Corruption Indexes

Regional Corruption Monitoring
in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Yugoslavia

April 2002

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The Southeast European Legal Development Initiative (SELDI) was launched in late 1998. It was initiated by the Center for the Study of Democracy and the International Legal Development Institute, Rome. The Southeast European Legal Development Initiative brings together the efforts of various government organizations and experts from different countries of Southeast Europe. It creates opportunities for cooperation between the most active public institutions and public figures, the governments, and international agencies in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Yugoslavia.

Conducting the Regional Monitoring of Corruption is an essential part of SELDI activity.

The present report outlines the chief findings of the Regional Monitoring of Corruption based on two independent representative surveys conducted in February 2001 and February 2002. Opinion polls were administered in seven countries of Southeast Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The methodology was based on the Corruption Monitoring System of *Coalition 2000*. The main goal of the analysis is to demonstrate the public significance of the problem of corruption and the degree of its penetration in the various social structures, institutions, and groups, both on a comparative level, among the individual countries in the Balkan Peninsula, and in terms of their dynamics.

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Sample Size

National representative survey of the population aged 18+ in each country.

Sample Size by country	*2001*	*2002*
Albania	1001	1037
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1000	1000
Bulgaria	1158	1149
Macedonia	1000	1000
Romania	1000	1044
Croatia	1000	1000
Serbia	976	1003
Montenegro	604	563

Survey method

The survey method used was face-to-face interview.

Field work

2001	15.09.2000 – 13.02 2001
2002	03.01.2002 – 08.02.2002

CORRUPTION INDEXES

- Corruption indexes assume values from 0-10.

- The closer the value of the indexes is to 10, the more negative are the assessments of the respective aspect of corruption. Index numbers closer to 0 indicate approximation to the ideal of a "corruption-free" society.

- Corruption indexes have been grouped into several categories:
    - Attitudes towards corruption;
    - Corrupt practices;
    - Assessment of the spread of corruption;
    - Corruption-related expectations.

MAIN PROBLEMS FACED BY THE BALKAN COUNTRIES.

Table 1. Main problems in the countries of SEE

	Albania		Bosnia and Herzegovina		Bulgaria		Macedonia		Romania		Croatia		Serbia		Montenegro	
	2001	*2002*	*2001*	*2002*	*2001*	*2002*	*2001*	*2002*	*2001*	*2002*	*2001*	*2002*	*2001*	*2002*	*2001*	*2002*
Unemployment	44.4	44.8	60.9	60.9	67.8	68.9	75.3	58.2	39.5	33.9	66.0	78.5	30.3	38.0	53.1	51.1
Low incomes	39.3	40.8	39.6	39.3	49.0	47.0	62.0	26.7	41.3	49.4	39.1	44.2	39.2	33.6	35.6	37.2
Poverty	24.4	28.2	29.8	31.9	41.5	42.7	-	43.9	50.6	57.4	31.6	28.7	39.7	44.4	34.8	43.4
Corruption	*60.8*	*68.4*	*47.6*	*48.3*	*37.5*	*35.1*	*35.1*	*31.2*	*59.9*	*59.9*	*41.7*	*41.1*	*37.2*	*37.3*	*30.8*	*35.9*
Crime	36.0	24.6	32.9	32.8	25.7	32.9	27.6	23.9	10.2	12.5	33.5	30.4	44.1	41.4	31.5	30.1
High prices	24.0	23.3	10.9	13.9	22.4	20.9	25.4	7.8	35.6	35.6	27.3	18.4	24.7	24.0	21.2	17.7
Health Care	3.7	2.3	9.9	9.5	14.0	17.2	7.2	1.7	17.4	15.4	7.1	8.9	8.7	9.8	4.0	2.0
Political instability	49.6	46.0	37.0	33.9	17.0	13.1	33.2	55.9	29.9	11.6	20.1	28.7	47.8	35.3	59.3	57.7
Education	3.9	3.2	4.6	4.8	2.1	1.8	3.7	0.8	7.9	8.8	4.4	4.1	6.3	7.8	4.5	3.9
Environment pollution	5.2	3.6	3.8	3.1	2.7	1.5	6.0	1.0	1.6	3.2	2.8	3.5	2.5	5.6	4.8	2.7
Ethnic problems	3.0	2.4	15.6	17.1	1.7	1.4	14.9	40.7	2.4	1.6	7.0	3.6	10.2	8.2	8.6	5.2
Other	0.9	4.4	1.8	1.3	1.9	4.5	0.5	0.9	1.1	1.5	2.1	3.1	0.6	1.8	1.5	3.0
DK/NA	0.2	0.8	0.3	0.7	1.6	0.5	3.0	1.2	0.2	2.7	1.6	1.7	1.1	1.9	1.8	0.3

MAIN PROBLEMS FACED BY THE BALKAN COUNTRIES:

- Over the one-year period, the chief problems faced by the Balkan states were still marked by the general social and economic crisis of the transition (Table 1). Unemployment permanently emerges as one of the main obstacles to the normal functioning of nearly all of the states surveyed. Next come social phenomena such as the low living standard, poverty, and high prices, which, though to different extent in the individual countries, clearly indicate how public opinion assesses the level of development of the Balkans.
- A corruption permanently settle among the foremost problems cited and increasingly appears to affect all of the countries in the region. The high ranking of corruption suggests that despite the launch of a sweeping campaign to limit its scope, public opinion still does not seem to detect any tangible results.
- In comparative terms, there appear some substantial differences in public attitudes to corruption. Thus for instance, in Albania and Romania public opinion ranks this problem first, whereas in Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, corruption comes only fourth or fifth by importance.
- The dynamics of public opinion on corruption in the individual countries displays similar differences. In the course of one year, the share of the Albanian citizens ranking corruption among the gravest problems faced by their country has increased by nearly 10%, while in the remaining countries such an increase has either not appeared at all (Romania, Croatia, Serbia), or is confined to a mere 1-2 percent.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS CORRUPTION

Acceptability in Principle

This index reflects the extent to which various corrupt practices are tolerated within the value system.

This index generally preserves its low values of the past year in the countries of the Balkan region. Individually, the levels registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, as well as the increasing value of the "acceptability in principle" index in Serbia, suggest that in these countries corrupt practices are perceived as morally admissible in higher measure compared to the remaining countries of the region. In this respect Albania has made the most serious progress in the one-year period.

In 2002 the index value is lowest in Bulgaria, dropping by 0.3 points compared to the previous year. This is not only indicative of the moral rejection of corruption, but may actually be the first tangible result of the anti-corruption campaign under way.

**FIGURE 1. ACCEPTABILITY IN PRINCIPLE**

Susceptibility to corruption

This index measures citizens' inclination to compromise on their values under the pressure of circumstances.

In 2002 this index continued to have higher values than the previous one (acceptability in principle). The tendency is observable in all of the countries surveyed. This actually comes to confirm the view that despite the formal denunciation of corruption, its role as an effective instrument for addressing private problems is still quite important.
On the whole, however, with the exception of Albania, toleration of corruption within the personal moral and value system is lower compared to the previous period monitored.

FIGURE 2. SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CORRUPTION

INVOLVEMENT IN CORRUPT PRACTICES

Corruption pressure

This index measures the incidence of attempts by public officials to exert direct or indirect pressure on citizens in order to obtain money, gifts, or favors.

What is common under this index is that in the Balkan context engaging in corrupt behavior is rather motivated by consciously pursued gains, individual economic or institutional interests, or even practical necessity, than the outcome of overt social pressure by the "corruptive agents" in the public sector.

In the course of the one-year period, the index retained its relatively low values and even displayed a tendency towards decline. The exceptions are Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to some extent, Romania, where the degree of open coercion on the part of public officials has risen.

FIGURE 3. CORRUPTION PRESSURE

Corruption pressure

TABLE 2. "IF IN THE COURSE OF THE PAST YEAR IF YOU HAVE BEEN ASKED FOR SOMETHING IN ORDER TO HAVE A PROBLEM OF YOURS SOLVED, YOU WERE ASKED BY:"

	Albania		Bosnia and Herzegovina		Bulgaria		Macedonia		Romania		Croatia		Serbia		Montenegro	
	2001	*2002*	*2001*	*2002*	*2001*	*2002*	*2001*	*2002*	*2001*	*2002*	*2001*	*2002*	*2001*	*2002*	*2001*	*2002*
Police officer	52.00	54.13	25.70	30.49	24.00	19.90	14.40	17.31	34.00	25.23	24.80	16.51	42.40	45.68	38.40	39.50
Customs officer	55.60	54.88	15.90	16.20	15.80	18.55	21.80	25.32	20.50	29.60	10.50	7.36	42.80	52.60	21.60	29.67
Doctor	62.60	51.78	19.90	22.77	22.10	17.96	20.20	23.93	35.10	34.38	16.60	11.47	33.60	39.08	19.50	18.87
University professor or official	29.00	27.85	9.80	11.11	13.90	14.29	16.30	14.43	15.00	12.97	8.40	4.70	17.20	26.61	8.70	10.12
Businessman	30.50	12.77	8.50	12.96	9.70	10.77	13.20	14.08	17.80	18.59	16.10	10.71	31.60	30.35	15.80	14.45
Municipal official	52.50	50.67	19.10	22.91	10.30	9.96	11.90	19.67	26.90	19.70	11.30	8.27	27.20	25.12	19.30	20.79
Adm. official in the judicial system	47.00	40.04	9.90	11.65	11.50	9.38	10.60	10.00	22.30	16.49	6.70	6.15	19.40	16.92	9.40	7.99
Judge	53.10	44.31	8.30	9.15	9.10	7.80	13.70	15.53	16.60	13.70	5.80	5.97	19.30	26.24	7.00	7.65
Tax official	56.80	50.43	8.80	12.19	8.30	5.29	8.90	24.08	10.60	7.98	6.60	3.45	22.00	23.49	13.30	17.24
Official at a ministry	39.40	37.34	13.90	12.97	7.00	4.92	13.20	14.90	10.30	5.61	8.40	5.05	15.40	16.59	7.20	7.58
Investigating officer	32.70	35.23	10.10	9.39	6.00	4.27	6.60	5.34	10.60	10.91	10.90	4.73	15.30	24.30	8.20	5.14
Public prosecutor	39.60	27.40	3.80	4.80	7.80	4.07	8.10	4.39	10.30	6.48	2.30	1.66	12.00	20.16	4.30	4.35
Banker	19.60	9.71	3.60	4.11	2.90	4.07	5.40	4.28	7.80	9.03	5.10	2.71	13.40	12.35	3.30	4.78
Teacher	15.40	10.60	5.70	5.41	5.50	3.60	6.70	8.71	12.70	14.63	4.50	2.39	11.70	19.81	5.90	5.55
Member of parliament	31.20	19.00	2.50	4.86	6.40	2.08	7.80	20.57	4.50	2.53	0.60	1.08	7.10	8.59	0.90	4.55
Municipal councilor	38.90	33.24	6.90	8.92	3.20	2.05	7.80	13.07	12.40	10.76	6.50	3.34	10.20	12.05	2.50	5.40

*Relative share of those who have had contacts with the respective group and have been asked for cash, gifts or favors.

Corruption pressure

- At the present stage public opinion in the Balkan countries places doctors and those vested with official authority (police and customs officers, tax, municipal, and court officials) among the occupational groups exerting the strongest pressure over the citizens (Table 2). This is a persistent tendency from the last period monitored, when the same groups held the leading positions among the most corrupt occupations.
- With regard to the individual professional groups, there emerge considerable differences between the countries surveyed. In Albania, in nearly all of the cases the most corrupt groups were cited by more than half of the respondents. This fact was also registered last year. A similar distribution is observable in Serbia. This suggests the formation of lasting popular perceptions of the occupations where corruption is most widespread.

Involvement in corrupt practices

The index reflects the self-assessed involvement of the respondents in various forms of corrupt behavior.

In terms of the personal involvement in corrupt practices of the citizens of the Balkan republics, the year 2002 displays several more notable tendencies. Above all, in most of the countries surveyed there has been a noticeable decline in index values. The change is most drastic in Albania, where the index value fell by almost a full point.

At the same time, the index values doubled in Macedonia. There have clearly emerged certain factors (for instance, the general political instability in the country and the mounting ethnic tension) that have affected Macedonians' inclination to resort to acts of corruption in order to have their problems solved.

Overall, however, the index levels in all eight countries remain low, which indicates that corruption is essentially sustained by a limited in number, yet consistent, group of citizens who have realized the social efficiency of corrupt practices.

FIGURE 4. INVOLVEMENT IN CORRUPT PRACTICES

ASSESSMENT OF THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

Spread of corruption

This index registers citizens' assessments of the spread of corrupt practices among public sector employees.

The evolution of the index displays several notable characteristics. In general, its values in all of the countries surveyed are the highest compared to the remaining indexes, which is a tendency carrying on from last year. In comparative terms, the most pronounced deviations occur in Macedonia and Montenegro, where the estimations of the rate of corruption have risen sharply. At the same time, in the remaining countries there has been a noticeable change in a favorable direction, except for Bulgaria, where assessments of the spread of corruption remain almost unchanged.

These empirical facts, notwithstanding certain country-specific characteristics, suggest the following conclusions: first, public opinion perceives the corruption as largely pervading public space; and secondly, there is hardly reason to expect any radical curbing of corruption in the countries of the region in the foreseeable future.

FIGURE 5. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

TABLE 3. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

	Albania		Bosnia and Herzegovina		Bulgaria		Macedonia		Romania		Croatia		Serbia		Montenegro	
	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002
Those in power striving at making fast money	49.00	54.05	41.90	44.50	57.80	58.57	69.10	66.3	55.6	52.4	49.90	40.7	46.80	46.42	53.00	52.24
Imperfect legislation	28.80	27.17	42.20	45.20	40.50	42.99	14.20	17.5	38.7	41.5	35.50	41.2	35.20	34.61	22.20	19.93
Low salaries of the officials in the public sector	67.50	61.21	50.50	53.20	41.60	38.47	56.20	56.1	58.0	55.5	48.70	41.6	52.60	43.88	53.60	59.20
Missing strict administrative control	40.60	40.67	27.90	27.20	32.30	34.46	17.10	22.9	30.9	27.6	24.10	27.1	21.50	24.87	22.70	24.45
Inefficiency of the judicial system	19.50	20.41	32.50	35.90	22.20	32.29	37.90	41.3	33.8	30.3	33.10	47.5	24.60	28.94	19.20	17.39
Office duties interfering with the personal interests of the officials	33.30	36.39	17.50	18.30	32.60	26.72	23.50	15.1	17.9	20.2	9.70	11.5	28.70	24.66	23.70	29.70
Crisis of morals in the period of transition	24.50	20.01	30.50	32.60	17.00	18.28	23.00	25.9	26.5	21.3	36.20	31.8	37.20	31.95	50.00	45.57
Secularities of the (country's) national culture	7.60	6.00	19.70	20.00	4.20	5.31	9.00	7.3	5.2	6.4	5.30	23.4	15.90	19.16	16.60	12.98
Communist past legacy	20.70	19.59	17.10	13.30	7.80	4.96	11.80	10.7	18.0	18.3	22.20	18.8	19.20	15.94	12.70	9.50
Other	1.30	1.02	0.70	0.80	1.00	0.87	0.70	0.9	0.6	1.2	0.60	1.2	1.10	1.19	3.00	0.14
DK/NA	0.70	3.15	3.90	1.70	7.20	5.83	13.70	6.3	3.1	7.4	2.90	5.1	3.10	3.65	4.00	3.76

Factors influencing the Spread of corruption

- In general terms, the main corruption-generating factors in a given country are of a socio-economic character and are associated both with the personal morality and conduct of the susceptible public officials, and with the legitimacy of the State in the eyes of the citizens. The "low salaries factor" continues to be in the lead in most of the countries surveyed (except Bulgaria), and has moved up by importance in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro compared to 2001. The same group of factors also comprises the imperfect legislation, inadequate control over public officials, and malfunctioning judicial system (Table 3).
- The influence of moral and ethical norms in terms of the generation and spread of corruption can be referred to another group of factors. In some of the countries surveyed, this is a critical issue. Those are Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the rest, including Bulgaria, citizens tend to attribute the high rate of corruption largely to socio-economic factors.

TABLE 4. "ACCORDING TO YOU, HOW WIDESPREAD IS CORRUPTION AMONG THE FOLLOWING GROUPS:"

	Albania		Bosnia and Herzegovina		Bulgaria		Macedonia		Romania		Croatia		Serbia		Montenegro	
	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002
Customs officers	86.6	89.8	58.8	62.2	75.2	74.15	72.2	83.1	63.4	54.9	51.3	51.5	80.9	77.8	61.9	63.42
Lawyers	70.6	58.9	41.0	46.5	52.9	55.53	42.2	44.7	55.2	49.5	45.3	44.6	55.7	60.6	36.9	33.43
Public prosecutors	70.9	64.3	37.8	41.2	51.3	55.35	39.4	50.2	49.3	41.3	29.6	36.6	56.8	48.9	32.5	37.76
Judges	80.1	74.4	42.6	43.7	50.1	55.00	49.2	52.9	55.7	50.1	38.4	47.3	63.7	55.4	37.7	42.02
Tax officials	79.0	80.1	54.4	59.7	53.7	51.26	52.3	75.0	49.0	32.5	40.6	48.0	63.5	54.6	44.7	47.19
Investigating officers	52.7	51.4	44.5	48.2	43.8	48.04	29.8	44.9	45.3	35.1	28.0	41.9	57.0	48.7	33.0	38.27
Members of parliament	61.8	60.4	47.5	46.6	51.7	47.78	60.8	77.0	65.9	54.5	33.1	41.4	45.9	43.9	31.0	39.33
Officials at ministries	66.2	66.2	52.5	54.3	49.7	47.08	47.5	52.5	54.5	44.2	47.0	46.7	56.1	42.8	42.5	48.52
Police officers	56.4	65.6	46.5	59.2	54.3	47.00	46.3	53.9	64.4	55.3	47.3	47.5	73.2	66.7	50.7	50.97
Doctors	71.6	61.2	48.9	58.3	43.6	45.78	45.4	47.8	54.4	52.4	53.2	47.6	62.9	70.2	45.0	57.11
Ministers	67.8	76.5	54.2	54.4	55.0	45.34	61.0	77.5	58.0	45.1	37.3	40.5	55.3	46.1	41.9	52.26
Political party and coalition leaders	54.7	44.3	56.0	60.6	43.8	42.99	44.6	64.4	53.7	45.8	39.4	43.5	58.1	60.0	40.7	51.07
Business people	42.6	38.7	41.1	41.4	42.3	41.60	34.1	41.0	45.4	44.4	41.3	39.8	63.9	56.8	50.3	49.66
Adm. officials in the judicial system	63.0	60.6	41.6	42.4	40.2	41.17	31.0	36.1	51.6	40.6	32.8	40.4	50.3	42.7	33.3	35.80
Municipal officials	69.1	64.4	51.4	56.4	41.6	39.34	36.8	39.1	47.9	45.6	48.1	48.0	60.1	50.3	47.0	45.18
Local political leaders	49.6	42.6	54.7	62.6	36.8	34.38	39.1	57.7	48.0	40.0	41.9	48.0	56.9	58.3	41.9	46.84
Municipal councilors	55.2	55.5	46.2	46.2	32.1	31.77	33.4	36.3	43.1	40.2	27.7	40.7	45.0	41.8	31.1	33.19
Bankers	24.4	17.8	31.9	32.1	33.5	31.68	19.7	24.2	44.8	36.9	34.0	26.6	49.2	44.2	34.9	32.84
University officials or professors	46.0	32.1	35.7	37.6	28.1	27.68	42.9	42.7	24.7	21.8	40.4	31.3	39.1	41.5	25.7	32.31
Representatives of NGOs	23.1	16.4	26.3	25.8	23.9	21.76	16.5	23.4	17.8	15.3	14.2	14.8	25.8	28.8	29.8	27.97
Journalists	18.8	14.8	24.3	24.8	13.9	12.27	17.1	17.0	22.1	15.4	22.8	20.3	34.0	30.7	36.3	46.80
Teachers	11.6	10.4	20.9	22.1	10.9	9.75	18.7	22.7	20.4	17.5	19.3	16.2	28.5	33.4	18.0	20.59

Spread of corruption by professional groups

- In 2002 the assessments of the rate of corruption in the individual occupational groups generally preserved their structure of the previous year. Notwithstanding some differences among the various states, there definitely begin to emerge certain "problematical" occupational groups that can be considered the main "agents of corruption". Those are generally the customs officers, those engaged in law-enforcement and the administration of justice (judges, prosecutors, investigators), and, with some exceptions, the representatives of the executive.
- Public opinion appears divided regarding doctors and police officers. In Serbia and Montenegro they have been ranked among the most corrupt professional groups, whereas in the remaining countries they tend to be placed in the middle of the rating.
- Found at the bottom of this rating are journalists, teachers, and NGO representatives. This empirical fact is observable in all of the countries surveyed and is characteristic of both of the periods monitored (Table 4).

TABLE 5. "ACCORDING TO YOU, HOW WIDESPREAD IS CORRUPTION IN THE FOLLOWING INSTITUTIONS:"

	Albania		Bosnia and Herzegovina		Bulgaria		Macedonia		Romania		Croatia		Serbia		Montenegro	
	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002
Customs	8.84	8.99	7.88	7.81	8.9	8.95	8.8	8.84	8.6	8.22	6.90	7.07	8.68	8.52	8.2	7.85
Privatization Agency	7.56	7.34	7.36	7.66	8.06	8.57	8.08	8.24	8.68	8.16	7.70	7.30	7.46	7.70	7.44	7.07
Judiciary	8.48	8.33	6.74	7.11	7.6	8.21	7.38	7.86	8.02	7.86	6.66	7.00	7.78	7.57	6.58	6.80
Agency for Foreign Investment	6.04	7.60	6.46	6.33	7.54	7.75	7.86	8.02	6.64	6.40	6.84	-	-	7.51	-	8.00
Tax offices	8.36	8.59	7.66	7.89	7.54	7.72	7.72	8.22	7.48	6.93	6.74	6.93	7.88	7.57	7.38	7.32
Industry line ministries	7.6	8.11	7.14	7.14	7.5	7.34	7.82	8.76	7.98	7.60	6.94	6.48	7.76	7.40	6.96	6.94
Police	7.24	7.64	6.96	7.47	7.14	7.22	7.12	7.44	7.78	7.64	6.98	7.05	8.08	7.88	7.24	7.36
Parliament	7.38	7.13	7.32	7.12	7.42	7.18	7.84	8.18	8.18	7.54	5.92	6.09	7.04	6.27	6.08	6.25
Committee on Energy	7.18	-	6.3	6.36	7.0	7.08	-	7.03	6.64	6.35	6.86	6.51	6.8	7.43	5.62	6.78
Municipal government	7.54	7.81	7.56	7.75	6.94	7.01	6.94	7.11	7.4	7.38	7.10	6.95	7.38	7.22	7.18	6.90
Commission for the Protection of Competition	-	6.03	6.84	6.46	6.54	7.00	-	8.25	6.38	6.11	6.42	6.27	-	6.79	-	2.00
Government	8.1	8.40	7.78	7.56	7.44	6.87	8.06	8.58	7.96	7.40	6.28	6.04	7.32	6.31	6.86	6.60
Municipal administration	7.5	7.70	7.32	7.57	6.54	6.73	6.5	6.65	7.38	7.13	6.80	6.80	7.24	6.91	7.12	6.71
Securities and Stock Exchanges Commission	6.62	7.10	6.7	6.52	6.46	6.73	-	7.59	7.28	6.94	6.46	5.85	-	6.39	-	-
National Telecommunication Company	6.9	6.62	6.28	6.57	6.6	6.63	6.28	6.52	6.74	6.38	6.72	5.96	6.26	6.85	5.5	5.51
Audit Office	7.18	7.27	7.06	6.88	5.98	6.07	-	7.82	5.96	6.32	6.26	5.94	6.26	5.92	5.82	6.43
National Bank	5.56	5.62	6.44	6.09	5.72	5.49	5.92	5.68	5.7	5.42	6.02	5.13	6.58	5.77	6.08	6.45
Army	5.92	5.33	4.78	5.21	4.98	5.13	4.4	5.67	4.9	4.95	5.98	5.68	5.42	4.85	5.88	5.08
National Statistical Institute	4.3	4.47	5.36	5.04	5.02	4.68	4.38	4.59	4.48	4.58	4.58	4.11	5.46	4.68	4.78	5.19
Presidency	6.1	5.59	7.18	7.03	4.52	4.63	4.72	5.72	6.36	5.42	4.66	4.20	7.68	5.79	-	5.52

* Scores close to 1 correspond to low spread of corruption,those close to 10 to highest degree of proliferation.

Spread of corruption among institutions

- The structure of the estimated institutional spread of corruption largely reproduces the assessments of the individual occupational groups (Table 4). Even in 2002 Customs and the Privatization Agencies remain among the chief centers of corruption, with only slight changes in the average rating of these institutions compared to 2001 (Table 5). The other traditional focal points of corruption, such as the judicial system, tax services, and the foreign investment agencies, are assessed differently depending on country-specific characteristics. Thus for instance, the court system is deemed most corrupt in Albania and Romania. In Bulgaria there has been a sharp increase in popular distrust of this institution, with the level in 2002 being almost as high as the one registered in Albania.
- The Army and the National Statistical Institutes are generally the institutions where corruption is deemed least widespread. With some exceptions (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia), the Presidency can also be referred to the group of institutions with a traditionally low rate of corruption.

Practical efficiency of corruption

This index shows citizens' assessments of the extent to which corruption is becoming an efficient means of addressing personal problems.

In terms of the practical efficiency of corruption, the one-year period is marked by declining values in nearly all of the Balkan countries surveyed. Macedonia constitutes the only exception from this tendency. On the whole, however, it is only a slight decline and the index values generally remain high. This indicates that in the Balkan societies corruption continues to be perceived as an efficient mechanism of addressing problems and a convenient way of bypassing the bureaucracy.

In this sense, it should be noted that corruption could hardly be limited without changing the environment in which it is propagating and restricting the factors conducive to it.

FIGURE 6. PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY OF CORRUPTION

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
CORRUPTION EXPECTATIONS

This index registers citizens' assessments of the capacity (potential) of their societies to cope with the problem of corruption.
The survey conducted in January 2002 registered popular pessimism and doubts as to the ability of the state to deal with the problem of corruption. More specifically, the index values have increased substantially in Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia compared to a year earlier. This implies that with respect to the corruption climate popular trust in the state is seriously undermined in these countries.
The high values of this index in general indicate that the changing individual attitudes to corruption and the realization of the gravity of this problem for modern society are not sufficient factors to produce a tangible impact and contain corruption as a negative social problem.

FIGURE 7. CORRUPTION EXPECTATIONS