

**NATO TRANSFORMATION –
FACING NEW SECURITY FRONTIERS**

April 28-29, 2006

Sofia, Bulgaria

The present publication summarizes the discussions at the International Security Conference “*NATO Transformation – Facing New Security Frontiers*” held on April 28-29, 2006 in Sofia, Bulgaria. The conference’s discussions benefited from the participation of the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivailo Kalfin, Assistant Secretary General of NATO Ambassador Adam Kobieracki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Borys Tarasyuk, Prime Minister, PISK, Kosovo Agim Çeku, senior officials from Southeast European and EU countries, Ukraine, USA, Japan, representatives of international organizations and aid agencies, diplomatic missions, academic institutions and non-governmental organizations.

The 2006 conference was the fourth in the series of annual CSD security conferences which in previous years included the high level event “*Shaping a Common Security Agenda for Southeast Europe: New Approaches and Shared Responsibilities*”, held in September 2003 in Sofia with the participation of NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and Bulgarian and SEE officials; the International Security Conference “*NATO, EU and the New Risks: A Southeast Europe Perspective*” held on October 29-30, 2004 in Sofia with the participation of NATO’s Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Alessandro Minuto Rizzo and Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister Plamen Panayotov; and the International Security Conference “*Security Risks and Transformation – Euroatlantic and Regional Perspectives*” held on November 19-20, 2005 in Sofia, Bulgaria with the participation of the Bulgarian Prime Minister Sergey Stanishev, Supreme Allied Commander Europe General James Jones, Bulgarian and SEE, Russian, Ukrainian, US and EU countries, officials.

The conference was a NATO Flagship Event and generated further debate regarding the adjustment that is already taking place in NATO and the member states towards the changing conditions and the following necessary actions for the security in the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans. The conference promoted further political, professional and academic debate on NATO’s transformation thus helping the outlining of bold new policies, overcoming legacy relationships and transatlantic divides.

Center for the Study of Democracy
5, Alexander Zhendov Str., 1113 Sofia
Tel. (+359 2) 971 3000
Fax: (+359 2) 971 2233
csd@online.bg
www.csd.bg

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THE ORGANIZERS



**CENTER FOR
THE STUDY OF
DEMOCRACY**

Founded in late 1989, the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) is an interdisciplinary public policy institute dedicated to the values of democracy and market economy. The Center achieves its objectives through policy research, process monitoring, drafting of legislation, dissemination and advocacy activities and building partnerships, local and international networks.

In recent years CSD has focused its efforts on the linkages between a more traditional rule of law agenda and the newly emerging threats to both security and development in Bulgaria and Southeast Europe. Among these, smuggling and the international operations of organized crime pose one of the most serious threats to security and prosperity in the region and thus warrant the attention of a wider community of stakeholders. CSD has been promoting the establishment of public-private partnerships in this area both in Bulgaria and internationally. Its pioneering studies of the role of corruption in the trafficking of commercial goods in Bulgaria have brought about changes in government policies increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement. This method allows policy makers to identify weak spots in border controls and design responses that target the latest developments in the techniques used by organized crime. In addition to its policy analysis and recommendations work CSD is providing training assistance to the government in enhancing the anti-corruption capacity in the security sector.

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AGENDA

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
**NATO TRANSFORMATION – FACING NEW SECURITY
FRONTIERS**

April 28–29, 2006

Boyana Conference Center, Sofia, Bulgaria

Friday, April 28

15.45

Opening



Dr. Oginan Shentov
Chairman, Center for the Study of Democracy

**First Panel: NATO's transformation – an agenda for the 2006 Summit.
Towards a common definition of new security frontiers.**



Panel chair

Amb. Boyko Noev

First Panel (continued)



Ivailo Kalfin
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria



Amb. Adam Kobieracki
Assistant Secretary General, Operations, NATO



Robert McFarlane
Former National Security Advisor, US

Discussion

16.45

Coffee break

17.00

Second panel: Partnerships in managing common security challenges



Dr. Horst Teltschik
Chairman, Munich Conference on Security Policy



Amb. Shohei Naito, Ambassador of Japan
to Belgium

Discussion

20.00

Dinner hosted by Mr. Ivailo Kalfin
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria

Saturday, April 29

15.15

Third panel: Political strategies for the Balkans and the wider Black Sea area



Panel Chair

Minister (ret.) Michael Durkee



Borys Tarasyuk

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine



Agim Çeku

Prime Minister, PISK, Kosovo

Third panel (continued)

Pjer Šimunović
National Coordinator for NATO, Croatia



Araz Azimov
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Azerbaijan



Theodosios Georgiou
Chairman, Greek Association for Atlantic and
European Cooperation

11.00

Coffee break

Discussion

12.00

Closing remarks

12.30

Lunch

CONFERENCE OVERVIEW

The international conference “*NATO Transformation – Facing New Security Frontiers*” was a follow-up to the April 2006 NATO Ministerial Meeting hosted by the government of Bulgaria. The conference contributed to the broader debate on NATO’s transformation and helped outline bold new policies, overcoming legacy relationships and transatlantic divides.

The discussion focused on the future partnerships in managing common security challenges and longer-term political strategies for the Balkans and the wider Black Sea area. One of the main topics of the conference, addressed in one way or another by all participants, was the effort to work out a common definition of the new security frontiers. Two main aspects of this effort were focused on—geographical and functional.

From the point of view of geography, the importance of the different NATO partnerships was emphasized. Currently they encompass mainly the regions adjacent to NATO, but as security issues become increasingly global, the Alliance would need to consider ways to establish special links with countries that share its values and/or actively contribute to its operations, no matter how far these countries are situated. Enhancing the partnership approach should not come at the expense of increased bureaucracy but should rather focus on bringing added value and flexibility. Ties to new partners should not diminish the importance of the existing partnerships, nor should they encapsulate the partnerships into a group of like-minded states and societies.

From the point of view of the functional dimensions of security, it is obvious that the security frontiers have been moved as well. A political transformation is accompanying military transformation in NATO in response to shifts from one type of threat—a massive invasion—to a variety of asymmetric risks and threats coming from different sources and directions and interacting in often unpredictable ways. The purpose of political transformation is to increase the role of NATO as a forum for political dialogue on all security issues that concern the Euro-Atlantic community. NATO currently deals with peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, with fight against terrorism and security sector reform as well as with scientific cooperation, public diplomacy and political consultations.

It is crucial for the Alliance to go beyond the intergovernmental approach and reach out to other types of partners. Projection of stability is key for NATO’s future role in international security and it requires new, adequate capabilities but also partnering with various allies in critical regions. NATO alone cannot succeed in, for example, giving the Balkans or Afghanistan the democratic, multi-ethnic and economically

vibrant statehood that is indispensable for long-term stability. To achieve this goal requires the help of many other public and private institutions.

One much discussed new challenge to international stability is energy security. The importance of international cooperation to protect critical energy infrastructure was highlighted during the conference. The global energy systems are vulnerable and disruption of critical infrastructure could have a variety of political, social and military implications.

A four-point agenda was outlined for the NATO and the European Union as regards alternative fuels: providing incentives for building hybrid-electric vehicles; converting to flexible-fuel vehicles; providing incentives for using carbon composite materials. Further, a focused contingency planning is required in cases of, for example, disruptions of oil supplies. An emphasis was made on this being a collective—even an Article 5—security issue that demands and justifies the urgent focus of NATO.

SPEECHES

Dr. Ognian Shentov

Chairman, Center for the Study of Democracy

Today's forum is the fourth in the series of CSD's annual security conferences held in Sofia. It continues the tradition of contributing to the synergy of two processes: on the one hand, the enhanced integration of the new member states into NATO as a system of collective security and on the other hand, the broader process of NATO transformation necessitated by the various new elements of global instability.

By general recognition, individual states have not yet managed to adapt their institutions to the post-Cold War international realities and there remains a significant gap between the actual and the potential capabilities of NATO to promote the collective security interests of its member states. This is the reason why the 2006 NATO Summit is expected to provide answers to the critical challenges to the 21st century security environment.

Some of the solutions are related to finding better mechanisms for achieving consensus on NATO's role in specific situations threatening the international community. Despite sometimes conflicting views of the member states on whether NATO should be relied upon in specific crises, the new threats to global security demand a new measure of responsibility for collective security issues. Consensus over the gravest of them can only be achieved by a much needed involvement in the debate of new member states such as Bulgaria.

NATO should find ways to remain a reliable guarantor of international security, which is no longer defined by the old geographical or functional dimensions. As aggression today transcends national boundaries and is manifested in new flexible forms—the most extreme of which are terrorist acts—it should be countered through equally flexible and comprehensive approaches. Therefore, it is vital to strengthen the dialogue beyond the EAPC format, extending cooperative initiatives also to major states in the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific. The democratic values shared by some of these states are a sound basis for extending this dialogue in the future.

I am extremely pleased to note that besides attracting many of the new democracies as NATO members, the Alliance evolves by engaging in further partnerships to multiply the resources for maintaining regional and global stability. This process calls for wider involvement of civil society actors in the debates on security priorities and on where security policy belongs in the modern democratic world. In this respect, I would like to point out that the Center for the Study of Democracy has made public-private partnerships a priority in its work as a key to the successful handling of contemporary security issues.

Ivailo Kalfin

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria

Excellencies,

Dear guests,

In the wake of the biggest NATO event that Bulgaria has hosted so far, I would like to welcome those of you, who have just arrived and start with a brief overview of what I consider to have been a substantial and fruitful, although informal, discussion. As you are all aware, the main purpose of the meeting was to have consultations on the political-military agenda of NATO's transformation before the Riga Summit later this year. We discussed issues like the open-door policy of the Alliance, the partnerships, the political aspects of the NATO operations, the broadening of the overall political dialogue on different security issues and, of course, we had the opportunity to meet with our partners from Ukraine and Russia.

Today, NATO remains the most credible military alliance that exists and one of the most effective operational instruments that can be used in crisis situations. The thing that changes is in fact the security frontiers. To be precise, in geographical terms, they were actually removed. More and more, our security depends on events, decisions and processes that happen thousands of kilometers away from the physical borders of our countries. However, not only the geographic scope of the security risks broadens. The functional dimension of our security is also becoming wider. With the deepening of the globalization processes we increasingly depend on the developments and factors that are not only far from us in the geographic sense, but that are also not directly related to the security issues, at least at first sight. This imposes on us the imperative to work together to resolve the challenges facing our security. The most visible and, as a lot of people argue, the most effective means of NATO to do that is the open-door policy and the partnerships.

Speaking about new frontiers, one may expect the Riga Summit to address the relations with the three Membership Action Plan (MAP) countries—Albania, Croatia and the Republic of Macedonia. Judging from our own experience, the preparation for membership in NATO requires a lot of work. After all, the performance is the strongest leverage of the countries aspiring to NATO membership. At the same time, equally important is the long-term political vision. The experience clearly demonstrates that the process of putting into practice democratic and economic reforms in the region is directly related to and stems from the unambiguous and real prospect and support for joining the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. That is why the NATO and the EU commitments to the region are a powerful means to promote its stabilization,

modernization and Euro-Atlantic integration. Thus, joining NATO is both a means and a goal of sustainable democratic consolidation.

Therefore, it is our firm belief, that extending invitations to Albania, Croatia and the Republic of Macedonia to join NATO is part of the all-important perspective and process of integration of the Western Balkans in the Euro-Atlantic community. In its own right this is a major factor for the stability and prosperity of the whole Southeast Europe. As an advocate of the enlargement process, Bulgaria will continue to work for achieving consensus on a decision that will send an encouraging signal and maintain the momentum of the integration efforts of the three countries and will best acknowledge their accomplishments in fulfilling the criteria for membership.

In line with that unambiguous policy, we will push for the further development of the relations between NATO and Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Further support of the Alliance to the relevant aspects of the reforms in these two countries and the recognition of their efforts are fundamental to keep them safely on the path of Euro-Atlantic integration. We believe that having the two countries on board of the Partnership for Peace will be highly beneficial for the security and stability in the region. However, such a welcome development should not be to the detriment of the cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia (ICTY).

Speaking about new frontiers we should also think about Ukraine and Georgia—two long-standing partners which have expressed their wish to strengthen their relations with NATO and even to accede to it. We hope that the new Ukrainian leadership will continue the course of Euro-Atlantic orientation and will preserve the commitment to the reforms. At the same time, the Ukrainian leadership would face the need to achieve a broad and solid political, parliamentary and public support for this choice. If Ukraine continues along this path, it is logical that the NATO member states consider positively its aspirations to join the Membership Action Plan. Georgia has also demonstrated resolve in the implementation of the reforms and the transformation has been gradually approaching the stage of sustainability and irreversibility. Taking into account Georgia's efforts and given the strategic importance of the Black Sea region, NATO might be expected to respond in an open and forward-looking way and consider including a close perspective for launching an Intensified Dialogue with it.

Having said at the beginning that the geographic security frontiers were removed, I would like to stress once again the importance of the different NATO partnerships. Currently, they encompass mainly the regions adjacent to NATO, but as the security issues become increasingly global, the Alliance should consider ways to establish special links with countries that share its values and/or actively contribute to its operations, no matter how far these countries are situated. NATO has also a

comparative advantage in supporting security sector reforms. This advantage is a result of both the profound transformation the Alliance underwent itself and the support provided in this field to some of its current partners, to the member states of the two latest waves of enlargement and to the countries from the Western Balkans, to Iraq and to Afghanistan.

However, these considerations and their outcome should not lead simply to an array of new bureaucratic mechanisms. The changes to the partnerships need to bring added value and flexibility and they should not diminish the importance of the existing partnerships, nor should they encapsulate the partnerships into a group of like-minded states and societies. The world is colourful and so should be NATO partnerships if they are to be an adequate political instrument.

With respect to the functional dimensions of security, it is obvious that the security frontiers were moved as well. For decades NATO was the military guarantee for the protection of the values of the Euro-Atlantic community against possible Soviet invasion. In the 1990s this setup became irrelevant and new, asymmetric threats gained ground. This necessitated a profound transformation in NATO—to modify the irrelevant capabilities and practices and to address the new challenges. This transformation process, in the part concerning the concrete machinery, mechanisms and capabilities of the Alliance, is well on track and its direction is clear.

Simultaneously with the military transformation, NATO conducts the political one i.e. to increase the role of NATO as a forum for political dialogue on all security issues that concern the Euro-Atlantic community. In other words, this means to shift from one type of threat—a massive invasion—to a variety of asymmetric risks and threats coming from different sources and directions and interacting in often unpredictable ways. In this sense NATO has crossed the “frontier” and currently deals also with peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, with fight against terrorism and security sector reform and with scientific cooperation, public diplomacy and political consultations. The Alliance more and more cooperates and interacts with the UN, the EU and other organizations that have to do with security issues in their broadest understanding and geographic scope. In Riga, we will have to take stock of the achievements in the process of transformation, to see what works and what does not and to give a new boost to the whole process.

Meanwhile, at several places in the world, NATO will continue to be the provider of security. It is enough to mention KFOR, ISAF, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq and the assistance that is provided to the African Union Mission in Darfur.

The security situation in Kosovo will require the Alliance’s presence, although modified accordingly, for quite some time. Regardless of the outcome of the Status Talks the existing complicated problems will not be resolved overnight and all the

necessary standards will have to be fully implemented. NATO and the EU will have to coordinate closely their efforts to facilitate the finding of a solution to the Kosovo issue and to ensure the appropriate international presence. However, all interested parties have to be aware that only a mutually acceptable outcome will be a long-lasting one.

In Afghanistan NATO is expanding its support for the Afghan authorities. All member states are aware that ISAF will require a considerable and sustained effort as the stakes for the security and stability of the whole region are very high. Given the often harsh operational conditions and the significance of the mission, the Alliance highly appreciates the participation of its partners in the operation and their efforts will continue to be a major factor for the success of ISAF and the international community as a whole in its endeavour to rebuild Afghanistan.

The NATO Training Mission in Iraq, although of smaller scale, is not less important. It is crucial to enhance the capacity of the Iraqi security forces because only in this way the Iraqis can take in their hands the future of their own country.

In Darfur NATO continues to provide logistical and training support to the peacekeeping mission of the African Union. This has contributed not only to the efforts of the international community to find a solution to the crisis, but also to the building up of the own African Union peacekeeping capabilities.

To sum up before leaving the floor to the distinguished speakers who will further elaborate on the topic, I would like to underline that NATO's transformation is fundamental in preserving the *raison d'être* of the Alliance, namely to provide adequate security for its member states. Moreover, the transformation is even amplifying this *raison d'être* because NATO today is a major provider of security not only for its member states but also for its partners and many more. We expect the Sofia Informal Ministerial Meeting and the forthcoming Riga Summit to give a new impulse to the transformation, so that the Alliance keeps abreast with the challenges of the world we live in.

Thank you for the attention!

Ambassador Adam Kobieracki

NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations

NATO on the Way to Riga

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It gives me great pleasure to open this Seminar. The Center for the Study of Democracy has a strong reputation for taking a broad view of security—a view that takes democracy and democratic values as its starting point. It is a view that I very much share. And—as I will try to explain in my remarks today—it is an approach that is also shared by the Atlantic Alliance.

In November, NATO Heads of State and Government will meet in Riga. After Prague in 2002, and Istanbul in 2004, this will be the third NATO Summit after the terrorist attacks on 9/11. In other words, Riga will be the third Summit to chart NATO's transformation from a Eurocentric institution into a security organisation that looks at challenges no longer territorially, but functionally—an organisation that can act wherever and whenever transatlantic security interests are at stake. The concrete Summit agenda is not yet clear in all its details. Our informal Foreign Ministers' Meeting here in Sofia, both yesterday and the day before, has been an important stepping stone for the Summit. But it is clear that we still have work to do. Having said that, NATO's evolution over the past few years does offer a number of clues as to what will be addressed in Riga. If we take a look at the recent evolution of our Alliance we can discern one major characteristic: an ever-increasing range of operational tasks.

Indeed, as we meet here today, NATO is engaged on three continents. In Europe, NATO troops, including soldiers from Bulgaria, are keeping the peace in Kosovo, where they provide the safe environment for the Status Talks to succeed. In Africa, NATO aircraft are airlifting African Union peacekeeping troops into the crisis region of Darfur. And in Central Asia, NATO leads the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, with almost 100 Bulgarian soldiers participating. In addition, NATO conducts a maritime anti-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean; a training mission for Iraqi security forces; and we recently conducted a humanitarian relief operation for the victims of last October's earthquake in Pakistan. Last but not least, we have used our AWACS aircraft to provide protection for major public events, such as the Olympics in Greece or the Soccer Championship in Germany this summer.

In short, developments over the last few years have clearly shown that the demand for NATO is growing. And this is not surprising. After all, there is no other framework that brings Europe and North America closer together. It remains a simple but powerful fact that America and Europe together are the central pillar of global stability. So we

will continue to be in demand. And this requires us to take a very close look at the conditions that must be met if we want to continue to meet those demands. What are the conditions for successfully projecting stability in new ways and new places? And how do we need to adjust our policies in order to meet these conditions?

The first condition for projecting stability is a common assessment of the challenge. Now, that may sound like a platitude, but it is not. In fact, as all of you here know very well, there have been many occasions where the lack of a common assessment has prevented the international community from taking action. Without a broader consensus on the way ahead, nations tend to hold back—or pass the buck to others. How can such a consensus be achieved? How can we avoid a situation where different perceptions may lead to a loss of solidarity—or, worse, to inaction? My answer is clear: we need to foster a more forward-looking dialogue among the Allies. We must not limit ourselves to discuss current challenges of current operations, but also look ahead. Indeed, no topic should be off limits. At NATO, we have made a good start. For example, we have been discussing issues such as the Middle East peace process, support for African Union peacekeeping, or energy security. Over time, this will lead to a greater awareness of the issues—and that is a precondition for any common approach.

Achieving consensus to take action is one major step. It is equally important, of course, to implement what we have decided. Which brings me to my second element of projecting stability: having the right capabilities. Projecting stability requires forces that can react quickly, that can be deployed over strategic distance, and then sustained over a long period of time. And we need forces that are capable of performing both high intensity combat tasks and post-conflict reconstruction work. Afghanistan is a living example of a new challenging environment in which NATO forces must operate. Indeed, as we expand our mission, there, ISAF will be challenged and will have to perform a broad range of duties that—I would argue—surpasses what we have been experiencing in the Balkans. As for capabilities, we have made good progress in developing them. The NATO Response Force, which should be fully operational by the time of Riga, will enable us to react to new challenges even more quickly. We are also taking a hard look at our force planning and force generation procedures, to better match our political decisions and military commitments. And we are revising our funding arrangements—to make them fairer, so that nations don't hesitate to commit to operations. All these steps will ensure that future missions can be better planned, equipped, and paid for.

Another necessary ingredient for projecting stability is to have like-minded nations on board. Challenges like the Balkans or Afghanistan do not just affect NATO Allies. They also affect others. That is why, when NATO leads an operation, we want to have mechanisms in place that allow those other countries to contribute—politically and/or militarily. Again, if I use the example of Afghanistan—ISAF includes more than 30

nations—NATO and non-NATO alike—with new partners such as New Zealand and Australia part of our joint efforts. To enhance these new cooperative mechanisms, we have been building networks since the end of the Cold War. First throughout Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Then across the Mediterranean to states in Northern Africa and the Middle East. And most recently, we started to build new ties to states in the Gulf region. We are now looking at ways to expand this network even further, by building closer ties with like-minded countries such as the ones I mentioned above—Australia, New Zealand or Japan. This would not turn NATO into a global policeman, but it would allow us to build global coalitions. That is the only credible answer to many of today’s security challenges. And that is why I expect these new partnerships to be a major deliverable—and a major focus of attention—at the Riga Summit.

Projecting stability requires the collective solidarity of like-minded nations, but it also requires the collective solidarity of institutions and non-governmental organisations. When NATO deploys into a crisis area, it can tackle the immediate military challenges. It can help a country reform its security sector, or assist in border control. In short, NATO troops can provide a secure environment. And that is an essential contribution.

But NATO alone cannot succeed in giving the Balkans or Afghanistan the democratic, multi-ethnic and economically vibrant statehood that is indispensable for long-term stability. To achieve this goal requires the help of many other actors—institutions as well as non-governmental organisations.

At NATO, we have long been aware of the need for institutional cooperation. Indeed, the term “interlocking institutions” was coined within NATO more than 15 years ago. We have also put this approach into practice, as we work closely with the UN, the EU and many NGOs in the Balkans and Afghanistan. But we must do more. Right now, we work with the UN and the EU in the field, but there is very little coordination at the strategic level. We must change this. We must go beyond ad hoc cooperation on the ground. We must establish a structured relationship with the UN, which allows us to discuss options before we engage in an operation. We must build a strategic partnership with the European Union in which we consult and coordinate our approaches across the whole spectrum of security issues. We must develop a sustained dialogue with key NGOs. And we are hoping to make progress in all those areas in the run-up to our Riga Summit.

Let me conclude with one other issue that will figure prominently at Riga. This issue is not directly related to NATO’s operations, or to enhancing its operational effectiveness. Yet, it is about something equally significant: about finishing Europe’s unfinished business. And here I am, of course, talking about NATO’s enlargement. NATO’s enlargement process has enhanced our own security by extending it to others. It has

extended a unique zone of security throughout our continent. NATO's enlargement process has given—and continues to give—our neighbours new confidence in their own future and a strong incentive to reform. And in so doing, it enhances prosperity and security for us all. This logic of integration through NATO enlargement remains as valid as ever. With three official membership aspirants in the Western Balkans, and given the membership ambitions stated by both Ukraine and Georgia, our Heads of State and Government will need to send a clear signal at Riga that NATO's door remains open for further accessions. And I am sure that they will give such a strong signal.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

If there is to be any semblance of order and security in today's world, the transatlantic community must accept the responsibility to act where this is required—whether the issue is to prevent terrorism or to provide humanitarian relief. In an increasingly small and interdependent world, equating security with the security of one's own territory clearly is a much too narrow definition of national interest.

It is this understanding of security that has inspired NATO's evolution since the end of the Cold War. This evolution will continue, along the lines that I have just outlined—with more dialogue, new capabilities, more partners and new ties to other institutions. The Riga Summit will be a focal point for these efforts. It will be another strong demonstration that NATO is meeting the challenge of change.

Thank you.

Robert McFarlane

Former National Security Adviser, US

Thanks very much, Minister Noev, for your kindness of including me in this Conference as an American at a time of some strains in America's relationship with the rest of the world. As somebody who personally has worked with the CIA for a long time I am pleased to be invited almost anywhere, but especially to join you here at this important conference. I am going to focus my remarks on energy security for this is a domain to which I have focused my attention since leaving the Reagan Cabinet twenty years ago.

Today, in addition to the prices that we are paying for petrol at the pump, all of us are becoming aware of the importance of energy in every dimension of our lives. It heats our homes, makes the synthetic fibers on your back, transports our cars and trucks and sure it is fundamental. Without energy economies collapse. But why today are we especially concerned about energy security? I believe three factors have focused our attention in recent years on this issue. First of all, the faster than expected growth in the demand for oil and gas by emerging markets: China, India, others. Can you imagine a 40% increase in the imports of oil by China in one year—2004 to 2005, and imagine further sustaining an 8 to 10% annual growth rate and what that will mean for stresses in sourcing energy and what it could imply in the way of competition for energy supplies from the same source—the Persian Gulf—by Japan, China, India? The second area that has concentrated our minds on energy security is the potential for disruption of supplies primarily from the Persian Gulf, but not only from the Persian Gulf. As we have seen in Nigeria, turmoil there has reduced production by as much as 40%. Separately, in Venezuela, rather extreme rhetoric and capricious management of production of Venezuelan oil calls into question the reliability of Venezuela as a supplier.

All of these factors together have managed to elevate the price of oil to more than \$70 a barrel. Thoughtful analysts of the sources of production throughout the world cannot imagine oil going below \$50 for the foreseeable future. To imagine one extreme problem that should focus all of our attention: recall three months ago the attack that occurred at Abqaiq—an important terminal in Saudi Arabia that processes 4 million barrels a day of oil. That attack came within 100 meters of taking that plant off line and eliminating 4 million barrels a day from the market for at least 9 months and probably a year. Were that to happen, the price of oil overnight would go to more than \$150 per barrel—twice what it is today and, within very little time, lead to the collapse of, first, Japan's economy, but ultimately, through ripple effects, to the economy of Europe and of the United States. Such is the severity of our reliance upon very vulnerable sources of hydrocarbons. Probably the most important sector of our economies at risk to this threat is transportation. Trucks, buses, cars—more than 2/3 of our consumption of

hydrocarbons occurs in our transportation sectors. And if I could reduce the problem to a simple definition, I would say that the problem is really how many kilometers per gallon of gasoline from a vulnerable area we are consuming today.

Let's turn to how we solve the problem. To oversimplify, when a source of a commodity is at risk, you either try to produce more from a less vulnerable area, or consume less overall. Let's analyze whether we can do that. First of all, producing more from less vulnerable areas is not an easy solution to define. One can imagine producing more in Russia or in the Caspian. However, as we have seen in recent months, the sometimes arbitrary control by Russia over its supplies of oil or gas calls into question the reliability of that country as a supplier. Similarly, one has to conceive what it will take, assuming the reliability of Russia and the Caspian, to get those resources to market. It will take an enormous amount of capital to develop the pipelines, the alternative routes for transportation to accomplish this, not to mention a great deal of time. Most of Russia's probable, yet undiscovered oil is in remote parts of Siberia and the Northern Arctic Coast where there are no pipelines and it will take years and tens of billions of dollars to get it to the market.

I think, still, however, on the side of improving or increasing production from less vulnerable sources one has to begin to consider alternative fuels. And here there is very good news. It has been proven for two generations that it is feasible to run cars and trucks on other fuels than oil and gas—ethanol, methanol, bio-diesel and electricity—all of these are proven alternatives to oil and conventional petrol. Consider only the use by Brazil of ethanol that, after 30 years of focus in research and development, is now providing 20% of the consumption of fuel throughout the cars and trucks of Brazil today—a country of 175 million people. As you consider each of these possible alternatives, it is important to realize that this is not a blue-sky remote possibility that will take many many years. These technologies are available, they are in production today, and they are competitive price-wise today. They do, however, need to be wrapped up and expanded in the scale of production, if they are going to be actually available at your gasoline station or your ethanol/methanol station in the years ahead (and I will come back to that in a moment).

Apart from producing more of a usable fuel, an alternative to oil, let's turn to using less and how we might do that. And here there is also good news. We are beginning to see automobile manufacturers produce vehicles that run on either a conventional fuel or methanol, or ethanol, or a mixture, and electricity. Hybrid-electric vehicles are entering our market at an increasing rate. This week we have seen the announcement by DaimlerChrysler that it intends to build 500,000 hybrid-electric cars next year. Similarly in Toyota, in Honda, in Ford. Manufacturers are getting the message. We have to be able to run our cars and trucks on something beside gasoline.

It is interesting to note that a battery today in a hybrid-electric vehicle will take you about 30 kilometers. It is an interesting statistic I ran across that in the United States almost half of the vehicles, 150 million vehicles, go less than 30 kilometers every day and that is probably true here in Europe as well. Well, if a battery will take you that far, you could, by transforming your cars and trucks in Europe, literally take half of your consumption away from gasoline and put it on a battery and, within two years, if you could make that vehicle capable of being plugged in at night when you come home to fill up the tank with electricity, you would be filling it up with the equivalent of roughly \$1 per liter of petrol—a far better price than you are paying today at the pump.


The point of all this is that they are all alternatives to having to live with the importation of oil and gas from the Persian Gulf and other risky areas. You can make today, not tomorrow, today, a hybrid-electric vehicle. You can make a flexible-fuel vehicle that can burn anything—ethanol, methanol, gasoline or any mixture. And the added cost of that vehicle for burning flexible fuels is no more than \$150—that is very cheap for the flexibility you gain from doing that. And finally, if we begin now and transform our manufacturing of cars, trucks and airplanes to use carbon composite materials, you will have a stronger vehicle and a lighter vehicle that consumes much less fuel. We see this being introduced right now by Boeing Aircraft that is putting carbon composite materials into the new generation 787 so called Dreamliner Aircraft and the result is roughly a 20% increase in the fuel efficiency of that aircraft, and sales and responsiveness of the market have taken off dramatically. In short, it can be done and every country in Europe, including Bulgaria, has one of the sources of going to this alternative family of fuels—whether it is coal, biomass that can be used to make ethanol, coal to make methanol, or electricity to run your automobiles. There are alternatives, they are available today and the supply of them is going to grow in the years ahead.

No single country has the capital or the political power to introduce these several means, these alternatives to relying on the Persian Gulf, by itself. It takes too much money and too much political power for one state to go up against Russia or Qatar, or Saudi Arabia. This is truly a collective security issue. What specifically can be done?

First of all, NATO and the European Union should focus on this four-point agenda I have just gone over—of alternative fuels: providing incentives for building hybrid-electric vehicles; converting to flexible-fuel vehicles; providing incentives for using carbon composite materials. But secondly, NATO should introduce a focused planning activity on what we would do, if there were a disruption of oil from the Persian Gulf. Can we create more strategic petroleum reserves? How would we share them in the event there is a problem? There has been work done on this, as you know, already by the International Energy Agency in Paris and others. But this, as a collective security issue, is something that demands and justifies the urgent focus of NATO. How would

you build reserves, how would you share them, if we face a crisis? In addition, NATO and the European Union ought to focus on achieving the ratification of the Energy Charter by Russia—this is important in order to restore confidence in the reliability of Russia as a supplier. And finally, it seems to me that for all of these reasons and the catastrophic impact that a disruption of supply could have, clearly energy security is an Article 5 matter. If Bulgaria's access to secure supplies of affordable energy is threatened, it is clear that Germany, and France, and all of us are threatened as well and we must all focus upon how we can relieve that menace that faces each of us. It is a collective security issue, it is urgent and compelling, an Article 5 issue, if ever there was one, and we must begin to treat it that way.

Thanks very much.




ENERGY SECURITY

SPONSORED BY
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IN COOPERATION WITH **NATO**

April 28-29, 2006
Robert McFarlane
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
 SLIDE 1



ENERGY SECURITY

- **SECURE** ACCESS TO **RELIABLE** SUPPLIES OF **AFFORDABLE** ENERGY
- TRANSPORTATION – AIR, SEA AND LAND – IS ESSENTIAL TO ECONOMIC GROWTH
- WITHOUT ENERGY ECONOMIES COLLAPSE


 SLIDE 2



**HOW IS ENERGY SECURITY
THREATENED?**

- BUSINESS AS USUAL – CONTINUED GROWTH IN DEMAND (ESPECIALLY BY LARGE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES) WILL KEEP OIL AT OR ABOVE US\$50/BBL
- DISRUPTION OF FLOWS FROM THE PERSIAN GULF (e.g. AT RAS TANURA) COULD REMOVE 4MM BBL/DAY FROM THE MARKET FOR UP TO A YEAR. PRICE WILL RISE TO >US\$150/BBL
- WE CONSUME IT ALL – PEAK OIL

 SLIDE 3



 SLIDE 4



 SLIDE 5



SLIDE 6

SOLUTIONS

- SUPPLY SIDE SOLUTIONS
 - 1. PRODUCE MORE FROM LESS THREATENED REGIONS (e.g. CASPIAN, RUSSIA?);
 - 2. PRODUCE ALTERNATIVE FUELS – METHANOL, ETHANOL, BIO-DIESEL AND ELECTRICITY?
- DEMAND SIDE SOLUTIONS – CONSUME LESS PETROL THROUGH:
 - MIXING ALTERNATIVE FUELS WITH PETROL (REQUIRES FLEXIBLE-FUEL VEHICLES);
 - PRODUCE HYBRID-ELECTRIC (AND PLUG-IN HYBRID-ELECTRIC) VEHICLES;
 - USE CARBON COMPOSITE AND OTHER LIGHT WEIGHT METALS IN CONSTRUCTION OF CARS AND AIRPLANES

SLIDE 7


Energy Security through economic fuel choice



SLIDE 8

MOST COUNTRIES ARE POOR IN OIL BUT RICH IN CONVERTIBLE DOMESTIC RESOURCES

- COAL – TO MAKE METHANOL;
- BIOMASS – BILLIONS OF TONS ANNUALLY CAN BE USED TO MAKE ETHANOL (e.g. BRAZIL);
- IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, SOLAR, WIND, HYDRO, GEOTHERMAL, AND NUCLEAR ENERGY CAN BE USED TO GENERATE ELECTRICITY

 SLIDE 9

 SLIDE 10

Flexible fuel vehicles (FFV) stretch the liter



- FFV's are designed to operate on alcohol (ethanol, methanol..), on petrol, or on any mixture of the two.
- Nearly four million FFV's have been manufactured in the US since 1996.
- The marginal cost of FFV is less than US\$150.

 SLIDE 11

What is methanol?

- An alcohol fuel that can be produced from coal, natural gas, biomass.
- Can be used to power FFVs.
- Can also be used as a user friendly hydrogen-carrier fuel to power fuel cell vehicles.

SLIDE 12



It's time to stop wasting our waste.



SLIDE 13

Electricity is a domestically generated transportation fuel!



SLIDE 14


Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEV)



Think of them as electric vehicles with an auxiliary fuel tank, or "souped-up hybrids";
All electric range for a portion of the daily driving cycle;
Night time charging means significantly lower fuel cost;
When the charge is used up, the car automatically keeps running on the fuel in the fuel tank;
Performance equal to that of current vehicles.

SLIDE 15


Half of all cars on the road travel a total of 20 miles per day or less



Depending on the battery size, the first 20-60 miles of driving in a PHEV would be essentially all electric


SLIDE 16

Greatly reduced annual petrol consumption



SLIDE 17

A multi fuel vehicle




 SLIDE 18

Bottom line: It can Be Done

PHEV + FFV fueled with 80% alcohol and 20% petrol = 200km per liter of petrol!


If by 2025, all cars on the road were hybrids and half are plug-in hybrid vehicles, NATO oil imports would drop by 20 million barrels per day (mbd). Today, the U.S imports 10 mbd and it is projected to import almost 20 mbd by 2025. If all of these cars were also FFV, U.S. oil imports would drop by as much as 12 mbd.



 SLIDE 19

BUT IT CAN'T BE DONE BY STATES ACTING ALONE


- NO INDIVIDUAL STATE HAS THE CAPITAL OR POLITICAL POWER TO EFFECT NEEDED CHANGES;
- THIS IS A COLLECTIVE SECURITY ISSUE;
- NATO AND/OR EU MUST MUSTER THE CAPITAL AND POLITICAL WILL



 SLIDE 20

WHAT MUST BE DONE?

- MEMBER STATES MOVE TOWARD FOUR POINT AGENDA
 - METHANOL, ETHANOL AND BIODIESEL PROGRAMS
 - INCENTIVES FOR PLUG-IN HYBRIDS
 - INCENTIVES FOR CARBON COMPOSITE VEHICLE PRODUCTION
- JOINT PLANNING FOR SHORT TERM MEASURES – SHARING DURING CRISES AND INCREASED STORAGE
- FOCUS TOGETHER ON COMPLETION OF ENERGY CHARTER
- NATO-WIDE DEBATE ON ARTICLE V APPLICATION TO ENERGY SECURITY



Ambassador Shohei Naito
Ambassador of Japan to Belgium

As a representative of the Japanese government, first let me express my gratitude for the invitation to the CSD Annual Security Conference. Minister Aso himself has to be in Tokyo today in order to attend deliberations in the Diet. Therefore, in light of my role as the liaison with NATO in Brussels, I am participating in the discussions on this matter. Now, before going into this issue, we studied the current state of NATO's transformation. And indeed, NATO is carrying out self-reform to adapt to the demands of the times. As an observer who follows these changes closely, I would like to state clearly here that I rate the transformation highly.

So, the issue before us is partnerships for dealing with common security challenges. It appears that Japan has been invited to this conference precisely because it is starting to be recognized by NATO as a potential partner. In fact, six days from now, on May 4, Minister Aso is invited to NATO headquarters in Brussels, where he will give a speech in the North Atlantic Council on Japan's position. Therefore, what I am going to say to you this afternoon is meant to fill in the background of this for you.

Geographically, Japan is located at the opposite end of the Eurasian continent seen from Europe. Nevertheless, both Japan and Europe are tightly linked by the bonds of shared values of fundamental importance, such as the firm belief in freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is because we share these beliefs that Japan and Europe have recognized the need for partnership and continue to promote cooperation in that direction. The partnership between Japan and Europe was first mentioned in writing in the 1991 Japan-EC Joint Declaration (Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Community and Its Member States and Japan). This statement at the outset reconfirms the consciousness of both Europe and Japan of their common values. Since 1992, Japan has been a partner of the OSCE (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Japan also has been enjoying its status as the only Asian nation observer in the Council of Europe since 1996.

Europe, in particular, has actively continued its effort to introduce common fundamental values to be shared in the region, and this promotion of values has been instrumental in successfully bringing about political and economic stability in Europe. Japan highly commends this success, and is supportive of such efforts made by Europe.

Let us now focus our discussion on NATO's recent activities and explore the possibilities of partnership with Japan. In response to the enormous changes in the security environment of the international community since the end of the Cold War, NATO has reinforced its efforts toward international peace and stability and is also actively

engaging in building partnerships with neighboring countries. With the Japan-US alliance and international cooperation as the bases of its foreign policy, Japan, as well, is making every effort to contribute to international peace and stability in close cooperation with the international community and international organizations such as the United Nations. Further, even in the context of the New National Defense Program Guidelines published in 2004, Japan has made clear its policy of more proactive implementation of international peace support activities in the future, while maintaining the basic concept under the constitution of an exclusively defense-oriented stance. Over the past 14 years, there has been a remarkable evolution in Japan's contribution to the peace and stability of the international community through overseas dispatch of the Self-Defense Force.

From the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improvements in the international security environment, the first example is the active contribution to international disaster relief activities in the aftermath of the recent Indian Ocean tsunami and the earthquake in Pakistan. The gratitude shown by the governments and people of the affected countries for these kinds of activities shows that disaster relief is one of the main areas where the Self-Defense Force can contribute to the peace and stability of the international community.

Second, with regard to peacekeeping operations, while Japan's Self-Defense Force is under a strict constitutional restriction whereby the use of weapons is limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense, we have carried out many UN assignments based on the International Peace Cooperation Law. Since, engineer units were dispatched to Cambodia for peacekeeping activities in 1992, Self-Defense Forces have been dispatched to Mozambique, the Golan Heights and East Timor. In addition, it has carried out relief activities for refugees and victims in Rwanda, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Thirdly, since 9/11 it has continued to provide logistical support for Operation Enduring Freedom activities in the Indian Ocean and to carry out humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq. When it participates in activities such as those in the Indian Ocean and Iraq, which are not covered by the existing law allowing participation in peacekeeping operations and disaster relief, a special measures law is enacted each time.

Until now, there has been some dialogue between Japan and NATO, but for Japan and NATO to build a partnership for cooperation in dealing with various issues faced by the international community, it is essential to sort out the conditions for effective cooperation in the future.

First of all, in addition to exchange of views, such as those in the framework of the Japan-NATO High-Level Consultations that took place this month, we are aware that

it is important to strengthen the dialogue, for example by ensuring opportunities for regular dialogue with the NAC, the highest decision-making body of NATO, in order to create a common understanding on various issues. Further, we would like to look into future cooperation on the operational side by promoting defense exchanges, participating actively in seminars and the like, and thus steadily build results. In this way, I believe that by deepening cooperation between Japan and NATO even further, the values shared by Japan and the NATO countries will spread and lead to global peace and stability.

Dr. Horst Teltschik

Chairman, Munich Conference on Security Policy

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It's a pleasure for me to be back to Sofia. The last time I was here was during the Cold War, having discussions with President Zhivkov in this very same building, staying in this building. Time has changed and talking about NATO in Sofia today is a real miracle for me.

Well, to start with NATO, I would like to say at first NATO is a real success story. It's one of the most successful alliances human beings have ever established and NATO, I am absolutely sure, is still indispensable for a simple reason—it's the strongest bond to keep the United States in Europe. And if you look at our history during the last century, you know how important it is to keep the US in Europe. And I think it's in both sides' interest, I hope you can agree. It's not only our advantage to have the Americans here, but I think it's in their interest as well. If you look at the world map, who should cooperate, if not the US and the Europeans? Sure, Japan as well, and Australia and New Zealand, but I think Europe is, with 450 million people now integrated into the European Union, a really important factor in world politics.

NATO is important for Germany in a special way. In May 1990 I was in Moscow, discussing with President Gorbachev the issue whether a united Germany should stay in NATO or not, and President Gorbachev had asked me: "Well, Mr. Teltschik, why do you need NATO anymore? We will be friends and partners in the future. You don't need NATO anymore." I tell you, I gave him a simple answer and I think this answer is still true today. I told him: "Look at the map! What neighbours Germany has: Luxemburg, Netherlands, Denmark, Poland and so on. And all these neighbours, they can live with a united Germany, the strongest country within Central Europe, easier when we are integrated in a common alliance." And this is still true for Germany.

I do hope you might understand why I am looking back on NATO's strategy during the Cold War. Security was always NATO's first priority, guaranteeing the balance of power by the TRIADE, the essential link between the US tactical and strategic nuclear power with the conventional power in Europe. And this strategy worked very successfully. And you know, the last important test NATO had to stand occurred in the 1970s, when the Soviet leadership had decided to deploy the notorious SS-20s, the middle-range nuclear missiles, mainly directed at the Europeans. I am reminding you about that historic event because this decision was taken by the Soviets at the peak of the famous policy of détente of Chancellor Willy Brandt. In the years of 1970 to 1972 he had signed important treaties with Moscow, Warsaw, Prague and East Berlin. A Four Power Agreement for Berlin was signed in these years and the highlight of this

policy of détente was the final act signed by all CSCE member states on August 1, 1975 in Helsinki. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union started to deploy new weapons, starting a new arms race. And you know NATO responded to this Soviet threat with the Double-Track Decision in 1979, mainly pushed by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and later carried out by Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

In 1983 several European countries began to deploy American middle-range nuclear systems and in the same year US President Ronald Reagan announced his SDI Program. President Mikhail Gorbachev has told me once that these both decisions taken by NATO and taken by the US president had forced the Soviet Politburo to reconsider its policy, being aware that the Soviet Union could not afford a new arms race with the West. I would draw two conclusions: Never neglect your own security, that's the first conclusion, the second one: Can we really rely on political promises of non-democratic governments?

But the military strategy of NATO was still only one side of the coin. The Atlantic Alliance saw itself from the very beginning as a political alliance as well. Coping with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, one can distinguish between two different periods. At the beginning the relations were dominated by confrontation, sanctions and the non-recognition of the GDR. In 1967, NATO fundamentally changed its strategy by deciding the so called Harmel Report and its central message was, I quote: "Military security and the policy of détente are not a contradiction, but mutually complementary". And the essence of the Harmel Report was twofold. Firstly, security remains the first priority. And secondly, on the basis of security, the Alliance will develop a process of dialogue, cooperation, détente and non-aggression agreements. And the highlight of this process was a CSCE final act from Helsinki with its three baskets. The first basket, confidence-building measures, security and disarmament. Secondly, economic cooperation, science, technical cooperation, and environment. And thirdly, human contact, exchange of information, and culture.

What are the conclusions and why am I reminding you of these historic events? I am reminding you because this mixture of security and a policy of détente worked brilliantly. The East-West conflict ended peacefully. And facing today new security challenges, I do believe we need some kind of a new Harmel Report. Perhaps a Merkel Report or de Hoop Scheffer Report or from somebody else, or a CSCE-like agreement, defining a common strategy how to cope, for example, with Iran and all the other challenges and threats. Remembering the Cold War we should not forget the role of the European Community during these years as well. The European Union, and I think this is a lesson for the Balkan states, from my point of view, was and is still an excellent, and probably the only model how to overcome deep-rooted hostility between different nationalities in Europe. Germany and France had been, till the end of WWII, so called arch-enemies. Today, they are close friends and partners and they have been so far the most important engine for the European integration.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The landmark of the end of the Cold War was the CSCE Summit in November 1990 in Paris, where all presidents and heads of government signed a Charter for a New Europe. And I never will forget, after having signed this new Charter, the Charter for New Europe, President Gorbachev stood up and said: “What is our task for the future?”, and he said: “We have to go from dictatorship to democracy and from command economy to market economy.” And the Charter included a common goal. The common goal was an all-European peace and security order, what President Gorbachev has called a “common European house”.

Well, the Polish Ambassador has already mentioned—do we have a vision today how to shape Europe and the world? Well, think of people like Winston Churchill, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gaspari. They had a vision, they had a dream, the dream of the united nations of Europe. Today, do we have a dream of Europe and the world, do we have a vision others might follow? We enlarged the European Union up to 25 members. Hopefully, Bulgaria and Romania will join the EU next year. We have started negotiations with Turkey. We have promised the Balkan countries to join once the European Union as well. And we have established a NATO-Russia Council. And you do know this was in return of the NATO enlargement mainly with the three Baltic states. So far, it’s a real success story. But, do we have any idea how to build a “common European house”, like the CSCE, now the OSCE, as an institutional frame for an all-European security order? The OSCE, you do know that, plays an important, but at the end a marginal role.

Still, today we have no institutional frame for an all-European peace and security order, including the United States. President Clinton started the initiative Partnership for Peace—a right idea from my point of view, but is this really working? Chancellor Schroeder started to speak of Russia about a strategic partnership, but so far without important content. The European Union and Russia, they agreed about a collaboration on four areas—economy; freedom, security, justice, whatever that means; external security, and fourthly, research, education and science. But there’s no appropriation so far on all these areas. Now there’s a new idea coming up of a partnership for energy supply. We will see whether this can work, if there are no other agreements. The former President of the European Union, Prodi, put forward a proposal to President Putin for an all-European free-trade area. But nobody in Europe cares for such a proposal. Is it not a central point for us, the most interesting issue in Europe for us, to know where Russia is really going in the long run? A Russian friend whom I have asked once how it is going in Russia gave me the answer: “Well, Horst, we are walking on a road, we don’t know where it goes, but we will walk till its end.” Will Russia be a close partner and friend of the Europeans and the West? Or will Russia try again to become an independent power, not predictable for Europe and the US?

After the Cold War, many people expected a peace dividend. We didn't get a peace dividend, as many Europeans have hoped and expected. But it was obvious from the very beginning that NATO would need new objectives. Henry Kissinger put forward in 1991 the proposal that a new objective could be a transatlantic free-trade area. I don't know whether such an objective would be sufficient enough. Nevertheless, it's an interesting goal, and I would work for such a goal, but nobody does.

We have so far no common objectives for NATO. But we have new challenges. The first challenge was the Iraq War in 1991. The second one was the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the military intervention in Kosovo. But till today, we have no exit strategy neither for Kosovo, nor for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The next challenge was 9/11, terrorism. Sure, within two days, all NATO member states were ready to invoke Article 5 of the NATO Treaty for the first time in its history. Chancellor Schroeder spoke at that time about an unrestricted solidarity with the United States. We are facing asymmetrical threats; you know all these kinds of threats. This wording is terrible as such. No citizen in our countries understands what asymmetric threats are. Crazy sometimes, what kind of wording we are using. But you know these threats: terrorism, non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons, failing states and so on.

Do we have common strategies to meet all these challenges and threats within NATO? And you know the global solidarity with the United States after 9/11 failed very quickly because of the Afghanistan intervention. There were no consultations within NATO. The argument of our American friends was: "Well, this was because of lack of time. NATO consultations take too long to go to Brussels and to start discussions whether we should intervene in Afghanistan or not." The global solidarity with the United States failed due to the Iraq War. Europeans were strongly split, as you know. Discussions came up about the new axis between France, Germany and Russia building up a counterweight to the United States. Since then we have a big wave of anti-Americanism in many European countries. And then Iran. We have so far no common strategy how to cope with Iran. We started quite late to discuss how to cope with Iran. Negotiations with Iran, contacted by three European governments, backed by the US, are going on, but the US is not directly engaged in the negotiations. The involvement of Russia happened too late, same with China. India is not yet involved. But 40% of the energy supply for India comes from Iran, but India is not involved in such negotiations. And to be frank, Iran doesn't take the Europeans very seriously without the Americans at the table. And so far we have no bilateral negotiations between the United States and Iran.

We have a growing competition between the European Union and NATO because of developing common European foreign and security policy and its institutional frame. We are building up a European rapid deployment force on the one side and a NATO response force on the other side, but what are the objectives of these two forces? We haven't decided yet, we don't know! What are the necessary resources, have we

mobilized the resources so far? Not at all. We are facing, ladies and gentlemen, a growing gap between the United States and the Europeans with respect to the military capabilities which will harm NATO. This is a quote from Condoleezza Rice! We have a growing gap and this will harm NATO. And I tell you, I am just now working for Boeing, a small American company. I know what I'm speaking about. This gap will still grow. And the outcome is that the interoperability of our forces within NATO is in danger.

Nevertheless, discussions have started to extend responsibilities of NATO even further. Now, should NATO become a global player, partnering such countries as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, taking over the responsibility not only for Afghanistan, but for Africa, perhaps Palestine and other areas of conflict? Must we get the legitimation by the United Nations for such decisions? Think how difficult consultations are within NATO. And if we will get an agreement within NATO, then starting negotiations with the United Nations? Forget about it! It won't work, if there is an actual crisis where we would be forced to act or to react within a few days or even hours. Could it really be in our interest, in the interest of the European member states to extend NATO's responsibility on a global level? Former NATO Secretary General George Robertson and the current one de Hoop Scheffer were and are demanding to improve the consultations inside NATO. The same did Chancellors Schroeder and Merkel at the Munich Conference on Security Policy last year and this year. There is nobody, ladies and gentlemen, there is nobody who really disagrees that we need better consultations, that we need consultations as such, not even better. We haven't had real consultations within NATO during the last years. Even our American friends don't disagree. But nothing is really improving, to be honest. Nobody is talking how to improve the process of consultations. Have you ever heard a public proposal how to improve it?

Well, let me finish with some conclusions. Can we establish a common and agreed procedure of political consultations between 26 member states which works fast and efficient? Well, 9/11 was a proof that we can. What we might need are more summits of the heads of all governments. Maybe that we need a kind of Directoire, a kind of a NATO Security Council with few permanent members and some rotating members. I don't know, I'm just thinking about that. But who takes the lead to improve this consultation process? And to be frank, there is no leadership so far in Europe. Do we need a new Harmel Report how to deal with the main challenges and threats? Do we need such a report on Iran? The Harmel Strategy which we used with the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union might be a model for Iran as well. Security, on the one side, plus dialogue. Détente and cooperation. On the Middle East, do we need such a common strategy, on the Mediterranean area, on the Balkans, on Africa, on China, on Eastern Europe, including Belarus, Ukraine, Central Asia, Caucasus, on Russia? Developing an all-European peace and security order, a kind of institutionalized CSCE or common European house? It was no surprise to me that the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey

Lavrov has just told Gen. James Jones, NATO Supreme Commander Europe, last week in Moscow that the collaboration between NATO and Russia must get a new quality to avoid a new confrontation. That was Lavrov. Lavrov referred mainly to a cooperation between NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (ODKB). Do we have an answer to this demand, which is a Russian response to the US' intention to deploy US troops in Bulgaria, Romania and a response to the US presence in Georgia, Moldova and in Central Asia? Why should NATO extend its responsibility globally? I do believe we would overstretch our resources. Look at the defense budgets of the European countries, including my country, stagnating for years. There's no chance to increase the defense budget in Germany. We face difficulties to afford all the military exercises we are doing now in several different countries like Afghanistan, Africa and elsewhere. I do believe we would overstretch our resources. We should concentrate our political and security efforts on Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Mediterranean area, Greater Middle East and perhaps Africa. This would be, from my point of view, really good enough. But nevertheless, somebody in Europe has to take the lead. We are waiting for leadership in Europe.

Thanks a lot.

Borys Tarasyuk
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

*Ministers, Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,*

It is a great pleasure and honour for me to address such a distinguished audience. As you may know, my participation in this conference follows the informal meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of foreign ministers. Therefore, this is just the right time and place to share my views on the matters related to the ongoing transformation of the Alliance.

The new era of international development brought not only positive trends into everyday life, such as spread of democratic values, but also a number of new challenges to world security. These challenges are mostly of global nature, namely terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, strained energy resources and supply, regional crises and local conflicts, which endanger the broader security area. Countering them requires the joint efforts of the whole world community. In this regard, I am glad to meet here my colleagues from various places all over the world to exchange views on how to improve our cooperation vis-à-vis the new threats and challenges.

The geography of participants at this conference proves that the issues of NATO transformation are no longer being treated as internal ones for this organization. The issue of new priorities for NATO activities arose some decades ago, when the Cold War came to an end. Since then, the Alliance succeeded in several transformations in accordance with the new challenges, including two waves of enlargement.

We all know that the essential purpose of NATO is to safeguard by political and military means the freedom and security of all its members in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the provisions of the Washington Treaty of 1949. At the same time, we realize that the strategic security environment in the world has changed to include a wide spectrum of new global threats from terrorism to various civil emergencies as an integral part of today's security landscape. The main threats are now beyond the traditional area of NATO's responsibility. Consequently, the Alliance should continue to review its approaches to preserving security. It should be reflected in nowadays transformation process of the Alliance.

An important change in NATO activities since the end of the Cold War is its involvement in building stability on three continents—in former Yugoslavia in

Europe, in Afghanistan and Iraq in Asia, and in Sudan in Africa. Moreover, the NATO operational activity has also changed dramatically—the Alliance more and more often acts together with partner nations, as well as other interested regional and world players. The Balkans became the first region, where NATO tried to do its best, together with partners and regional actors, in resolving the crisis. The situation in the Balkans still needs much attention by the international community. However, the progress we have achieved so far is remarkable: Bosnia-Herzegovina got well on track in terms of internal stability, Kosovo hopefully is moving towards the resolution of its complicated inter-ethnic problems, Slovenia became a NATO member and Macedonia and Albania will do the same in the near future. The role of NATO in the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan continues to be important and constantly grows. Ukraine has also declared recently its intention to contribute to this process. Ukraine is also contributing to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq. Such efforts aimed at developing Iraq's own capabilities to ensure its security are vital in the global context. Despite the withdrawal of our military contingent from Iraq, Ukraine continues to render all possible support to the Iraqi authorities in building up their national security sector by providing appropriate training for Iraqi personnel. I cannot but mention the Alliance's assistance to the African Union in expanding its peacekeeping mission in Darfur. Never before has NATO been involved in the African region. Recently, Ukraine decided to support this NATO-EU mission and now the African Union's peacekeepers are airlifted by Ukrainian planes.

Another important aspect of NATO transformation in terms of maintaining regional and world security is its engagement in global efforts to fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean became an important element of international activities in this area. Ukraine shares the view that it is vital for global security to keep the Mediterranean safe. Energy supplies and transportation are the reasons for that. About 65% of the natural resources consumed in Europe, such as oil and gas, pass annually through that region. Ukraine has committed itself to support operation Active Endeavor, and is now preparing appropriate capabilities.

The new and very positive element of NATO security activities is the assistance in civil emergencies relief. I mean, first of all, the assistance to Pakistan in tackling the dramatic consequences of the earthquake as well as to the USA after dreadful hurricane Katrina. Sharing the Alliance humanitarian efforts, Ukraine provided its contribution as well.

The NATO operational and crisis management experience, both in and out of the Euro-Atlantic area, should be duly reflected in the process of Alliance transformation. Moreover, the Alliance's operational capabilities should be combined with the enhancement of political dialogue and cooperation. Taking into account the new

security challenges, the geography of such cooperation should go far beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, and responsibility should not be limited to NATO member states. Today's regional and global security challenges require appropriate steps in terms of transforming the geopolitical role of NATO.

First, prevention is the best strategy to resolve any problem. That is why NATO enlargement aimed at extending the zone of security and stability for the whole of Europe is in the best interest of all Allies, partners, non-NATO European states, and the world community. Certainly, aspirants and those who are supposed to become aspirants in the nearest future (hopefully, Ukraine is among them) should make a substantial endeavor to achieve as soon as possible the criteria necessary for membership in the Alliance.

Second, it is advisable to improve cooperation within the framework of EAPC, in particular in terms of expanding of democratic values and taking on board interested states, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro. The ultimate resolution of all the Balkans' problems, in our view, could be found in the NATO and EU membership of all countries of this region. Besides that, in the context of continuous globalization, there is also a significant potential for fruitful cooperation in the format of NATO+ and EAPC+.

Third, NATO security activities in different regions of the world engage many non-partner states in security cooperation with the Alliance. Now Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Brazil demonstrate their growing interest in developing cooperation with NATO. Moreover, they already participate in the Alliance operational activity. It is a promising trend for all of us. Thus, NATO should think over the possibilities to extend its programs of partnership cooperation, as appropriate, for members of the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as for other "operational" partners of NATO. This would result in a real "global security partnership" led by NATO. At the same time, the proven partnership instruments such as EAPC/PfP should not be dissolved in this new global security cooperation.

Fourth, in conformity with the declarations of the 2004 NATO Summit in Istanbul, the Alliance should pay more attention to the security in the wider Black Sea region. European and Euro-Atlantic integration have become the main factor of stabilization and consolidation in the region. Membership in the EU and NATO is a key tool to securing lasting peace in the region, to building civil societies, to bringing democracy and economic prosperity to the peoples. Ukraine realizes the vital importance of this issue in the context of European security. The security in the Black Sea region was at the core of our joint initiative with Georgia named Community for Democratic Choice. Ukraine believes that there are many options for NATO to build and extend cooperation with all actors of the Black Sea region.

Ukraine adheres to the EU and NATO policy in the region and is willing to be an active promoter of such cooperation.

To summarize, I would like to underline that all aspects of NATO transformation influence the interests of Allies and the whole world community. That is why we hope that those issues will be discussed in an appropriate manner with NATO partners as well.

Thank you for your attention.

Agim Çeku

Prime Minister, PISK, Kosovo

NATO Transformation

Kosovo has been a witness to the most remarkable coalition in action since the Second World War. The nineteen-member NATO coalition intervention to stop ethnic cleansing and gross human rights violation was a first practical step toward what NATO is becoming and plans to transform to in the future.

Kosovo's experience from 1999 has, in a way, determined its way of living in coexistence with NATO. As the most trusted organization by the people of Kosovo, NATO has been achieving significant results on the ground and has been a major player in maintaining security and peace in Kosovo and in the region.

The people and elected institutions of Kosovo have been a truthful ally to the NATO forces on the ground. The relations that have been developed in the past years show a remarkable friendship and working relation between Kosovars and the forces on the ground. Thus the long-term and strategic orientation of Kosovo towards becoming a member of NATO and of the EU. The values that these organizations have been offering to Kosovars are integration, inclusion and partnership in common endeavours.

As Kosovo enters the finales of the road to independence, we are developing a clear vision about our security and NATO integration and our European agenda as two main pillars of our place in the region and beyond. The situation in the Western Balkans has improved dramatically since 1999 and the danger of large-scale warfare has receded, although it is not entirely discounted. However, the situation remains fragile due to immature political institutions and weak economic positions. Tensions are driven to meet political needs which result from the unresolved status of a number of states. The major threat to security derives from the precarious economic situation that affects most Balkan countries. This provides a fertile ground for trading in drugs, human trafficking, illegal immigration, organised crime and weapons proliferation which undermine economic development, setting the conditions for political extremism and further instability. Added to this are the natural and environmental threats of which avian flu is a most graphic example. These threats must be tackled if the emerging nation-states are to develop into modern, stable, democratic countries. It is clear that challenging these threats lies outside the scope of a single state; they are regional problems and can only be dealt with by regional initiatives. Unfortunately, this is not possible at the moment. The legacy of the violent decade that marked the breakup of Yugoslavia created bitter divisions and rivalries, but above all a complete lack of trust amongst neighbouring states. Peace and stability have been enforced

by the deployment of significant international forces, which, despite being major successes, will not provide the enduring solution to our problems.

The future strategy must be to press for further Euro-Atlantic integration which, while costly, will be a better long-term investment for the international community than the maintenance of stabilizing forces for an indefinite period. In this respect NATO will play the key role because it provides the unique combination of international forum and practical engagement.

NATO, on behalf of the international community, must seek to achieve two objectives. The first is to build trust and confidence between nations, so that they are able to cooperate over regional issues. The second is to create sound regional structures and procedures to ensure success in regional initiatives and operations. The majority of regional states will be more than willing to play their role in these initiatives, but it must be accepted that some will have to be coaxed into the process through sound diplomatic and economic initiatives.

Confidence-building will be the most difficult issue and I would propose a number of basic measures. The first is that we should create national forces within the Balkans to meet the needs of the 21st century. Reassured by the collective defense provided by Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, we should recognize that the days of having to have forces structured to defeat your two most powerful neighbours are long gone. Now we should have smaller forces designed for operations on the NATO frontier that work within coalitions and pose no threat to our neighbours.

The second measure is that we must build professional and reliable, both militarily and politically, forces that meet the high standards of existing NATO nations. In this respect NATO must maintain its benchmark and not lower it to accommodate the Balkan nations. These measures can only be implemented with the leadership and support of NATO. We need the intellectual input to guide us on strategy and doctrine; we need the training support to guide us through a transitional period. The last element is openness and we need NATO to monitor and report on our activities, so that we are able to verify to our neighbours that we are indeed developing our military as a force of good in the region.

Building connectivity at the operational level will be easier and we already have some of the means on hand through SEEBRIG. I would see the inclusion of the emerging nations in this organisation as an important first step. This will lead to groups of Balkan nations deploying to operational theatres where they can develop mutual respect as a precursor to direct cooperation. Kosovo has offered demining teams to support operations in Iraq, which would take us into the same operational theatre as other Balkan states, although we might not necessarily work alongside them. However, I would see this as being a positive step as we develop the same working ethos and

professional respect. I would also see that the emerging nations work alongside the international stabilization forces in their own country to develop a professional ethos. This will require a different mindset and will involve the development of professionalism through engagement as partners in the same operation.

It is hoped that through these measures we will build confidence, trust and connectivity leading to cooperation. Only once this is done will we truly be able to address our regional threats with confidence and build stable Balkans for the future. NATO will have the challenge to meet this new task. Large-scale stabilization forces will fade away and be replaced with smaller high-quality detachments that will provide the leadership, training and mentoring necessary to achieve the aim. I would see a need for NATO personnel embedded within the local forces as advisers rather than commanders, who get to know the people and are better placed to fulfill their role. Individual terms of deployment may well be different from now, requiring longer periods in post and better grasp of local language and custom. This in itself will be a challenge for NATO because the number of countries willing and able to undertake such missions will be small and will inevitably put pressure on those nations that are most committed. NATO will have to encourage new nations to step forward and in doing so will have to make sure that those preparing for such tasks develop the experience necessary to conduct them successfully.

Finally, as the prime minister of an emerging nation and a former soldier, I would like to give my perspective of where the emerging Balkan nations should be moving to. Firstly, I am confident that we will remain under the NATO protective umbrella either through the presence of a NATO force or through the protection offered by Article 5. Secondly, we will have a small defense force as a symbol of our sovereignty and to satisfy the demands of national pride. That force will be configured to meet our own limited security concerns, while enabling us to support regional initiatives and international coalition operations on the NATO frontier, rather than the traditional Balkan role of home defense. Our aim will be to operate alongside our Balkan neighbours as allies in the maintenance of both regional security and international peace. We will achieve it with NATO's help. The challenge for NATO will be to make it happen.

Pjer Šimunović

National Coordinator for NATO, Assistant Minister for International Organizations and Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Republic of Croatia

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Prime Minister, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Truly, it is a great pleasure and honor to be able to present to you our views, Croatia's views, on some important issues: on the future, on the perspectives and on the strategies to develop in order to foster stability and democracy in the region of Southeast Europe. In the first place I wish to express our sincerest gratitude to the organizers, to the Bulgarian organizers, to the Center for the Study of Democracy, to you personally, Ambassador Noev, and also I think we all need to express congratulations to our Bulgarian hosts for hosting an important NATO meeting, a very successful NATO Ministerial. Let me also begin with this fact—I think that the mere fact that such a meeting, a NATO meeting, a NATO Ministerial meeting, has been organized in the region demonstrates most clearly how deeply the region has changed. It is a region in which the countries have been either integrated into the Euro-Atlantic structures, or are on their way to accede as soon as possible. Also in that regard, I am lucky to be able to speak after Prime Minister Çeku, whose intervention, I think, has very clearly demonstrated how much the region has changed, how much the perceptions in the region have changed. The region has been burdened by so many crises and ultimately with violence throughout the 1990s. Now, we see a sea change in the region, we see military forces been developed not to fight each other but to participate in NATO operations, in the UN operations.

And this is my first point with which I would like to start this intervention, to give you our vision, a 'status Report', of how the region looks. Certainly, I wouldn't like to sound too complacent, saying that everything has been resolved and that the region is facing no more problems or that there are no more obstacles to overcome. This is not certainly the case. But when we compare how the region looked ten years ago, how the region looked throughout the 1990s, we see how much we have advanced, in a specific region, strategically important, linking Central and Western Europe to the area of the Black Sea, Central Asia, Greater Middle East. We see how this strategically important region has changed. And it has changed in a very positive way. It is demonstrated by the topics which we are discussing among ourselves, and with our partners from the EU and NATO. We are discussing our speedy accession to the Euro-Atlantic integrations, and this is what has changed, I would say, dramatically due to a variety of factors. I think that the first factor has been that an aggressive, violent policy of expansion, the one conducted by late President Milošević, has been

utterly defeated, in the first place due to some internal developments and a changed balance of forces, but also very much, which is an important element also addressed by Prime Minister Çeku, due to a very successful, robust intervention by NATO, by the political and military involvement of major powers.

So, in the region we live in a different world. The problems which we have yet to overcome are clear, but also I would like to stress that to all likelihood this year 2006 should be a decisive year in terms of resolving, of laying a firm ground, a firm base for resolving all the remaining issues, all the outstanding issues which are big (let's not forget that), in a durable and just way. In the first place Kosovo, I will not speak about it extensively, the Prime Minister was speaking about it. Clearly, there are rules; there is a list of how this problem is to be resolved and this year, in terms of the Status Talks, in terms of finding the final settlement, looks very promising. The second issue is Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ten years after Dayton, the region, not only Bosnia-Herzegovina, has been very much pacified. A certain presence of international troops is still very much needed, but the war, an all-out war, is certainly not an option. A certain level of possible outbreaks of smaller-scale violence may exist, but it's not very high on the list of possibilities, I would say. Certainly an all-out war in the region seems to be out of the question and I think what is very important is to take a look into how the respective defense reform is working in all of the individual countries in the region, in terms of their defense strategies and in terms of development of their forces. No country regards any other country in the region as an enemy in relation to which it should develop its national security strategy or it should be directing its forces. The countries in the region, while they are developing their forces, are working in order to develop them to be interoperable with NATO, in order to be expeditionary forces meant to face the threats we are all facing, such as the threat of WMD proliferation, such as the threat of the spillover from certain crises in the world, such as, certainly, international terrorism. They are looking how they can contribute to NATO peace-support operations. So the entire philosophy in the region in something which is very important, which is the defense strategy, which is the national security policy, has changed, I would say, dramatically in all corners of the region. I speak, of course, on behalf of Croatia, but in that regard, I think, our analysis of the region is precisely the same.

I mentioned Bosnia-Herzegovina. Just recently we had the pleasure of hosting a meeting. Let me just use this as a symbol for what has been achieved in Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite all the problems, all the political uncertainties, all the political problems which still remain to be resolved. Recently we had a meeting of the so called Sub-Regional Consultative Commission which is meant to discuss Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement. This is the Annex dealing with arms control. We actually got together in order to change the Annex in a way to reflect the advancement, the big progress which has been achieved in Bosnia-Herzegovina, due to the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina now have one defense ministry and single armed forces, we

actually changed the document in order to give Bosnia-Herzegovina one voice, one position instead of three, which was the position of the Dayton Agreement. So, if you take a look into these ten years which have passed, we see a shift towards a major political advancement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We see at this stage the discussions of the constitutional reforms, we see certain political problems. But what we see in the first place is a country which has been, I would say, thoroughly pacified and which, looking into some important elements of the stabilization, gives us a lot of reasons to be optimistic.

Also, the third issue I would like to emphasize for the purposes of this intervention is the issue of the settlement of the situation of the state union between Serbia and Montenegro, which is also on its way to being resolved one way or another, following the Montenegrin referendum happening very soon. So what we see is the forceful effort to resolve all the remaining problems throughout this year and this is due to the, I would say, internal dynamics in the region, in the countries in the region, wishing to have a better position to start finalizing their Euro-Atlantic dream without the burden of some issues which were remaining unresolved for years.

What we in the region are very glad to see is a forceful engagement of the international community, putting, in order to resolve these matters, all the necessary weight on the resolution, either through the European Union, through NATO, through Contact Group, or bilaterally by some important international powers, such as US in the first place. So we see circumstances changing for the better, we see a drive to resolve all the remaining issues and, as the common denominator of it all, we see a shared wish to accede to the European Union and NATO. And, to me, it looks rather encouraging.

In that regard I think of some examples in the region, and I have a great pleasure of starting to use our host country Bulgaria as an example. We see some countries in the region, the countries which have not directly been involved in the crises, in the violence in former Yugoslavia, which were countries of the region, nevertheless, being success stories, being true success stories in terms of acceding either to both the EU and NATO, such as for example Slovenia and Hungary, or having acceded to NATO and being one step from acceding to the EU, such as the case of our Bulgarian friends and of our Romanian friends. So we see a lot of positive developments in the region. I am using this opportunity to present a more optimistic view. This is not to say, again, that I would like to sound complacent. I think that we would be able certainly to dedicate an entire conference on discussing the problems which remain and which are big. But what I see, what we see at this stage, is certainly, in terms of observing what we may call decisive trends, are some very positive perspectives.

This is for the introduction of my intervention, to give a certain vision of how we see the region at this stage. Let me now develop this into telling you something more about what we think are the measures undertaken in order to develop certain promising

political strategies and plans for the region. Within the region which was formerly burdened by political and military problems, the region of former Yugoslavia, we certainly see a full development of bilateral ties which are certainly underpinning normalization in the region across the full spectrum of issues: political, economic, social, police cooperation, cooperation on any given issue. Let me use a couple of examples. One of them is certainly dealing with a very important political, economic, but in the first place human issue. This is the process of return of refugees dislocated, expelled by the consequences of war. In that regard we have the so-called Sarajevo Declaration signed by the three governments—of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The aim of this document, which has been followed by a full range of action plans, road maps and implementation measures, is to close down the refugee chapter, the bulk of it, by the end of this year. This is a very ambitious plan and when one thinks about it, throughout history such a plan has never been completed, there were hardly any situations in which we had such a high level of returns, although one cannot be complacent until every refugee wishing to return has actually returned. But if we are talking about the numbers and about the trends in the region, we see a very encouraging situation. Speaking on behalf of Croatia, we are very proud of having achieved a very high level of refugee returns. The expenses were almost entirely, in the case of Croatia, our own, our own money was stimulating the return. And not only stimulating the return, but ensuring the right circumstances for the returnees to live normally and, more than that, to be able to start anew their life—to give them all the money necessary to rebuild their houses, to rebuild their lives, to start businesses, to develop employment, establish a culture of tolerance and dialogue, equal rights and some specific national minority rights. So we see an encouraging process, however difficult and complicated, of crisscross return of refugees happening between Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia.

The second important process, on top of resolving the refugee issues and the issue of cooperating very energetically bilaterally, is a process of multilateral regional cooperation. In that regard I would like specifically to emphasize the importance of the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP), which will have its Summit in Greece next week. Now it is under the Greek presidency and after the Summit next week Croatia will be taking over the chairmanship-in-office. This is very much a process involving all the countries from Southeast Europe, actually replacing some previous instruments which were used by the international community to help stabilize the region. What I am trying to say is that basically with this particular process the region is clearly demonstrating that it is able to take care of itself. I think it is a good example of the regional ownership and the cooperation within the Southeast European Cooperation Process (again our Bulgarian friends are prominent members of this cooperative framework) aims to enable the individual countries in the region in the first place to be able to cooperate more efficiently, but the first aim, as we see, it is to enable the countries to accede to both EU and NATO as soon as possible. So cooperation along the shared wish to accede to the Euro-Atlantic

integration underpins this cooperation, which is working smoothly and which has been extended in a variety of fields, such as traffic, such as police cooperation, culture, sports, medicine, basically all affairs, energy as well, energy very much. So in a variety of fields this demonstrates to be a very effective, very efficient regional cooperation group.

Another one, very much related to NATO, is the US-Adriatic Charter encompassing Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, and the US. Also attached to that cooperation we have Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The aim is to enable us to implement our Membership Action Plans more effectively, to exchange views and to cooperate in any field in which we are able to cooperate in order to pursue our NATO candidacy and also in relation to other countries (Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina) to help them, to support them all the way we can to join Partnership for Peace as soon as possible, which we think is a very important element in helping democratize and stabilize these two countries.

With this small overview of the situation in the region and of the measures we think are being implemented I would like to reach the conclusion of my intervention, Mr. Chairman, by ending with something which is maybe one of the most important elements and this is—to keep the inclusion and enlargement policy alive. It refers both to the EU as well as to NATO and I think this is the fundamental part of helping stabilize this region and of helping it become a full-fledged member of the community of Euro-Atlantic democracies, meaning that the inclusion is a process which fosters the reforms most efficiently and also, in terms of keeping the open-doors policy in both cases—EU and NATO. It is of a vital importance for us in the region not yet members of both organizations to have the certainty of accession once we do our homework, which is clearly of big use, in terms of that we know what remains to be done. But having this option very much realized, in that regard we were very glad to listen to Minister Kalfin's yesterday's remarks on the deliberations during the NATO Ministerial, which were referring to the NATO enlargement, saying that the ministers were thinking in line of outlining the option of having the next round of issuing invitations to start accession talks, if all goes well, most probably in 2008. And this is exactly what we would like to keep alive, to keep in a very concrete way alive. This is the most clear possible perspective of enlargement, perspective of being able ultimately to accede both to the European Union and NATO. I think it is by far the most important driving force of normalization, democratization, stabilization, prosperity and security of the region.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you very much for your attention. It was a pleasure being here, many thanks again to our Bulgarian hosts. Thank you very much.

Araz Azimov

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Azerbaijan

Thank you, Chairman.

First of all, these are usual for a speaker thanks to go to the organizers of the conference. My gratitude for being invited. Although I've been lately informed that I have to speak, anyway I'll try to engage you and entertain you somehow. The topic which I've been put in, the session, somewhat widened, expanded the range of issues which is embedded in a so yet not known quite geographically Wider Black Sea Region and I've been a bit puzzled about the strange composition of the panel, with me from the Southern Caucasus sitting together with a representative of a breakaway region of Serbia—Kosovo.

But anyway, I'll try to do my best in addressing the wide range of issues which come across the agenda of security of Azerbaijan. Behind the energy producer image and a country located in a vulnerable and volatile region of the South Caucasus Azerbaijan proudly has many other merits, and one of those is a strong partner of NATO so far during the last fourteen years. We always, together with our close partner in South Caucasus—Georgia, were first on the list of joining PfP 1994 in May, in joining PARP in 1996, in joining IPAP two years ago. And, of course, the agenda of NATO, although informal, meeting of ministers yesterday was quite a place of pinned interest and hopes of Azerbaijan and, I believe of course, Georgia. I am not pretending to present this neighbouring family country of Azerbaijan here today, but sometimes my friend David Dondua, Ambassador Dondua, will forgive me for referring to his country, as we are interlinked in a variety of ways. We are both engaged in NATO partnership, we are both sharing some goals of our foreign policy, we both are interested in settlement of conflicts which are very similarly developing in the territories of the two states, and we are those interested in providing security in a very vulnerable region of the Southern Caucasus.

Yesterday we've heard, thanks to the organizers for bringing Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria from NATO Meeting here to this audience, some interesting elements, some pieces of discussion which took place in this informal meeting of NATO. We understand this was a very important meeting, we understand that ministers of NATO were very engaged in that, and still I hoped to have a bit more sound presence from that part of the Alliance here, in this hall, to talk to us, to partners. Actually, I would hesitate of putting a difference between alliance and partners, differentiating those in terms of being interested in providing Euro-Atlantic security. I would pretend, even more, to name both parties as partners. As we are partners of NATO, NATO is a partner of Azerbaijan and Georgia, other countries involved in PfP.

So agenda of NATO developing till Riga Summit and afterwards would be of course a major focus of our interest in these upcoming months because somewhat now the turn is after us maybe, in a way. Now, somewhat, we are summing up, we are approaching the edge where we can sum up the results of the activities, of efforts spent, energies spent so far, during the last fourteen years, as I said, and some would be rather frustrated once opportunities are lost. Or what opportunities, you would ask me. While NATO is increasing its involvement in a variety of ways, as yesterday Assistant Secretary General of NATO Adam Kobieracki has informed us, through different kinds of missions, operations, assistance programs—walking down to Pakistan, moving in helping the United States after Katrina hurricane, of course, that increases the expectations. While we see that NATO is playing a stronger and deeper role in providing security in the Euro-Atlantic area, those partners which, like Azerbaijan and Georgia are vulnerable would expect more engagement in this part of the world. Effectiveness and mightiness of NATO is a desire of all, of all sitting in this hall. And as philosophy of the security, yesterday someone touched upon the issue of basic ideology of unification, and I thought that actually the security did not change in terms of its philosophy, otherwise why are all these things happening today in Euro-Atlantic security? And once we have the basis of unification, as Adam Kobieracki said yesterday, of like-minded nations as democracy and free market, why then there is a problem between NATO and Russia? Why then there is such a big or deep political frustration in Russia about enlargement? Why then Russia is not engaged in this process? So, basically the reasons are not in democracy, which is somewhat developed in Russia. The reason is not in economics based on free markets. Those are actually present in Russia today. There is something else. There is something leading us to deeper security interests, to deeper security confrontationist approaches in Euro-Atlantic area. Some are taking us to another system centered around Russia and sponsored by Russia. Some have invited yesterday the very dangerous and narrow strip of freedom of maneuver within the cooperation between NATO and so called Organization for Collective Security Treaty based in Moscow and sponsored by Russia so far. And this is something very sensitive for my country. Cause you leave me then no room, no space for maneuver. I would be squeezed, already I am squeezed, I am sandwiched, as I usually say, between North and South, and now you make me more squeezed, if you arrange the cooperation between NATO and again Russia-centered system of collective security. Having no bright perspectives of enlargement or whatever security commitment of NATO towards South Caucasus, towards me—Azerbaijan, and towards Georgia. I'm not touching upon Armenia, not because of ignoring that country, but Armenia is well suited and fitted in terms of its military alliance with Russia and I am not touching upon that issue. But this is something to be taken due account of. There is a discrepancy in the South Caucasus region and there is a gap between policies. There is a problem of foreign military presence in the South Caucasus—not only those pieces of weapons which still remain in Georgia, but there is a huge presence of Russia in Armenia, there is an indirect presence of the military alliance of Russia in Armenia, in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, there

are huge amounts of UTLE (uncontrolled treaty-limited equipment) in Azerbaijan exceeding the ceilings of Azerbaijan sometimes twice. So all this bunch of risks and complex of threats is just in front of my eyes while I look at the prospects of the Riga Summit.

What may I see there? I see that the more NATO is involved, more support NATO shall meet and the role of partners will be increasingly higher and demanded. The more NATO is increasingly involved in wider geography of activities, then the question of stretched capability of NATO is coming around. The stretched capability to be understood as a potential ability of a system, and NATO is a system, to be stretched Eastwards, Westwards, Southwards or Northwards, in any way, covering wider and wider geographies. And the interest of mine is to have effective NATO, to have a structure which can address problems because I am part of that system as well. And the system is stretched, as yesterday Mr. Teltschik has said—stretched, NATO is overstretched, he said. Well, I am not part of NATO member community and I will not dare to judge on this part of NATO's policies, but I may give questions. And my question is about how far we can go forward, how far we can count on increased political unanimity covering this wider geography, how far we can count for interoperability between and among partners and NATO community. Because, again someone yesterday touched upon the issue of, I believe Ambassador Teltschik has said that, growing technological gap between the US and the EU that brings the issue of interoperability between these two members of NATO. The US and EU countries—members of NATO should be interoperable and while the gap is growing up, what to say more about interoperability between some old members and other old members? Nor say anything more about old members and new members. You all understand this is truly the thing that, within the enlargement policy since 1996, the major political drive was made. Interoperability has never been on the first place in the agenda. It was maybe second or third row of questions. But majorly, political environment, political reasonability, geopolitical soundness of enlargement was first to be tackled. Geography has taken NATO so far closer to us. But as geography played a role in driving NATO towards enlarged NATO of 2006, question is: shall geography play the same role further on? I believe there are more difficult pieces in front of us, more difficult than it was in the past.

Current enlargement has obvious limitations and those limitations are somewhat getting closer to my part of the world, my region. And partners, in terms of thinking what else can be done besides PARP, besides IPAP, are thinking about the reasonability behind all these things. Partners think more about motivation, partners think more about some new patterns of cooperation, some commitments of NATO towards security concerns and problems of these countries, some, even, security assurances, not to say guarantees. One of the speakers yesterday mentioned Washington Treaty's Article 5 issue and was so open mentioning that the energy security is a matter of Article 5. But I am an energy-producing state and with all my great respect to

the ideas given yesterday by Secretary McFarlane on the issue of ethanol, and by coincidence yesterday CNN reported on ethanol production in Brazil—there was a report from CNN, but I believe since we are today in a foreseeable future not yet able to afford ethanol and methanol and other alternative energy resources, able and capable enough to replace current oil and gas-based resources of energy, we still have to care, we still have to care about vulnerability, about uninterruptedness of supplies and about reliability of sources. Countries like Azerbaijan would need more commitment to make the source of energy more reliable, lest make less vulnerable the state. And vulnerability is coming out from sometimes lack of interest, or lack of attention, or hesitation. Are we witnessing this on the side of NATO? I would say there are two programs—program minimum and program maximum—and there are a lot of questions. With regard to the upcoming Riga Summit, what partnerships could be developed further on? I think the major philosophical change has to be brought in. Partnership is no more exclusively a path towards membership. Partnership should be developed as an institution because NATO so far is not able to provide the membership in such a stretched, expanded way to all pieces of Euro-Atlantic security area. On the other hand, expectations are growing high. Overheated expectations in countries like Georgia, once the expected invitation will not be given, may bring a society to a frustration and may actually impact the policy of the government, and may give a wrong message to those who have been concerned, neighbouring countries I mean, who have been concerned with the possible invitation, and let them think that once invitation has not been given, there is a new stage, new opportunities, so we can still go on pressing. So the Riga Summit is important not only in terms of transformation of NATO, it's important also in giving right messages.

Someone yesterday, if I am still in time, Chairman, I am sorry for that, but I have not been able to make a shorter speech in advance, so I have to run through those pieces of yesterday's speeches trying to assemble all of them and to cover all of them at one presentation. So I have only several remarks to go on. Someone said yesterday about a link between NATO enlargement and crisis management. That made me think more about that also. And the question is: is there any link between settlement of conflicts or protracted unsettled stage of conflicts and perspectives of enlargement? On the other hand, someone yesterday, and I believe that was respected Assistant Secretary General Kobieracki, mentioned an opportunity of preventive deployment vis-à-vis a potential crisis as the one we heard NATO is expected to cover and to continue to provide protection for Kosovo area. Protecting separatist area, the function of NATO—is that it? And then shall that give a new message to neighbouring countries in the region? And shouldn't that, then, put an aspiring partner in a very sensitive, difficult situation? With NATO playing the role of protector of breakaway regions in the heart of Europe, with NATO coming to this region, with several breakaway regions there, and with Northern neighbours getting a nice opportunity of being the good guy providing other sensitive opportunities. So we come to a very tricky situation with this point. So let's think in depth about it, and I fully support what has

been said by Ambassador Dondua indirectly by his question to Minister Tarasyuk, and what Minister Tarasyuk said was exactly what Azerbaijan thinks, maybe in a more serious and a more exacting way because we are vulnerable in terms of conflict. And I believe that the settlement of conflict has no other perspective, specifically in South Caucasus and in Moldova, other than providing territorial integrity of state and we do that accommodating a self-ruling region with certain ethnic communities inside. So this is what is absolutely important, indispensable to the lasting security in the region of South Caucasus and in Moldova, otherwise this would be a continued conflict with more chances for our Northern neighbours to get back to the track.

And finally, my reply to those who discussed yesterday and today the issue of intensified dialogue. All partners are different, partners should be treated in a differentiated way, but still, those countries which are implementing IPAP today without being put in a specific position of having received or not received an invitation for Intensified Dialogue, should be given a precise message that implementation of IPAP will open the way for Intensified Dialogue. That should be somewhat done in a shorter, automatic, procedurally smooth way. Implementation of IPAP, if there is a desire, opens a way towards Intensified Dialogue. If there is no desire, then of course something else might be considered. But I believe that Washington Treaty Article 5 is important not only in terms of energy security, but even in that case. Energy security takes us to many more challenges linked to conflict settlement, linked to security and, of course, if we are about an increase through all of NATO, if we are about better and deeper engagement in Euro-Atlantic security, then more commitments on the side of NATO will be expected.

Thank you, Chairman.

Theodossis Georgiou,
Chairman, Greek Association for
Atlantic and European Cooperation

The Role of the NGO's of NATO and Their Contribution to the Common Security

It is a big honor for me to participate in the International Conference of the Center for the Study of Democracy under the title *NATO Transformation – Facing New Security Frontiers* and I would like indeed to thank the organizers for inviting me. With this occasion, allow me to repeat what I have emphasized many times in several of my presentations. During these presentations, I have pointed out as the most fundamental issue that of public support. NATO membership is nothing more than a promise and a commitment by each of its members to be part of a community of values, and to act diplomatically and militarily to protect that community of values. Public support guarantees the political will of the signature to be a member of the Alliance. Public support provides the legitimacy, which matters as much as power does. As everybody knows, public support requires an educated public and an educated public means that they understand the reason for being a NATO member and how this issue affects their lives.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In our days, the idea of an interdependent world having to deal with a multitude of complex issues is gaining ground at a steady pace. The international system is composed of many structures of interactions, and not just among states. Governments are not the only actors on the world level, and military stability is not the only important issue in world politics.

There is no doubt that today's world of interdependence and globalization of problems reinforces the role of non-governmental organizations, since they do not face the restrictions of government actors. As the new dimensions acquired by the notion of security make new channels of communication among people above and beyond government activity necessary, by reinforcing the role of NGOs we can contribute to the creation of confidence and security between countries.

Indeed the nearly forty years (1946–1986) which constitute the period immediately after the Second World War, were characterized by the East-West confrontation which dominated the whole international scene and by one of this confrontation's main consequences: the European continent's division. This situation had, of course, many consequences. I think that one of them, which is the least mentioned, even though it is very important, concerns mental and psychological aspects. No one can deny the fact that the Cold War period has continuing effects, not just on our economies

but basically on our minds: people living on the same continent do not know each other—certainly not as well as they should, now that the period of confrontation is over and the artificial divisions among us have disappeared. But if the mentality of one is practically unknown to the other, how can we be sure that confidence has replaced suspicion and mistrust?

In my view, an environment of confidence can be created if we focus our future efforts on developing and extending transparency and information. This, I believe, is the best route towards ensuring stability and the secure construction of solidarity and understanding among people. Our relationship should be based on the establishment of a climate of trust that would reduce the risk of conflict by improving at the same time political relations.

In order to establish a new framework for security and cooperation, the NGOs of NATO, such as is the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) and its partners may play a dynamic role in promoting confidence across the European continent. More specifically, the Atlantic Treaty Association, an international organization, a network of national Atlantic Associations in 42 countries from Vancouver to Vladivostok, has a very important part to play in the Euro-Atlantic context.

ATA is unique in its status. It is a confederation of national Euro-Atlantic Associations that aim to inform and educate public opinion in our respective countries. We are acting in a domain which is clearly political, but we are not engaged in political affairs. We are acting in a domain, which touches on the security of our nation, but we are not military experts. We conduct our affairs in a plain that in certain circumstances concerns the diplomatic domain, but we do not practice parallel diplomacy.

ATA strives to defend and develop the basic principles of the Treaty: peace, freedom, well-being and security.

The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an organization which acts as a network facilitator in the Euro-Atlantic and beyond. The ATA draws together political leaders, academics, and diplomats in an effort to further the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty.

Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the role of the Atlantic Treaty Association has changed considerably. Given the shifting nature of security politics, and NATO's continued transformation, the ATA now works beyond the borders of the Euro-Atlantic—promoting new initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the South Caucasus. Following the accession of the new NATO countries in 1999 and 2004, the ATA membership expanded considerably, and naturally its security focus has shifted eastward.

The ATA is active in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Mediterranean Dialogue programmes.

The Atlantic Treaty Association seeks, through discussion and political channels, to support the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Freedom, Liberty, Peace, Security, and the Rule of Law. As such, the ATA acts as a forum for debate in which member associations can realize common interests and democratic goals in the ever-changing security environment of the 21st century.

The ATA is now fully dedicated to engaging the youth of the Euro-Atlantic through close cooperation with its youth division, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA). YATA seeks to educate and promote debate amongst the successor generations in an effort to create responsible future political leaders who have an understanding of the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Atlantic Treaty Association firmly believes in the strength of the transatlantic relationship—one which is fundamental to the stability of the international system in the 21st century. As such, the ATA remains instrumental in bridging values from both sides of the Atlantic in its effort to underpin the broader goals of the NATO Alliance.

The ATA aims to:

- *Promote the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty.*
- *Educate and inform the public regarding NATO's missions and responsibilities.*
- *Promote democracy.*
- *Promote the solidarity of the populations of the North Atlantic area, and of those whose governments have signed NATO PfP or Mediterranean Dialogue Agreements, and/or those who are directly concerned with the affairs of Euro-Atlantic security.*
- *Support the development of civil society in the Black Sea area and the Caucasus.*
- *Conduct research into the role of NATO, and its expansion to the countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union.*
- *Pursue a dialogue with countries bordering the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, which work in cooperation with the Alliance.*
- *Deepen cooperation between the ATA, its member associations, the governments of its member associations, NATO, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and the EU.*

- *Foster debate and dialogue in an effort to create a solid understanding of key Alliance issues.*
- *Engage civil society groups which support peace, security, and broad democratic practices.*
- *Facilitate the development of strong relationships among its members in an effort to realize common interest, and achieve common goals.*

There are regular exchanges of information and ideas between the National Committees, a pooling of knowledge about the situation in particular countries, to achieve a deeper understanding of the economic, social and political factors that inspire competitive arming or provocative behavior. This results in improving awareness on how one country's actions affect the security perceptions of neighboring countries. There is a definite need for a greater cultural insight into societies and a better familiarity with the political vocabulary of each other. That creates a mood of solidarity, which exists among its national organizations and its members committed to the same values and the same ideals.

The spirit of cooperation generated by this atmosphere allows the Atlantic Associations to play a discrete but efficient role in promoting understanding and collaboration among the countries of the Euro-Atlantic area. A particularly significant aspect of ATA's actions rests on the solidarity which exists among its national organizations and its members committed to the same values and the same ideals. A concrete example of this is the privileged relationship that has developed between the Atlantic Council of Turkey and the Greek Association for Atlantic and European Cooperation. Let me tell you that I am convinced that the actions of our respective associations have had their influence on the positive evolutions that our two countries have recently experienced in their relations.

The Atlantic Associations and the Atlantic Councils as factors affecting the public opinion of the member countries, but also as receivers of messages, can convey these to governments and to the major actors that influence the process of cooperation on political, environmental and security issues. While as NGOs they defend the values of democracy and solidarity among peoples, these associations can equally influence the decision-making process both at the national and international level. They also assist their governments, by offering suggestions for their undertakings in establishing confidence. In this context the ATA and its National Committees can also broaden the coalition of different forces willing to work for the same purpose among representatives of government and a multitude of other actors, such as scientists, experts and the public.

We must consider the fact that long-lasting peace necessarily depends upon continued progress, not solely in military matters but mainly upon other fundamental issues, such as political, economic, and environmental issues. In this aspect, the ATA and

its National Committees must emphasize their part regarding the already mentioned political aspects of security, in contributing to the adoption of comprehensive security measures beyond the military ones. There is a greater need to focus on political, economic, social and other forms of non-military operations, than on military arrangements as such.

The ATA and its National Committees focus their efforts on increasing interdependence between countries through enhanced cooperation in the fields of politics, economy, human rights, democratic institutions and the environment. That expansion of interdependence would lead, to a certain extent, to the decrease of tautness, and eventually will prevent sources of tension from escalating.

The ability of the Atlantic Treaty Association—the Confederation of Atlantic Associations—to positively contribute to decision-making and policy formation within the Atlantic Alliance is therefore obvious. Moreover, the restoration of networks between groups above and beyond core politics can create a culture of cooperation and peaceful coexistence in a very efficient way in our globalized world. NGOs have a crucial role to play in this context.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The role of the NATO NGOs is thus clear: we have to establish and defend the peace and freedom that we enjoy today, so as to ensure that all our people in the future will speak the common language of democracy. The new century has brought a new management concept with it: states and governments must learn to run their internal and external affairs with the direct participation and cooperation of NGOs. This is something that our associations inaugurated within our Euro-Atlantic family many decades ago. With the addition of new members from Central and Eastern Europe, we have become stronger. Not restricted by governmental limits, but in cooperation with governments, we have prepared and realized the rapprochement of Euro-Atlantic societies and established bonds of cooperation between them. We have the vision, we have the mission, we have the motivation and we have our self-confidence.

Thank you.

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Kosovo Should Be an Independent State Contributing to Balkan Peace and Security, 30 April, 2006

Belgrade Awaits Others to Decide about Kosovo, 1 May, 2006

PHOTOGRAPHS



Dr. Ognian Shentov, CSD Chairman, opens the conference.

From left: Mr. Ivailo Kalfin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Amb. Boyko Noev, CSD European Program Director, Amb. Adam Kobieracki, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations, Mr. Robert McFarlane, former US National Security Advisor.



First panel. "NATO's transformation—an agenda for the 2006 Summit. Towards a common definition of new security frontiers."



First panel. Mr. Ivailo Kalfin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, addresses the participants.



Second panel. *From left:* Amb. Shohei Naito, Ambassador of Japan to Belgium, Amb. Boyko Noev, CSD European Program Director, Dr. Horst Teltschik, Chairman, Munich Conference on Security Policy.



Second panel. Dr. Horst Teltschik, Chairman, Munich Conference on Security Policy, presents his report.



From left: Mr. Araz Azimov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Amb. Elman Zeynalov, Embassy of Azerbaijan in Sofia, Amb. Danilo Vucetic, Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in Sofia, Amb. Nikola Dimitrov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Macedonia.



Third panel. *From left:* Mr. Borys Tarasyuk, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Mr. Agim Çeku Prime Minister, PISK, Kosovo, Mr. Pjer Šimunović, National Coordinator for NATO of Croatia, Minister (ret.) Michael Durkee, Mr. Theodosis Georgiou, Chairman of the Greek Association for Atlantic and European Cooperation, Mr. Araz Azimov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan.



Third panel. Mr. Pjer Šimunović, National Coordinator for NATO of Croatia, presents his report.



Third panel. *From left:* Amb. Konstantyn Morozov, Head of Mission of Ukraine to NATO, Mr. Vladyslav Yasniuk, Deputy Director General for NATO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Amb. Yuriy Rulach, Embassy of Ukraine in Sofia.



From left: Mr. Cihad Erginay, Counselor, Permanent Representation of Turkey to NATO, Amb. Ümit Pamir, Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO, Mr. Vural Altay, Head of NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey.



From left: Brig. Adm. Nikolay Nikolov, Chief of Defense and Armed Forces Planning Directorate, Maj. Gen. Evgeni Manev, Commandant, Rakovski Defence and Staff College, Lt.-Gen. Atanas Zapryanov, Deputy Chief of General Staff, Amb. Lyubomir Ivanov, Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to NATO.



From left: Amb. Rolf Baltzersen, Royal Norwegian Embassy in Sofia, Amb. Boyko Noev, CSD European Program Director, Mr. Ramë Arifaj, Political Advisor to Prime Minister of Kosovo, Mr. Agim Çeku Prime Minister, PISK, Kosovo.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Albania

Amb. Bujar Skendo Embassy of Albania in Sofia

Armenia

Amb. Sergey Manasaryan Embassy of Armenia in Sofia

Azerbaijan

Araz Azimov Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Elman Zeynalov Embassy of Azerbaijan in Sofia

Belgium

Amb. Dominique Struye de Swielande Permanent Representative of Belgium to NATO

Bulgaria**Parliament**

Angel Naidenov MP, Chairman, Defense Committee
Amb. Konstantin Dimitrov Member of Parliament

Office of the President, Government

Zlatin Trapkov Foreign Policy Secretary to the President
Valentin Radomirski Political Advisor, Council of Ministers
Tzveta Markova Chairperson, State Commission on Information Security
Lt.-Gen. Kircho Kirov Director, National Intelligence Service

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ivailo Kalfin Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lyubomir Kyuchukov Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Todor Chourov Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Amb. Lyubomir Ivanov	Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to NATO
Amb. Elena Poptodorova	Embassy of Bulgaria in Washington
Plamen Bonchev	Director, NATO and International Security
Slav Stanchev	NATO and International Security Directorate
Hristo Georgiev	Director, Europe – I
Amb. Dimitar Ikonov	Director, Europe – III
Emil Yalnazov	Director, UN and Global Issues
Emil Vassev	NATO and International Security Directorate
Zdravko Popov	Director, Diplomatic Institute, MFA
Anton Yordanov	UN and Global Issues Directorate
Stefan Stratiev	Diplomatic Institute, MFA

Ministry of Defence, General Staff

Sonya Yankulova	Deputy Minister of Defense
Spas Panchev	Deputy Minister of Defense
Lt.-Gen. Atanas Zapryanov	Deputy Chief of General Staff
Maj. Gen. Evgeni Manev	Commandant, Rakovski Defense and Staff College
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Sabi Sabev	
Brig. Adm. Nikolay Nikolov	General Staff, Chief of Defense and Armed Forces Planning Directorate
Col. Kalin Kuzmanov	General Staff
Col. Prof. Georgi Bahchevanov	General Staff
Col. Prof. Valeri Ivanov	General Staff
Col. Prof. Ilia Saltirov	General Staff
Col. Milko Cholev	General Staff
Col. Stoyko Georgiev	General Staff
Col. Milcho Minkovski	General Staff
Col. Georgi Shopski	General Staff
Col. Krasimir Chichev	General Staff
Col. Neiko Neikov	General Staff
Col. Dimitar Dimitrov	General Staff
Col. Prof. Andrey Andreev	General Staff
Col. Nikolay Kisyov	General Staff
Capt. Martin Laskov	General Staff
Capt. Rumen Radev	General Staff
Col. Georgi Karastoyanov	Rakovski Defense and Staff College
Col. Emil Simeonov	Land Forces Headquarters
Col. Valentin Burov	Land Forces Headquarters
Teodora Genchovska	General Staff
Nikolay Petrov	General Staff

Maj. Plamen Dimov	Collective Defense and Security Department, MoD
Proletka Dimitrova	Defense Policy and Analyses Department, MoD
Lachezar Kuzmanov	Defense Policy and Analyses Department, MoD
Yordan Bozhilov	Director, International Cooperation, MoD
Col. Ivan Milanov	Director, Defense Policy, MoD
Ilia Nalbantov	Defense Policy Directorate, MoD
Col. Tsvetko Georgiev	National Security Service

Non-Governmental Organizations

Avgustina Tsvetkova	Vice-President, Atlantic Treaty Association
Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Anyu Angelov	Chairman, Center for the Study of National Security
Simeon Kralikov	President, AFCEA
Dr. Sergei Russev	SIBAL
Ilia Liaskov	SIBAL
Col. (ret.) Tihomir Stoichev	IAPGS
Amb. Bashkim Rama	
Vasil Sotirov	24 Chasa daily
Yordan Simeonov	24 Chasa daily
Daniela Tarinska	Eurointegration Association
Tsvetanka Andreeva	Eurointegration Association

Center for the Study of Democracy

Dr. Ognian Shentov	Chairman of the Board
Amb. Boyko Noev	Director, European Program
Chavdar Chervenkov	Senior Advisor, European Program
Boyko Todorov	Program Director
Georgi Apostolov	Senior Advisor
Biliana Apostolova	Assistant, European Program
Alexander Russanov	Project Assistant, Law Program
Milena Yordanova	Assistant, European Program
Daniela Mineva	Fellow, Economic Program
Mariana Yankova	Administrative Secretary
Andrei Manov	Interpreter
Aglika Markova	Interpreter
Ognian Stefanov	Photographer

Croatia

Pjer Šimunović National Coordinator for NATO, MFA of Croatia
Amb. Drazen Colić Embassy of Croatia in Sofia
Stanko Cmrečnjak Counsellor, Embassy of Croatia in Sofia
Damir Smolić Counsellor, Embassy of Croatia in Sofia

Czech Republic

Amb. Petr Dokladal Embassy of the Czech Republic in Sofia

Georgia

Mamuka Kudava First Deputy Minister of Defense
Amb. David Dondua Director, Political Department, MFA of Georgia
Amb. Teymuraz Sharashenidze Embassy of Georgia in Sofia

Germany

Dr. Horst Teltschik Chairman, Munich Conference on Security Policy

Greece

Theodossis Georgiou Chairman, Greek Association for Atlantic and European Cooperation

Iceland

Amb. Gunnar Gunnarsson Permanent Representative of Iceland to NATO

Ireland

Amb. Geoffrey Keating Embassy of Ireland in Sofia

Japan

Amb. Shohei Naito Ambassador of Japan to Belgium
Amb. Koichiro Fukui Embassy of Japan in Sofia
Motoko Nakayama Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan in Sofia
Daisaku Oka Attaché, Embassy of Japan in Sofia

Republic of Korea

Jeong Woon-Jin Counselor, Embassy of Korea in Sofia

Kosovo, UNMIK

Agim Çeku Prime Minister, PISK, Kosovo
Arben Qirezi Political Advisor to Prime Minister
Ramë Arifaj Political Advisor to Prime Minister
Ramiz Lladrovci Chief of Cabinet to Prime Minister
Lt.-Gen. Sylejman Selimi Commandant Kosova Protection Corps
Col. Xhavit Gashi Chief of Cabinet to Commandant KPC

Latvia

Amb. Janis Eichmanis Permanent Representative of Latvia to NATO

Lithuania

Amb. Linas Linkevicius Permanent Representative of Lithuania to NATO

Macedonia

Amb. Nikola Dimitrov MFA, Republic of Macedonia

Moldova

Amb. Vyacheslav Madan Embassy of Moldova in Sofia

NATO

Amb. Adam Kobieracki Assistant Secretary General for Operations

Netherlands

Amb. Herman Schaper Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to NATO

Amb. Willem van Ee Royal Netherlands Embassy in Sofia

Bart De Bruyn Royal Netherlands Embassy in Sofia

Commander Hoekstra-onnema Royal Netherlands Embassy in Sofia

Norway

Amb. Rolf Baltzersen Royal Norwegian Embassy in Sofia
Arild Sande Deputy Head of Mission, Royal Norwegian Embassy in Sofia

Poland

Amb. Dr. Jerzy M. Novak Permanent Representative of Poland to NATO

Serbia and Montenegro

Amb. Danilo Vucetic Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in Sofia

Slovakia

Amb. Michal Kottman Embassy of the Slovak Republic in Sofia

Slovenia

Amb. Matjaž Šinkovec Permanent Representative of Slovenia to NATO

Turkey

Amb. Ümit Pamir	Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO
Cihad Erginay	Counselor, Permanent Representation of Turkey to NATO
Gul Yalcin	Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Turkey in Sofia
Vural Altay	Head of NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security Department, MFA of Turkey
S. Murat Ozkahraman	Second Secretary, Embassy of Turkey in Sofia
A. Fulya Yucekok	Third Secretary, Embassy of Turkey in Sofia
R. Olgun Yucekok	Third Secretary, Embassy of Turkey in Sofia

Ukraine

Borys Tarasyuk	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Andriy Zayats	Director, Private Office to the Minister
Vladyslav Yasniuk	Deputy Director General for NATO, MFA
Amb. Kostiantyn Morozov	Head of Mission of Ukraine to NATO
Nadiya Tsok	Counselor, Mission of Ukraine to NATO
Ambassador Yurii Rulach	Embassy of Ukraine in Sofia
Valerii Kovalenko	Counselor, Embassy of Ukraine in Sofia
Liubov Nepop	Counselor, Embassy of Ukraine in Sofia
Volodymyr Laishev	First Secretary, Embassy of Ukraine in Sofia

USA

Robert C. McFarlane	Former National Security Advisor
Michael Durkee	Minister (ret.)
Curtis Coward	Atlantic Council
Amb. John Beyrle	US Embassy in Sofia
Jeff Levine	DCM, US Embassy in Sofia
Brad Freden	Counselor, US Embassy in Sofia

UNDP

Neil Buhne	UNDP Resident Representative to Bulgaria
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