



Presentation of Validation Study Results

ELIAMEP

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Qualitative Assessment of Islamist Radicalisation Indicators

Aims:

- ▶ **Test** which of the behaviour/actions indicators and factors at the micro and meso levels can be analysed and measured by qualitative assessment by social scientists.
- ▶ **Verify** the adequacy of the selected indicators and factors to the national context of Greece.
- ▶ **Finalise** the qualitative study indicators for Component 3 (i.e. 'Qualitative assessment of risk factors and root causes of Islamist radicalisation') of the Monitoring Tool.

Qualitative Assessment of Islamist Radicalisation Indicators

Methodology:

- ▶ **Desk research** → Identify the scope and trends in Islamist radicalisation in Greece, and explore which of the behaviour/actions factors and indicators included are relevant to the qualitative study of Islamist radicalisation in Greece.
- ▶ **Semi-structured stakeholder interviews** → 8 interviews with key government representatives/public officials, as well as academics, NGO representatives, Imams and independent experts in Islamist radicalisation → Assist in the identification and improvement of the factors and indicators.
- ▶ **Discussion guide** → To be used in qualitative semi-structured interviews with radicalised or vulnerable to Islamist radicalisation individuals.

Qualitative Assessment of Islamist Radicalisation Indicators

Semi-structured stakeholder interviews – The Procedure:

- ▶ The interviewees were provided with the list of indicators before the interview in order to have the time to prepare their comments beforehand.
- ▶ During the interview, they were asked to comment on the indicators with which they felt more familiar.
- ▶ These insights were used to construct a qualitative discussion guide, which is presented in the report.

Qualitative Assessment of Islamist Radicalisation Indicators

Semi-structured stakeholder interviews – Findings (Micro Level):

- ▶ ‘Cutting ties with family and friends – social withdrawal’ combined with ‘seeking or having contacts with a charismatic person or spiritual advisor’ (both do not apply to Christian converts to Islam).
- ▶ ‘Openly voicing grievances’ (in their own language, within their community).
- ▶ ‘Expressing dichotomous worldview’ (close cooperation between authorities and communities is essential).
- ▶ ‘Psychological problems’ (particularly Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder)
- ▶ ‘History of violence’ (what kind of violence?).
- ▶ ‘Prison experience’ (use with caution – especially regarding administrative detention of asylum seekers).
- ▶ ‘Financial problems’ (use with caution, taking into account present economic situation in Greece).

Qualitative Assessment of Islamist Radicalisation Indicators

Semi-structured stakeholder interviews – Findings (Micro Level):

- ▶ ‘Education and employment situation’ (use with caution, taking into account present economic situation in Greece).
- ▶ ‘Family problems’ (take into account, however, the potential de- and/or counter-radicalisation dynamics developed in extended Middle Eastern families).
- ▶ ‘Attending rallies for extremist causes’ (define/list ‘extremist causes’).
- ▶ ‘Travel to risk countries/conflict zones’ (define/list ‘risk countries’. Move indicator to suggestive indicators. Use with caution, and always combine with other suggestive and ‘red flag’ indicators).
- ▶ ‘Contacts with radical groups locally or abroad’ (Take into account definitional and conceptual concerns regarding the term ‘radical’).

Qualitative Assessment of Islamist Radicalisation Indicators

Semi-structured stakeholder interviews – Findings (Micro Level):

- ▶ 'Possessing or disseminating extremist literature and paraphernalia or online materials' (Take into account definitional and conceptual concerns regarding the term 'extremist').
- ▶ 'Openly voicing support for terrorist organisations and causes' (Take into account definitional and conceptual concerns regarding the term 'terrorist').
- ▶ 'Received combat / military training' (Move to suggestive indicators. Take into account that combat and military training are mandatory and/or a cultural tradition in some countries).
- ▶ 'Openly expressing certain attitudes supporting violence, or against an expressed target revenge or death rhetoric'.
- ▶ 'Personal trauma or crisis event'.
- ▶ 'Victimisation or conflict situation'.
- ▶ 'Perception of international or local events'.

Qualitative Assessment of Islamist Radicalisation Indicators

Semi-structured stakeholder interviews – Findings (Meso Level):

- ▶ 'Instances of members of community implementing security measures, secrecy, other rituals/suspicious group activities' (such instances have not been observed in Greece yet).
- ▶ 'Foreign religious emissaries active in locality' (Doesn't indicate anything in itself. It needs to be combined with information about the past and profile of foreign religious emissaries).
- ▶ 'Activities of new/unknown informal organisations, foundations' (Use with caution – if these organisations have the opportunity for regularisation and avoid it, then they need to be monitored).
- ▶ 'Instances of community members expressing disrespect for (secular) authorities' (It's been observed in Western Thrace in instances of ethnic radicalisation. Could be effective for Islamist radicalisation too).
- ▶ 'Rise of a strong radical/conservative Muslim leadership' (proposed instead of 'lack of strong moderate Muslim leadership').

Qualitative Assessment of Islamist Radicalisation Indicators

Semi-structured stakeholder interviews – Findings (Meso Level):

- ▶ ‘Leaders spreading narratives and materials glorifying violence’.
- ▶ ‘Military and combat training provision’.
- ▶ ‘Members of community having contacts with or supporting transiting foreign fighters’.
- ▶ ‘Lack of trust in public institutions’.
- ▶ ‘Exclusion from political process’.
- ▶ ‘Segregation of migrant communities’.
- ▶ ‘Social, religious, ethnic conflicts and tensions’.
- ▶ ‘Hate speech by community/group leaders’.

Qualitative Assessment of Islamist Radicalisation Indicators

Discussion guide:

- ▶ Piloting in specific localities and groups at risk of Islamist radicalisation with the aim to validate the relevance of questions, has not been possible.
- ▶ **The non-existence of native Islamist fighters radicalised in the country, and the limited number of and lack of information about Muslim migrants who had resided in the past and became radicalised in Greece are the main reasons why piloting the monitoring tool was not feasible.**

Situational Analysis of Far-Right Extremism

Aims:

- ▶ **Identify** the capacity of relevant agencies to collect, provide and analyse data as per the categories and indicators provided.
- ▶ **Identify** data that is already been collected by respective agencies.
- ▶ **Identify** what data is not collected by respective agencies.
- ▶ **Refine** the analytical framework and provide **recommendations** for compiling a comprehensive analysis report at national level.
- ▶ **Draft a pilot situational report** based on the data collected.

Situational Analysis of Far-Right Extremism

Methodology:

- ▶ **Desk research** → Identify if data along the categories and indicators provided is publicly accessible on institutional web sites, publicly available reports and analyses.
- ▶ **Written data inquires** → Sent to relevant agencies and institutions (i.e. Ministry Of Citizen Protection, Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights, and Racist Violence Recording Network), requesting relevant data for the past 6 years (2010-2015).
- ▶ **Semi-structured stakeholder interviews** → Were conducted with representatives of aforementioned agencies and institutions after information from desk research and written data inquires were collected and analysed. → 3 interviews were conducted with representatives of respective agencies and institutions, and 1 written response to a questionnaire was provided.
- ▶ **Pilot situation report** → Puts forward an overview and quantitative, as well as qualitative analysis of the collected data along the provided categories and indicators.

Situational Analysis of Far-Right Extremism

Semi-structured stakeholder interviews – The Procedure:

- ▶ The interviewees were provided with the list of indicators before the interview in order to have the time to prepare their comments beforehand.
- ▶ During the interviews, the representatives of all three organisations/institutions were asked to assess the usefulness of the indicators, and the capacity of their organisations/institutions to collect the required data and produce the aforementioned indicators.

Situational Analysis of Far-Right Extremism

Semi-structured stakeholder interviews – Findings (Hate Crime Incidents):

- ▶ 'Incidence of hate crimes' → Used by the Hellenic Police together with 'geographical density of potential hate crimes'.
- ▶ 'Share of hate crimes in violent criminal activity' → Not used, but can be developed by the Hellenic Police. Deemed not essential though.
- ▶ 'Share of hate crimes in overall criminal activity' → Not used, but can be developed by the Hellenic Police. Deemed not essential though.
- ▶ 'Proportion of hate crimes sub-types' → Not used, but can be developed by the Hellenic Police. Deemed not essential though.

Situational Analysis of Far-Right Extremism

Semi-structured stakeholder interviews – Findings (Perpetrators of Hate Crimes):

- ▶ 'Number of persons prosecuted for committing hate crimes' → Used by the Hellenic Police.
- ▶ 'Socio-demographic and socio-economic profile of perpetrators of hate crimes' → Used by the Hellenic Police.
- ▶ 'Type of crime committed/charged with' → Used by the Hellenic Police.
- ▶ 'Criminal record of the perpetrator' → Used by the Hellenic Police.
- ▶ 'Number of hate crimes that involved weapon possession by the perpetrator' → Used by the Hellenic Police.
- ▶ 'Number of indicted and convicted perpetrators' → Not used and impossible to be developed.
- ▶ 'Membership in extremist organisation' → Not used and impossible to be developed.

Situational Analysis of Far-Right Extremism

Semi-structured stakeholder interviews – Findings (Manifestations of Far-Right Extremism and Radicalism):

- ▶ ‘Overall count of notable events with far-right extremist focus’ → Not used, but could be developed.
- ▶ ‘Participation in notable events with far-right extremist focus’ → Not used as such. ‘Estimated number of participants’ is used instead.
- ▶ ‘Notable events with far-right extremist focus by type’ → Not used, but could be developed.
- ▶ ‘Violent attitudes presented during notable events with far-right extremist focus’ → Not used as such. ‘Overall count of notable violent events’ is used instead.

Situational Analysis of Far-Right Extremism

Semi-structured stakeholder interviews – Findings (Far-Right Extremist Content on the Internet):

- ▶ ‘Number of websites, forums, social media pages/groups/profiles, etc., on which known far-right extremist groups and actors have online presence’ → Not used, and not possible to be developed.
- ▶ ‘Type of far-right extremist content that is being distributed on these websites, forums, social media pages/groups/profiles, etc.’ → Not used, and not possible to be developed.
- ▶ ‘Number of followers/readers/people engaged in these websites, forums, social media pages/groups/profiles, etc.’ → Not used, and not possible to be developed.
- ▶ ‘Spread and nature of far-right extremist content/radical ideas via the internet, beyond the internet presence of known extremist groups’ → Not used, and not possible to be developed.
- ▶ ‘Patterns and modalities of far-right recruitment through the Internet’ → Not used, and not possible to be developed.

Main Findings on Baseline Indicators

Distribution and volume of potential hate crime incidents across administrative regions, 2010 - 2015



Administrative Regions	Number of potential hate crime incidents
Attica (Athens)	143
Central Macedonia (Thessaloniki)	30
Western Greece (Patras)	9
Peloponnese (Tripolis)	5
Central Greece (Lamia)	4
Thessaly (Larisa)	3
Crete (Heraklion)	3
North Aegean (Mytilene)	3
South Aegean (Ermoupoli)	3
Ionian Islands (Corfu)	2
Western Macedonia (Kozani)	1
Eastern Macedonia and Thrace (Komotini)	1
Epirus (Ioannina)	0
Total	207

Main Findings on Baseline Indicators

Share of potential physical hate crime incidents in violent criminal activity , 2010-2012

	Number of potential physical hate crime incidents	Violent Criminal Activity	Indicator: Share in violent criminal activity
2010	1	12,287	0,0081
2011	7	3,750	0,1866
2012	24	8,684	0,2763
2013	20	N/A	N/A
2014	35	N/A	N/A
2015	25	N/A	N/A


Main Findings on Baseline Indicators

Share of potential hate crime incidents in overall criminal activity, 2010-2012

	Number of potential hate crime incidents	Overall Criminal Activity	Indicator: Share in overall criminal activity
2010	2	333,988	0,00059
2011	7	194,031	0,0036
2012	35	194,144	0,0180
2013	39	N/A	N/A
2014	58	N/A	N/A
2015	66	N/A	N/A


Main Findings on Baseline Indicators

Share of bias motivations in total number of potential hate crime incidents, 2010-2015




Main Findings on Baseline Indicators

Potential hate crimes by type of violence, 2010-2015



Main Findings on Baseline Indicators


Cleared and non-cleared potential hate crime incidents, 2010-2015



Main Findings on Baseline Indicators




Total number of prosecuted individuals per potential bias motivation, 2010-2015



Main Findings on Baseline Indicators


Share of single perpetrator and group attacks, 2011-2015



■ Single Perpetrator ■ Group attack

Main Findings on Baseline Indicators

Level of violence in incidents of racist violence, 2011-2015



■ Verbal violence ■ Severe body injuries ■ Body injuries

Main Findings on Baseline Indicators

Membership in extremist groups in incidents of racist violence, 2011-2015

