

## Security program

In 2016 the Security Program activities focused on the following areas:

- **Countering organized crime, financial crimes and racketeering.** The study *Extortion and Racketeering in the EU: Vulnerability Factors* was published, along with a model for estimating the vulnerability of businesses. The study examined the Italian experience in countering extortion and racketeering. Its results were presented at several international conferences. Further advances were made in the areas of understanding the role of corruption in trafficking in human beings and in developing effective methods for countering money laundering in Bulgaria.
- **Countering radicalization and terrorist threats.** The Security and Sociological programs published the report *Understanding Radicalisation: Review of Literature*, presenting the key academic concepts and debates on radicalization leading to violence. Practical tools for the identification, monitoring and analysis of risks and trends of radicalization and extremism in Bulgaria were developed. These tools will lay the foundation of designing specific measures and policies for prevention of radicalization and for better understanding of radicalization by first line officers, and also by law enforcement and intelligence services.
- **Enhancing the governance of the private security sector.** A study on the private security firms and their management practices was completed in 2016. The analysis covered the role of the public security sector in protecting critical and strategic public infrastructure, as well as in provision of security services in rural and remote regions of Bulgaria. The efforts of this area provide better understanding of the risks and challenges to good governance in the private security sector, and will improve its interaction with police.
- **State capture and the role of media.** The report *Media and Political Influence* identified the challenges to the Bulgarian media sector under state capture. It highlighted the risks posed by the lack of independent and balanced media and transparency in media ownership, and made policy recommendations for enhancing media independence and investigative journalism.
- **Border security.** An evaluation of the External Borders Fund, commissioned by DG Migration and Home Affairs was completed. It covered all EU Member States and the Schengen area countries which are not EU members. CSD re-affirmed its reputation of a reliable partner to the European Commission in the area of border security and was awarded to conduct a forward-looking analysis of the challenges to EU border management beyond 2020, as part of the EC preparation for the next multiannual funding period.

## I. Countering organized crime, financial crime and racketeering

### Countering extortion racketeering: the European experience

In 2016, the Security Program completed its research on the forms of extortion racketeering, which includes also the assessment tools that could be used for improving the work of investigation services. The research findings were presented at a number of national and international events.

Extortion racketeering has been long identified as the defining activity of organized crime in accumulating financial resources and infiltrating the legal economy. Although it was not included in Europol reports on serious organised crime threats, this crime affects all the European countries, albeit in different ways. Only a few European countries have managed to develop proactive approaches and preventive methods for countering racketeering. Police authorities in most EU Member-States have adopted a rather passive approach and limit their investigation of this type of crime to cases where victims have filed complaints. Conversely, as a number of businessmen are actively engaged in the grey and black economy, in most cases of racketeering the victims refrain from reporting to the authorities. Typically, most instances of racketeering remain unregistered. Preventive and proactive police activities aiming to address the specific challenges that victims face and to encourage them to report the crimes they have been a victim of remain rare. Italy is one of the few countries which have developed and introduced such a proactive police approach in regards to racketeering.

The study of efficient instruments for assessing extortion racketeering through facilitating the sharing of experience


among different institutions involved researchers from three institutions – CSD (and its subsidiary Vitosha Research), Instituto de Ciencias Forenses y de la Seguridad – Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, and Transcrime – Univercitta Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano. The study was supported by Bulgarian police authorities and the Special Prosecutor’s Office, Guardia Civil and the National Police of Spain, the National Police of Italy, the Italian Prosecution, as well as a number of Italian anti-racket associations.

The main findings of this effort were included in a report entitled *Extortion racketeering in the EU: vulnerability factors*. The report analyses extortion racketeering forms and practices in the EU countries, assessing the risk and vulnerability factors for enterprises in two business sectors – agriculture and hospitality – as well as in the Chinese communities. The study analyses the social and legal aspects, the institutional and economic environments, and the profile of both victims and criminals in order to identify the circumstances that lead to extortion racketeering in these two sectors, and in the Chinese communities.

Drawing on the result of the analyses, the report argues that the concept of extortion racketeering as crime perpetrated by organized crime groups should also be extended to include **systemic use of extortionist practices by organized groups or networks of public officials and corporate executives**. Extortionist groups or networks involving public officials and corporate executives have been identified in Bulgaria, Romania Greece and Spain in cases related to extortions in the agricultural sector and to a lesser extent in the hospitality sector. However, the identified cases included all elements of extortion racketeering:

- they are form of organised crime – they were perpetrated by three or more persons acting in coordinated manner;
  - they were systemic – practiced against more than one company and were continuous in time;
  - they involve coercion – i.e. forcing the victim in a given behaviour using threats through position of power;
  - they involve patrimonial damage for the victim – i.e. loss of current or future incomes and loss of property rights.
- The second research paper, *Countering extortion racketeering: the Italian experience*, describes the Italian authorities' approach in countering this crime:
- A Special Commissioner is responsible for nation-wide coordination of anti-extortion and anti-racket activities and initiatives.
  - A Solidarity Fund operates for the benefit of victims of organised crime, extortion, and usury.
  - Protective policies and measures, such as those for the protection of

### The Italian institutional framework for countering organised crime and extortion racketeering




Source: Italian Ministry of Interior, Italian Ministry of Justice, authors' elaboration.

collaborators and witnesses of justice, are in place.

- A legal framework is present, which enables civil society organisations to take part in the fight against organised crime and mafia-type activities, particularly as regards victim support.
- Social re-use of confiscated assets is particularly important because of its symbolic and economic significance.

A new methodology for sectoral assessments of the vulnerability to racketeering and extortion in both the agricultural and the hospitality sector in Bulgaria was developed, in addition to assessment of the vulnerability of migrant communities. It was presented in a Policy Brief. The methodology is an useful tool designed to assist law enforcement institutions in assessing and



**EXTORTION RACKETEERING:  
THE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT APPROACH**




Policy Brief No. 63, September 2016


Extortion racketeering has long been pointed out as the defining activity of organised crime. It has also been identified as one of the most effective tools used by organised crime in the accumulation of financial resources and the penetration of the legal economy. Although in recent years this crime has not been among the top listed organised crime threats in the strategic EU policy documents, it still remains ever present in European countries. The seriousness of the phenomenon has been recognised at the EU level and the crime has been listed in a number of EU legal acts in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

Extortion racketeering is a latent form of crime, infamous for the low rates of reporting by the victims. There are, however, a number of factors that hinder reporting by victims to the police – indebtedness, operating in the grey economy, fear of reprisals, lack of trust in public authorities due to their low capacity or corruption. The imminent presence of such factors results in low registration rates and authorities being unaware of the real scale of extortion rackets in their country. Standard business victimisation surveys, which are widely accepted alternative to police and judicial statistics, also often suffer from low response particularly with regards to extortion and protection racketeering and are therefore not reliable enough when it comes to assessing the full extent of the problem. For example, a recent report on the

**KEY POINTS**

- Extortion racketeering is a latent form of crime, infamous for the low rates of reporting by the victims, which result in authorities being unaware of the real scale of the problem in their country.
- The typical law enforcement approach is to investigate extortion incidents only when a victim files a report, whereas more proactive policing and victim-focused prevention and support measures are needed in order to effectively tackle this type of crime.
- Sector vulnerability assessments could help government authorities to identify, assess and hence understand the risks related to extortion of businesses in a given economic sector.
- The vulnerability approach emphasises the examination of opportunities provided to organised crime groups by legitimate business and the broader socio-economic environment.
- The assessment of the vulnerabilities to extortion of specific sectors and social groups is a useful tool that can facilitate prevention and investigation of extortion racketeering through enhanced deterrence and detection.
- Vulnerability assessments aim at ensuring better allocation of resources by competent authorities; by informing the design of specific new policies or legislative measures; by evaluating and adjusting administrative regulations or criminal justice tools and thus making them pertinent to the identified risks.



understanding the risks related to racketeering in the different economic sectors through identifying sector-specific or community-specific factors enabling or facilitating extortion.

The vulnerability assessment:

- a) contributes to the better allocation of internal resources of the institutions empowered with countering racketeering and extortion;
- b) assesses and adapts the administrative regulations and instruments used by law enforcement services in countering the risks under consideration;
- c) assists in formulating new policies and legal measures.

The various methods for assessing vulnerability to extortion racketeering were presented at several events that took place in 2016. A round table dedicated to


the issue of extortion racketeering and the ways of tackling this criminal phenomenon was organized by the Center for Study of Democracy and took place on 19 May 2016. The round table was attended by representatives of Transcrime of Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore of Milan, the Italian police, the Prosecutor's Office of the Italian Republic, the Bulgarian Specialized Prosecution Office of Appeal, Directorate General for Combating Organized Crime, the National Police and the AFCOS Directorate of the Interior Ministry, the Inspectorate of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food and the Inspectorate of the Ministry of Tourism.

The round table also discussed the practices of extortion racketeering in the Bulgarian agricultural and hospitality sectors, including the risks and factors of vulnerability in these sectors.



*Participants in the round table on Countering Extortion Racketeering:  
The European Experience, 19 May 2016*

### Cases of racketeering related to the organized crime



Source: *Extortion Racketeering in the EU: vulnerability factors.*

The main causes behind extortion racketeering in the agriculture include a strong misbalance in land ownership, European subsidies distribution practices, the absence of small agricultural producers' associations, and local corruption. The need to give priority of investigating the organized forms of extortion racketeering by officials was especially emphasized.

Several factors behind racketeering in the hospitality business were identified, including the existence of a sizeable grey sector, the traditional activity of criminal structures, and the low administrative capacity, additionally burdened by corruption practices.

An important focus at the round-table discussions was Italy's experience in countering extortion racketeering and organized crime. Participants examined the current state of organized crime in

Italy, involving national groups of Mafia type who use extortion to impose their control over territory, as well as foreign organized crime groups from countries in Eastern Europe and East Asia (China), which use racketeering of citizens and businesses within their own communities. Representatives from the Italian police and prosecution discussed the measures which the Italian state and criminal justice institutions use to encourage victims to testify, which serve as a preventive tool.


Extortion racketeering practices among Chinese immigrants, in addition to the activities of Italian anti-racketeering associations were discussed at a seminar on *Countering extortion racketeering in the EU*, which took place on 26-27 May 2016 in Milan. In addition, representatives from law enforcement institutions, magistrates and researchers from Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Spain, Croatia,

**Table 1. Distribution of CAP Direct Payments in 2013, for selected MS**

Member state	The top x% of beneficiaries	Received x% of the CAP direct payments
Romania	1.1	51.7
Bulgaria	1.1	45.6
Hungary	0.9	38.5
Poland	2.0	28.5
Germany	1.2	28.4
Italy	0.8	26.3
Spain	1.3	23.4
UK	0.9	14.4
France	1.2	9.0

*Source: Extortion racketeering in the EU: vulnerability factors.*

### Vulnerability to racketeering factors in the agriculture sector



*Source: Extortion Racketeering in the EU: vulnerability factors.*




*Participants in the conference on Countering Extortion Racketeering in the EU, Milan, 29 September 2016*



*Participants in the round table on Countering Extortion Racketeering in Bulgaria: Examining the Evidence and Devising Appropriate Measures*





*Dr. Atanas Rusev at the Annual conference of the European Criminological Association*

the U.K., Poland, Ireland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, and Portugal, discussed the national specifics of the extortion racketeering phenomenon.

On 27 October 2016, CSD organized a round-table on *Countering Extortion Racketeering in Bulgaria: Examining the Evidence and Devising Appropriate Measures*. The meeting was attended by representatives of the Ministry of Interior, General Directorate National Police, General Directorate Combatting Organised Crime and the Sofia Court of Appeal. The participants discussed the application of methodology for sectoral assessments of vulnerability to racketeering. Several proposals were made for increasing the effectiveness of measures to cope with this threat, as well as for implementing best practices from abroad, such as “collaborators of justice” widely involved in the process in Italy.


Conversely, Bulgaria’s poor record at the European Court of Human Rights was attributed to infringements the defendants’ right of fair trial due to unlawful means and undue use of special investigative means and protected witnesses to prove a crime in court.

On 23 September 2016 CSD experts organized an academic panel on the problem of racketeering in the EU in the framework of the Annual Conference of the European Criminological Association that took place in Münster, Germany. The presented reports focused on the national specifics and trends of racketeering in Bulgaria, Italy and Spain.

### **Corruption practices in human trafficking**

Human trafficking continues to be a serious problem for the European Union. Being the third largest income-gener-

### Convicted traffickers per 100,000 for 2014



Source: Population data (World Bank, 2015); Convicted traffickers (US Department of State, 2015).

ating criminal market worldwide surpassed only by drugs and arms trafficking, it is an important source of accruing criminal assets. Despite the emergence of new trends in human exploitation, the trafficking of women for forceful prostitution remains the most lucrative form of human trafficking. CSD experts and their colleagues from Italy, Kosovo and Croatia took part in a joint research project on **corruption practices in women trafficking with the aim of their sexual exploitation** in the four countries, also studying the effects of such practices on the victims.

Despite the significant share of this market, neither the main participants involved, nor the goals and corruption methods applied by them have been adequately analysed. Early in the 21<sup>st</sup> century this business mainly involved big criminal organisations; nowadays, however, as a result of free movement

and stronger police pressure, smaller criminal groups play an increasingly important part. Accordingly, current corruption practices seek to avoid criminal investigation and discontinue ongoing investigation or to clinch light sentences and acquittals. Therefore, the importance of corruption mediators has significantly grown, while direct corruption pressure is increasingly avoided. The findings were presented in two publications: *Corruption and Women Trafficking: The Bulgarian Experience*, and *Analytical Report: Corruption and Women Trafficking* which sums up the results of research on the subject in all four countries.

The main steps needed to increase the effectiveness of countering corruption in women trafficking include: increasing the capacity of in-house institutional units dedicated to countering corruption in police services and in the judiciary; raising the awareness on

the linkages between the two types of crime and the need for coordinated investigative approach in dealing with them; improving the effectiveness of gathering and analysing intelligence data, giving impetus to international police cooperation; putting in place better safeguards for trafficking victims; and encouraging reporting these crimes to the police.


The main research findings were presented by Nadya Stoyanova, analyst at CSD's Security Program, at an international colloquium on *Multifaceted Organized Crime and Profit Crime: Criminal Markets, Money Laundering and the Ways to Cope with Them* held in Newcastle. The results were also presented at the European Parliament by Dr. Atanas Rusev and Ms. Stoyanova.

The economic and financial crisis of 2009 in the country led to a revival of **illegal and predatory lending and usury**. Pushed by financial constraints, a significant number of households and businesses turned to shadowy money lenders. Anton Kojuharov and Atanas Rusev wrote an article titled "Sharks in Sheep's Clothing: Modalities of Predatory and Illegal Lending in Bulgaria" based on new research data. It was included in this year volume of *Illegal Entrepreneurship, Organised Crime and Social Control*, published by Springer. This year's edition was dedicated to Professor Dick Hobbs' contribution to modern criminology evolution.

According to their analysis, the number of people victimized by predatory lenders is on the rise, as are incidents involving the use of coercion and violence in debt recovery. Such a trend is not surprising given the fact that a large part of usury and predatory lending in Bulgaria is performed by organized crime groups involved in these illegal and highly lucrative practices. An

interesting phenomenon emerges as highly flexible criminal groups profit from poor regulation by positioning themselves as legal businesses under the cover of non-banking financial organisations. This tactics gives them the opportunity to follow their predatory way of lending, in addition to widening their local and regional scope of activities. The article analyses the usury and predatory lending practices in Bulgaria and proposes a new classification of several underlying activities, in addition to a typology of the usurers' clients.

In 2016, CSD experts took part in a number of international seminars and conferences on organized crime and related topics.



On 24 November 2016 Dr. Atanas Rusev took part in a Europol seminar in The Hague on *Identifying the Trends in Serious and Organized Crime* related to


the SOCTA 2016 report. The experts discussed future threats and organized crime trends in Europe. Dr. Rusev took part in two working groups focusing on “The impact of migration crisis” and “The importance of geographical factors for organized crime activities”.

Dr. Rusev presented his paper “Dealing with and disposal of secured and seized proceeds of crime” at a seminar on *Financial Investigations and Secured Assets Governance* held in Bratislava. The event was organized by Slovakia’s Ministry of Interior in the framework of Europol’s EMPACT initiative with a focus on investigating VAT fraud and improving cooperation between law enforcement services.

## II. Countering radicalization and terrorist threats

### The radicalisation phenomenon

In 2016, CSD published the report *Understanding Radicalisation: A Review of Literature* compiled by experts of the Security Program in cooperation with the Sociological Program. The phenomena of radicalisation today are speedily developing and changing, with their extreme forms manifested globally. The destructive dimensions of (violent) Islamist or right-wing radicalisation have become dramatically visible in Europe, posing serious challenges to European societies. This literature review presents key academic conceptualisations and debates on the phenomena of radicalisation that might lead to violence. It deals with three different forms of radicalisation: Islamist, right-wing, and left-wing radicalisation. In addition, an overview is provided of current academic debates regarding the role of the Internet in radicalisation processes. The review is intended to help social scientists who



are entering the field of radicalisation studies navigate through the complexity of underlying processes and factors that lead different individuals or groups to adopt radical ideas and commit acts of violence. The review is particularly relevant for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe where radicalisation remains understudied, although most countries in the region share histories of extremism and political radicalism.

### Approaches and instruments for monitoring of radicalization risks in Southeast and Central Europe

Countering radicalisation that turns to terrorism has become an issue of particular concern for many European societies. In recent years, both Islamist and right-wing radicalization have surged, leading to violent attacks on European soil. In this context, the early detection of radicalization processes and the understanding of the root causes and fac-

<b>Classification of theories of social movements and terrorism</b>			
<b>No specific theoretical foundation</b>	<b>Studies based on theoretical paradigm</b>		
	<b>No explicit behavioural assumption regarding human nature</b>	<b>Explicit assumption regarding human nature (rational choice models)</b>	
Historical case studies Journalistic studies Case studies by security experts and former intelligence officers	<b>Psychological theories</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Psychopathology</li> <li>• Social psychology</li> <li>• Social learning</li> <li>• Identity theory</li> <li>• Narcissistic personality</li> <li>• Paranoia hypothesis</li> </ul> <b>Social psychological theories</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social learning</li> <li>• Frustration-aggression hypothesis</li> </ul> <b>Cognitive theories</b>	<b>Marxist theories</b> <b>Western sociological theories</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Modernisation</li> <li>• Structural imbalance</li> <li>• Relative deprivation</li> <li>• Resource mobilisation</li> </ul>	Rational actor hypothesis Game theoretic models
<i>Source: Understanding Radicalisation. Review of Literature.</i>			

tors that trigger them becomes ever more important as a preventive factor.

In 2016, the Security Program in close cooperation with the Sociological Program continued their research aimed at developing practical instruments for identifying, surveillance and analysis of radicalization and extremism linked risks and trends. Two instruments were designed:

1. approaches for detecting early signs of radicalization and a framework of indicators for risk identification;

2. a methodical guide for assessing extremist phenomena.

The results of the application of these instruments were discussed at an [expert workshop on the validation of radicalisation monitoring tools](#) in Southeast and Central Europe, held on 28 June 2016 at the Center for the Study of Democracy. It was attended by experts from ELIAMEP Greece and CUNI-SBP and Charles University from the Czech Republic.

In her opening speech, Dr. Mila Mancheva, Senior Analyst at the Sociologi-

### Levels of analysis of causes for radicalisation that can lead to terrorism

1. *Micro-level*, i.e. the individual level, involving e.g. identity problems, failed integration, feelings of alienation, marginalisation, discrimination, relative deprivation, humiliation (direct or by proxy), stigmatisation and rejection, often combined with moral outrage and feelings of (vicarious) revenge;
2. *Meso-level*, i.e. the wider radical milieu – the supportive or even complicit social surround – which serves as a rallying point and is the ‘missing link’ with the terrorists’ broader constituency or reference group that is aggrieved and suffering injustices which, in turn, can radicalise parts of a youth cohort and lead to the formation of terrorist organisations;
3. *Macro-level*, i.e. role of government and society at home and abroad, the radicalisation of public opinion and party politics, tense majority-minority relationships, especially when it comes to foreign diasporas, and the role of lacking socio-economic opportunities for whole sectors of society which leads to mobilisation and radicalisation of the discontented, some of which might take the form of terrorism.

*Source: Understanding Radicalisation. Review of Literature.*

cal Program of CSD, emphasized on the importance of discussing the results from validation studies of proposed monitoring instruments and risk indicators, conducted in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Greece in order to finalise a comprehensive Radicalisation Monitoring Tool targeted at right-wing and Islamist radicalisation.

Mr. Libor Stejskal of CUNI, Charles University, and Mr. Dimitis Scleparis of ELIAMEP presented the results from validating the Situation Analysis indicators on right-wing radicalisation that were conducted respectively in the Czech Republic and in Greece. Some gaps have been identified in the annual situation assessment reports on extremism produced by the authorities in the Czech Republic. These include the lack of coherence between police and judicial data on extremist crimes and registration time delays leading to the appearance in statistics of one and the same crime with

a different date, and the need for more rigorous regional analysis of the crime data collected by authorities. In the presentation of the key findings of a pilot situation assessment in Greece based on data collected by Greek authorities it was emphasized, that most hate crimes in Greece are registered in Athens and Thessaloniki and the primary bias motives are based on national or ethnic origin, or on skin colour. In addition, more than half of hate crime cases are cleared by the Hellenic Police and most attacks are conducted by groups, and not by a single perpetrator.

Rositsa Dzhekova, Coordinator of the Security Program at CSD and Pavel Mička from CUNI-SBP shared findings from testing risk assessment indicators among first-line officers in the field of Islamist radicalisation. In Bulgaria, there is limited understanding of radicalisation-related risk factors among first-line police officers with the issue being con-

sidered a sensitive topic falling within the domain of intelligence services. In light of this, Ms Dzhekova suggested that commitment at the central level (the Ministry of Interior) is necessary before police officers could apply the risk assessment effectively.

Ms. Dzhekova also attended two events of the **Radicalisation Awareness Network** (RAN) of the European Commission. At a working discussion in Venice on 25-27 October 2016 experts were acquainted with the approaches of the Italian penitentiary and probation services dedicated to the social reintegration of prisoners as an effective method for countering radicalization. On 23-24 December 2016 Ms. Dzhekova took part in a working visit to RAN in Paris, where she met with representative of central and local authorities, and NGOs involved in applying measures for preventing and countering radicalization. Participants

from 10 countries were briefed about the range of the government's policies and measures for improving the identification, surveillance and prevention of risks from radicalization leading to violence.

Rositsa Dzhekova also joined the annual meeting of the **European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues** held in Milan on 2-4 November 2016, which was organised by the Federal Criminal Police Service of Germany and by Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore of Milan. She took an active part in the discussions and thematic panels of the conference on the links between migration processes and radicalization.

### Countering the Islamic State

The current situation in Syria and Iraq and the emergence of the so-called Islamic State have created new security



*Round table: What Comes After the Islamic State: Implications for Europe.  
From left to right: Brian Jenkins, Senior Adviser to the President of the RAND Corporation, and Dr. Ognian Shentov, Chairman, Center for the Study of Democracy*

threats in Europe. As the international military campaign against Islamic State has been intensifying, its eventual defeat poses several challenges to Europe's security. The latest developments in the conflict were the subject of a round table discussion entitled *What Comes After the Islamic State: Implications for Europe*. It was held at the Center for the Study of Democracy on 18 November 2016, with the participation of Brian Jenkins, Senior Adviser to the President of the RAND Corporation.

The discussion focused on the current general situation in the Middle East and the military campaign against Islamic State, along with possible scenarios for its defeat, as well as its aftermath and implications for Europe. Following his comments on the current military campaign in the Iraqi city of Mosul and the Syrian city of Aleppo, Mr. Jenkins presented the main risks of the return of "foreign fighters" to their European

countries. One of the persisting gaps that undermine the fight against terrorism in Europe, according to Mr. Jenkins, is the lack of adequate sharing of information between intelligence services and the existing differences in legislation across EU member states.

Brian Jenkins stressed the differences between the radicalization itinerary of Al Qaida adepts and that of the new generation of Islamic State fighters, which makes it almost impossible to develop the profile of the typical terrorist, and, respectively, the identification of risk indicators that precede violent acts.

### III. Improving private security governance

Research on the Bulgarian private security sector continued, as part of a larger study of the sector in Southeast Europe. On 12-13 April 2016, a workshop was or-



*Participants in the workshop on private security companies, 12-13 April 2016*



ganized by the Security Program with the participation of experts from the Belgrade Center for Security Policy (BCSP), the Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS), the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM), and the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). The experts discussed the role of the private security sector in the protection and guarding of critical and strategic infrastructure. The involvement of private security companies in providing security services in rural and remote regions was also explored, particularly in light of developments on the Bulgarian security environment.

CSD researchers took part in a roundtable held in Belgrade on 7–9 December 2016. Participants from the private security sector in Kosovo, Serbia and Sweden, as well as academics and representatives from law enforcement agencies in Albania and Bulgaria discussed good practices in delivering effective and efficient oversight of the private security industry in Europe.

#### IV. State capture and the media

Political corruption flourishes where public demand for good governance is weak. This usually happens when the main feedback vehicle – mass media – is captured by business or political elites. Media capture can take either direct or more subtle forms. In the case of Bulgaria, the most substantial deficiencies of the media model are lack of transparency and concentration of ownership, monopoly position on the distribution market and poorly developed self-regulation mechanisms. These deficiencies impede the counteraction of influence peddling and allow hidden control over media. Even established violations of statutory requirements have remained unpunished. At the same time, the Bul-

garian legislation does not respond to the new challenges posed by online media and their potential for manipulation, but rather by their owners' business interests and above all by anonymous equity.

The political instrumentalisation of media in Bulgaria and Southeast Europe is visible in a number of ways. This was the key conclusion reached at the conference *Media and Political Influences*, co-organised by the Center for the Study of Democracy and Bulgaria's Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 16 May 2016. The event was attended by the Ambassadors of the Kingdom of Netherlands and of the Czech Republic to Bulgaria, representatives of the Council of Europe and national state institutions, NGOs, as well as researchers and journalists.

Dr. Ognian Shentov, Chairman of the Center for the Study of Democracy, emphasized that media, including social media, are used increasingly in a very cold and professional way to influence political process and there is a need for deeper understanding of these influences.

Ambassador Tom van Oorschot (the Netherlands was holding in the first half of 2016 the Presidency of the Council of the EU) shared a concern about the global dimensions of media dependence from external forces, and highlighted the principle of free and impartial journalism as a cornerstone of healthy democracies not just in Europe, but across the world.

Mr. Tihomir Bezlov, Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of Democracy, presented an overview of the recent state of the media environment in Bulgaria in terms of ownership, revenue streams, and changes in the media market. Due to the shrinking advertis-

ing budgets (aggravated to a large extent by the global financial crisis), media are subject to increased vulnerability to political and business pressure. One of the major threats for media independence are the “political investments” in print and TV, as well as the PR contracts with government agencies and with large business groups. Mr. Bezlov emphasized that tight control of media content in private media leaves very limited space for critical coverage and investigative journalism. Grounds for optimism can be seen in the growing importance of social networks as an alternative media. They present a unique chance for independent journalists to create media content and to get paid (through sharing a portion of the revenues generated by social networks), thus bypassing the traditional media outlets.

Dr. Malgorzata Pek, Programme Officer at the Council of Europe’s Media and In-

ternet Division, talked about the Council of Europe standards with regards to ensuring a pluralist media landscape, diversity of media content, inclusiveness in public service media, as well as media coverage of election campaigns. Drawing upon different policies and the relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, she underscored the need to further develop specific guidelines and standard-setting proposals on the transparency of media ownership and internal editorial policies. Dr. Lyubomir Kutin, Senior Analyst at the Center for the Study of Democracy, presented the findings of two case studies on the (in)dependence of Bulgarian regional media and the coverage of local elections. The lack of independent local media is a trend with devastating implications for the regions of Bulgaria. The absence of critical/high-quality journalism affects not only the local public institutions; regional economic activity is also hin-



*Participants in the conference Media and Political Influences*

dered by the void of independent media voices. The regional media do not disclose the sources of their income and public funding, especially during election periods. However, content analysis of the elections coverage indicates bias in favour of incumbent mayors and lack of critical or analytical publications. The role of regional media has been downgraded to a channel where various political groups can publish their press releases. Prof. Katharine Sarikakis, Professor of Media Industries, Media Organisation and Media Governance at the Department of Communication at the University of Vienna, highlighted the role of the state in contributing to the shrinking of public communicative spaces and the erosion of confidence in media institutions in general, but especially when it comes to public broadcasting. By (re-)exerting control over public service media in Europe, the state has posed one of the key challenges to democratic development, as it has been involved in different strategies for political engineering and interference with the functioning of public media. The risk to public service media is not to be underestimated, given that it sets the standards for employment, impartial debate, the flourishing of diversity and informed citizenry. Among the key threats for the autonomy and survival of effective public media, Professor Sarikakis listed the growing public budgets deficits in many countries across Europe (leading to shrinking financial contributions), as well as the intense administrative control over such types of public service journalism. Mr Christian Spahr, Director of Konrad Adenauer Foundation's Media Program for Southeast Europe, provided an overview of the media environment in the region. Media in the region has become increasingly consolidated with fewer companies owned by a smaller group of people, most commonly members of the political elite or

individual oligarchs. One of the intangible effects of the economic insecurity of media in Bulgaria and SEE has been the adoption of a form of self-censorship by journalists and editors. Indirect political control over the media is established inter alia through public advertising. The lack of solidarity within the journalist profession makes media particularly vulnerable to external pressure.

A number of recommendations and specific approaches for change in the media environment were suggested: greater accountability of media funds, better transparency of ownership, enhanced public debate, and further media literacy education among citizens and professionals.

## V. Border security

### Evaluation of the EU External Borders Fund

In 2016, a team of researchers from the Security Program completed an evaluation of the External Borders Fund (EBF), commissioned by the EC. In the framework of the evaluation, the team visited the border services of 8 countries participating in the EBF (Bulgaria, Greece, Norway, Poland, Hungary, Finland, the Czech Republic and Switzerland). An in-depth analysis of projects financed by the fund in the period 2011 – 2015 was carried out. The evaluation criteria were relevance and utility, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of results, coherence and complementarity with other EU financial instruments, and EU added value in the control of external borders. CSD's involvement in the evaluation further reestablished its reputation as a leading partner of DG Migration and Home Affairs of the European Commission in studies related to EU border security.



*Visit to the Finish Border Guard*

### **The future of border management in the EU**

In late 2016, the Security Program launched a study of future developments in the area of migration and border management in the period after 2020. The study will develop scenarios to be used by the European Commission in the setting up of policy and funding priorities for the Multiannual Financial Framework after 2020. The scenarios will help the EC in defining a mid- and long-term strategy based on currently identified trends and uncertainties, including migration pressure, political

uncertainties within the EU and possible strategic shocks in third countries, in particular neighbouring countries and countries of origin of massive migration flows. The complex interplay of intentions, capacities and contradictions will be reflected in the set of alternative scenarios, taking into account the unprecedented clash of internal and external factors (such as the exit of the UK, the global refugee crisis, the rise of far-right, populist parties across Europe, and the continued terrorist threats) that shaped global politics in 2016 and will continue to define the future of the EU in the coming years.