1	60.0	57.5
MPs	55.1	51.7	52.6	43.5	47.8	39.2	56.2	53.5	57.5	56.9
Investigators	48.0	43.8	43.5	48.4	48.0	43.1	57.5	55.4	53.6	55.4
Ministers	53.4	55.0	52.3	41.2	45.4	35.6	50.8	49.5	52.6	54.9
Tax officials	51.0	53.7	47.3	51.6	51.2	41.9	58.0	52.6	51.8	54.1
Doctors	40.9	43.6	27.0	46.8	45.7	52.3	54.9	51.0	49.8	53.4
Politicians and leaders of political parties and coalitions	45.0	43.8	39.1	40.8	43.0	33.0	54.0	50.7	51.3	50.8
Businesspersons	51.4	42.3	43.6	42.2	41.6	41.4	48.9	52.7	50.9	48.7
Ministry officials	55.1	49.7	43.9	45.8	47.1	36.7	48.3	44.6	44.4	45.1
Mayors and municipal councilors	35.2	32.1	30.9	26.3	31.8	23.4	48.3	45.7	43.6	45.0
Municipal officials	46.5	41.6	35.9	39.6	39.4	30.0	49.1	40.9	39.8	42.2
Administrative court officials	45.2	40.2	36.8	41.7	41.1	36.5	45.0	42.4	37.5	37.9
Bankers	38.8	33.5	35.6	32.5	31.7	29.5	37.2	43.4	35.8	37.1
University professors	29.3	28.1	21.6	27.4	27.7	29.8	33.4* 23.1**	30.8* 20.0**	31.7* 19.0**	34.1* 21.2**
NGO representatives	18.2	23.9	18.2	19.8	21.8	15.3	21.4	20.2	21.0	21.6
Journalists	14.1	13.9	11.3	10.5	12.2	9.5	15.3	12.1	13.3	12.9
Teachers	8.2	10.9	5.8	9.3	9.7	9.8	13.9	9.8	11.6	10.9
Local political leaders	36.4	36.8	34.2	35.1	34.4	27.1	-	-	-	-

* *Assessment of the spread of corruption among university professors*** *Assessment of the spread of corruption among university officials*

Table 6.

“If you have an important problem and an official directly asks you for money to solve it, what would you do?” (Distribution by socio-demographic group – July 2003; %)

	<i>I will always pay</i>	<i>I will pay if I can afford it</i>	<i>I won't pay if I can solve the problem by some other means</i>	<i>I will never pay</i>	<i>DK/NA</i>
<i>Highest level of completed education</i>					
1 Less than primary	3.0	3.4	16.5	50.8	26.3
2 Primary	-	9.3	23.1	59.5	8.1
3 Elementary	0.3	26.2	26.5	39.9	7.1
4 Secondary	1.2	24.8	41.4	25.7	6.9
5 College	4.2	7.9	28.4	49.2	10.3
6 University	1.4	12.2	48.6	34.2	3.6
<i>Financial situation</i>					
1 Poor	0.8	20.7	23.8	46.8	7.9
2	1.0	21.7	36.4	32.7	8.1
3	1.0	20.8	50.7	22.4	5.1
4	-	22.2	55.7	11.9	10.2
5 Wealthy	100.0	-	-	-	-
<i>Social status</i>					
1 Lowest social status	0.9	19.5	24.3	48.4	6.9
2	1.0	22.8	34.2	34.0	8.1
3	1.0	21.5	51.0	21.1	5.4
4	-	16.8	45.8	32.8	4.6
5 Highest social status	100.0	-	-	-	-
<i>Principal occupation at present</i>					
1 Managers, professors, specialists	-	6.9	50.0	36.1	6.9
2 Administrative officials, employed in the retail and services sectors	1.2	22.5	40.6	29.5	6.2
3 Technicians, workers, farmers	2.4	27.8	38.5	27.3	4.0
4 Housewives, retired, unemployed	0.5	20.0	31.1	39.8	8.6
5 Students	-	32.9	53.2	5.7	8.2
6 Other employment	1.7	16.1	49.8	29.0	3.3
<i>You live in:</i>					
1 Sofia	1.7	24.1	48.5	23.3	2.4
2 Large town	0.9	18.2	40.9	31.9	8.1
3 Small town	0.9	18.5	35.5	38.1	7.0
4 Rural area, village	1.0	25.1	26.2	39.4	8.3