

TRENDS IN RADICALISATION THAT MAY LEAD TO VIOLENCE

NATIONAL BACKGROUND REPORT CZECH REPUBLIC

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INTRODUCTION

Few would dispute the risks associated with the existence of extremism and radicalism. While not all extremists necessarily turn to political violence this dangerous pathway cannot be ruled out, as reminded by numerous acts of political violence worldwide. This national study should contribute to a better understanding of extremism and radicalism and the road that leads individuals and groups to radical views and social identities. The study was prepared within the framework of an EU-sponsored MONITOR project and serves a twofold purpose. First it provides background empirical data about the development and the state of extremism in the Czech Republic to both professionals in the field and experts interested in advancing further research. Second it serves the development of the MONITOR project, working within its structured framework and allowing a careful cross-case comparison with other national studies which are developed by partners.

While extremism and radicalism are hardly the most important topic of Czech public debate and arguably even less likely a real challenge for the country's security policy, a wide range of data is well available. For this study, data were drawn from various sources, both official statistics and existing scholarly research. National authorities including respective departments at the Ministry of the Interior, national police, and intelligence services have been continuously following the radicals in the Czech Republic since well into the 1990s. A national report on the state of extremism and a strategy on how to tackle it are produced annually by the ministry since 1997 and are publicly available. The governmental sources, while less analytical, provide invaluable data for a long period, revealing the development of communities which share radical views. Further data for this study were drawn from reasonably well-developed state-of-the-art research which has been pioneered in the Czech scholarly community mostly by Professor Miroslav Mares and his colleagues from Masaryk University in Brno. Even though some data are less available, the broad range of what we have allows a fairly in-depth understanding of the development of extremism in the Czech Republic up to the present.

This study is structured as follows. In the first chapter Libor Stejskal and Pavlina Blahova analyze the rise of right-wing extremism, including a small vanguard of truly convinced neo-Nazis, back into the 1990s. The next chapter by Oldrich Krulik is devoted to football hooligans. It reveals the rise of the phenomenon in the 1990s and its slow but continuous decline in the last ten years. While thousands were involved in football-related violence, it is argued that the phenomenon has little connection to political extremism and for an overwhelming majority of all involved, hooliganism provided a venue for getting rid of boredom and frustration, like a special kind of illegal martial arts competition. The following chapter examines the state of radical Islamism. Michal Horejsi argues that considering the state of the Muslim community in the country Islamism represents a marginal phenomenon,

whose coverage in public discourse far outweighs its role in the society. Yet despite this optimistic view the national authorities carefully observe the development, with the threat of individual radicalization and a possible lone wolf attack being prominent among their concerns. The last chapter by Ludek Moravec thoroughly explores Czech media discourse about radicalism, revealing that for the media extremism is mostly related to right-wing anti-Roma groups and individuals, while radicalism and radicalization are processes that happen in deprived third-world Muslim countries and lead to Islamic terrorism.

PART I – INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

Libor Stejskal

I.1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The issue of radicalization has no particular and direct articulation in the law of the Czech Republic. Similarly, the term “extremism”, which has long been established as an official umbrella term in the practice of law enforcement and criminal justice (Mareš 2006, 2011), has no legal status. Both of these terms are used in official documents but their substance is present in the wording of legislation only in other, more general ways.

In the perspective of criminal law, this may be illustrated by the fact that judicial practice does not necessarily treat, prosecute, and eventually punish acts of violence differently either in cases of radicalism-induced violence (or simply hate crime), or in cases of ordinary violence. For instance, a murder or serious bodily injury committed with an extremist or radical background establishes no special approach by the court. Nevertheless, the so-called hate crime may be and often is reflected with sentencing which cumulates the punishment for 1) the violent crime as such, 2) the hatred motivation to it. This cumulative, “layered” approach is similar to acts of terrorism that have been, for years, prosecuted without employing a particular legal qualification of “terrorism”, which was incorporated into the penal code only in 2004, and utilized for a single verdict since then (Hospodářské noviny, ihned.cz, 18. 1. 2014).

The overall legal framework for dealing with radicalization and the closely interlinked extremism comprises two general sources:

- Constitutional & civil law – they formulate an entire sphere of societal and cultural conditions and rules to provide a multifaceted prevention from radicalization, radical attitudes, activities, and organizations;
- Criminal law – it governs the repression of a wide variety of crime stemming from radical attitudes and radicalization, and defines special conditions for prosecution of these kinds of crime;

The Constitution of the Czech Republic No. 1/1993 Coll., as a fundamental piece of law, presents *inter alia* a normative set of values and principles that clearly distinguish desirable attitudes, beliefs and behaviours from unacceptable ones. The Preamble mentions a “spirit of the inalienable values of human dignity and freedom”, while Art. 1 prescribes the Republic to be “a sovereign, unitary and democratic, law-abiding State, based on respect for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen”. Article 9, par. 2 postulates that the “substantive requisites of the democratic, law-abiding State may not be amended”. The sovereignty of the people as the only source of all power in the State is guaranteed by Art. 2, par. 1. Article 5 anchors a “free competition between political parties respecting the basic democratic principles and rejecting violence as a means of asserting their interests”; and the last to be mentioned here, Art. 6 institutes the protection of minorities in all decisions taken by majority (Constitution of the Czech Republic, 1993).

The constitutional framework includes the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, No. 2/1993 Coll., which also articulates the values that might become challenged or directly denied by radicalized proponents of extremism. Here Articles 1 and 3 stipulate the general right to freedom and equality for all people in their dignity and rights. Fundamental rights and freedoms are inherent, inalienable, non-prescriptible, and irrevocable; and this enjoyment of fundamental rights and basic freedoms is guaranteed to everyone without regard to gender, race, colour of skin, language, faith and religion, political or other conviction, national or social origin, membership in a national or ethnic minority, property, birth, or other status. Article 19 provides the right of peaceful assembly but presumes that the right may be limited if it would compromise measures necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, public order, health, morals, property, or the security of the state (Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, 1993).

The body of civil law is extremely vast but some acts deserve a brief notice as they have a significant prohibitive impact on institutional and organizational forms of radicalization and extremism. Act No. 83/1990 Coll., on Citizens’ Associations, determines in its Section 4 that no associations shall be permitted a) whose aim is to deny or to restrict personal, political or other civil rights because of nationality, sex, race, origin, political or other opinions, religion and social status, to foster hate and intransigence for these reasons, to assist in violence, or otherwise to commit breach of constitution and laws, b) which follow the implementation of their goals by means contrary to the Constitution or laws, or c) which are armed or have armed units (with the exception of sporting and hunting purposes).

Act No. 84/1990 Coll., on the Right of Assembly, in its Section 10 declares that a particular assembly of citizens may be prohibited if there is a suspicion that personal, political and other civil rights may get endangered on the basis of nationality, sex, race, origin, political or other opinions, religion and social status, and if hate and intransigence for these reasons may take place, as well as violence or “disorderly conduct”.

A similar restriction is present in Act No. 3/2002 Coll., on the Freedom of Religious Expression and the Position of Churches and Religious Societies. In Section 5, the formation and development of churches is not permitted for those whose teachings or activities threaten in any way the rights, freedom and equality of citizens and their associations, including other churches, or threaten the democratic foundations of the State, its sovereignty, independence or territorial integrity, or which: a) are contrary to the protection of public morality, order and health, or to the principles of humanity, tolerance and safety of citizens; b) disclaim or restrict the personal, political or other rights of natural persons on the basis of their nationality, sex, race, ethnicity, political or other conviction, religious expression or social position, or inflame hatred or intolerance for these reasons, or support violence or the breaking of laws; c) restrict the personal freedom of individuals, especially by using psychological pressure or physical force for creating dependence, leading to the physical, psychological or economic damage to persons or their dependent family members, to the destruction of their social relationships, including impairing the psychological development of minors and restricting their right to education, and precluding their receiving health care appropriate to their respective health needs; or d) are secret in the whole or in some parts, similarly to certain organised churches in practice outside the Czech Republic.

Currently the most important individual source of civil law is Act No. 89/2012 Coll., the Civil Code. From the perspective of organized radical or extremist activities, there is new regulation for the establishment of legal entities. Section 145 on the purpose of legal entities makes it prohibited to “establish a legal entity whose purpose is a violation of law or achieving its goals illegally, especially if its purpose is a) the denial or restriction of personal, political or other rights of persons due to their nationality, gender, race, origin, political or other opinion, religion and social status, b) incitement of hatred and intolerance, c) promotion of violence, or d) control of public authority or public administration without legal authorization.” Significant is the prohibition “to establish an armed legal entity or one with an armed component, unless it is a legal entity established by a law which specifically allows or requires the creation of an armed component, or a legal entity which uses weapons in connection with its business under other legislation, or a legal entity whose members hold or use guns for sporting or cultural purposes or for hunting or for the performance of duties under other legislation.” (Mareš 2012, pp. 198–199).

The body of criminal law presents an instrument to collect evidence of, prosecute, and punish various types of manifestations, expressions, and violent or non-violent acts of

radicalism and extremism. All of these are covered by generally applicable regulations in the Czech Republic. A special law on the subject has not been created even though such an option was also considered. Analyses of the Ministry of the Interior show that the current legal framework in this area is sufficient; however, some instruments are not sufficiently used in practice. The prosecution of radicalism and extremism by law enforcement and the judiciary in the Czech Republic is regulated by following statutes:

- Act No. 40/2009 Coll., the Criminal Code,
- Act No. 141/1961 Coll., the Criminal Procedure Code,
- Act No. 218/2003 Coll., on Juvenile Criminal Justice.

In 2009, the Criminal Code, sometimes referred to as a Penal Code, replaced the previous Criminal Code from 1961 (Act No. 140/1961 Coll.). The vast majority of criminal behaviours of persons stemming from radical and extremist attitudes can be classified under some of the existing offenses, both traditional and relatively new ones. Some of them clearly belong to the set of so-called “hate crime” or “bias crime”, and particularly, many of them are associated with a “bias motivation” (Mareš 2011, pp. 9–10). Below is an indicative list of the most typical criminal offenses linked to radicalization and extremism:

Crimes against humanity:

- Section 403 – Establishment, support and promotion of movements aimed at suppression of human rights and freedoms
- Section 404 – Expressing sympathies for movements seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms
- Section 405 – Denial, impugnation, approval and justification of genocide

Criminal offences distorting the coexistence of people:

- Section 352 – Violence against a group of people and individuals
- Section 355 – Defamation of nation, race, ethnic or other group of people
- Section 356 – Instigation of hatred towards a group of people or of suppression of their rights and freedoms
- Section 358 – Disorderly conduct

Criminal offences against life:

- Section 140 – Murder (par. 3g: for actual or perceived race, ethnicity, nationality, political belief, religion)

Criminal offences against health:

- Section 145 – Grievous bodily harm (par. 2f: for actual or perceived race, ethnicity, nationality, political belief, religion)

- Section 146 – Bodily harm (par. 2e: for actual or perceived race, ethnicity, nationality, political belief, religion)

Criminal offences against freedom:

- Section 175 – Extortion (par. 2f: for actual or perceived race, ethnicity, nationality, political belief, religion)

Criminal offences against property:

- Section 228 – Damage to a thing of another (par. 3b: for actual or perceived race, ethnicity, nationality, political belief, religion)

Criminal offences against the execution of powers of public authority and official person:

- Section 323 – Violence against public authority
- Section 325 – Violence against public official

Criminal offences against the foundations of the Czech Republic, foreign states and international organisations:

- Section 310 – Subversion of the Republic
- Section 311 – Terrorist attack
- Section 312 – Terror
- Section 314 – Sabotage

Criminal offences against national defence:

- Section 319 – Collaboration

There is a group of criminal offenses that do not belong to the category of hate/bias crime per se – like murder, bodily harm, extortion, or disorderly conduct – but their hate/bias motivation can be reflected as one of potential aggravating circumstances. According to Section 42 “the court may consider the following circumstances as aggravating, particularly when the offender (...) b) committed the criminal offence out of greed, for revenge, due to hatred relating to nationality, ethnic, racial, religious, class or another similar hatred or out of another particularly condemnable motive”.

Among the wide scale of penalties, ranging from prison sentences (unconditional and conditional) to loss of military rank or honorary degrees, a special new kind of sanction can be found. Under Section 52, the prohibition of attending sports, cultural and other social events may be imposed for up to ten years (on the basis of a particularly serious offence). Breach of such a judiciary verdict may entail a follow-up punishment of up to three years for the crime of obstruction of justice and obstruction of a sentence of banishment (Section 337). The ban on attending respective collective events is, however, not understood as a punishment *sensu stricto* but rather as a precautionary measure.

To present a comprehensive picture of the legal framework, two other sources of criminal law need to be mentioned. The Criminal Procedure Code (Act No. 141/1961 Coll.) is a general regulation for the entire sphere of criminal justice so that it has no particular link to the issue of radicalization. However, certain statutes and sections of the judicial procedure have a very special importance for repression of radicalism and extremism. Below is a selection of significant procedural instruments:

- Detention of items
- Domiciliary search, body search, search of other premises and lands, entry into dwellings and other premises and lands
- Wiretapping
- Precautionary measures – particularly a ban on visits to unsuitable environments, on attending sports, cultural and other social events, and on contacts with certain persons
- Witnesses and testimony
- Experts and conditions for their deployment
- Operative and search means and conditions for use – surveillance and deploying agents

Obviously, for evidence of radicalization and extremism activities in court it is crucial to use experts with very specialized expertise (symbolism, history, comparative studies); wiretapping, surveillance, and agents are of the same importance.

The last source of criminal law, Act No. 218/2003 Coll., on Juvenile Criminal Justice, defines provisions for a special treatment of young offenders in court, especially in terms of criminal and judicial procedure. The importance of this statute consists in the fact that radicalization is to a large extent a process involving and affecting the youth.

Outside the body of criminal law, there is a special category of less serious offences which includes an extensive variety of unlawful behaviour generally referred to as “misdemeanours”, “offences” or “petty crime”. Such acts are treated either within the framework of Act No. 200/1990 Coll., on Misdemeanours, as amended, or are sanctioned according to various special norms. Below is just a brief selection of offences that belong to this category of less serious and harmful unlawful behaviour:

- Offences against public order
- Disregarding of orders of public officials during the exercise of their powers
- Curfew violations
- Offences on protection from alcoholism and other addictions
- Offences against civil coexistence
- Offences against property, etc.

Additionally, offenders can be punished through private law insofar as the injured party may claim damages.

To conclude the introduction to the legal framework, a brief review of current affairs in legal treatment of radicalization can be provided. As of 2015, there are a few “hot” cases with open trial or criminal prosecution. The first one to be mentioned is the case of a few arrested members of so-called Network of Revolutionary Cells (referred to as *Sít’ revolučních buněk* or SRB in Czech): a group of left-wing extremists that had undergone a relatively strong degree of radicalization were arrested by the Police and accused of plotting a terrorist attack against a military transport train. Some others were accused of failure to prevent a criminal offence (Section 367) and unlicensed arming (Section 279). The potential sentence would be the second one for a terrorist attack (Section 311) in history, as since 2004 only one offender has been sentenced (in 2012) for sending threatening emails to the Minister of Finance (Lidovky.cz, 6. 5. 2015). Another case has been related to a recent surge of emotionally tense, hostile attitudes and protests against refugees and immigration into the Czech Republic, which has a serious intensity and illustrates a strong radicalization of certain strata of the general public. At a demonstration held in Prague in July 2015 protesters carried gallows, with no immediate reaction by the Police. A strong criticism of the Police inactivity took place and a criminal prosecution was launched against the organizers – with potential use of sanctions for defamation of nation, race, ethnic or other group of people (Section 355), instigation of hatred towards a group of people or of suppression of their rights and freedoms (Section 356), violence against a group of people and individuals (Section 352), dangerous threatening (Section 353), or establishment, support and promotion of movements aimed at suppression of human rights and freedoms (Section 403) and expressing sympathies for movements seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms (Section 404) (Lidové noviny, 3. 7. 2015, pp. 1, 3). The verdict may have a substantial influence on judicial practice for the years to come.

I.2. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

In the context of the European Union, the Czech Republic is a medium-sized country with a full-fledged architecture of democratic institutions and with a functional system of division of power and checks and balances. The following overview of institutions and organizations that have to deal with the issues of radicalization and extremism is basically identical to the list of institutions that form the components of the Security System of the Czech Republic responsible for internal security, law enforcement, and public order.

The hierarchy of this subsystem for internal security, law and public order reflects the elementary division of power within the State, which comprises the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The general setting of institutions involved is structured as follows:

Legislative power	Executive power	Judicial power
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Parliament of the Czech Republic - Chamber of Deputies - Senate	President of the Republic	Independent courts - Constitutional Court - System of courts: the Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative Court, and High, Regional and District courts
	Government	

Table 1: Scheme of state bodies according to the constitutional division of power (author: Libor Stejskal).

The sphere of internal security, law enforcement, and public order – which embraces monitoring, prevention, and repression of radicalism and extremism – is mostly operated and controlled by the Government as a supreme body of the executive power, responsible for safeguarding the security of the State, citizens and other residents, and for protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms. However, in a democratic state with rule of law, the repression and sanctioning of unlawful behaviour associated with radicalization and extremism inevitably cannot be implemented by executive bodies only. The system of independent courts (with public prosecutors and attorneys), as a component of the judicial power, is essentially involved too. Beside the bodies of the state there are two more-or-less separate spheres engaged in policies on radicalism and extremism:

- Territorial self-government, consisting of local government (municipalities) and regional government (“higher territorial self-governing units”)
- Non-governmental organizations and informal groups of citizens

The national **Government**, as a supreme authority of the executive power, evaluates (in general) risks and threats in the field of security and takes the necessary measures to reduce and/or eliminate such risks and decides on measures for an effective functioning of the security system of the Czech Republic. It is authorized to declare a state of emergency in the event of natural disasters, environmental or industrial disasters, accidents or any other danger that threatens lives, health or material values or internal order and security to a considerable extent. Where delay could be detrimental, a state of emergency can be declared by the Prime Minister. His/her decision shall be approved or cancelled by the Government within 24 hours of the declaration. The government must determine, along with the declaration of a state of emergency, which fundamental rights and freedoms shall be restricted and what duties shall be imposed. The Government shall also propose to the Parliament to declare a state of national threat where the sovereignty or territorial integrity or democratic foundations of the State are immediately endangered. The Prime Minister has the overall responsibility and the ministers involved in combating extremism in their respective fields of competence are responsible to him/her. He/she is the Chairperson of the National Security Council and also chairs, in particular, the Intelligence Activity Committee within the National Security Council.

The **National Security Council** (NSC) is a special working and advisory body, established by the Government and chaired by the Prime Minister. This standing co-ordinating body at ministerial level deals with security matters, including threats induced by terrorism, extremism, and radicalism, and coordinates intelligence activities (in counter-terrorism, extremism, etc.). Permanent members of the NSC include the Prime Minister (chair), Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Environment, Minister of Defence, Minister of Finance, Minister of Industry and Trade, Minister of Transportation, and Minister of Health. The sessions of the NSC are also attended by the Governor of the Czech National Bank, the Head of the State Material Reserve Administration and the Head of the Office of the Government. The President of the Republic also has the right to attend the sessions of the NSC. Other members of the government, Chairpersons of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate of the Parliament and representatives of other central administration units, as well as other experts, can also be invited to join the sessions of the NSC, when necessary. The NSC must convene at least once every three months.

The main task of the National Security Council is to define and to participate in the formation of a national security system, to assess current risks and threats in the area of security, and to deal with the preparation of appropriate measures and crisis situations when they occur. With respect to radicalism and extremism it ensures the co-ordination and monitoring of measures aimed at safeguarding the security of the Czech Republic and its compliance with international obligations. It co-ordinates and evaluates issues relating to the security of the Czech Republic and proposes appropriate measures to be implemented by the Government (it cannot decide or act by itself). For that purpose, the National Security Council includes five standing working committees as follows:

- Committee on the Coordination of Foreign Security Policy (coordinated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs),
- Committee on Defence Planning (coordinated by the Minister of Defence),
- Committee on Internal Security (coordinated by the Minister of the Interior – established in 2014),
- Committee on Civil Emergency Planning (coordinated by the Minister of the Interior),
- Committee on Intelligence (coordinated by the Prime Minister).

In addition to these, there is a central task force (or literally “Central Crisis Staff” according to the Czech wording) as the NSC, a working body responsible for finding solutions to crisis situations or other serious situations concerning the security interests of the Czech Republic (coordinated by the Minister of Defence in the event of an external military threat to the Czech Republic, to ensure the fulfilment of allied commitments abroad and to ensure the participation of the Czech Republic’s armed forces in international operations to restore and keep peace, or coordinated by the Minister of the Interior in case of other types of threat to the Czech Republic, to ensure the provision of large-scale humanitarian aid abroad, and to involve in international rescue operations in the wake of accidents or natural disasters).

Two of the five committees are the most relevant for the purpose of treating radicalization and extremism:

- **Committee on Internal Security** – chaired by the Minister of the Interior, it coordinates the planning of measures to safeguard internal security, protection of public order and law enforcement, protection of the economy from economic crime, protection of classified information, asylum and migration policy and border protection, fight against organized crime, corruption, and universal prevention of all kinds of crime. The Committee consists of 17 members, including Minister of the Interior, Deputy Minister of the Interior for Internal Security, Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Health, and Justice, deputy directors of all intelligence services, a representative of the President's Office, the Supreme Public Prosecutor, directors of the National Security Authority, the Penitentiary Service of the Czech Republic, the Customs Administration of the Czech Republic, and the Secretariat of the NSC.
- **Committee on Intelligence** – chaired by the Prime Minister, with Minister of the Interior as the executive deputy chair, its main task is to coordinate the activities of intelligence services of the Czech Republic and to plan measures to secure intelligence activities and co-operation between governmental bodies that acquire, collect, and evaluate the information necessary to safeguard the security of the Czech Republic. The **Common Intelligence Group** is the Committee's permanent working body designed for exchange of intelligence information and to ensure coordination between the intelligence services of the Czech Republic, the Police of the Czech Republic, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The members of the Group are representatives of all the intelligence services of the Czech Republic, Police of the Czech Republic (representatives of the Criminal Police and Investigation Service and the Organised Crime Unit), Ministry of the Interior (representatives of the Security Policy Department), and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (representatives of the Common Foreign Security Policy Department). Representatives of other central administration units, as well as other experts, can also be invited to join sessions when necessary.

The National Security Council can also set up ad-hoc expert groups, always chaired by a permanent member, in domains falling within its competence, and may request information and analyses relating to safeguarding security from all the ministers and heads of other administrative authorities.

The **Ministry of the Interior** (including the Police of the Czech Republic and the Fire Rescue Service of the Czech Republic within its policy domain) carries out tasks in the area of public order and internal security, including issues related to terrorism, extremism, and radicalism. *Inter alia* it coordinates the proposed measures in the field of combating extremism and terrorism with other ministries and with the requirements arising from international co-operation. It also carries out tasks in the field of asylum seekers, refugees, the entry and stay of foreigners, the integration of immigrants, and Schengen co-operation; deals with

inspection mechanisms on trading in and other handling of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, including exports and imports of goods and technologies subject to international control regimes; and develops relevant analytical and conceptual documents.

Within the structure of the Ministry, activities related to extremism and radicalization are predominantly performed by the **Security Policy Department**. Its key role consists of analytical, strategic and conceptual work. The most important publicly accessible policy document is the Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic, compiled and published annually, which is subject to approval by the Government of the Czech Republic.

The practice of law enforcement, internal security, safeguarding public order and safety of persons and property, universal crime prevention and crime repression is the overall mission of the **Police of the Czech Republic**, a national police force controlled centrally under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. It is headed by the Police President, who is subordinated and responsible to the Minister of the Interior according to the Police Act (Act No. 273/2008 Coll., on the Police of the Czech Republic). The centralized structure of the Police of the Czech Republic is composed of:

- the Police Presidium,
- territorially organized units: 14 Regional Police Directorates (with territories identical with the fourteen administrative regions of the Czech Republic),
- specialized units with specific competences and responsibilities over the entire territory of the state (some with regional branches).

The Organization Statute of the Police of the Czech Republic, as well as various Orders of the Police President, describe the roles of all the individual parts of the Police of the Czech Republic. The area of extremism, radicalism, and terrorism belongs to the tasks of the **Unit for Combating Organised Crime** within the Criminal Police and Investigation Service. Also the Regional Directorates of the Police of the Czech Republic have established their own expert teams on extremism, which are incorporated into the Criminal Police and Investigation Service as well.

Other specialized police units, too, may take part in operations against extremist, terrorist, or radicalism-related threats – most commonly these include Public Order Units deployed at large events for crowd control, the central Rapid Response Unit (URNa) and eight Regional Intervention Units, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service, etc. The micro level of operational practice offers some special and relatively novel forms of police expertise to be deployed, like conflict prevention units at large-scale sports and culture events that use the soft skills of communication with potential violent groups and individuals. Sometimes it is efficient enough to prevent the deployment of Public Order Units. Another example are “spotters”, individual police officers, disclosed but without uniforms, often accompanying visitors to events abroad, who take position within the crowd and may help to identify offenders or communicate to counter escalation.

In the field of international co-operation most of the tasks belong to the International Police Cooperation Department, which is a common platform for the INTERPOL national bureau, the EUROPOL national unit, the SIRENE office, etc. In 2002 the National Football Information Point was established within the Police Presidium to implement the Decision of the Council of the EU 2002/348/JHA; its mission is to facilitate international police cooperation related to football matches and potential spectator violence. Due to constant development of the domestic and foreign criminal scene and the need to respond to threats of terrorism and international organized crime, the police adopted various measures to reduce the level of security risk and achieve its mission. As a particular counterterrorism instrument, the National Contact Point for Terrorism (NKBT) was established in 2009 as a specialized communication, information and analytical department of the Czech Police. Its main role covers the collection, evaluation, analysis and processing of information identified by the Police of the Czech Republic about terrorists and persons reasonably suspected of being linked to terrorist organizations. NKBT is linked to all departments of the Police and also cooperates with other national and foreign security authorities. The main objectives and tasks are to monitor, collect, and analyze information related to terrorism, prevent and eliminate harmful effects of terrorist activities, provide an appropriate central point of contact for domestic and foreign partners on issues of mutual cooperation, provide a trustworthy and discreet contact point for citizens of the Czech Republic and to enable them to participate in law and security enforcement.

Beside the Police, a lot of monitoring, operative and analytical work in the area of extremism and radicalism, both violent and non-violent, is carried out by **intelligence services** of the Czech Republic. These governmental bodies are responsible for the acquisition, collection and evaluation of important information for protection of the Constitution, significant economic interests, security and defence of the Czech Republic. Three intelligence services operate in the Czech Republic:

- the Security Information Service (BIS) – a civilian counter-intelligence service,
- the Office for Foreign Relations and Information (ÚZSI) – a civilian intelligence service,
- the Military Intelligence (VZ) – a military intelligence and counter-intelligence service.

The basic legal regulation is Act No. 153/1994 Coll., on the Intelligence Services of the Czech Republic, which stipulates the position, powers, coordination, cooperation and inspection of the intelligence services of the Czech Republic, assignment of tasks to the intelligence services and reporting by them. The use of specific means, acquisition of information and keeping of records containing personal data in BIS and VZ, as well as the status of members of intelligence services, are regulated by special statutes (Act No. 154/1994 Coll., on the Security Information Service, and Act No. 289/2005 Coll., on the Military Intelligence Service).

From the perspective of domestic extremism and radicalization, key importance can be attributed to the **Security Information Service (BIS)**. Its tasks include intelligence on

conspiracies and activities aimed against the democratic foundations, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Czech Republic, activities of foreign intelligence services, activities endangering classified information, activities which may endanger the security or significant economic interests of the Czech Republic, relating to organized crime and terrorism. BIS had been publishing a quarterly entitled, "Information on Developments in the Extremist Scene", but the most recent available one is from 2013.

The **Office for Foreign Relations and Information** creates intelligence originating abroad, important for the security and protection of the foreign political and economic interests of the Czech Republic. This may nowadays well cover the issue of Islamist radicalization among immigrants from Muslim countries and, e.g., the highlighted concern over "foreign fighters" coming from the Middle East and North Africa.

The **Military Intelligence** gathers information originating abroad that is important for the defence and security of the Czech Republic and relates to foreign intelligence services in the field of defence; it monitors and exposes conspiracies and activities aimed against the defence of the Czech Republic and activities endangering classified materials relating to the defence of the Czech Republic. VZ is a part of the Ministry of Defence. The offensive section of VZ strives to explore any radicalized persons entering the territory of the country who could become a source of a terrorist threat. The counter-intelligence section of the VZ has been responsible – together with the Military Police and the Police of the Czech Republic – for monitoring, identification, and support to criminal prosecution of (usually right-wing) extremists and extremist groups that have penetrated the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic.

The judicial power, represented by the **system of independent courts**, has a central administrative counterpart within the Government – the **Ministry of Justice**. The Ministry of Justice holds a jurisdiction over judicial co-operation, in particular the issues of extradition and mutual legal assistance in both civil and criminal matters. In terms of legislation, the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code fall under its responsibility.

The **judiciary system** in the Czech Republic consists of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative Court, two High Courts, eight regional courts, and 86 district courts. In Prague, the district court and the Municipal Court respectively carry out the tasks of the district and regional courts. In addition, the judicial system also includes the Constitutional Court, which forms a separate part of the system and serves to protect the constitutional order of the state and to ensure respect for constitutional rights and freedoms. The Criminal Procedure Code (Act No. 141/1961 Coll.) refers the jurisdiction in criminal matters to the district courts, regional courts (Municipal Court in Prague), High Courts and the Supreme Court. The main task of the regional courts is to serve as the court of appeal for the district courts. They also examine the legality of decisions by administrative bodies in cases stipulated by law. The two High Courts (located in Prague and Olomouc) supervise the interpretation of laws and other legal regulations in cases set out in procedural law. In

addition, the High Courts serve as courts of appeal in criminal cases where the first-instance proceedings were conducted before a regional court. The Supreme Court is the highest judicial body in matters falling under the jurisdiction of the courts, with the exception of matters decided by the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Administrative Court. Located in Brno, the Supreme Court oversees the enforceable judgements of the High Courts, and ensures the legality of the decision-making process among the High Courts and the lower courts within their territorial jurisdiction. It rules on extraordinary corrective measures such as complaints concerning breaches of law filed by the Minister of Justice, forms opinions on the interpretation of laws and other legal regulations, and decides in some other cases stated by law.

A public prosecutor, whose office is independent of the court, represents the **public prosecution** in criminal proceedings. There are 86 District Prosecutor's offices, 14 offices at the regional level, two at the level of the High Courts, and the Supreme State Prosecutor's Office in Brno. Among his/her functions, the Public Prosecutor prepares and submits accusations to the courts and supervises the legality of the preliminary phase of the criminal procedure. Public prosecutors also monitor the work of investigators and have the right to be present during investigations. There is no specific criminal procedure that applies to the prosecution of extremists, terrorists, or violent radicals, and to the investigation of such activities. Furthermore, there are no specialised prosecutors in this area: each prosecutor is the competent authority under the control of his/her superior Public Prosecutor's Office and the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office. Different prosecutors in each office specialize in specific criminal fields, though. In this respect, the Supreme Public Prosecutor issued a binding Instruction of a General Nature concerning the specialisation of prosecutors (Instruction No. 3/2000, as amended) according to which there are prosecutors specialised in serious violent crime, extremism, "hate crime", football hooliganism, etc. In 2013 the institution of a **National Correspondent for Extremism** was founded within the structure of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office. In 2014 an expert team was established for the body and a methodology was created in order to provide the government with a tool concerning various issues that the ministries face when handling extremism. The National Correspondent is also in charge of inter-ministerial cooperation (The Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2012, p. 81).

Independent **expert witnesses** are often deployed in trials with offenders with an extremist background. In some cases, the heavy dependence of judges on experts in terms of assessing the legality/illegality of certain acts, speech, symbols, has been subject to public criticism. The **Probation and Mediation Service** is a new institution in criminal policy that "aims to offer effective and socially beneficial solution of crime-related conflicts and at the same time organises and provides for efficient and dignified execution of alternative sentences and measures with emphasis on victim interests, community protection and crime prevention" (The mission and objectives of the Czech Probation and Mediation Service, 2015). This approach is based on a combination of social work and criminal law, and as such it creates

an innovative and multi-disciplinary profession in the criminal justice system, very useful in cases of less serious and location-specific extremist or radicalism-induced criminal offences. The last body to be mentioned with respect to judicial practice is the Institute of Criminology and Social Prevention (IKSP), established by the Ministry of Justice to conduct surveys, analyses, and data collection on crime and its social circumstances – with a focus on extremism, radical violence, and football hooliganism, too.

The remaining set of institutions and actors incorporated in the institutional framework can be introduced with just a brief notice.

Central government authorities:

- **Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MŠMT)** is responsible for public administration in education, for developing educational, youth and sport policies and international cooperation in these fields – which comprises preventative work in schools and youth organizations, as well as the activity of sports associations that are responsible for organization of large scale sports events.
- **Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MPSV)** is responsible for social policy, family policy, social security, employment (e.g., labour market, employment services, employment of foreigners), labour legislation, occupational safety and health, equal opportunities of women and men, migration and integration of foreigners, the European Social Fund and other social or labour-related issues. Particularly, the labour market and employment is a key policy area for sustainability in countering radicalization (Melzer – Serafin 2013).
- **Ministry of Culture** is the founding (and funding) authority for numerous **museums, memorials** and other institutions of living memory, which play a significant role in education of the public and young people. This applies in particular to the facilities that represent a memento and commemorate organized violence and hatred based on racial, ideological, ethnical, religious, and political intolerance (Vyhodnocení plnění Koncepce boje proti extremismu pro rok 2014).
- **Ministry of Defence** is the central authority of the state administration for ensuring the defence of the Czech Republic and controls the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (OS ČR/AČR). The presence of extremist ideology and symbols has been recorded in several cases among military personnel of the **Army of the Czech Republic**. The monitoring and countering of extremism and radicalization in the Army is the task of individual commanders within the units, and in a systematic way, this duty (including collection of evidence of such illegal behaviour) belongs to both the **Military Police** and the Military Intelligence.

Municipal self-government authorities:

- **Municipalities** are entitled according to the law (Act No. 128/2000 Coll. on Establishment of Municipalities) to promulgate and actively implement measures on issues of public

order in their territory. Such measures can either prevent any disrupting behaviour (which does not qualify as disorderly conduct in accordance with the Penal Code) or mitigate its consequences. In everyday practice, a substantial role in maintaining peaceful coexistence and public order belongs to the **Municipal Police** – which can be established by local administration according to a special law (Act No. 553/1991 Coll., on Municipal Police).

Non-governmental organizations:

- **Universities and academia** – there is a number of academic institutes, mostly within public and state universities, that pay long-term attention to issues of extremism, terrorism, and radicalization. The leading position is held by the Masaryk University in Brno, with a substantial body of Czech literature produced by Miroslav Mareš and his fellows. Minor contributions can be traced to the Police Academy of the Czech Republic or the Charles University in Prague.
- **Associations** – vast numbers of civic associations are present in public life in the Czech Republic. They cover all potential dimensions of extremism and radicalism. To provide a rough division, the first group can be labelled as **active opponents of extremism and radicalization**. These activist, advocacy, support, or care-providing organizations aim at legitimating the fight against extremism, supporting the victims of extremist or radical violence (or “hate crime” generally), and prevention and social work to counter radicalization and extremist attitudes. The second group is typically a set of **active proponents of extremism and radicalization** – a colourful variety of right-wing, left-wing, Islamist, xenophobic, racist, football fandom, paramilitary and other initiatives, organizations or groups that are radical or extremist due to their political, ideological, or simply bias or hate motivations. The third group can be defined as **involved in parallel or by coincidence**: any association organizing a cultural, sports or other large-scale event can get involved through the presence of persons committing a criminal offence or misdemeanour with extremist background. For instance the Football Association of the Czech Republic is an NGO responsible for organizing football matches, which at least since 2009 has embraced full responsibility for securing public order and safety for all spectators present at the stadium. Organizers who carry out the task of keeping the area safe are either volunteers activated by the football clubs, or hired guards provided by the private security companies. Only when the event organizers are not able to safeguard public security the Police of the Czech Republic is called to provide assistance.

I.3. POLICY FRAMEWORK

Nowadays, the term “radicalization” is only partly present in documents related to terrorism, as will be shown below in the section on analytical, conceptual, and strategic documents. However, having no separate definition of “radicalization” or “radicalism” as a specific policy

issue does not necessarily pose a limitation, as the existing definitions of extremism are capable and inclusive enough. The sub-policy of counter-extremism embraces most of the radicalization phenomena. Beside the sub-policy of counter-terrorism, which already recognizes the issues of radicalization and counter-radicalization, there is a particular sub-policy against spectator violence and football hooliganism, too.

This section aims at exploring the policy terrain and its terminology, the strategic and conceptual documents that set out government policies, and the instruments and measures that are used in the area of countering radicalization, radicalism, terrorism, and especially extremism. Why extremism in particular? As indicated in the previous sections on legal framework and institutions, the concept of extremism is an umbrella term, deeply embedded in the Government's policy, particularly in that of the Ministry of the Interior and of the Police of the Czech Republic. It has also been utilized by intelligence services (Security Information Service, Military Intelligence), the Ministry of Defence (Military Police) and, of course, the Ministry of Justice, etc. These components of the national security system have their own specialized bodies for countering extremism, and the term "extremism" is officially anchored in their statutes and internal norms. However, as mentioned above, primary law – like the Criminal Code and other acts – does not recognize and/or employ the term as such.

Since its conception in the early 1990s, the policy against extremism in the Czech Republic has embraced a wide scope of issues including radicalism and radical beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour that led or could lead to physical or verbal violence against other groups or individuals. In other words, the concept of extremism has since the beginning covered what is currently known as "hate crime", "bias crime", and "hate speech" in many other countries (Mareš 2011, section 10). However, there is a substantial feature of the "extremism" that makes it different from "hate crime": not all manifestations and acts of extremism are illegal, prohibited, or criminal in the proper sense (The Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2012, p. 6).

The definition of extremism has gained stability as the same wording has been used at least since 2003 (The Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2014, p. 6). The source document defines extremism as follows: *"clear ideological attitudes which deviate markedly from the rule of law and constitutional law, show elements of intolerance, and attack democratic constitutional principles as defined in the Czech constitutional order. These principles are as follows:*

- *respect for the human and citizens' rights and freedoms (Article 1 of the Constitution)*
- *a sovereign, unified and democratic state of law (Article 1 of the Constitution)*
- *the inadmissibility of change to the essential requisites of the democratic state of law (Article 9(2) of the Constitution)*
- *the sovereignty of the people (Article 2 of the Constitution)*

- *the free competition of political parties respecting fundamental democratic principles and rejecting violence as a means for the implementation of their interests (Article 5 of the Constitution)*
- *the decisions of the majority respect the protection of minorities (Article 6 of the Constitution)*
- *all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights; everyone is entitled to imprescriptible, inalienable, not subject to the statute of limitations, fundamental rights and freedoms without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status (Articles 1 and 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms)*

Extremist attitudes are eligible to transform into destructive activities, and, whether directly or in terms of their long-term consequences, act destructively against the existing democratic political and economic system – i.e. they endeavour to replace the democratic system with an antagonistic one (a totalitarian or authoritative regime, dictatorship, or anarchy) ... Extremism usually takes the following forms: historical revisionism, social demagoguery, activism, verbal and physical violence against its opponents and against clearly defined social groups, and conspiracy theories” (Report on the Issue of Extremism in the Czech Republic in 2002, pp. 9–10).

Even within the counter-extremism policy there is a minor divergence between the definition of the Ministry of the Interior, which has been stated above, and of the Police of the Czech Republic. The Police subsumes “extremism” under a special crime policy, together with issues of religious sects and spectator violence, and articulates it as an “evidenced set of criminal offences – crimes or misdemeanours – stemming from political, racial, ethnic, social, religious, linguistic, environmental, and economic motives, when such a criminal offence is targeted against fundamental human and political rights and freedoms, democratic foundations of the State, and sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State” (Binding Instruction of the Police President No. 94/2010).

Again, both definitions are seemingly identical in their material scope and logic but there is a substantial divergence in legal status: the police definition understands extremism solely as a criminal activity, while the ministerial one postulates it as an activity challenging the fundamental democratic principles which may be threatening but not necessarily illegal or criminal.

The overall hierarchy of strategic documents related to issues of extremism, radicalism, terrorism, and football hooliganism is as follows:

- the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic,
- national strategies for countering terrorism and extremism and related annual reports,
- other conceptual and analytical documents and reports.

The **Security Strategy of the Czech Republic** (2015) recognizes its vital interests in Article 13 as comprising “the Czech Republic’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and the preservation of all constituent elements of the democratic rule of law, including the guaranteeing and protection of the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the population.” Protecting these “vital interests of the state and its citizens” is a “fundamental duty of the Government and all public administration authorities”, and the state is “ready to use all legitimate approaches and all available resources” to safeguard and defend them. This is followed by a list of strategic and other important interests; among them the following are worth a mention: “reducing crime, with an emphasis on economic crime, organised crime, information crime and the fight against corruption”, “reinforcing the Czech Republic’s counter-intelligence and defence intelligence”, “fostering a tolerant civil society, suppressing extremism and its causes”, and “making government institutions and the judiciary more efficient and more professional”. A box on security threats (ibid, pp. 13–14) lists eleven key threats. For the purpose of this study, the following three are of immediate relevance:

- **“Terrorism.** The threat of terrorism as a method of violent pursuit of political goals remains high. Its characteristic feature is the existence of supranational networks of loosely affiliated groups and individuals (‘lone wolves’) who, even in the absence of a central command, share an ideology, goals and plans to achieve them, as well as resources and information. They are capable of directly threatening human life, health, the environment and also critical infrastructure. The phenomenon of foreign fighters poses a growing security risk to the whole Europe.”
- **“Negative aspects of international migration.** The ever more numerous local armed conflicts cause an increase in illegal migration, which in turn becomes a source or catalyst of many security problems. However, insufficient integration of legal migrants can also give rise to social tensions resulting in undesirable radicalisation of people belonging to immigrant communities.”
- **“Extremism and growth of interethnic and social tensions.** The existence of socially excluded neighbourhoods and social groups contributes to the development of criminogenic environment and gives rise to interethnic and social tensions that are exploited by various extremist groups.”

The strategy of prevention and suppression of security threats emphasizes “the combatting of all forms of terrorism”, including “measures to counter terrorist financing, radicalisation and recruitment” (Article 56). Article 59 is particularly devoted to the Czech Republic’s endeavour “to consistently detect and prosecute manifestations of extremism, including xenophobia, racism and other forms of intolerance and discrimination”. And Article 70 promises that “the Czech Republic will actively work to suppress and prevent crime and socio-pathological phenomena in socially excluded neighbourhoods. The aim is to build public confidence in the ability of government institutions to enforce law in such neighbourhoods and to prevent the emergence of the factors that contribute to the growth

of crime. It is necessary to improve the population's subjective sense of safety and security in order to deprive political extremists of one of their topics."

The **Strategy of the Czech Republic for the Fight against Terrorism from 2013 onwards** (2013) (subtitled "Measures to minimize risks and impacts of potential terrorist attacks carried out in the Czech Republic or against its interests abroad") declares the fight against terrorism as a permanent priority of the Czech Republic. Chapter 4 is the most relevant, entitled "Prevention of radicalisation and recruitment to terrorist structures" (pp. 24–26). It deals with the issue of successfully integrating foreigners into the society and with threat posed by immigrants. Nevertheless, "all the steps to prevent radicalisation of immigrant communities and the inclination of their members to terrorism need to go hand in hand with actions against the 'domestic' extremism, racism and xenophobia and with the educational and awareness-raising activities for general public. The issue is also being dealt with under the government Policy for the Fight against Extremism, which is updated and evaluated every year. It shall be pointed out that no proven link between the 'domestic' extremism and radicalisation of immigrant communities has yet been recorded in the Czech Republic" (p. 26).

The **Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2014** (2015) is the most recent document in a long sequence of annual reports on extremism. In the past three years, these reports have been conceived as the core document within a triad of interconnected strategic, analytical, and evaluation documents. The other two – available in Czech only – are the Conception in Combating Extremism in 2014 and the Evaluation of the Conception in Combating Extremism in 2013. The last complete set of these three documents in English is available in 2011 (The Issue of Extremism in the Czech Republic in 2010, Evaluation of the Conception in Combating Extremism, 2011 Conception in Combating Extremism). All the respective documents, including the Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2014, are authored by the Ministry of the Interior's Security Policy Department (sometimes translated as Security Policy and Crime Prevention Department), on the basis of inputs from a number of other institutions and the academic sphere, namely intelligence services (Security Information Service) and the Police of the Czech Republic, the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, and Defence, the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office, and the Probation and Mediation Service of the Czech Republic. The document is processed annually and its aim is to inform the public about developments on the scene on a regular basis.

From a historical perspective, an uninterrupted chain of analytical reports has been available since 1997 in Czech (*Zpráva o postupu státních orgánů při postihu trestných činů motivovaných rasismem a xenofobií* 1997) and since 1998 also in English (*Report on State Strategy in Punishing Criminal Offences Motivated by Racism and Xenophobia or Committed by Supporters of Extremist Groups* 1998). However, the first official "government" document comprehensively mapping the domestic extremist scene, was a material of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic called "Information about the Manifestations of Extremist

Attitudes in the Czech Republic” approved by Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic no. 279 of 10 May 1995. A part of the document characterized the domestic extremist scene. The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice were assigned a task to intensify the monitoring of the activities of extremist groups. Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic no. 192 of 19 March 1998 called on the Minister of the Interior to submit a document entitled “Report on State Strategy in Punishing Criminal Offences Motivated by Racism and Xenophobia or Committed by Supporters of Extremist Groups” each year. Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic no. 684 of 12 July 2000 related to the “Report on the Issue of Extremism in the Czech Republic in 1999” assigned the Minister of the Interior together with the Minister of Justice to finalize a report on the issue of extremism in the Czech Republic until 30 June each year. The Report was to be not only descriptive but also include specific proposals for measures to eliminate extremism (since then it has been no longer only a “Report” but a “Strategy” or a “Policy” as well).

Another relevant report on the level of Ministry of the Interior is the **Situation Report on Internal Security and Public Order in the Czech Republic in 2014 (compared to 2013)**, which is available in Czech (Zpráva o situaci v oblasti vnitřní bezpečnosti a veřejného pořádku na území České republiky v roce 2014 (ve srovnání s rokem 2013), 2015) or in English (Situation Report on Internal Security and Public Order in the Czech Republic in 2013 (compared to 2012), 2014). It has special sections on Terrorism (p. 67), noting the rise of jihadist propaganda, efforts for self-radicalization of Islamic youth, and the presence of foreign fighters from Syria, Egypt, Somalia, etc. in the country. The section on Extremism (p. 68) describes a rise in the number of extremist violent offences and a series of violent anti-Roma riots.

Much more detail can be found in the following conceptual, analytical, and reporting documents:

- **Quarterly reports of the Security Policy Department on extremism** (Čtvrtletní zprávy o extremismu Odboru bezpečnostní politiky MV 2009–2015). This quarterly summary situation survey is produced ex post; its size is usually up to 10 pages. Specifically, the most recent output as of April 2015 informs that some hooligans in the Czech Republic expressed anti-Muslim sentiment after the Charlie Hebdo attack through banners during football and ice hockey (which is rare) matches.
- **Quarterly situation reports of the Security Information Service on extremism** (Čtvrtletní zprávy Bezpečnostní informační služby o extremismu 2010–2013) are publicly available through the website of BIS or the Ministry of the Interior but for the period between 2010 and 2013. These BIS reports are usually only a few pages long.
- The phenomenon of spectator violence in the Czech Republic is generally perceived as a marginal topic, left as an issue of interest to the daily newspaper describing the atmosphere in football or other stadiums, usually without trying to look for deeper

causes of this phenomenon. Spectator violence and football hooliganism have been more systematically scrutinized through the **Report on the Situation in the Field of Spectator Violence, Effects of the Conception in Practice and Proposals for Further Measures** (Zpráva o situaci v oblasti diváckého násilí, dopadu koncepce v praxi a návrzích dalších opatření 2010). The document refers to the fact that there are mutual personal connections between hooligans and members of the skinhead subculture, who often commit “crimes of an extremist nature”. The Ministry of the Interior also compiles a related periodic document: the Situation Report of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic – Spectator Violence, which is elaborated every two months and provides a list of events related to spectator violence and similar issues.

- The **Manual for Football Clubs** (Manuál pro fotbalové kluby 2015) has been published already in its second edition (1st edition in 2008). This document provides instructions for the Football Association of the Czech Republic and individual clubs on safeguarding the safety and security of visitors at stadiums.

To conclude the section on policy framework, there is an issue that needs to be solved in the future. The concept of criminal offences with extremist background allows for the prosecution of so-called hate crime (or bias crime). The difficulty, surprisingly, is not in the legal procedure but in statistical evidence. Basically, for the statistics, extremist crime is so far defined not by the merits of a criminal offence – for example Sections 403 (Establishment, support and promotion of movements seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms), 404 (Expressions of sympathy for movements seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms), 355 (Defamation of nation, race, ethnic or other groups of people), or 356 (Encouragement to hatred against a group of people or to restrict their rights and freedoms) – but by affiliation of the offender to a registered and monitored extremist organization or group (Mareš 2011, pp. 35–36). Attempts to monitor all criminal offences with a hate/bias motivation were made but in current categorization they turned out to be confusing: “The document does not capture all racist and xenophobic manifestations which were attributed to individuals who are not members or sympathizers of extremist groups. Capturing of all racist and xenophobic behaviours, actions or statements on a national or even a regional level is beyond the scope of both the document and the issue of extremism itself as it is perceived by the Ministry of the Interior” (Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2014 (2015), pp. 4).

Another pertaining problem is the lack of matching and continuity between the datasets generated by the Police, courts, and public prosecutors. Due to differences in terminology it cannot be clearly traced whether a certain crime listed by the Police as one with an “extremist” background is later treated as such by the public prosecutor’s office, and eventually decided by the court (Mareš 2011, p. 40).

PART II – RADICALIZATION TRENDS

II.1. RIGHT-WING RADICALISATION

Libor Stejskal & Pavlína Bláhová

Right-wing radicalization is not a common term in public, official, or academic discourse in the Czech Republic. As mentioned several times already, the term “extremism” is much more frequent, both in relation to right-wing and left-wing extremism. On the other hand, the persons involved in right-wing extremism are recognized not only as “extremists” but quite often as “right-wing radicals”, too.

Only recently, in the past months, did the word “radicalization” enter the public space – mostly in terms of dramatically changing attitudes of the general public towards immigrants and refugees to the EU. This emergence of xenophobia, hysteria, and real radicalization, however, still does not have the features of full-fledged right-wing orientation. So far it is rather just radicalization towards xenophobia and populism.

II.1.1. BACKGROUND

The entire sphere of right-wing radicalism and extremism has had a long tradition in the territory of Czech lands, Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic. However, the vigour, strength, or potency of this phenomenon are quite questionable over time, especially due to several discontinuities in a historical and political sense. Also the differences among particular subcategories are quite substantial: for instance, putting nationalism, fascism, or skinhead subculture into a single package does not make much sense from an analytical perspective, as these subcategories have played much different roles and have been very different in size and power in particular historical periods.

Modern right-wing politics within the Czech society can be traced back to 2nd half of the 19th century. Nothing as a “radical” or “extreme” right wing can be identified at that time because nationalism, as one of the most typical contents of the far right, was quite central to the entire body of Czech ethnic politics within the realities of late Habsburg Empire. Nationalism was common for not only right-wing but also left-wing parties, as the labour movement formed a bit later (1870s and 1880s) and did not feature any internationalist patterns. This first period, ending with WWI, lacked the extreme-right element in politics as most of the social and political life of the gradually emancipating Czech society was centred on nationalistic goals. For example, the *Sokol* mass sports and gymnastic movement followed a nationalistic and even militaristic orientation but still was an extremely large civic institution representing both the working and the middle class population.

The interwar period marked with the birth of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 brought about the ideology of fascism, in addition to the classical ideologies of socialism and social democracy, liberalism, and conservatism. The Czech fascist movement was inspired by Italian fascism. It could be characterised as a revolutionary, radically nationalistic, authoritarian, anti-German, anti-Communist, and anti-Semitic movement, organized in a minor political party (Národní obec fašistická – National Fascist Community) and a civic association, *Vlajka* (the Flag), that later – after 1938 – inclined to merge with ideology of German Nazism. The Czech fascism of the 1920s and the 1930s can be well understood in terms of right-wing extremism and radicalism – it was prone to physical and verbal violence against political opponents, it addressed young people through its youth organization, and it used a rhetoric supporting radicalization (especially the slogans of “resurgence” and “purification” of the nation).

The period of World War II was significant as a period of destruction of Czechoslovakia as a nation state, occupation of the Czech territory by Nazi Germany, and a totalitarian regime aiming at a gradual elimination of the Czech nation as a political and later even physical entity. This situation led only a marginal group of ethnically Czech political entrepreneurs and renegades into voluntary support of the Nazi ideology and into active participation in Nazi Germany’s occupation policy in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Nevertheless, beside the military action of the exile Czechoslovak Government and its Armed Forces and the resistance movement at home, the vast majority of the Czech society followed the track of more-or-less passive resistance or collaboration with occupants with the goal of mere physical survival.

Later on, after World War II, the Communist party seized power in the country between 1945 and 1948, and no right-wing political party or movement could exist anymore; no right-wing ideology was present for the next 40 years. Only as late as in the 1980s did some elements appear that could be associated with the current definitions of right-wing extremism. First, it was the emergence of football hooliganism (which is dealt with separately in this report), and second, the skinhead movement – where the sympathies to

Nazism and especially racism were subject to a close scrutiny, monitoring and prosecution by the Public Security (police) and criminal justice in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic already before 1989.

A general conclusion can be made that discontinuity is a strong feature of current right-wing extremism. Most of the nationalist and fascist patterns of right-wing radicalism of the 20th century are forgotten. The historical nationalism cannot be identified in any programme or doctrine of contemporary Czech nationalists but – on the other hand – today's nationalistic rhetoric may resemble the spirit of the “second republic” (1938–1939) with catchwords and slogans of national autarchy, unity, purity, and especially desired independence from the hated European Union or NATO. The racism and xenophobia are still present as well but the link to the Czech inter-war species of fascism is completely covered and forgotten. Some of the contents of domestic fascism are alive and vibrant – but the ideology and brand itself is dead. In fact, it has been fully replaced with modern European neo-Nazism, closely corresponding to that present in most of the EU member states.

A historical perspective also shows that individual radicalization does not happen only due to particular personal exposure or through separate events affecting the individual; there is also a systematic, historical motive, which works as a collective, rather than individual phenomenon: a reaction to large political changes, as could be witnessed after the fall of the Czechoslovak First Republic in late 1938 and early 1939.

II.1.2. IDEAS AND IDEOLOGY

The scholarly literature dedicated to ideologies of right-wing extremism in the Czech Republic (Bastl et al. 2011, Charvát 2007) recognizes basically two main sources:

- nationalism,
- neo-Nazism.

Nationalism can be analysed as a unifier within the right-wing extremism but still it includes a variety of ideas and attitudes, most of them being legal and with democratic legitimacy, giving no reason for repression or prosecution. In its pure form, Czech nationalism has always been defensive, not aggressive. One of the distinct sources is the St. Wenceslas tradition, present also earlier in the 20th century. The radical catholic tradition of anti-reformation and anti-modernism is another source. In opposition to that, the Chalice tradition (referring to the Hussite revolution in the 15th century) puts more emphasis on anti-immigrant attitudes and “Czechhood”. All these forms represent a kind of continuity with pre-WWII imagery, symbols, personalities, and even names of organizations and parties – like the National Democracy, e.g. (Bastl et al., pp. 198–199). This cluster of non-aggressive patriotism draws on ideas of independence or sovereignty, on culture and language.

In more detail, such a national conservatism includes the principles and ideas of: ethnocentrism, anticommunism, considerable xenophobia, authoritarian rule, and belief in conspiracy theories. In this aspect, Czech political nationalism is close to the Czech Fascism of the interwar period (Bastl et al. 2011, pp. 199–200, 247). Also scepticism or reluctance towards the European Union and NATO can be identified; the instruments include anti-globalism, anti-cosmopolitanism, anti-Americanism, pro-Russian sentiments, pan-Slavism, isolationism, and strict aversion against Sudeten Germans. This mind set often tends to identify the enemies inside the nation – they are labelled “truth and love”, “Jewish lobby”, or, recently the “Prague café”. In its acrimonious gestures, calls for law and order, homophobia, and many other stereotypes and elements of populist demagogy are represented (Bastl et al. 2011, p. 214).

Moving beyond the inherent ideological area of pure Czech nationalism, which is mostly positively ethnocentric and defensive rather than aggressive, current right-wing extremism and radicalism utilizes ideas and traditions that tend to be more aggressive and intrusive:

- racism,
- antisemitism,
- xenophobia

These ideas are, unlike nationalism, based in hatred towards defined groups. In the context of contemporary Czech society, the most pronounced and widespread among these attitudes, sentiments and actions are those of the anti-Roma or “anti-Gypsy” kind. They have been present for at least all the 20th century but since 1989 they have been established as a permanent social factor, a cause for repeated severe criticism of the Czech Republic even from respected international organizations like the United Nations, European Union, OECD, or Council of Europe. Recently the anti-Roma attitudes have been complemented and, in mainstream public discourse, overshadowed with an aversion towards refugees and immigrants, most often due to their Muslim background.

Beside nationalism, neo-Nazism is another established and predominant right-wing radical ideology in the Czech societal and political environment. It relates to the German Nazism of the 1930s and 1940s and to collaborating regimes, the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia in this case. Yet it is a difficult job to be a neo-Nazi in Czechia, as 1) the country’s collaboration regime during WWII was completely devoid of any appeal, attraction, convincingness, or inner strength; 2) Nazi ideology and policies intended to dismantle or annihilate the Czech national and ethnical identity at all; 3) the Czech ultra-right wing was sharply anti-German for most of its history. This makes Czech neo-Nazism quite full of paradoxes and without a real tradition (Bastl et al. 2011, p. 141). In fact it rather substitutes the absent Czech neo-fascism which could have a much more solid ideological background.

The fundamental ideas of contemporary neo-Nazism comprise hatred of democracy, liberalism and communism, the principle of strong authoritarian leadership, racism,

antisemitism, and also nationalism (Bastl et al. 2011, pp. 139–141). The racism is pan-Aryan (allowing other European ethnics to join), and militant national socialism can be found too (Charvát 2007). In practice neo-Nazi actors decry democracy and globalization, propose ethnocentrism and xenophobia, call for law and order, and desire the purification of Europe of all immigrants and people of colour (Bastl et al. 2011, p. 174).

Inside the neo-Nazi community there are differences in ideological orientation that allow discerning the following categories (Bastl et al. 2011, p. 143):

- traditionalist neo-Nazism – marginal,
- modern “white power” neo-Nazism with a pan-Aryan ideology of equality of white European nations – predominant, with accents on racism and anti-Roma xenophobia,
- primitive neo-Nazism – marginal, centred on racism, violence, and vandalism, using symbols without any knowledge.

Neo-Nazi groups tend to use symbols and particular imagery extensively. Quite often symbols that are displayed (on clothing, flags, printed documents) convey a very particular conventional meaning or message that needs to be hidden in the visual form because otherwise their communication could be prosecuted by criminal justice (Mareš 2006).

A special subculture within right-wing extremism – the skinheads – has been rooted in Czechoslovakia since the late 1980s and has two distinctive ideologies. The indigenous “chalice” form takes inspiration from the Hussite tradition, bearing mostly nationalist and anti-alien rhetoric. A different variety, the National Socialist (Nazi) skinheads, are linked to the European neo-Nazi movement. The other particular ideological formation is the autonomous nationalism, representing a radical, unorganized and quite violent branch of nationalism (Bastl et al. 2011, p. 153).

The doctrines of the radical right wing incorporate both old, traditional topics and new, emergent, mobilizing issues. The utilization of historical issues can be found rather counterproductive, often breeding confusion and ridicule – like e.g., episodic collaboration between the extreme right-wing, nationalist and neo-Nazi Workers’ Party (DS) and the Club of Czech Borderland, an extreme left-wing, post-communist but also nationalist organization. New, emergent, and mobilizing topics include populist calls for defence against immigration, purification from all non-indigenous people and groups, and elimination of parasitism (socially excluded groups). This loose doctrine helps to spread the doctrines into general public, and enables the occasional internationalization of efforts.

II.1.3. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES AND ACTORS

The landscape of right-wing extremism and radicalism is fragmented, heterogeneous, changing, and populated with only very small entities. Fluctuation is the way of evolution.

Hence, there is no sense in going back deeper into the history beyond the current state of affairs.

Political parties

The most significant record can be attributed to the Association for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, which was a far-right populist and nationalist party present in the Parliament between 1992 and 1998, later disintegrated, re-established in 2008, and finally banned by the Supreme Administrative Court in 2013. The other entities that emerged in the past 10 years – like the National Party (NS), the National Coalition (NK), or the National Union (NSJ) – have never gained a substantial momentum and electoral support, though at least the NS (active till 2009, still existing) and the NSJ had a potential to integrate the far right. The patriotic and nationalist right wing has lost almost all its vigour, compared to the 1990s (Bastl et al. 2011, pp. 215–218, 227).

Between 2003 and 2010 there existed the Workers' Party (DS) – a political subject occupying the ultra-right wing, embracing not only nationalism but rather a national socialist ideology, with links to Neo-Nazi scene. The party was officially banned in 2010. Expecting the verdict, the DS transformed into the Workers' Party of Social Justice (DSSS), with the same aggressive neo-Nazi profile, and in the 2010 elections, it won 1.14 percent and more than 2 percent in some regions. Later on it had to downgrade its extremist profile and voice a distance from Nazism (in order to avoid dissolution).

No to Brussels – National Democracy (NBND), a registered party and former partner to the DSSS, combines elements of nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-Western and pro-Russian propaganda – which aligns it very closely with the communists, and with the radical left wing generally (Extremismus: Souhrnná situační zpráva za 1. čtvrtletí roku 2015).

It is also necessary to mention the Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio Okamura (a controversial Czech-Japanese entrepreneur), a political movement which entered the Parliament after the elections in 2013 with almost 7 per cent of the vote. Since then it came through a turbulent development, and now it bears the name “Dawn – National Coalition”. Its ideology embraces not only direct democracy but also a strong anti-immigration agenda, Euroscepticism, nationalism, and populism in its pure form, which altogether had a synergic effect with rising radicalization of the public in the last two years.

Associations

On the level of organized associations, which are required to pass legal registration, it is obvious that explicitly neo-Nazi and violent groups are basically disqualified. The nationalist groups, however, can operate freely if their statute is in line with the legislation and constitutional order.

There are two traditional associations, established in 1990s, propagating the ideals of Czech nationalism in both cultural and political terms: the Patriotic Front (VF), and the Patriotic League (VL). Both of them not only hold on to Czech nationalism but also exhibit anti-German, anti-NATO, and anti-EU attitudes. Today both are existent but passive.

Another registered association with significant media coverage – the National Alliance (NA) – was banned already in 2000 on charges of holocaust denial etc. The Labour Youth (DM) is a youth satellite organization linked directly to the DSSS party. Before its descent into passivity, the National Party (NS) had established its own supposed paramilitary component, the National Guard (NG), registered in 2007 and active as a regular NGO in 2008 and 2009 (Smolík, Josef 2011. *Národní garda: krátký příběh*, Rexter, 01/2011).

Another type of association to be exemplified is the ultra-conservative *Akce D.O.S.T.* (acronym for Trust; Objectivity; Freedom; Tradition). Also this NGO, registered in 2010, was linked to the National Party. Its members formed a conglomerate of nationalism, conservatism, Catholicism, and anti-modernism, with a strong anti-EU position and campaign. The organization was subject to intensive medialization in 2011 due to a prearranged appointment of its leader as an adviser to the Minister of Education.

The last particular category can be labelled as single-issue associations and represented by the Bloc against Islam (BPI). This registered association was built upon a Facebook initiative, “We Do Not Want Islam in the Czech Republic” (IVČRN), it has a university teacher as a charismatic leader, and its central doctrine is the xenophobic fight against alleged Islamization of the country and its Western lifestyle.

Loose groupings and informal networks

The overview of informal organizations and networks may be more focused on entities that have reached the potential or real conflict with the legislation, and that are surveyed by the security and law enforcement authorities of the Czech Republic.

The neo-Nazi scene has for most of its history been quite heterogeneous, fragmented, and oriented on the subculture logistics – like organizing concerts of White Power music and distributing clothing, records, and symbolic merchandise. However, some of the early National Socialist skinheads groups intended to enter the public space. The first were the Bohemia Hammer Skinheads in the 1990s, a brotherhood with direct links to a major European neo-Nazi formation, Hammerskins Nation. Later in the 1990s a local branch of European NS group Blood & Honour took roots in the self-titled Blood & Honour Division Bohemia (BHDB), and there was also a group identifying with the originally British militant group, Combat 18. These original structures are passive today but individual links, contacts, and cooperation are kept alive. Still in 2012 the Police arrested the group of 12 BHDB activists. Much more activity and public outreach was carried out by the National Resistance (NO). NO was formed as a branch of Blood and Honour in the late 1990s and its ambition was to become a full-fledged political movement. In 2006 the Supreme Court declared NO a

neo-Nazi movement, with consequences for individuals prosecuted for large-scale violence on May Day marches and demonstrations in 2006, 2007, and 2008. Since 2009 its members were politically active through the DS party, and NO, still a dominant but intentionally decentralized movement, suffered from gradual decline in activity.

The Workers' Party (DS/DSSS) and the National Resistance (NO) have been mutually linked through personal ties, and have been allied with a few informal organizations (i.e. without legal registration) that comprise an entire neo-Nazi conglomerate (Bastl et al. 2011, pp. 143–155). The other groups include the Resistance Women Unity (RWU), a female NS union; the Anti-Antifa, currently passive project for monitoring activists, politicians, judges, or policemen who are perceived as threat; and the Autonomous Nationalists (AN), which is a decentralized network of cells providing an agile and highly visible “frontline” formation for militant and violent actions in the public space and for confrontation with “enemies”. However, the AN leadership quit their cooperation with the DSSS in 2010.

From an organizational perspective, the entire neo-Nazi and nationalist scene is weak in terms of permanent structures as the state repression has been quite intensive for at least a decade. Also the aversion of the public and of opposition NGOs is relatively strong, at least since around 2009 (Bastl et al. 2011, pp. 180–181). Hence, the role of individuals, their personal commitment, initiative, and multiple membership is critical for the extremist right-wing institutions and groups.

II.1.4. MANIFESTATIONS (ACTIONS)

The manifestations of right-wing radicalization can be conceptualized through several categories. The first possible approach is a simple distinction between legal and illegal activities. Another approach presented in the Ministry of the Interior's Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic (2015) recognizes three types of events: 1) public gatherings and demonstrations, 2) concerts, 3) other events (other concerts, meetings, discussions and partly public or private events). However, “events” do not represent all actions, and so the following overview employs two categories:

- events – organized or spontaneous actions limited in time and space,
- public relations – including visibility, propaganda, publicity, and recruitment.

Events

In the first quarter of 2015, there were only 7 events registered by Ministry of the Interior that can be attributed to organized right-wing extremists, and 8 events attributed to an “Islamophobic scene”. This presents a sharp decline in activity of the extreme right compared to previous years. Most of the recent events are non-violent demonstrations and public gatherings organized by DSSS, NBND, and IVČRN – all within the context of rising

xenophobic and anti-Islamic tendencies (Extremismus: Souhrnná situační zpráva za 1. čtvrtletí roku 2015).

In 2014, there were 133 events directly organised or attended by right-wing extremists. Of that number, there were 49 public gatherings, 8 concerts of so-called White Power Music, and 76 other concerts, meetings, discussions and partly public or private events (Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2014, p. 16). In 2014, there was a decrease in the amount and frequency of demonstrations with an exclusive anti-Roma character after it had dominated right-wing radicalization and extremism in previous years. Most of these demonstrations were induced in the aftermath of minor local incidents between the Roma and fellow citizens, happening mostly in the cities of North Bohemia (Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2014, pp. 8). Most often these events were organized by the DSSS and its supporters.

Acts of violence and vandalism have been limited in 2015, and oriented only against houses and facilities owned by Muslim organizations and persons. In 2014, the number of direct attacks against property was a bit higher than in 2013. Nevertheless, there had been much more violence in the past years. Basically, the physical violence takes the following forms:

- fighting political opponents, mostly left-wing radicals and activists,
- fighting the police,
- individual attacks.

The peaks of right-wing radical violence can be found in 2008 and 2009. In 2008, a series of marches and demonstrations took place in socially excluded areas with Roma settlements – with numerous violent clashes both with the local Roma population and with the Police of the Czech Republic. The “battle of Janov” occurred in the town of Litvínov with hundreds of participants on both the neo-Nazi (DS, NO, AN) and the police side, resulting in dozens of wounded radicals and policemen and dozens of arrested radicals (Bastl et al. 2011, p. 147).

There are also more traditional marches and demonstrations on May Day that have become a sort of “institutionalized” fight between NS and anarchists. The intensity of the May Day street fighting peaked around 2006–2010.

The individual attacks can be exemplified on an arson attack by four neo-Nazis linked to NO and AN against the house of a Roma family in Vítkov in 2009, causing very serious injuries to some of the family members. The offenders were sentenced for up to 22 years of prison.

Another category of activities to be mentioned includes paramilitary activities and vigilantism (Mareš 2012). The past examples of the NG (initiated in 2007 by the NS) and of the “protection corps” of the DS were recently revived only in episodes – an attempt of IVČRN fans to deploy an “anti-refugee guard” in trains in September 2015.

The fragmentation and decline of the radical right-wing scene can be evidenced by the fact that a number of prominent activists who formerly participated quite willingly in right-wing extremist demonstrations and gatherings have gradually scaled down their engagement in public events and preferred rather less visible and less surveilable activities. The decrease in the number of demonstrations was also linked to a decrease in criminal activity with an extremist definition (Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2014, pp. 15, 17).

Public relations

As the crisis within the right-wing extremist scene continued in 2014, the decline in activities in the public sphere was accompanying the long-term fragmentation of right-wing radicalism and extremism.

For years, the use of neo-Nazi symbols has been limited to almost null by a relatively intensive repression from the state, especially the police, which is supported by civil society and human rights activists.

The recruitment strategies do fully exploit the widespread internet-based social networks. Public gatherings and demonstrations are organized regularly through Facebook, Twitter etc. Most of the new groups and initiatives (like We Do Not Want Islam in the Czech Republic – IVČRN) combining nationalism with xenophobia against immigrants are woven around Facebook groups. Activists use foreign domains and specific instruments for communication and mobilization in order to enhance anonymity and lower the risk of detection by security forces. The internet environment is also increasingly becoming a vehicle for extremist criminal activity.

Fanzines remain a marginal resource for circulating ideology and doctrine. They did not disappear especially in the neo-Nazi and related environment due to easier secrecy, compared to online publishing. Printed versions can more easily avoid monitoring by law enforcement bodies.

The music subculture of skinheads, gradually unified in the so-called White Power Music, has also remained relatively marginal and closed within its community of fans. The years of intensive co-production of concerts with foreign neo-Nazi bands, with large numbers of fans coming from neighbouring and other EU countries – have passed away with intensified police surveillance and monitoring.

In general, in last two years, the right-wing extremist scene has been searching for new topics as the traditional anti-Roma issue does not offer any further potential for mobilizing new supporters (Extremismus: Souhrnná situační zpráva za 1. čtvrtletí roku 2015). Such a new mobilization issue has been found in Islamophobia, drawing on older xenophobic patterns. The novelty in 2015 consists in the level of radicalization and in the larger number of social media supporters. The new discourse defending the European and Czech traditions

and cultures against phantom Islamist invaders seem to be partly successful for the time being.

II.1.5. INSTITUTIONAL/LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

There is no great difference between the institutional/law enforcement response towards right-wing and left-wing-radicals. Especially the prevention and monitoring measures are mostly the same. The Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic is the main coordinator of activities concerning radicalization behaviour, from prevention and radicalization monitoring to repressive measures. The Ministry therefore assigns various tasks to the Police of the Czech Republic, the Ministry of Education and the Office of the Government of the Czech Republic (Konceptce boje proti extremismu pro rok 2015, Ministerstvo vnitra ČR, p. 3). The Ministry of Education puts great emphasis on prevention education within the framework of primary schools and high schools. These educational programs focus on respect for cultural differences and different opinions and ideas within society and on recognition of nontolerant, xenophobic and extremist ideology and behaviour (Vyhodnocení plnění koncepce boje proti extremismu pro rok 2014, p. 8). Within the prevention framework, the Police of the Czech Republic is running a helpline where people can announce illegal and extremist content of web pages. The Ministry of the Interior is cooperating with the Ministry of Industry and Trade on this issue in order to shut down websites with illegal content. Their activities are nevertheless unsuccessful because radicals use the opportunity to move their websites to servers in countries with almost no restriction of online content (Combating racism, xenophobia and extremism in Central Europe. Organizace pro pomoc uprchlíkům, 2012, p. 70).

Security measures concerning events which may lead to the gathering of radicals include consistent monitoring and documentation of such events. One of the widespread instruments used for meetings of radicals is low-profile policing, including conflict prevention units and a 3D strategy (discussion, de-escalation and determination) during dangerous situations which may escalate into an open conflict. The strategy consists of discussion with the radicals in the first phase; the second phase is de-escalation of the conflict and if these two measures are not effective, then determined, decisive action follows (Vyhodnocení koncepce boje proti Extremismu pro rok 2014, Ministerstvo vnitra, Odbor bezpečnostní politiky, p. 18).

Local authorities have the right to ban a public assembly if the purpose of the gathering could lead to the denial or restriction of personal, political or other rights of citizens on the basis of their nationality, gender, race, and origin, political or other conviction, religion and social status. An assembly can be also banned if it might lead toward violence or animosity spurred by the previously mentioned reasons. Municipality officials are given methodological assistance in making decisions whether an announced assembly represents a security threat and should be forbidden (Combating racism, xenophobia and extremism in Central Europe.

Organizace pro pomoc uprchlíkům, 2012, p. 52). Specialized forces of the Police of the Czech Republic are assigned to eliminating expressions of extremism during public gatherings (Manuál pro obce k zákonu o právu shromažďovacím. Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, 2009). In 2002 an amendment of the Act on Public Assembly forbid to attend any public meeting with face covered by anything, which could complicate or prevent police from personal identification (Act no. 269/2002 Coll.).

In 2014 a new set of guidelines was created in order to provide the government with a tool concerning the different issues that its ministries faces when handling extremism. The National Correspondent is also in charge of inter-ministerial cooperation (Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2012, Ministerstvo vnitra ČR, p. 81).

Non-state actors are important in pursuing a large number of activities connected to the fight against radicalization and extremism. They are mainly active in the field of prevention, monitoring and training. Czech NGOs also started several anti-extremism campaigns in the media (Combating racism, xenophobia and extremism in Central Europe. Organizace pro pomoc uprchlíkům, 2012, p. 53). NGOs also prepare informative materials for teachers and create a variety of e-learning materials. They organize events such as marches or anti-extremists demonstrations or monitor connections between radicals and politicians (Combating racism, xenophobia and extremism in Central Europe. Organizace pro pomoc uprchlíkům, 2012, p. 54).

II.1.6 ROOT CAUSES AND MOTIVATIONS

Macro level

Both left-wing and right-wing radicalization is spurred at the macro level by similar determinants, which can be divided into three categories: socioeconomic deprivation, dissatisfaction with political representation, and disapproval of international political situation.

Right-wing radicalization emerging from economic situation is driven mainly by employers' preferences of highly qualified experts or employees with university education. As a result, non-qualified workers without higher education might struggle with obstacles while searching for a job. Unemployment and lower living standards make them seek for the causes of their situation. Non-qualified unemployed people often find immigrants guilty for their situation and consider them rivals in the job market (Kreidl, Martin; Vlachová, Klára (1998) *Nastal soumrak extrémní pravice?* Sociologický ústav AV ČR, p. 9).

Frustration from the economic situation and the feeling that immigrants are stealing jobs from Czech workers is also connected to disagreement with government policy toward immigrants. Most of the respondents interviewed on reasons of radicalization stated they do not agree with the way government channels financial support to minorities (Krásná, Zuzana (2011) *Právní a sociální aspekty současného extremismu v ČR*, Západočeská univerzita

v Plzni, p. 52). Radicalization based on economic issues is usually defended as a mere protection of the country's economic interests (Ludvíková, Barbora: Kriminologické aspekty trestných činů z nenávisti. Univerzita Karlova v Praze. 2013, pp. 35–36).

Also frustration from low social status or from inability to reach a higher status may be compensated by joining groups of radicals where social status is not important and where the members may win their status for loyalty to the group (Smolík, Josef (2010) Subkultury mládeže. Grada, p. 64).

Dissatisfaction with political elites and apprehensions that government is not able to face issues of criminality or unemployment effectively, mixed with a desire for a strong state and politicians, is another root of right-wing radicalization at the macro level (Vlahová, Aneta (2010) Postoje středoškolské mládeže k extremismu. Masarykova univerzita, p. 33).

Aversion towards international organizations is one of the connecting links between right-wing and left-wing radicals. Especially disagreement with membership in the NATO and the EU is one of the reasons for radicalization. Right-wing radicals claim that these organizations are stealing Czech sovereignty and left-wing radicals claim they are false authorities (Bach, Marek (2008) Dělnická strana, Masarykova univerzita, p. 36).

People also stated that one of the reasons they were willing to join radical movements was their support of capital punishment for serious crimes and their support of strict rules concerning immigration (Sibřinová, Pavla (2013) Národní strana. IPS UK, pp. 140–150).

Far-right political parties are gaining support from those who are dissatisfied with the development of democracy after the end of the communist era in Czech Republic. Through their populist promises they reach people who consider the current political system ineffective in terms of protection of national identity and law enforcement (Krásná, Zuzana (2011) Právní a sociální aspekty současného extremismu v ČR, Západočeská univerzita v Plzni, pp. 52–53).

Meso level

At the meso level, family is one of the most important determinants of radicalization. The main source of this determination is usually xenophobic behaviour and opinions of the parents, which is adopted by their children (Ludvíková, Barbora: Kriminologické aspekty trestných činů z nenávisti. Univerzita Karlova v Praze. 2013, pp. 35–36).

Cases of dysfunctional families, which are causing radicalization of youth, are also normal. Young people who are searching for strong examples and do not find these in their families they might be able to find examples in radical groups (Řeřicha, Vít (2011) Sociální a kulturní zázemí stoupenců extremistických hnutí v Plzeňském kraji; Jihočeská univerzita v Českých Budějovicích, pp. 35–36).

Micro level

Right-wing radicals are supported very often by young people, who are even under the age of criminal responsibility, who lack moral barriers, and who consider minorities responsible for their failures or low social status (Drašarová, Markéta (2012) Socioekonomické příčiny vzestupu preference DSSS v českých komunálních volbách v roce 2006 a 2010; Mendelova univerzita v Brně, p. 36). According to psychological studies, there are personality determinants of radicalization such as lack of self-confidence or lack of empathy, which enables such people to join extremist groups involved in illegal activities (Novosad, Luboš (2009) Extremismus mládeže. Psychologické a právní problémy. Masarykova univerzita, pp. 14–15).

Right-wing radicals tend to be easily manipulated by populists, who claim that Czech people are being exploited and who promise immediate improvement (Drašarová, Markéta (2012) Socioekonomické příčiny vzestupu preference DSSS v českých komunálních volbách v roce 2006 a 2010; Mendelova univerzita v Brně, p. 49). Among right-wing radicals there is also a high number of those with lower levels of social intelligence, who are easy targets of manipulation by leaders of the radical groups (Loničková, Petra: Příčiny extremismu u školní mládeže. Masarykova Univerzita, Brno 2013).

II.2. LEFT-WING RADICALISATION

Libor Stejskal & Pavlína Bláhová

To the left-wing radicalization the same statement can be applied as to the right-wing one. The term “radicalization” is used seldom in the Czech Republic – with the exception of the current refugee and immigration crisis, where the induced radicalization cannot be clearly attributed to either right-wing or left-wing ideologies.

The term “extremism” is much more frequent in the public, official, and academic discourse, both in relation to right-wing and left-wing extremism. Again, persons present in the sphere of the left-wing extremism are sometimes recognized as “extremists” and sometimes as “left-wing radicals”, too.

II.2.1. BACKGROUND

The issue of left-wing radicalism and extremism in the Czech Republic can be traced well deep into the history. However, today, radicalism in association with the political left means something quite different from the historical meaning. In the 19th century, “radicalism” was mostly recognized as a wilder branch of liberalism; so radicals were radical liberals. This meaning was present in the Czech lands, too. The Spring of Nations revolution of 1848 saw an early appearance of radical liberalism in the country.

As liberalism became a standard in Europe in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, such association ceased to make sense. From the perspective of the current landscape of political ideologies left-wing radicalism can only be matched to “extreme left” ideologies, communism and anarchism, with minor sub-varieties, overlaps, and mixtures.

Both anarchism and communism, as dominant extreme left ideologies, are deeply rooted in the Czech society. Anarchism can be traced back to the 1890s, when it was a component of the then split labour movement. The cleavage between anarchism and social democracy consisted of the emphasis on absolute individual freedom and, to a certain extent, justification of the use of violence as a means of politics against the capitalist economic order. Anarchists with a working class, youth and student background were often harshly prosecuted by the law enforcement of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The community was never really large but was present not only in Prague but in other industrial cities, both large and small, as well. After the birth of the Czechoslovak Republic, a young anarchist was the first person to commit a political assassination in modern Czech history, when Alois Rašín, the minister of finance, was killed in 1923.

By that time, communism became an established political movement and one sharply distinct from the social democracy, with a Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) founded in 1921. The communists were a strong party throughout the 1920s and 1930s: in the elections of 1925 they won the second largest vote share, and were able to keep that position in the 1930s due to the Great Depression and the rising threat of Nazi Germany. Their ideology was centred on the class struggle and violent revolution of the working class, and was strongly influenced by the Communist International led by the Soviet Union. During the WWII the KSČ gained a large credit and in 1946 it won a democratic general election. Since the communist coup in 1948 communism became an official ideology of the Czechoslovak Republic, which lasted till 1989. However, the existing political and economic system was called “socialism” throughout the period. Only an intermezzo of societal and political détente towards a “socialism with human face” took place in 1968, vanquished by the invasion of the Soviet Union and its allies.

The leading role of the communist party was abolished in 1989, the ideology proclaimed to be a criminal one, some of the crimes were prosecuted, and a few people were sentenced with rather negligible penalties.

All in all, the long history of left-wing radicalism and radicalization can be summarized in two ways. The continuity is basically uninterrupted in the communist movement, which is still organized through a regular political party with parliamentary representation – KSČM (the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia). KSČM is, however, also an extremely conservative organization, so that its “radical” element can be disputed. There are also smaller groups and associations of the Communist Youth that are truly extremist and radical. The anarchist or anti-establishment movement is much smaller in numbers and weaker in its political or public impact. It has undergone many years of stagnation, and it definitely

features virtually no link to the historical structures, traditions, and symbols of the early Czech anarchism of the 19th and 20th centuries. Thus, contemporary left-wing radicalization bears no distinctively “Czech” attributes, and it uses the same ideas, symbols and instruments as in other EU countries. And in the very recent years it has expanded its activity, awareness and public relations, and grown in numbers of supporters.

II.2.2. IDEAS AND IDEOLOGY

Two dominant sources of ideology can be distinguished within the radical left-wing formations in the Czech Republic (Bastl et al. 2011, Charvát 2007):

- communism,
- anarchism.

Both are deeply rooted in Czech political culture, both display a long tradition. Nevertheless, they are highly different from each other and in many aspects almost contradictory (Charvát 2007, pp. 17–19). For historical reasons, the gap between anarchists and communists is much deeper in the Czech Republic than in Western countries.

Communism is – as opposed to any other radical or extremist ideology – established in the standard political structures and processes of the state. The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) was forced after 1989 to abandon the aim of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat through the means of class struggle and revolution, as well as the goal of eliminating the private ownership, but it still holds on to some elements of Marxism, Leninism, and even Stalinism. The ideas of historical materialism, disgust for liberal democracy, and a state-centric approach are still components of its doctrine. The Communist Party was forced to give up any rhetorical and programmatic points that are in conflict with the Constitution, democratic order, civil rights and freedoms, or the market economy. This, however, does not mean that these liberal principles have been internalized in the communist mindset. While freedom is not articulated in their programme, equality (mostly in economic terms) is.

In real-life politics, a certain hybridity and a paradox within the communist world view can be documented: on one hand, Czech communists declare themselves to be a left-wing party, which in a Western perspective would suggest an emphasis of solidarity, progress, freedom and social justice; on the other hand, they are virtually the most conservative political formation, with openly authoritarian, state-centric admiration of illiberal and non-solidary regimes in China and Russia, or of the North Korean dictatorship. Also a very strong nationalism, and partly militarism, can be identified as values shared by Czech communist supporters. The ideology of “avant-garde” transmuted during the communist regime into purely illiberal rigidity, and it has stayed on the same track till nowadays.

Anarchism is the second large “family of ideas” in the Czech radical left. Its elementary goal of maximization of personal freedom has its roots – among other sources – also in the country’s history: Petr Chelčický in the 15th century asserted the right of individual to self-determination, freedom, and non-violence (Charvát 2007, pp. 107, 112–113). Anarchism as such appeared as a part of the labour movement in late 19th century, focused on the ideals of freedom and self-determination, and on the ability of people to organize and cooperate autonomously, without state and other power structures. Equality of human beings belongs to the doctrine’s core, too. Anarchists oppose any coercion, and especially the state as a source and vehicle thereof. A strong aversion is, then, targeted against any repressive systems or ideologies: fascism, neo-Nazism, nationalism, communism, bolshevism, and also globalization and the capitalist market economy.

Violence has been rejected in most cases and in principle by anarchists; however, the tendency to take action against opponents and against “the system” inevitably brings about physical confrontation with either police or right-wing extremists, and so violence can be accepted when necessary. The anarchist movement never or only rarely seeks sympathy of the general public, with the important exception of antifascist and anti-neo-Nazi campaigns that serve as a mobilizing element and link anarchists to a diversity of left-wing, liberal, and pro-social circles within the society.

II.2.3. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES AND ACTORS

The landscape of left-wing extremism and radicalism bears the same attributes as the extreme right wing: fragmentation, fluidity, instability, and change. Most of the entities are extremely small in numbers, often compete against similar subjects, and suffer high levels of fluctuation. So, the following description is once again based in the current state of affairs, without any deeper historical view.

Political parties

The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) remains the only subject within both the radical left and the far right that is integrated in the political establishment of the parliamentary democracy, with a decreasing but still very large pool of disciplined members (around 50,000). The KSČM is still in opposition to central government but it already takes part in executive power at the regional and municipal levels. The party is also able to accommodate diverse platforms – from reformist democratic socialists to dogmatic Stalinists. The pragmatism of its leaders, however, cannot preserve the party from ongoing stagnation and isolation within the society.

There is no other relevant political party on the radical left wing, but a potential for radical socialist, neo-Marxist, anti-globalist and radical environmentalist political projects is slowly rising (Bastl et al. 2011, p. 77).

Associations

There are many registered civic associations with a radical left-wing ideology. One of the most visible is the Communist Youth Union (KSM) that has been subject to state repression. It had long held the neo-Stalinist, dogmatic positions on class struggle and violent revolution, being a cooperating companion to the KSČM. KSM activists occasionally had conflicts with anarchists when trying to join their demonstrations. In 2006 the KSM was dissolved by the Ministry of the Interior, but the trial in court which lasted till 2010 ended up with a judicial verdict reverting the ministerial ban. So the KSM currently exists, but since the ban it split into several rival associations – like the Union of Young Communists of Czechoslovakia (SMKČ).

There are also several associations with the doctrine of dogmatic aggressive communism, presenting themselves as the left alternative to KSČM, but their influence is minimal. A special branch consists of patriotic communism organizations – like the Club of the Czech Borderland that guards an ultra-leftist interpretation of history and holds anti-German, anti-American, anti-Zionist, anti-NATO attitudes. A similar profile can be found in the Patriotic Association of Anti-fascists (VSA), the Slavic Committee of the Czech Republic (SV ČR), or the rival Czech-Moravian Slavic Union (ČMSS) (Bastl et al. 2011, pp. 36–46).

A large variety of associations and initiatives based on neo-Marxism and democratic socialism cannot be categorized as the radical or extremist left wing. The anarchist movement, however, belongs to that category, even though it naturally does not tend to form permanent organizations. The old organizations from the 1990s like the Czech Anarchist Federation, later succeeded by the Czechoslovak Anarchist Federation (ČSAF) or the Federation of Social Anarchists (FSA), find themselves in permanent stagnation and inner disputes (Bastl et al. 2011, pp. 95–99). The mere goals of elimination of the state and of capitalism do not mobilize any wider audience. Another traditional organization is the Czech Anti-fascist Action (AFA). The culmination of these and similar anarchist initiatives came around 2000, when the International Monetary Fund and World Bank summit took place in Prague, which boosted an intensive mobilization and international coordination of the domestic anarchist movement with other anti-globalization entities, forming together an Initiative Against Economic Globalization (INPEG) (Bastl et al. 2011, pp. 104–107). Some of the following acts of reshuffling – like the merger of AFA and FSA into the Federation of Anarchist Groups (FAS) – has again no public significance.

Loose groupings and informal networks

This is the most heterogeneous segment of “organizations”, so that only a few examples will be mentioned.

The institution of Social Fora arrived to the Czech Republic quite early after 2001, and the Initiative for Social Fora was launched in 2004. The Czech Social Forum was organized several times since, forming a joint platform for reformist communists, anarchists, Trockists, neo-Marxists, radical social democrats, trade unions, and other anticapitalist initiatives (Bastl et

al. 2011, pp. 59–61). The March 8 Feminist Group (FS8b) is quite a unique example of radical left-wing feminist formation. Quite a different character could be attributed to the loose formation of radical violent anarchists referred to as the “Black Bloc”. This international event-induced network appeared in the country during the IMF-WB summit in 2000, showing an unprecedented level of violence against the police force.

The most significant initiatives or nonofficial organizations in 2014 and 2015 are:

- The Network of Revolutionary Cells (SRB), operating in a full conspiracy manner, is a qualitatively new, anti-establishment violent formation. A few of its members have been subject to criminal prosecution for an allegedly attempted terrorist attack in 2014. This group has openly professed its commitment to armed violence against security and law enforcement authorities (Bulletin of the Network of Revolutionary Cells, available at: http://aka.anarchokomunismus.org/images/attach_texts/SRB2014.pdf).
- Czechoslovak Reserve Soldiers against the War Planned by the NATO Command – a loose group of reserve officers who claim their determination to stop a NATO war plot, even through an armed uprising. The leaders do not hide their names, and the entire style, visual layout, and professional level of their presentation suggest affluent sponsors behind the scene. The sentiment for the Czechoslovak socialism and its armed forces, the explicit pro-Russian propaganda, and the conspiracy series of “advisory campfires” at various locations all around the country do certainly make this a real concern for counter-intelligence and police (ceskoslovenstivojaci.org).

It is quite significant for their organizational capability that – unlike the neo-Nazi or right-wing extremism at all – left-wing radical groups are generally perceived as less of a threat and do not induce as strong an aversion in the general public as neo-Nazi groups do.

II.2.4. MANIFESTATIONS (ACTIONS)

The manifestations of the left-wing radicalization can be conceptualized through several categories in the same way as for the right wing. The Ministry of the Interior’s Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic (2015) recognizes three types of events: 1) public gatherings and demonstrations, 2) concerts, 3) other events (other concerts, meetings, discussions and partly public or private events). An important aspect is the legality/illegality of particular activities, too. In general, as “events” do not represent all actions, another category has to be added:

- events – organized or spontaneous actions limited in time and space,
- public relations – including visibility, propaganda, publicity, and recruitment.

Events

In the first quarter of 2015 there were 29 registered events attributed to left-wing extremism. Of this number, there were 9 gatherings, 8 concerts, and 12 other events.

Compared to the sharp decrease for right-wing extremism, the left wing scored only a slight decrease (Extremismus: Souhrnná situační zpráva za 1. čtvrtletí roku 2015). In 2014, the statistics of the Ministry of the Interior recognized a total of 158 events, which made a slight increase in comparison with 2013. The total number breaks down to 62 public gatherings, 40 concerts, and 56 other events (Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2014, p. 23).

In the past two years, there was an increased activity within the left-wing extremist scene. The most typical event in the public space for the members of anarchist (or anarcho-autonomous) spectrum was – like for last two decades – the fight against political opponents, namely against right-wing extremists. The organization or participation in the protest gatherings against the right-wing radicals and groups was quite intensive, and also the attendance and public acceptance of these gatherings was much higher. Even though the number of right-wing or directly neo-Nazi events decreased, the left-wing radicals maintained an intensive efforts to organize the counter-events against them, and often participated in protest gatherings and demonstrations of diverse non-extremist liberal or left-wing initiatives of associations, too.

The left-wing radicals tend to organize events as components of more extensive mobilization campaigns. These campaigns vary in duration and intensity, and some can be listed:

- fight against islamophobia is the emerging response to right-wing radicalization, but so far the counter-events are not very successful or widely attended;
- concerts and music festivals within the Good Night White Pride (GNWP) campaign – serving both as a source of finance and as tool for radicalization through lyrics of songs;
- Food not Bombs (FNB) – a long-term anti-war and anti-NATO campaign;
- criticism of Israel for a prolonged suppression of the Palestinians;
- support of the squatting scene;
- solidarity campaigns supporting various platforms (like the Anarchist Black Cross) and imprisoned activists;
- campaigns against the elections – relabelling billboards of candidates and political parties, posting own banners;
- anti-NATO, anti-US, and anti-militarist campaigns – most recently boosted in 2015 by the transit of a large US Army convoy through the country – without any substantial support from the public; the most extensive mobilization of this kind took place in 2007–2009 through the sophisticated and successful initiative, “No to Bases”, focused on large-scale, structured protests against the plans to deploy components of the US anti-ballistic missile system in the Czech Republic.

The role and presence of violence can be categorized as follows:

- fight against political opponents,
- fight against police forces,

- destruction of private property or infrastructure.

This traditional activity label “direct action” has increased recently. A part of the anarchist scene has radicalised to the state of readiness to carry out serious attacks against both property/infrastructure and against the security forces. In 2014 the series of arson attacks took place, some of them against the police stations and police vehicles and some against infrastructure (a toll gate). The attacks against fur farms took place, too. These actions bear a significant sign of inspiration from abroad (Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2014, p. 24). The conflict between moderate and radical pro-violent activists has intensified, mostly due to emergence of Revolutionary Cells Network (SRB), which assumed the responsibility for arson attacks. Some of its members have been arrested for plotting a terrorist attack against the train with military equipment (Lidovky.cz, 6. 5. 2015. Policie obvinila tři levicové extrémisty z terorismu. Hrozí jim doživotí. Available at: http://www.lidovky.cz/policie-obvinila-z-terorismu-tri-z-sesti-zadrzenych-levicovych-extremistu-17z-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A150506_104201_In_domov_sij).

In the past, large-scale violent events took place as well: most notably in 2000 during the IMF/WB summit in Prague, and to a lesser extent during the NATO Prague summit in 2002. Also there are traditional events that induce violence almost automatically – like the May Day marches and demonstrations of the neo-Nazis and anarchists, with a massive preventative police presence but still often with violent clashes.

A special source of events is the squatting community. There was a number of violent conflicts between squatters and police in the past (Růžička 2007). At present the situation is calm and the communication between squatters and property owners – including the state – is usually working. A recent case of a former respiratory clinic confided by the state to the anarchist community and later handed over to one of the state authorities increased the tension again.

Paramilitary activities are in principle distant to the anarchist and anti-authoritarian spectrum, but such attempts have been recognized in the other part of the radical left wing – in the communist, nationalist, and authoritarian environment. The Czechoslovak Soldiers in Reserve against the War Planned by the NATO Command are currently the most visible initiative, with allegedly 5,000 supporters, bearing some paramilitary features and also organizing the conspiracy “advisory campfires” at various locations throughout the country (ceskoslovenstivojaci.org).

The internet has naturally become an important instrument for planning, organization and information sharing over public gatherings, direct action, and even violent attacks.

Public relations

One of the recent trends on the radical left wing is the developing focus on local issues and topics, often enabled by direct links to the local governments.

Mobilization and recruitment takes place through the continued campaigns and single-issue events that are mentioned above. Concerts belong to the public relations repertoire as well. A prominent role can be attributed to online communication, which has become much more sophisticated and professional on both the anarchist (etc.) and the communist (etc.) parts of the left-wing scene. There has been extensive use of trolling at the discussion forums, chats or blogs of right-wing extremists, particularly with the aim to disrupt their conveying at public gatherings. The messages and information on the attacks were made public by militant activists with an intention to inspire possible followers. On the other hand, the most radical and militant activists are now required to use encrypted communication or face-to-face meetings, as the surveillance and monitoring means of law enforcement bodies have advanced substantially.

With regard to visual symbols used by the left-wing radicals there is almost no direct repression by police or other law enforcement bodies. This is a part of long-term acceptance by the public opinion which is much more favourable to the radical left than to the radical right wing, mostly due to historical reasons and perceived lesser or no commitment to violence on the left wing. Also the presence of the left-wing radicals in media is still better accepted by the public compared to the right-wing radicals.

A very strong phenomenon of pro-Russian propaganda appeared in the Czech media and particularly in online social networks with the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis and renewed tension between Russia and the West. Disinformation is disseminated regularly and with a high level of sophistication by a network of would-be independent journalism servers (Aeronet, Ac24, Stalo-se, Infowars etc.). Their messages spread enormously through the social networks – possibly with the aim of disrupting the societal consensus on the Czech Republic's affiliation to the Western political community. However, the extent of the campaign in the online environment has not been matched on the ground, as shown by the actual absence of protests during the spring 2015 transit of the US Army convoy (Extremismus: Souhrnná situační zpráva za 1. čtvrtletí roku 2015).

II.2.5. INSTITUTIONAL/LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

The institutional or law enforcement response towards left-wing radicals at the level of prevention and monitoring is *de facto* the same as in the case of right-wing radicals. From the monitoring of websites with extremist content or events with a high concentration of left-wing radicals to prevention programs for children and youth at schools, official institutions use mainly the same measures, except the fact that they focus mainly on the fight against right-wing extremism, while left-wing extremism and radicalism seem to be unattractive for most of these organizations providing a prevention framework. On the other hand, this situation may change soon as the radicalization of the left-wing spectrum is gaining momentum (Tomáš, Robert (2009) Extremismus v České republice, Technická univerzita v Liberci, pp. 25–26).

Left-wing radicals often criticize the police for dilatory response to illegal behaviour and actions of far-right activists and at the same time they complain about groundless use of police force against left-wing radicals (Phamová, Melanie (2010) Popis a porovnání pobočky Antifašistické akce v České republice a Antirasistické akce v Severní Americe, Masarykova univerzita, p. 13). In 2014 and 2015, the activity of left-wing radicals and extremists significantly increased and so did the police effort to counter the illegal activities of left-wing radical groups and individuals, especially within the framework of the *Fenix* police operation, which was supposed to reverse an attempted terrorist attack. Left-wing radicals report that their members were arrested without relevant charge. They stated that the police also infiltrated their group (<http://antifenix.noblogs.org/page/2/>).

II.2.6 ROOT CAUSES AND MOTIVATIONS

Macro level

Left-wing radicalization at the macro level stems from the same roots as right-wing radicalization: socioeconomic deprivation, dissatisfaction with political representation and disapproval of international political situation.

Feelings of injustice caused by government and great cleavages in economic conditions and social statuses within society had spurred radicalization of several left-wing radicals interviewed (Řeřicha, Vít (2011) Sociální a kulturní zázemí stoupců extremistických hnutí v Plzeňském kraji; Jihočeská univerzita v Českých Budějovicích, p. 48).

Disappointment with democracy leads to criticism of political system and everything it brings, including political parties and elections. The opinion that the state has failed its role causes disapproval of any government actions and authorities and may lead to complete refusal of state power (Bastl, Martin (2011) Krajní pravice a krajní levice v ČR, Grada, p. 126). Opposition to international organizations and actors such as the NATO and the EU is also one of the reasons of discordance with Czech political representation. One of the concrete discussion issues which many people considered as a reason for their radicalization was the possibility of building a US radar base in Czech Republic, which caused many protests by left-wing radicals, who were very strictly against placing such a military structure onto Czech soil (Bastl, Martin (2011) Krajní pravice a krajní levice v ČR, Grada, p. 42).

Meso level

As it was said, family is an important determinant of radicalization, nevertheless there is a great difference in its influence on right-wing and left-wing radicalization. In the case of left-wing radicalization, it is more common that young people do not agree with a consumer life style of their families and start searching for a group of people with similar opinions (Marešová, Alena (1999) Kriminologické a právní aspekty extremismu, Institut pro kriminologii a sociální prevenci, ISBN 80-86008-59-2, p. 79).

Also classmates at school, their opinions and their preferences of, for example, music styles connected to anarchist groups, are a serious motivation for adopting left-wing ideologies (Bastl, Martin (2011) *Krajní pravice a krajní levice v ČR*, Grada, pp. 111–112).

Micro level

Reasons for left-wing radicalization at the micro level are closely connected to the feeling of insecurity and apprehensions of breach of personal rights, such as tracking the movement of persons etc. Also solidarity with those who are being oppressed by the system is a strong motivation for radicalization (Bulletin of Network of Revolutionary Cells, available at: http://aka.anarchokomunismus.org/images/attach_texts/SRB2014.pdf).

II.3. ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

Michal Hořejší

II.3.1. BACKGROUND

Before the “communist era” the number of Muslims in the area of the Czech Republic was very low. In the 1970’s to 1980’s there was increased migration of Muslims to Czechoslovakia. Arab students got scholarships for studying at universities in Czechoslovakia, and some of them married Czech or Slovak wives and settled in the country. In this way, they formed the core of the Muslim community in the Czech Republic (and Slovakia). Since 1989 the number of Muslims in the Czech Republic has been rising. In the 1990’s there was a “wave” of Muslim refugees from Balkan countries and former USSR. Currently there is both legal and illegal immigration from different countries.

There are no official data concerning the Muslim community in the Czech Republic. Estimates of the number of Muslims in the Czech Republic differ. The most probable figure is between 10,000–20,000 Muslims, including 400–500 Czech converts to Islam. The vast majority of Muslims are Sunnis. There is no predominant group in terms of country of origin. The main source countries are Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the former USSR, Macedonia, Serbia (Kosovo), Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan. Approximately 1/3 of the Muslims are women. The communities of recent immigrants remain small and fragmented. Czech Muslims live in bigger cities. A significant number of tourists from rich countries visit the country’s spas annually.

The majority of Czech Muslims are moderate believers but the number of radicals and extremists is slowly increasing. Some security problems have been monitored in the past and some individuals have proven vulnerable to radicalisation.

Because of the country's history, immigration to the Czech Republic is not dominated by flows from the MENA region but rather from Eastern Europe and East Asia, former USSR or the former communist bloc.

Trends related to radicalisation and recruitment in the EU are monitored and studied by Czech authorities and academia. A research study of the integration process of the Muslim community in the CR was organized in 2006–2007. The community was fully informed about the study and its outcomes – the results were published in July 2007.¹ There is no marginalization of Muslims in the CR. There are different models of integration of Muslims in the CR. The Report was published and distributed. The study focused on the description of the integration process of the Muslim community in the Czech Republic. The aim was to obtain basic information on the course and current status of the integration of Muslims in society in the Czech Republic. The study assessed the integration pathways and identified several obstacles to successful integration of Muslims into the majority society.

Unlike in Western Europe, there is no generation of frustrated descendants of Muslim immigrants, who tend most strongly toward extremism, growing up in this country. There are no Muslim ghettos. The population is largely homogeneous, with a relatively low proportion of minorities. The Czech Republic has a very small Muslim population, but it has also seen a sharp rise in anti-Islamic sentiment in recent months. As the Muslim population grows, so do tensions within the population. (e.g., in November 2013, two Muslim students threatened to file an anti-discrimination lawsuit against a nursing school in Prague after they were asked to remove their hijab in class). Never in the past has Islam been so discussed in Czech society as at present time. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 as well as the attacks in Madrid and London, the spread of IS etc., together with some more visible activities of Muslim extremists living in Europe, have strengthened the already existing negative stereotypes and prejudices towards Muslims as a whole (increased proliferation of materials presenting Islam as a dangerous political ideology rather than a religion). Currently the topic is linked to the debate on migration – most of the people whom the European Commission wants to resettle are from Muslim countries, and there is growing fear among the public in the Czech Republic that the quota will bring an influx of radical Islamists.

II.3.2. IDEAS AND IDEOLOGY

The Muslim community overall cannot be seen as overtly radicalized. Nor are there any signs of widespread organized ideological work towards that end. Only several individuals might be described as more deeply influenced by radical versions of Islam. In general these individuals mainly come from the Caucasus and the MENA region. Some converts do share more extreme ideas as well.

¹ (Link: http://www.mvcr.cz/dokument/2007/integrace_Muslimu.pdf). Main topics/questions studied: ways of integration of Muslims in the CR; main obstacles to integration; how Muslims assess their “interaction” with the “autochthonous population”; how Muslims assess their “position” (as individuals and as a community).

At the moment the individuals in question would like to steer the Muslim community in the Czech Republic in order to adapt a stricter interpretation of Islam (for example, sharia law). In a very long-term perspective some of them would like to change the entire country into a land of Islam. The main topics include crimes of the West and its proxies and the global suppression of certain regions, populations etc.; also, concepts such as liberal democracy, freedom of speech and gender equality are described as unrealistic and hypocritical Western ideals. Narratives are employed to delegitimise the West and advance the perception that fighting against the immoral West is a just cause.

It has to be mentioned that there has been only utterly minor occurrence of terrorist acts in the territory of the Czech Republic. No “classical” terrorist attacks with links to international groups or networks have been committed in the Czech Republic. Neither has any “classical” terrorist act been noticed with violence as a means of reaching a certain aim.

II.3.3. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES AND ACTORS

The Muslim community in the Czech Republic is largely fragmented: there is a centre, other parts and a so-called periphery. The centre is small, other parts of the community consist of individuals from “non-Arabic” countries (mainly the former USSR and some African countries. Some are not very active believers). The majority of Muslims in the CR are well integrated. In 1991, the Centre of Muslim Religious Communities (*Ústředí muslimských náboženských obcí*) was established. In 1998 the first mosque was opened in Brno and in 1999 another one in Prague. Attempts to build mosques in other cities have been blocked by fellow citizens.

The Centre of Muslim Communities (*Ústředí muslimských obcí*, UMO) was registered by the state in 2004 (in accordance with the Act on the Freedom of Religious Expression and the Position of Churches and Religious Societies). There have been internal tensions within the community and the coordinating role of the UMO is not recognized by all actors. Other organizations have been created but their role and influence is limited. Muslim believers pursued their activities under the headings of several institutions that were registered according to Czech law. Important actors among them include the General Federation of Muslim Students in the Czech Republic (*Všeobecný svaz muslimských studentů v České republice*) and the Islamic Foundation in Prague (*Islámská nadace v Praze*). Another important player, the Islamic Foundation in Brno (*Islámská nadace v Brně*), was founded in the year 1994.

Generally speaking, there is no information on a specific extremist group related directly to or active predominantly in the Czech Republic. The media and authorities do inform about risks related to terrorism and violent extremism. At the moment the so-called Islamic State is considered as the main problem for the West. *De facto* the entire Muslim population in the West is seen as a potential risk factor by some journalists, politicians and experts.

The internet and social media are the main sources of radical messages. They play a key role in indoctrination, offering the possibility to disseminate tailor-made propaganda to target audiences. Especially some individuals or specific channels from abroad have been implicated.

II.3.4. MANIFESTATIONS (ACTIONS)

In 2014 the police raided a mosque and the headquarters of the Islamic Foundation. Police officers detained a 55-year-old Czech citizen and accused him of organizing the translation of a book by A. A. B. Philips that allegedly spreads racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia. Dozens of people were held at the mosque when the raid took place during Friday prayers. The case is pending.

The printing and distribution of such materials, however scarce an occurrence, seems to be the typical action of individuals leaning toward stricter interpretations of Islam. Although the trial is still open in the above-mentioned case, it is the prime example of manifestations of religious fundamentalism. Moreover, on several occasions, there have been videos of youth posing with airsoft mock weapons at a place of worship in Brno. Nevertheless, these actions have been widely dismissed as foolishness.

More sinister activities related to Islamic radicalism have been conducted by foreign nationals. In one case, a workshop forging passports operated by a Caucasian extremist has been uncovered. Also, several foreign nationals have been arrested traveling through the territory of the Czech Republic. Put together, there is enough suggestive evidence that the territory of the Czech Republic, just as in many other cases, is used for logistical and transit purposes.

II.3.5. INSTITUTIONAL/LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

The Czech Republic has not adopted a specific strategy on radicalization and recruitment. This topic is partially covered by counterterrorism strategy. The issues of extremism, terrorism, hooliganism are frequently solved separately. The Czech Republic is aware of the dangers of radicalization and constantly analyses “best practices” of the EU member states concerning the prevention of radicalization. In previous years substantial measures in the counter-terrorism area were adopted. The last publicly accessible document dedicated to key principles of fight against terrorism in the specific conditions of Czech Republic is Counter-terrorism Strategy 2013. The Strategy defines the following key areas of counter-terrorism:

- No. 1: Improved communication and cooperation between stakeholders involved in the fight against terrorism and better conditions for their work.
- No. 2: Protection of population, critical infrastructure and other targets potentially vulnerable to a terrorist attack.

- No. 3: Security research, training and information to the public on specific aspects of the fight against terrorism.
- **No. 4: Prevention of radicalisation and recruitment to terrorist structures.**
- No. 5: Legislative and contractual issues in the context of international obligations.

The Strategy emphasises that “the steps to prevent radicalisation of immigrant communities and the inclination of their members to terrorism need to go hand in hand with actions against the ‘**domestic**’ **extremism, racism and xenophobia** and with the educational and awareness-raising activities for general public. The issue is also being dealt with under the government Policy for the Fight against Extremism, which is updated and evaluated every year. It shall be pointed out that no proven link between the ‘domestic’ extremism and radicalisation of immigrant communities has yet been recorded in the Czech Republic.”

Police officers working in socially excluded areas are trained in communication and minority policing. They also have a brochure about extremist and radical symbols, which was created in cooperation of ministerial and police experts with academics. The cooperation of the security community with education institutions in the Czech Republic is on a high level.

There are no specific national disengagement or exit strategies. These measures would be implemented operationally in case of need.

The EU, along with its member states, have implemented numerous programs and policies to help prevent and prosecute violent radicalization. The Strategy argues that “the Czech Republic cannot adopt all the best practices as they stand. The effort to ‘actively fight violent radicalisation’ shall not lead to a straightforward adoption of measures that had not been thoroughly discussed”.

Relevant authorities of the Czech Republic have been studying ways how to improve its abilities to prevent, stop and fight radicalization and recruitment for many years. The law enforcement authorities have not underestimated risks related to the phenomenon of radicalization.

Example tasks from recent strategic documents:

Example – National Action Plan to Combat Terrorism (2005–2007)

Task No. 11.1.: “To study reasons for radicalisation of certain population groups living in the territory of the Czech Republic and actively prevent situations which lead an individual to approve terrorism or to participate in terrorist activity (media campaigns, continuous information of the general public, education in the sphere of the integration of aliens, etc.”

National Action Plan to Combat Terrorism (2007–2009 update)

3.1 “... the requirements identified have shown that the security services lack human

resources to cover the agenda of confronting the criminogenic potential of enclosed immigrant communities. For this purpose the potential of cooperation between the security community and the respective educational institutions of the Czech Republic will have to be identified and developed.”

3.2 “... active communication between the security services and regional and local self-government authorities... it is necessary to develop methods of disseminating information on security risks associated with the emergence of enclosed immigrant communities in concrete regions and localities, which would be directly focused on the respective self-government authorities.”

3.3. “... specific aspects related to prevention of enclosed immigrant communities and radicalisation of their members will have to be addressed.”

The latest CT strategy is from 2013 and the current list of priorities in the fight against terrorism is connected with it. This list is Restricted and the priorities and tasks will be implemented in 2013–2015. The national counter-extremism strategy is updated annually just as the Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic (both documents are annually approved by government).

The Ministry of the Interior published a handbook on extremism for the Police of the Czech Republic. The Ministry of the Interior required the development of a handbook for police officers, “Symbols Used by Extremists in the Czech Republic”. Its objective is to facilitate the orientation of police officers regarding the current extremist scene and to help them preventing and prosecuting crimes having an extremist context. The handbook is supplemented by a “Neo-Nazi Calendar” and “flash cards” depicting some symbols which should help every police officer on duty to detect and evaluate whether such a symbol is permitted or not.

Regarding the Police of the Czech Republic we would like to mention that the activities in this is field are aimed at developing the education of newly recruited policemen as well as current policemen in the field of multicultural approaches to policing.

The supranational nature of the extremist phenomenon and its existence in various forms throughout the pan-European area demand permanent attention of public bodies as a whole and in particular efficient international cooperation. Therefore efforts to consistently expose and punish manifestations of extremism and to eliminate both its visible and latent forms remain a priority of an anti-extremist policy. In this context emphasis will be placed on strict punishment for disseminating ideas and manifestations of neo-Nazism, racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and intolerance. In this context increased attention will be devoted to the dissemination of such manifestations via the internet and to finding ways of punishing this type of crime.

There is an opportunity for civil society representatives to gain funding, for example from crime prevention programmes. The crime prevention agenda falls under the Security Policy and Crime Prevention Department of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic.

Problems and challenges:

- Citizens want to be informed about what is going on. To simply introduce the problem to the public by describing those who claim responsibility is misleading. It is important for security institutions to keep control over defining the situation. In the end, to solve a problem does not mean to create a bigger problem.
- Any strategy that hopes to counter online radicalisation must aim to create an environment in which the production and consumption of radical materials become not just difficult but unacceptable as well as less desirable.
- How to reduce high levels of alienation, which have certain proportions and are generating unease with the Muslim population, and to advocate values that can forge what people have in common.
- How to measure the effectiveness of measures adopted.
- The question of reliability of data.
- Limited number of experts on the topic in the Czech Republic.
- For scholars it is difficult to get access to reliable primary sources.
- Current challenges for law enforcement agencies: the internet enables extremists to effectively share their “best practices”. There are also limits to the work of law enforcement agencies (financial aspects, personnel etc.).

Czech experts are members of many EC-funded RAN groups, but there is no national umbrella RAN expert network in the Czech Republic.

II.3.6 ROOT CAUSES AND MOTIVATIONS

After the 1989 collapse of a totalitarian political system there was a significant expansion of freedoms and access to information, which *inter alia* meant an increase of the activities of subcultures (not only right-wing, but also other subcultures found new bases and ways of actions). In general in the area of extremism the current situation in the CR is not different from the situation in other EU countries. It is a global problem, the Czech extremist scene does not exist in a vacuum, and like in other EU countries, extremists in the CR are, too, becoming more and more sophisticated, balancing on the edge of laws, trying to address the public (contrary to their foreign “colleagues” they were not successful in the European Parliament elections).

There are many factors to be analysed that could have an influence on the present situation, which is not caused by the lack of effective laws or by the absence of an effective anti-extremism unit, but is rather much more complicated.

The authorities of the Czech Republic do combat those who exacerbate divisions by inciting racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia. The cases of Islamophobia are very rare in the Czech Republic. Specifically, there have been two cases of Islamophobia investigated by the Police.

Both “new” anti-Muslim projects of the German right-wing scene have attracted Czech fans. The “We Do Not Want Islam in the Czech Republic” initiative, a far-right group called *Pro-Vlast* (based in the Czech Republic) and so-called Czech Defence 4 League (CzDL) tried to play the anti-Muslim and anti-Islam cards in the Czech Republic (see below).

Internet discussions on Islam are often polarized and aggressive. Anonymity of internet attracts participants. Media are the major cause of anti-Muslim sentiments as the coverage of the Middle East and Islamic topics are quite extensive.

Some individuals have a feeling of an imminent civil war in Europe, to be fought between indigenous Europeans and the Muslim immigrants. This war is held to be the only logical outcome of the following ideas: a) Europe has been betrayed by the political elite; b) Muslim birth-rates are outstripping those of non-Muslims in Europe; c) Islam is an aggressive religion that is immune to reform and secularisation.

For example, in February 2015, some 600 people took part in an anti-Islam rally and they mingled freely with the participants of a separate rally of some 200 supporters of tolerance and religious freedom, causing no problems. The two sides quarrelled about whether Islam or intolerance is a greater threat. The first event was called by the “We Do Not Want Islam in the Czech Republic” initiative.

In February 2015, *Pro-Vlast* uploaded a video of a group of Islamophobes defacing the Islamic Foundation in Prague Mosque with four litres of porcine blood.

In June 2015 a crowd of several thousands, mainly young people, protested against the refugee inflow into the EU in the Slovak capital, Bratislava. The EU mandatory quota proposal (related to migration) triggered a violent demonstration, with thousands of protesters from Slovakia and the neighbouring Czech Republic marching through the city holding anti-Islamic banners. Czech extremists and hooligans attended the rally. Following the official part of the demonstration, the police detained dozens of the protesters who committed disorderly conduct in various places in the city. The protest, the first of its kind in Slovakia since the outburst of the migration crisis, was held under the motto, “Stop the Islamization of Europe”. (Another meeting, held elsewhere in the centre of Bratislava and aimed against intolerance, had a much lower attendance).

A book entitled, *Islam and Islamism*, was written by Lukas Lhořan, an apostate from Islam. Released in 2011, the book describes how some Muslims are abusing the ideology of multiculturalism to infiltrate Czech schools. He accuses Muslim extremists of giving lectures aimed at recruiting converts and new jihad fighters, and alleges that Czech mosques are

being controlled by Saudi Arabia. The Islamic Centre of Prague has filed a ten-page criminal complaint against Lhořan, accusing him of promoting hatred.

II.4. FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM

Oldřich Krulík

Sport-related spectator violence (hooliganism) in the Czech Republic is generally understood as (potentially) anti-social behaviour, not necessarily in pursuit of political goals.

In the Czech Republic, the term spectator violence is not defined unambiguously, but it is typically understood as violent or dangerous conduct of spectators that is related to sports matches and occurs not only at stadiums but also in the public space, especially in the vicinity of stadiums or during fans' transport to or from matches. Such behaviour is often planned, its nature is repetitive as well as demonstrative and it includes offences such as criminal damage or disorderly conduct during sporting events and beyond. It is obvious that spectator violence is not a uniform activity, but should rather be understood as a set of several problematic phenomena.

Of all sports, football is undoubtedly the most frequently affected by spectator violence in the Czech Republic (with an estimated share of at least 90% of incidents).

II.4.1. BACKGROUND

The broader (historical) context of the patterns of sport-related violence in the Czech Republic can be introduced through a distinction between two basic periods of spectator violence development (Mareš, Smolík, Suchánek, 2004).

The first, “pre-hooligans” period: Unorganized acts of mostly football-related violence, riots and vandalism which occurred since the beginning of football in the Czech Lands in the late 19th century,² with greater severity of the phenomenon from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s.

During this period one can also mention some explicitly political incidents (mostly related to the Czech-German tensions culminating in the 1930s in sports like football, tennis or boxing, as well as venting of the Czech frustration during the existence of the Nazi-administered Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, especially during football matches with German clubs; the same applied to an anti-Soviet sentiment which culminated during and after several ice hockey matches at the end of the 1960s).

² In 1920, the *České slovo* newspaper mentions a match between the Meteor Vinohrady and the Nusle clubs where bad referee decisions caused an “invasion” of the Nusle fans against rival players in which even sticks and knives played a role. Several people on both sides ended up severely injured (Kopic, 2003).

In the 1980s, a new wave of violent clashes was reported. Especially football stadiums witnessed a growth of vulgarity and brutality before and during matches. So-called flag bearers were visible especially in Prague, Brno, Ostrava and Olomouc (Mareš, Smolík, Suchánek, 2004).

In the period before 1989, the behaviour of football hooligans was characterised mainly by large alcohol consumption and mutual animosity between Czech and Slovak teams.

A key turning point came with an incident in June 1985 when supporters of Sparta Praha returning from a match in Banská Bystrica seriously damaged the entire train. The incident inspired the 1987 movie, "Why?" which, however, instead of having a deterring educational impact, popularized the phenomenon of hooliganism among the youth. It is still considered to be a cult movie; for example, the role of a skinhead was played by Daniel Landa, a real-life skinhead, singer of the extreme-right *Orlík* band, and still a relatively popular character today.

Despite all the efforts of its security forces, the communist regime failed to prevent or even eradicate spectator violence and the number of violent incidents was growing:

- 1988: Disturbances were caused by Baník Ostrava fans on a train; the conductor and a member of railway guard were assaulted.
- 1988: During fights between the fans of Sparta Praha and Plzeň (in Pilsen) an uninvolved woman was inadvertently killed.
- 1989: A match between the Plzeň and Xaverov football clubs was prematurely terminated due to a violent struggle between the fan groups.

However, with some exceptions, most fights and riots took place without media coverage. They were usually perpetrated accidentally by individuals or inconsistent groups (Mareš, Smolík, Suchánek, 2004; Sekot 2006).

After 1989, in relation to a change in the socio-economic situation of the country, an increase in hooligans' aggressiveness and confidence was reported. Stadiums became more frequently attended by members of the skinhead subculture, who brought in some racist and neo-Nazi elements (slogans, the Hitler salute etc.). In addition to increased attendance at stadiums, home fans started to accompany their teams on matches abroad. Organized fans and hooligans intensified their expression, and coordinated displays of support or "choreos" became acoustically and visually more impressive (Mareš 2003; Smolík 2001; Smolík 2003; Smolík 2008; Francková 2004; Harsányi 2005).

The second period is characterised by the presence of organized hooligan gangs that began to emulate western examples in the second half of the nineties. More-or-less stable and organized groups of "fans" of the largest football clubs (Sparta Praha, Baník Ostrava and Slovan Bratislava) arose.

After the split of Czechoslovakia, the fans of Slovan Bratislava were replaced by the equally dangerous fans of Brno. These gangs, whose members perceived themselves as members of

a specific (hooligan) entity, regularly attended football matches as well as fights and defined themselves as part of the hooligan scene, using their own names, symbols, zines, websites etc. (Mareš, Smolík, Suchánek, 2004: 183n; Harsányi 2005).

Fans were able to watch their “colleagues” from abroad. International matches began to be attended by many more fans from abroad. The presence of foreign players in some clubs, including ones of dark complexion (in football, volleyball and even ice hockey) was met with increased manifestations of racism and xenophobia during individual matches (Balcar, 2000).

The peak of the violence is situated between 1995 and 2009. Several years of pressure of the law enforcement apparatus brought a number of leading characters of the hooligan subculture to discourage violent activity.

Under pressure from the state authorities, football (sports) clubs changed their approach to the fulfilment of related legal obligations. They began to emphasize security procedures and standards and generally improved cooperation with the Police of the Czech Republic in terms enhanced stewarding services as well as pat-down searches before entering the stadium. The number of incidents directly within stadium premises now stands relatively low (fewer than 6 major incidents per year).³

Table: Comparison of two periods in the development after 1989

<i>The 1990s and the 2000s</i>	<i>The 2010s</i>
incidents take place in particular at stadiums or in their immediate vicinity	pre-arranged fights of hooligan groups in remote areas predominate; rioting directly at stadiums is not very common
dozens of incidents per year	5–6 major incidents per year
high fines for sports clubs	clubs as such are not penalized too often
very frequent police presence during sporting events	police presence during sporting events is not very frequent
hooliganism is a significant topic for the media (and occasionally also for politics)	there are a number of far more important topics of social discourse

Examples of incidents that took place between 1995 and 2009:

- 1995: Soldier Štěfan Kúdela was dragged behind a moving train. The case was investigated as attempted murder. Two hooligans were sentenced to 12 and 13 years of imprisonment, respectively. One of them hanged himself in prison.
- 1999: Mrs. Cichá was hit by a stone thrown by one of Baník Ostrava rowdies from a train in Havířov (she was seriously injured and lost vision in one eye).
- 2003: During a Prague derby between Bohemians 1905 and Sparta, a drunken member of the *Berserk Bohemians* “gang” attacked a linesman and insulted him. The match was immediately terminated.

³ Britská nemoc – Československo po roce 1989. In *Supporters.cz*, 10 February 2012. <<http://www.supporters.cz/clanek/britska-nemoc-ceskoslovensko-po-roce-1989/3867.html>>.

- 2004: Baník Ostrava won the 2003/2004 league season and its matches were attended by thousands of fans, who caused a considerable amount of problems.
- 2007: About 500 Czech hooligans attacked German hooligans on the Wenceslas Square in Prague two hours before the match. The result was not only the destruction of two restaurants and some shop windows, but also the injury of several persons, including uninvolved bystanders.
- 2008: After a match between Sparta Praha and Dynamo Zagreb, violence broke out in the centre of Prague and over 200 Dynamo fans were detained.
- 2009: A relatively high number of persons were investigated following a mass detention of the fans of Crvena Zvezda Belgrade who attended a match with Slavia Praha.

II.4.2. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES AND ACTORS

Football in the Czech Republic is organized by the Football Association of the Czech Republic. Adult championships in the country take place in the following divisions:

- the First League;
- the National Football League (Second Division);
- the Bohemian Football League and the Moravian-Silesian Football League;
- Divisions (A, B, C, D, E);
- Regional Championships and the Prague Championship;
- IA Classes;
- IB Classes;
- District Championships or Class II;
- Class III (not in all districts);
- Class IV (not in all districts).

Established in 1993, the Czech First League is the country's top football championship. Until the 1997/98 season, the League had a Czech and a Slovak division. It starts every year in the summer and, following a winter recess, ends in the spring. 16 clubs play according to a double round-robin schedule, in which every team plays all others once at home and once away. A total of 240 matches are played during 30 rounds of the Czech First League. The club with the highest number of points becomes the season's Champion of the Czech Republic. The teams ranking the lowest and second-to-lowest are relegated to the Second Division.

The Cup of the Football Association of the Czech Republic is a challenge tournament that has been played since 1993/1994. Depending on sponsorship arrangements, it has been known under names such as "Ondrášovka Cup" or "Pohár České pošty". Clubs of the Czech First League and the Second Division are required to participate in the tournament, while other clubs may apply. The fourth round and the quarterfinals use a single-elimination format. The semifinals are based on two rounds played at home/away. The cup winner is qualified for the UEFA Europa League and the Czech Super Cup.

The respective champions of the Cup and of the Czech First League compete against each other in the Czech Super Cup, which has been played since 2010.

During the approximately 380 First League matches that are played annually, about 60 incidents are recorded both at and outside stadiums, accounting for roughly 15 percent of the matches. Only about 5–6 of them are considered major incidents. These fall into the time period between March and November, when an overwhelming majority of the matches take place. As for days of the week, most incidents happen on weekends and Mondays.

Incidents are traditionally caused by supporters of so-called “big clubs” such as Sparta Praha, Baník Ostrava, Slavia Praha, Bohemians 1905, Jablonec, Viktoria Plzeň etc. They are typically classified as disorderly conduct and treated as administrative offenses. Flares and fireworks are used abundantly, both outside stadiums and inside, where they are prohibited.

The main fan groups and their links to particular clubs and teams

The most pertinent data on the Czech fan and hooligan scene comes probably from the mostly neutral and somewhat renowned hooligans.cz portal. Numbers of actively cheering people (ultras and hooligans together) are in the range of several thousand (up to 4000 for Slavia, 2500 for Bohemians, 1200 for Baník Ostrava), hundreds (Sigma, Sparta Praha, Liberec, Teplice, Opava, Plzeň) or only a few dozen (Kolín, Jablonec).

The scene is highly variable in terms of names as well as numbers of fans in the more stable groups (gangs, firms) of hooligans. The entire hooligan subculture is currently rather subdued (for example, Brno was relatively strong until recently but now it is almost invisible). An expert estimate can be made that about 20–25 groups associated with the abovementioned clubs have a potential for conflicts (mostly outside stadiums, in remote areas, without the presence of bystanders). The size of this subculture has been estimated as “several hundred people”. Hooligans of other sport clubs exist without a permanent subculture, only as independent individuals (Mareš, Smolík, 2004 Suchánek etc.).

With the exception of the rather leftist hooligans of the Bohemians 1905, the subculture consists of either extreme-right or neutral groups.

Relations between the main fan groups

The domestic scene reflects to some extent existing relations or “friendships” between some domestic clubs, as well as with some foreign clubs from Poland, Slovakia, Germany, Austria, or even more distant countries. Fans of clubs from Poland appear quite regularly at matches in the Czech Republic. Domestic hooligans, according to their possibilities, travel to matches in Slovakia (in particular its western part).

II.4.3. MANIFESTATIONS (ACTIONS)

Typology of violent behaviours and acts related to spectator violence

In the Czech Republic, sport-related spectator violence occurs most often in the following forms:

- pitch invasion;
- throwing objects (smoke bombs, stones, bottles, etc.) onto the playing area/pitch;
- throwing objects at players or referees during the game;
- tumultuous conduct (disorderly conduct focusing on skirmishes with the police, stewards, etc.);
- vandalism (destruction of equipment in the spectator areas);
- violence in sports arenas (against other hooligans, fans and spectators of the opposing team, players of own or opposing team, the referee, stewards, police, club representatives etc.);
- incidents on the way to the match (damaging public transport vehicles, harassing other passengers, stealing at petrol stations, running away from restaurants without paying);
- fights outside the sports arenas (mostly between two groups of hooligans).

The abovementioned spectrum of activities occurred mostly at the turn of the century, especially in the top football tournaments. After 2009, similar behaviours have been more often visible in the lower leagues. National team matches mostly take place without major incidents (Bureš 2004).

Targets of sport-related spectator violence

Sport-related violence primarily targets hooligans as well as “normals” (regular fans) of other clubs, but also fans of one’s own club. Spectator violence can also be aimed at the players, organizers and security staff (police officers, stewards). The reasons for hooligans’ aversion against a player, or for their effort to “cast” him, may include his game failure, “betrayal” (transfer to another club), or skin colour (usually monkeys are imitated or banana skins thrown toward the pitch). A specific incident which so far seems to have been realized only by Sparta Praha hooligans is to ambush a bus with one’s own players. A draining match in Jablonec was proclaimed as the main motive, but a role could also have been played by counter-hooligan measures of the club management (Štěpánek 1998; 58).

Mutual cooperation often exists between clubs and football radicals (hooligans and ultras). The club may financially contribute to its ultras equipment or subsidize bus trips to matches. In return, the hooligans create an atmosphere during the game. At home matches, they can cause the opponent players to play poorly. They are also a certain attraction for ordinary people attending the stadium (although their behaviour is socially problematic). A football or ice hockey stadium in the Czech Republic is literally a dead place without ultras. Moreover, spectator turnout is relatively low.

Hooligan actions can also significantly damage one’s home club. A club may have to pay heavy fines for its fans’ negative behaviour (fights, illegal fireworks, racist chants). If

hooligans break the rules and an incident occurs, club management usually suspends cooperation. This is followed by various repressive and preventive measures that complicate access to the stadium for the most violent hooligans. Some clubs with a record of spectator violence (Sparta) do not suspend their partnerships even after such excesses, because they realize that being in contact with the radicals is more convenient and cheaper than hiring numerous security guards or risking fines for any further incident.

The relationship between hooligans and police or stewards is usually “problematic”. In the Czech Republic, the sentiment hooligans express toward the “repressive forces” is dominated by a mixture of hatred, resentment, contempt and grievance. The main reason is the fact that law enforcement tends to spoil hooligan clashes and other “steam-blowing” activities.

The consequence of hooligan incidents can be detention and possible indictment of individuals involved. When police intervene, officers are simultaneously blamed for cowardice as well as brutality and inadequacy of their intervention (Havlicová 2001).

Conflicts are understood as a result of “intrusion” in one’s own territory and interruption of established rituals. Terraces, indicated by club or gang symbols, are treated as inviolable territory which has its own standards and needs to be defended against intruders. (Štěpánek, 1998; 57–58).

If a conflict between the police and hooligan group occurs, hooligans of the opposing team support their colleagues, even if there is hatred between the two hooligan groups. Chants like “police out!” or the obligatory ACAB are very common. There have even been cases (albeit very rare) when both rival hooligan groups fought side-by-side against the police.

Interconnection between hooliganism and politically motivated extremism

As for the links between spectator violence and extremism, arguments “for” their existence as well as ones “against” it can be identified. One should mention at this point that in the Czech Republic, extremism tends to be understood as a general phenomenon from the realm of political science, one that encompasses non-standard or otherwise abnormal social processes and their agents. In the context of the security and intelligence apparatus, an additional trait must be applied to the concept, namely antagonism to existing political and social order, which is accompanied by specific activities aimed at destabilizing the political and social system, or eliminating the entire system or parts thereof, in order to establish some form of non-democratic political system.

Acts termed as “extremist crimes” or “hate crimes on the grounds of racial, ethnic or other social prejudice” are considered criminal or administrative offences. They are motivated by a priori judgments against the victims as members of a racial, ethnic or religious group, social class or other social group (Danics 2002: 70).

Most hooligan groups either identify themselves as apolitical or purposefully adhere to the extreme right, while they are uninformed by sophisticated concepts or ideas in this regard. Nevertheless, it is possible to find examples of individuals from the hooligan environment who are connected with the extreme right (many groups from Prague, Brno etc.) or the extreme left as well as anti-globalization platforms (some fans of Bohemians 1905, Pardubice, as well as individuals from other groups).

Now we will pay detailed attention to arguments “for” and “against” the existence of links between hooligans and extremists (and especially the extreme right).

- Many members of the skinhead movement are involved in hooligan firms. As the most militant example, the Johny Kentus Gang of Brno repeatedly assaulted local alternative and extreme-left youth around the year 2000.
- Hooligan violence is often aimed against groups that are despised by neo-Nazi or neo-fascist movements. Favourite targets include anarchists (or individuals who are considered as such), homeless people, punks, the Vietnamese, the Roma and other people of colour.
- Hooligans often display extreme-right symbols, for example, the Confederate battle flag or the Celtic cross (drawn inside each “o” in the word “hooligans”). According to sources, it is not exceptional for hooligans to chant “eight, eight, eighty-eight” at the 88th minute of a match, to use the slogan, “racists, fascists, hooligans”, etc.
- A part of the Oi! music scene adopted hooligan themes during the 1990s (e.g., Orlik sang about the Viktoria Žižkov club).
- Occasionally, members of the subculture chant slogans in direct reference to the extreme right. For example, they praise Hitler or Mengele or shout, “Kill a kangaroo for your mom”.
- Overt expressions of homophobia are frequent among hooligans (with homophobic slurs directed against rivals).
- In the Czech Republic, too, spectators typically manifest racism by shouting vulgarisms at black players (who are, however, relatively few in Czech football). Some of these incidents occur on an ad-hoc basis, while other racist actions are rather systematic and long-term.
- Nevertheless, there is a much larger repertoire of opinions that relativize the link:
- Football hooliganism should be seen primarily as antisocial behaviour of a highly specific subculture that may or may not be characterized by political motives.
- Most hooligans likely do not possess in-depth knowledge of political ideologies.
- Most of these actions are committed by individuals who intend to provoke under the influence of alcohol or a hooligan firm. Hooligans consider these actions as a ritual performed traditionally during football matches (Mareš 2003a).
- These attitudes should be termed extreme, rather than extremist. They are deviant, unusual, exaggerated, but not necessarily political attitudes. Individual hooligans

tend to identify themselves as “fanatics” or “extreme” people, not as extremists (Mareš 2003).

- Football hooliganism needs to be researched from sociological, socio-psychological, cultural and anthropological perspectives. The effort of members of such a subculture is to “shock and awaken” a passive society. The more the social main stream rejects the manifestations of extreme-right slogans, the more they will be used by the hooligans.
- Many people who “make trouble” are not supporters of the skinhead movement. Although they look like them, (police) experience shows that they only provoke and have nothing in common with the movement itself. They are not even adherents of a particular club. Five or ten such people are enough to move an entire terrace to violence and racist slogans.
- There are cases of hooligans who espouse an extremist ideology but consider hooliganism more important than politics. These dual identities of theirs exist side-by-side.
- Extremist crimes are not necessarily committed by supporters of extremist organizations. In contrast, most of these acts cannot be linked to any such organization. These different expressions overlap but exist independently from one another (Danics 2002: 122).
- Specific cases of “politicization” of the spectator scene in the Czech Republic
- Fans and hooligans in Czech stadiums sometimes use shouting and banners to “comment” on the political situation or to ironize controversial political issues. This can be exemplified on the following facts:
 - 2001 (September): During a minute of silence for the victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks before a football match between Brno and Baník Ostrava at the Brno stadium, rowdies of both teams shouted slogans such as “Fuck the USA” and “Yugoslavia”.
 - 2002: Groups of hooligans attacked an antiglobalist protest against the organization of a NATO summit in Prague. Their purpose was not so much to support the Alliance as to express a clear stance against their opponents (mostly understood as leftists).
 - 2003 (October): A banner which was unfolded during an international match between Austria and the Czech Republic read “Österreichischer Fussbal nein – Temelin ja!” (No to Austrian football, yes to Temelín [nuclear power station]).
 - 2004 (May): Division Nord, a hooligan gang of Teplice, used banners against the European Union and the proposal to build a mosque in their hometown (Football Factory 27/2004; Konvička 2014)
 - 2013 (June): Some hooligans were involved in incidents around the Máj housing estate in České Budějovice, a culmination of tensions between members of the majority and the Roma.
 - 2014 (August): The hooligans.cz portal opened a discussion sub-forum on Ukraine (in June 2015 there were about 97,000 posts, often one-sided in favour of Ukraine, as well as ones striving for neutrality).

- 2015 (spring): Banners used at football and sometimes also ice hockey stadiums responded to the terrorist attack against the Charlie Hebdo magazine (they were critical of the alleged Islamisation of Europe).
- 2015 (May): Hooligans.cz criticized death sentences for hooligans in Egypt.
- 2015 (June): Hooligans.cz opened a discussion sub-forum on “anti-Islamisation”, which grew to more than 200,000 contributions in less than a month (!). Some members of the hooligan subculture were apparently involved in PEGIDA demonstrations in Dresden or similar events in Bratislava.

Hooligans’ potential (or even willingness) to overthrow the political regime in the Czech Republic is practically zero. Fortunately, the same applies to their potential for committing (at least more serious) terrorist attacks.

Hooligans’ critique of the status quo is often primarily apolitical. Conflicts between hooligans and clubs (typically in football, less often ice hockey or other sports) are often justified as an opposition to the commercialization of sport. Radical fans may suppose that their club is too concentrated on making money (e.g., through its advertising sales, by pandering to television viewers and families) and not on entertaining its “most loyal fans”. Some protests may result in the destruction of the equipment of one’s home stadium.

The ambivalent relationship to extremism (however blurred its definition is) or violence can be exemplified on disclaimers mentioned repeatedly (at least since 2002) by the most widespread national hooligan zine, Football Factory: “This zine is not an official press material. We do not encourage violence or other vices, we only reflect and monitor the true condition of the fan scene. Article content may not reflect the views of the editors. The contents of individual contributions correspond to those of their authors. ... We prefer to publish a trouble-free paper, so we prefer third-person descriptions without any political embellishment. Opinions on the Roma, or support for various movements, belong to other periodicals.” Related internet portals publish calls for not describing criminal acts (theft at gas stations, demolished restaurants etc.). Contributors have gradually accepted this trend. Over time there have been significantly fewer contributions with explicit expressions of anger. Those have been predominantly replaced by various metaphors, puns and ironic remarks.

II.4.4. INSTITUTIONAL/LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

There is a number of ways hooligan violence can be curbed, or at least diverted away from stadiums. These include measures taken by individual football (sports) clubs such as ticket registration, membership cards, CCTV surveillance etc. The stricter these measures, the lower the motivation of aggressive individuals to act violently – mainly due to the increased risk of being detected. A part of aggressive fans will be discouraged from attending the match at all.

Renowned authors have argued that spectator violence needs to be addressed through low-profile and highly specific projects that are based on local insider knowledge (“soft” preventive measures):

- educational, information and research programs aimed at decreasing and eliminating spectator violence phenomena;
- further development of contacts with relevant NGOs;
- establishment of discussion forums and roundtables involving affected municipal authorities;
- social work among fans (hooligans) with the aim to motivate socially acceptable behaviour;
- “youth action” towards creating a positive value system and fostering
- so-called “positive spectatorship”;
- selling tickets upon registration so that spectators are no longer anonymous;
- compliance with technical and construction standards related to stadium facilities;
- ensuring sufficient CCTV surveillance;
- improving stewarding services, training stewards;
- deepening cooperation between the police and clubs, with clear distribution of powers and accountability;
- low-profile policing, with deployment of conflict prevention units and police spotters;
- world and European championships have seen successful deployment of so-called fan embassies, which are based on similar principles as fan coaching (mobile info points that travel with the club and provide fans with diverse information in their native language);
- involvement of local governments in whose jurisdiction the matches are taking place, especially through issuing local ordinances and certain types of restraining orders against disorderly conduct. Local governments can also help install the necessary technologies at stadiums.

Interestingly, there have been cases (e.g., Brno) when hooligan firms agreed with their club to organize their own stewarding service in the Kop. “These people are respected and able to enforce order. This is the best way of maintaining order at the stadium.”

When there has to be repression, it tends to be swift and effective. This goes hand-in-hand with educating judges about the effectiveness of “stay away” restraining orders and other measures applicable in accordance with existing laws.

There is no single best method to determine the level of risk for a match. Each stakeholder (regional governments, the police, and stadiums) assesses risk at their discretion. Generally speaking, the level of risk increases if a match is played by at least one of the following teams: Sparta Praha, Slavia Praha, Bohemians 1905, Plzeň, Baník Ostrava, Sigma, Viktoria Žižkov. High-risk matches are ones between two of these teams, e.g., Sparta Praha – Slavia Praha, Sparta Praha – Baník Ostrava, Sigma – Plzeň etc., primarily because they have the

largest fan clubs. Even a match that has been rated as low-risk may be affected by conflicts or disorderly conduct.

Police officers in charge of matchday operations assess risk based on the following considerations:

- 1) evidence on anticipated fights or riots at the stadium;
- 2) experience from past matches;
- 3) number of fans (tickets sold);
- 4) other circumstances (another rival match in the vicinity or en route, threats expressed by fans).

All in all, many years of consistent pressure have made a difference and violent incidents are no longer commonplace, at least in higher-level football divisions.

II.4.5. ROOT CAUSES AND MOTIVATIONS

Sport-related spectator violence and a common identity

The football match is a part of many people's lifestyles and may provide spectators with different kinds of emotional experience. Such experience may be further accentuated by the ways spectators relate to a game, a club or a player; or it may have nothing to do with playing football. Individuals attending football or other sports matches are normally divided into several categories (Mareš, Smolík, Suchánek 2004: 183 etc.):

- a) spectators – basically neutral individuals (including television viewers);
- b) fans – individuals expressing their emotional stake in sporting events (by wearing scarfs, hats and other symbols);
- c) ultras – flag bearers, individuals identifying with their club (home team, hometown) and spend considerable amounts of time preparing fan choreography for its games. They are responsible for so-called atmosphere in the Kop. They create flags, choreographies, banners, stickers, original clothing etc. ;
- d) at-risk fans – individuals who occasionally take part in inappropriate spectator conduct;
- e) hooligans – individuals who commit violence against other people repeatedly, both in organized and in unorganized ways. Many hooligan firms have transposed traditional forms of fan support for a club into a wholly new dimension: instead of the original sport match, they focus on a "match" or fight with the rival team's hooligan firm. Therefore, it is often the case that the different firms do not even make it to the match and instead wage their "match" in a completely different timeframe. Next time they get together in their favourite pub, they collectively review the photographs. They talk about the pictures as well as older fights and events. A football team is usually supported by several firms that refer to themselves as a gang, clique, troop, commando, clan, or division, using such titles

to distinguish themselves from unorganized groups (Smolík 2003). Compared to regular football fans, they do not identify as much with the club, but rather with their exclusive hooligan group.

There may be overlaps between the categories, at least those under the letters c, d and e. Some hooligans may simultaneously act as flag bearers and vice versa. A flag bearer's identity may "grow" into a hooligan one or, even better, a hooligan may submit to social pressure and "discipline" himself into a flag bearer's role.

A hooligan identifies himself as an elite fan. His despise for the "normals" is sometimes explained by the alleged discrepancy between "hooligan cosmopolitanism" and "normal provincialism". Names such as "normals", "picnics", "wiener eaters" or "hillbillies" are called especially during games of the national football team. Those matches are also attended by people who normally do not go to football stadiums, and who are laughed upon by the radicals. Hooligans especially dislike a sort of "family fans" who show little initiative or spontaneity during the match.

From another perspective, two categories of hooligans can be distinguished (Bařková 2012):

- hooligans respecting certain rules: individuals who do not have to participate in stadium fights under any circumstances. While they crave conflict with a rival group, they prefer pre-arranged fights with a set of rules, taking place before the match at selected public venues outside the stadium or outdoors;
- pathological hooligans or rowdies: they take a sporting event as a mere excuse to get into fights. They are willing to fight anywhere and at any time, and they are fond of vandalism. Some rowdies do not shy away from assaulting bystanders.

An unidentified Baník Ostrava hooligan stated that he pursued the fights as an adrenaline sport, in order to vent aggression and stress, which he has in abundance by the end of every week at work as a helping occupation (Bařková 2012).

The different groups of football hooligans meet all the criteria of a small social group. Those criteria include, for instance, stability, structure, integrity, cohesion, closedness, interaction among members, intimacy, homogeneity, a specific system of values, a system of social control, collective goals etc. Most groups exhibit a set of shared opinions and norms that are binding for every member and regulate his behaviour.

Hooligans have their own hierarchy of values (aversion to the police, confidence in the in-group, ambition to excel among hooligan firms), as well as evaluations of what deserves respect – and that hierarchy is more-or-less shared across the hooligan subculture. One can be admired for his abundance by norms and brave conduct, while violation of norms or cowardice exposes him to sanctions, criticism and ridicule.

A good hooligan must travel to away matches regularly, endure fights, tell the truth about them (admitted defeat is not a shame), and refrain from robbing beaten rivals of anything else than items that symbolize their club. There is tangible solidarity among hooligans. One does not normally go home before arrested buddies are released. Any form of collaboration with the police is unthinkable.

These norms are applicable outside the football stadium as well. Furthermore, it is important for members to meet in between sporting events. Thanks to the group's collective consciousness, members are able to relate to one another's experience (Smolík 2003).

Collective activities help the group develop and cement a distinctive collective ideology. Uniformity plays an important role in hooligans' behaviour, and is based on shared attitudes, perceptions and experiences, often including prejudice (xenophobia).

"Radicalisation" or "recruitment" within the hooligan subculture

Mainstream scholarship typically provides the following answers to the questions of how individuals become "recruited" or "radicalised" by the subculture:

- There is apparently no formal recruitment procedure. In what is normally a spontaneous process, young people become integrated in existing hooligan groups, often as early as at the age of 12–14 years. The age of a hard core fan typically ranges between fourteen and thirty years, although recently there has been a growth in the number of younger rowdies.
- "The pack" is led by those who win the most respect, and there is no hierarchy other than that. The hard core is almost never comprised by children around the age of 16. Junior hooligans tend to follow the leadership of "the hardest" members, who are normally in their twenties.
- A hooligan career is demanding in many respects, and cannot be maintained infinitely. This why a change of generations takes place in the Kop from time to time (as they age, members either grow to prioritize their career, family or "their other identities", or simply lose the physical ability to fight). Active hooligans older than 35 years are an exception (Bařková 2012).
- By getting involved in football hooliganism, adolescents are able to break free from their parents and demonstrate their independence. At the same time, they are empowered by the fear they are able to incite among other spectators. At long last, they are making a difference and someone is taking them seriously (Večerka 1991, Štěpánek 1998).
- According to insider accounts, an adolescent who seeks to work his way up to an established hooligan circle should attend matches regularly, travel to away matches occasionally, and strive to be seen. In this relatively closed community, there is no other way to getting admitted.
- Young members are accustomed to pre-arranged fights that are subject to rules and age restrictions. Senior members are normally present at such fights in the role of

“oversight”. In such situations, the old veterans can be viewed as leaders and the young “adepts” as full members. tare

- Junior members persistently model others’ behaviour, whether consciously or inadvertently. They strive to act like their older role models, and the group’s feedback makes a big difference for them. If the norms of a subculture treat aggression as desirable behaviour, it is likely that individuals who strive to “be seen” and go with the flow will become aggressive as well (Slepička 1990).
- Some young members are seen as worthy of the name of their predecessors. They are treated with respect and applauded for their performance, which surpasses that of the relatively passive “elders”.
- Due to their relative financial poverty, compared to older colleagues, young members are often unable to participate in larger events.
- Some authors have noted that most young people accept sports celebrities as their role models. However, living a sportsman’s life is difficult, compared to the instant opportunity to model violent behaviour at the stadium.




Figure 1: Distribution of age in survey sample (Bařková, 2012)

II.4.6 SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF SPORT-RELATED SPECTATOR VIOLENCE

Scholarly efforts to identify a formal “ideology” or “enemy figure” with respect to sport-related spectator violence are mostly ineffective. It is far beyond the capability or ambition of the different firms or the subculture as a whole to change the political or economic situation in the country, whether violently or peacefully.

Hooligan “ideology” is centred upon violence and, more specifically, efforts to start riots and physical conflicts. There are two general goals to hooligan activities: to “have fun”, and to avoid contact with stewards/police or, more generally, social sanctions. Typical “fun” activities include binge drinking, petty theft (at petrol stations), vandalizing restaurants, trains and busses, and especially fighting. Recently (at least since 2010) the subculture shrunk significantly in numbers and actually also became more “cultivated”. Its

entertainment repertoire is now dominated by fights hidden from the eyes of uninvolved public (in parking lots, parks, glades or fields).

Participation in a fight against the rival Kop or gang is often the climax of the match and the only goal that preoccupies members of both gangs throughout the preceding week. It is the high point of a kind of cycle. To an increasing number of hooligans or rowdies, football no longer bears any importance in itself, and instead becomes a mere excuse to seek out the rival's immediate presence. Hooligans plan early, and some fights are even scheduled on the eve of a match. Arrangements are typically made by telephone or online. In short, such fights are not a result of sudden passion. They are attended by men only (exceptions are extremely rare). Many fights are not scheduled on the match day. They can even be attended by hooligans other than those of the two clubs that are playing (Mareš, Smolík, Suchánek 2004).

Hooligans often declare that they harbour no hard feelings toward their opponents (feel no hatred). According to some accounts, the aversion they feel is only momentary (it comes and goes with the fight). Thus emerges, paradoxically, a kind of adrenalin "sport within sport", a special form of amateur wrestling or white collar boxing, with the rivals making arrangements about place, but often also about number of participants and rules of the fight.

An agreed set of rules includes, for example, limits on age, number of combatants and fighting time. The entire fight often lasts no more than a few seconds or minutes. Sometimes a firm arranges for its opponents' transportation to the spot in order to make the fight happen. As a matter-of-course, the parties thank each other for "playing" the fight and share their reflections online.

Use of weapons is widespread among hooligans in some countries, although it is the main cause of fatalities or heavy injuries. The Czech scene has been rather "conservative" in this respect, which is perhaps why no hooligans have been killed in the country so far. For similar reasons as weapons, soccer kicks against a downed opponent or "lynching" are usually prohibited as well. Some fights have been suspended due to injuries and only resumed after treating the injured.

Catharsis or collective relaxation are considered an added value of real-life fighting. Such experience is valuable to a generation that has never lived in war and never served in the military. After all, military jargon is often used when accounts of the fights are told. There have been a few cases which exhibited traits of a premeditated fighting strategy (combat tactics, line of battle, cordons etc.).

Alcohol plays a considerable role in activities that can be referred to as spectator violence. Since it reduces fear and releases inhibitions (providing "liquid courage"), a large part of hooligans drink alcohol before, during and after matches. The same applies to time spent traveling by train or otherwise. Pubs are the typical matchday meeting points.

A number of Czech studies on hooliganism are centred on questions like “Who becomes a football hooligan and why?” It is often disputed and debated to which social stratum hooligans belong. Quantitative surveys (Bařková 2012) have revealed that young men aged 19–25 comprise the predominant part of active football fans, including hooligans, and they come from different social strata. An overwhelming majority have completed secondary education, and the proportions of individuals with primary education or a college degree are very low. Most respondents were either students or workers. There is a clear agreement among the country’s relevant spectator violence experts that hooligans in the Czech Republic come from all social strata. There is a number of cases that demonstrate the fact that spectator violence has been – at least recently – rather a substitute identity for individuals who are frustrated by a lack of thrill in everyday life. These people engage in disorderly conduct to relieve the frustration, and in fact consider football (as well as other spectator sports) a mere excuse. Rowdies are recruited both among the long-term unemployed and among successful, affluent managers. After all, the cost of this lifestyle (travelling abroad, publishing fanzines) is definitely not low. Even people with a high social status can be found among hooligans – because they desire to experience something out of this world. They live a double life, occasionally taking part in fights “to let out steam” so they can carry on with their orderly existence (Sekot, 2007).

A number of studies thus far have clearly demonstrated that spectator violence is not a domain of “anomic proletarians”, persons with low IQ, the unemployed, displaced and bankrupt individuals, etc. More importantly, football hooligans do not seek (or fail to find) self-esteem in mainstream domains or categories (job, family etc.) In other words, they place a low value on such forms of success – they do not find them fulfilling. One can be a successful manager but fail to derive self-esteem just from providing for his family. He can find more satisfaction in outdoor fighting, in the respect expressed nonverbally by his fellow hooligans, or in the fear raised among his rivals.

By the end of the 2000s, mainstream scholarship abandoned what was referred to as “traditional”, “Marxist” or “outdated” perspectives on hooliganism. Hooligans are neither frustrated members of the working class, nor rebellious members of youth subcultures. The different firms have among their leaders a number of individuals who enjoy a high standard of living and provoke disorder as a hobby. Fights are attended by students, blue collars, and white collars alike. These are no antisocial circles of “unemployed, drugged and retarded individuals”.

Hooligans themselves reject the assumption of their low social status and poor family ties. The same is emphasized by a large number of comments on the website of the Football Factory zine which decry the media for labelling hooligans as antisocial.

Due to a certain sense of territoriality, hooligan groups view one another as a priori hostile (in an effort to defend their city, town or borough against strangers). Their xenophobia (or at least strong “local patriotism” or “territorial imperative”) can also be shaped by specific

geographical or historical contexts. Fans of a visiting club simply must get a clear message that they are on hostile ground. If a group fails to protect its territory, it becomes the target of criticism.

In the Czech Republic, there is a certain tension between “core” and “periphery” hooligans. Prague fans are very often understood as enemies of “rural” fans. Expressions of an “anti-Prague sentiment” and Moravian patriotism can be traced back to a relatively distant past, with newspaper articles from as early as 1965 (Mareš, 2003).

Ironically, the social differences between the country’s regions, and the centre-periphery relations, can be exemplified by the text of banners unfolded by Prague hooligans during a match between Baník Ostrava and Sparta Praha on 8 May 2004: “[Travel] to Ostrava for football, to Prague for work” (Football Factory 27/2004).

There is evidence of some elitism among Czech hooligan firms, with those of the largest clubs on top of the hierarchy. Football fanatics have no respect for small clubs without their own hooligans. Some groups communicate the feeling of superiority in terms of their hooligan/ultras qualities. From time to time, the ranks of these traditional groups are joined by fans of another club, but the “quality” of such newcomers tends to be unstable (e.g., Olomouc, Liberec). Teams such as Blšany or Příbram that cannot rely on a major fan base (and even less so on a hooligan base) are despised by hooligans, who strongly oppose their playing the First League. There have been cases when elite hooligan firms rejected to fight against a group of fans during a match with their team so that they could clash with another elite firm. Small clubs tend to be criticized for under-average turnout at away matches, poor “support” and refusing to pre-arrange “regular” small fights.

II.4.7 MEDIA REFLECTIONS

Media and policy discourses with regard to sport-related spectator violence

A brief review of the main media and policy discourses with regard to sport-related spectator violence has had the following results:

- The key themes and sentiments circulating in public debates on sport-related spectator violence or radicalisation are very often limited to the role of the organisers (sport clubs), and especially their failure to comply with their commitments.
- For a long time (till the early 1990s), Czech media de facto ignored most activities among spectators. Only action on the playing field was the subject of reporting. The fans were mentioned mainly in connection with violence. Exceptionally, reports from matches of the national team reflected the fact that the fans created a great choreography.
- Hooligans are traditionally eager for “media” coverage, but it is important how they are presented. Most related fan or hooligan websites contain a section called “testimonies” with transcripts of newspaper articles about specific events. The hooligans generally accuse journalists of lying, bias, ignorance and sensationalism.

- Media articles where hooligans are described as antisocial, aggressive drunks who attack ordinary people and promote a perverted ideology, without any actual knowledge thereof, are not accepted positively by the hooligans (and some journalists are specifically and namely criticized by them in this regard).

In specific cases the media are also perceived as inducing or enhancing public outrage against hooliganism. The public then puts pressure on clubs and law enforcement, which results in different measures undesirable to hooligans (prohibitions, restrictions, sanctions etc.)

III. MEDIA REFLECTIONS


Luděk Moravec & Jan Ludvík

III.1 A NOTE ON THE MEDIA SURVEY

This report covers significant reflections of the ‘radicalization’ concept within Czech mainstream print media. In an attempt to construct the dominant narratives about both political (right-wing, left-wing, state and single-issue) and religious radicalization, the study surveyed, using keywords, 42 632 newspaper articles for the period between 1/2010 and 12/2014.

While the general presence of security-related themes seems to follow predictable patterns, it is ‘radicalization’ which diverted from predicted patterns in some respects.

Departing from the concept of general presence among print articles, the study developed around a statistical timeline for specific security relevant topics. Progressing further, a higher level of granularity was achieved by discerning concepts related to political violence in three specific clusters. These were ‘terrorism’; ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalization’. Specific statistical patterns over time were then compared to theoretical major ‘facilitating forces’ (Gupta, 2005) – spectacular events, state use of force, and perception of injustice.



Graph 1: Selected topics by month – trends⁴

It has been found that discussion over ‘terrorism’ follows spectacular events in the world, maintains a relatively strong presence (between the three topics mentioned above) and up until recently the attention to this phenomenon was steadily declining. Yet, since the Boston Marathon attack, this trend has reversed.

‘Extremism’, similarly to ‘terrorism’ has had its ups and downs. However, peak media presence scarcely reflects large demonstrations or significant attacks (the Brevik case excluded). While the ‘terrorism’ coverage reflects horror and spreads the word about outrage, the ‘extremism’ coverage focuses on judicial and police action against various subjects deemed extremist, almost unanimously right-wing.

This relationship is so significant that one can maintain that ‘extremism’ is a concept exclusively used in Czech mainstream media within the context of right-wing radicalism. Also its presence relates to state interventions against the scene, rather than developments at the scene itself.


The least cited of the three concepts is ‘radicalization’ which maintains a steady presence and shows only marginally distinctive peak periods across the whole timeframe under review. Such peaks refer most often to pre-election periods in the Czech Republic and related social developments such as industrial action and the like. This would suggest that the use of the concept is irrelevant for this report. Yet a close review conducted using all articles using ‘radicalization’ allows one to claim otherwise. During this review, every article

⁴ Korupce – corruption; povodně – floods; průmyslová havárie – industrial accident; autonehoda – car crash; politické násilí – political violence.

was coded using keywords (identifying key concepts) associated with 'radicalization'. The codebook was then transferred to a network analysis software⁵ for closer inspection.

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⁵ ORA NETSCENES, Carnegie Mellon University CASOS & NETANOMICS 2014 ©



Graph 2: A categorized breakdown of 'political violence'

The method used had been tailored to the exploratory nature of the inquiry. It builds loosely on the Associative Framing concept (Ruigrok & van Atteveldt, 2007). Whereas the original authors developed the approach to support comprehensive automated analysis and interpretation of semantic networks, the current authors limited their ambition in using semantic networks to providing assistance in their otherwise qualitative coding exercise. Therefore, we coded each of the 309 articles explicitly naming radicalization for concepts directly associated with respect to the message of the article as a whole. Only then did we construct the semantic web of codes based on co-occurrences in respective articles. This allows for summarization of the articles' messages while preserving some of the analytical logic of Associative Framing, and thus representing an oversimplified model of a cognitive frame shared among the authors of these news articles (Minsky, 1975; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). There were two resulting webs of concepts immediately showing some distinctive features as to their structuring and predominant concepts. Moreover, the web union allows for relative weighting of the two sets of predominant concepts.

We did not focus on normative properties of the concepts' associations in question, but while coding the articles we found certain tacit patterns (in fact missing concepts) which allow us to complement the overall picture provided by the automated analysis.

In order to be able to construct the dominant radicalization narratives we sought for the presence of concepts associated with theoretically defined sufficient conditions for violent political action as representation of the radicalization process in action (Gupta, 2005). These are:

- **historical grievances**
- **framed by political entrepreneurs** in religious, class or ethnic **contexts**
- leading to a **strong collective identity beyond a single (or multiple) organization(s)**.


III.2 THE MEDIA REFLECTION OF RADICALIZATION

In this exploratory study we included 309 articles across a time span of 5 years. These articles cover religious, political, ethnic, and state radicalism. As the study primarily focused on political and religious radicalization, the two following sections only cover these issues (135 and 109 articles, respectively).

However, in the interest of a comprehensive review, a general dataset analysis was performed. The network of concepts as described above was constructed to model the relationships of the concepts involved. The map below shows the full network. Elementary measures have been applied to this dataset to obtain preliminary information about its structure.

It is immediately obvious that regardless of their limited presence in the dataset, the concepts associated with religious radicalization play dominant roles among those related to radicalization as such. By far the most central concepts in the media discussion both locally and globally are 'Islam', closely followed by 'terrorism'. When looking at the sub-sets for political and religious radicalization, the relative centrality of 'youth' seems to be surprising. Obviously this concept is associated with articles not included in either of the groups singled out for further analysis.

Furthermore, the use of the software solution for this task allowed us to perform a Latent Semantic Analysis, uncovering concepts of importance to the overall message sent by the set of articles under review. This analysis used a concept-by-text matrix to analyze and generate topics based on their relationships. The matrix was used to identify the correlations between concepts in the corpus. This analysis pointed to 'elections', 'Somalia' and 'Palestine' as most important concepts in the dataset, further indicating a strong relationship between the use of 'radicalization' and the issue of Islamic radicalism.




III.3 POLITICAL AGENDAS IN THE MEDIA REFLECTION OF RADICALIZATION

This section covers 135 texts across the timeframe cited above which are solely devoted to political radicalization (as opposed to mixed and religious groupings). The resulting network shows a relatively high level of fragmentation. This is partially caused by the fact that radicalization is often used in other than political contexts, thus showing varying levels of entanglement of associated concepts. Yet the cluster of 135 articles included solely those coded as containing a message pertaining to political radicalization. Here the periphery of

the diagram often relates to isolated events in foreign countries or simply marginal contexts such as art exhibitions with a political message or, e.g., elaboration of the context of the Pussy Riot trial.

Three distinctive clusters of core concepts could be identified using the total-degree centrality measure:


- 1) one represented by the associations of 'Revolution' – 'Violence' – 'Demonstrations' which mostly related to the so-called Arab Spring and thus was irrelevant in the long run;
- 2) one represented by the associations of 'Elections' – 'Reform' – 'Corruption' that appeared time and time again during the pre-election period in the Czech Republic, thus representing a revolving heated debate over the same issues;
- 3) one represented by the associations of 'Racism' – 'Extremism' – 'Unemployment' – 'Roma' which appeared across the timeline without specific distinctive peaks.



The position and nature of the edges of 'Elections' signifies the most common use of the Radicalization concept in the Czech media – as a synonym for 'furthering political demands' or 'escalating pressure for political purposes'.

Using the ego-betweenness measure, we established concepts with a central role in each cluster of topics. These concepts are not only well connected, but also have a major (leading) role in their respective clusters. This exercise confirms the twofold context of political radicalization: first, that of political confrontation and heated debate, and second, more profoundly, that of right-wing extremism. There is one caveat to this, namely that the

fragmentation and spread of the data cause this observation to remain rather weak considering what a small fraction of the whole set is actually devoted to these topics.



After narrowing down the list of conditions for violent political action in the articles under review, we established that most of the information necessary to provide an informed account of the developments at the radical scene are continuously missing from the news media, and some are commented on in the most simplistic terms. There are seemingly only two conceptual categories revealing the radicalization chain: the ‘Roma’ card which is traditionally played at the right-wing scene, and ‘unemployment’ as another traditional topic.


Thus, the media coverage of political ‘radicalization’ can be viewed as brief at best. The media mostly repeat traditional points of grievance, yet do not comment at all on the process itself, nor do they focus on leaders or on identities of those involved. Moreover, the usual picture of the right-wing extremist is that of a mindless thug, which both downplays the danger of the process and inspires a subculture of separation and violence within the community itself. Much striking is another feature of the news reporting – there is no mention at all about the process of individual or communal radicalization. While the media cover to some extent major events related to right-wing extremism, any opinionated review is given only to cases where the police intervenes or cases which result in judicial proceedings. This picture is exemplified by the existence of a separate category of reporting on ‘Extremism’ which covers almost exclusively right-wing-related events and helps to reproduce the stereotypes mentioned here.

III.4 THE RELIGIOUS AGENDA IN MEDIA REFLECTIONS


This section covers 109 articles dealing with religious ‘radicalization’. The resulting network shows a minimum level of fragmentation and all the metrics used in the analysis show remarkably high levels, compared to the larger dataset on political radicalization dealt with in previous section. That signifies a more narrow use of the term ‘radicalization’ within the religious context. In fact, only two articles across the dataset refer to other than ‘Muslim’ radicalization.

Two distinctive clusters could be identified:

- 1) one associated with ‘terrorism’ – ‘Islam’ – ‘mosque’ – ‘prison’ which was not only strongly present but also the most stereotypical, compared to findings of other studies (CIT);
- 2) one associated with a current wave of radicalization and associated with the terms ‘youth’ – ‘internet’ – ‘Syria’.



Similarly to the previous section, we established the ego-betweenness levels of concepts within their respective clusters. While the situation changed in previous section, the predominant position of ‘Islam’ and ‘terrorism’ was not only confirmed, but strengthened. These are the concepts directly providing the media message about religious radicalization.



After narrowing down the list of conditions for violent political action in the articles under review, we found a striking difference between the subset on political radicalization and the one under review. Reporting about religious radicalization covers in principle (yet still simplistically) the chain defined above, at least in conceptual terms.

The historical grievances reported again included ‘unemployment’, as well as ‘inter-communal relationships’, ‘exclusion’, ‘low education’, ‘suffering’, but also ‘migration’, ‘neo-imperialism’, and ‘cooperation with dictatorships’. Thus, again, the news media repeated the arguments of extremist organizations themselves and/or the stereotypical neo-Marxist structural explanations of radicalization.

The process itself is seen as facilitated by communal authorities in ‘mosques’ and ‘prisons’, beyond single leaders, and shaped by ‘conservative movements’ such as ‘Al-Qaeda’ and ‘Islamic State’. At an individual level, the main vehicle of radicalization is believed to be ‘internet’ where new authority-less forms of the process take place. The media mythology of the process is that of puritanical conservative zealots against an unspecified unjust world order represented by the West.

Collective identity seems to be reported in terms of support for ‘terrorism’, tacit or open display of support for extremists of various sorts elsewhere, and shared hatred against anything ‘Zionist’. The common theme, according to the media picture, and also the centre of this collective identity is the Muslimhood itself.

III.5 CONCLUSION

The above-presented analysis is by no means comprehensive. To assess the value of the news media for early warning, a lot of work still has to be done (correlation with official statistics, a comprehensive content analysis of all three subsets within the political violence category). Yet it provides suggestive evidence as to the overall utility of media in such an endeavour.

First of all, there seem to be distinctive reporting patterns when it comes to different issues. The political radicalization and religious radicalization seem to be the prime examples. While terrorism seems to be covered heavily, but in reaction to major terrorist atrocities, the term extremism seems to be associated with the use of force against violent neo-Nazi thugs, and radicalization seems to be used to describe political differences and heated political debate.

Beyond that, the coverage of a radicalization process as the focus of this study seems to differ fundamentally when it comes to the political and religious strands of it. In simple terms, there are two completely different frames used in reporting about the phenomenon. Nonetheless, the above review suggests the two frames are overly stereotypical, thus promulgating a message which actually may support individual radicalization, especially at early stages, rather than delivering a balanced picture. To a certain extent the two stereotypes have one thing in common – their materialist basis.

The use of two terms – radicalization and extremism – is associated with the following stereotypes:

- 1) Radicalization is a process caused by false feelings of injustice felt by Muslim communities, shaped by imams in mosques and the internet elsewhere, including in the West.
- 2) Extremism is the state of mind of neo-Nazis and supporting strata of the population, attained at random with no specific starting point.

Beyond the stereotypes associated with right-wing extremism and religious radicalization, there are some minor findings ascertaining the value of media as an indicator of radicalization:

- No debate about the nexus between radicalization and extremism (9/309 articles, related to Ukraine or the far right).
- Virtually no coverage of the left-wing scene (in 2/135 articles in the political radicalization subset).
- Relatively strong emphasis on foreign countries (related to the cluster on political processes abroad commented on above; 42% of the political radicalization subset).
- No discussion about the role of hooliganism in individual radicalization (2/309 articles, both citing the same source).

- No coverage of threat assessment or trends within the communities of interest (with the exception of 2/309 articles which cite a Military Intelligence Annual report mentioning an increasing penetration of the military by extremism).
- Missing elements:
 - grievance (simplistic dichotomy of religious or economic issues, with economic problems portrayed as grievances in the cases of both political and religious radicalization),
 - role of entrepreneurs is not commented on at all in relation to political radicalization,
 - collective identity and its formation not commented on or analysed, mostly simplistic stereotypes originating in the extremist debate (Muslimhood – terrorism) are repeated, which are more dangerous than informative.

Thus, while the present authors maintain that there is only an indicative value to this study, the role of media in a radicalization context should not be seen as an indicator but rather a catalyst of radicalization, especially at its most profound level. The media have a strong influence over individuals tending to change their role from uninvolved to passive supporters and from passive supporters to active supporters. Their ability to influence the soldiers or vanguard of a movement of any sort is, however, minimal. Their indicative value with regard to those processes can, hence, lie in the strength of their coverage of sensitive topics. An increased and sustained coverage may induce the afore-mentioned standing in individual involvement with radical movements, thus increasing, in such cases, the overall importance of the radicalization issue. Beyond this simple framework, the media retain the catalyst role which should be a target of government deradicalization programmes, just as the communities at risk, as the media facilitate the sending of a dangerous message in such a form that is attainable by the at-risk groups.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Stereotypes are often bad guidance for judging national behaviour, yet at least in this case, there may be something into them. Apparently Czech society does not appear to be prone to extremism and radicalism of the sort that would turn into political violence. According to the stereotype, while Czechs are usually mildly dissatisfied with the government and the state of the polity, an overwhelming majority of them tend to leave complains for private debates over the pint. Actual incidents of political violence are scarce and the blood has been spilled rarely by extremist in the last decades, confirming the expected.

Even in the turbulent time of social transformation after the fall of the communist regime, violent radicals enjoyed a very limited appeal in society. The most numerous groups that could be considered extremist – like the skinheads on the right side of the political scene, the anarchists on the other side, or football hooligans – attract mostly youths in their years

of search for identity. The kids they attract usually need to rebel against the older generation, and are not very sure about their political views. Political violence among these groups tends to be limited to mutual hand-to-hand skirmishes between neo-Nazis and anarchists on May 1st, or similar battles between football fans. The national authorities carefully follow the radicals. Police and national intelligence have arguably established detailed information about the core of the radicals and so far managed to prevent any major acts of armed violence.

The worldwide growth in attention paid to Islamic terrorism that was sparked by the 9/11 attacks did certainly influence Czech society. The media regularly observe terrorism abroad and many Czechs are truly afraid of Islamic terrorism. This is in stark contrast to the reality of a small and hardly radical Muslim population in the Czech Republic.

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