Reports

Анализи

Situational

Assessment

of Extremist Trends

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SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EXTREMIST TRENDS

CSD

**CENTER FOR
THE STUDY OF
DEMOCRACY**

Violent extremism is one of the major challenges Europe is currently facing. The threat is both external as well as internal as indicated by the rise in home-grown Islamist terrorists, as well as of nationalistic and anti-immigrant movements and far-right aggression. An accurate picture of the spread, nature and trends in the extremist and terrorist activity and actors is paramount to formulating strategic policy approaches and effectively allocating available resources. This publication provides a methodological framework for the establishment of a viable mechanism for monitoring and assessment of the state and developments over time in extremist acts and actors on the national level. The situational assessment is an instrument for systematic collection and analysis of statistical data, open source data and intelligence information pertaining to extremist actors and activities, for the purposes of developing regular situational reports of the spread, nature and trends in extremism and violent radicalisms. Following the application of the situational assessment tool, the publication presents main findings on extremist trends and monitoring capacities in three countries from Central and Southeast Europe: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Greece.

Authors:
Rositsa Dzhekova, Center for the Study of Democracy (Chapters 1, 2 and 3.3.)
Ludek Moravec, Centre for Security Policy, Charles University of Prague (Chapter 2)
Pavlína Bláhová, Jan Ludvík and **Libor Stejskal**, Centre for Security Policy, Charles University of Prague (Chapter 3.1.)
Dia Anagnostou and **Dimitris Skleparis**, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (Chapter 3.2.)
Nadya Stoynova, Center for the Study of Democracy (Chapter 3.3.)

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ACRONYMS

CC	Criminal Code
CSD	Center for the Study of Democracy
ECRI	European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
LWE	left-wing extremism
MoI	Ministry of Interior
NSI	National Statistical Institute
RVRN	Racist Violence Reporting Network
RWE	right-wing extremism
UK	United Kingdom

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Violent extremism has emerged as one of the key challenges Europe is facing today. The serious threat of outgoing and returning foreign fighters, home-grown Islamist and far-right extremists has underscored the need for the development of well suited and targeted approaches to address these threats. Given the dynamic security environment, both internal and external, the need for timely and robust assessments of current and future threats is greater than ever. An accurate picture of the spread, nature and trends in the extremist and terrorist activity and actors is paramount to formulating strategic policy approaches and effectively allocating available resources. While it is mainly within the remit of national intelligence and security agencies to monitor such trends, available information is not always processed in such a way that it translates into analytical and strategic products to be used beyond the operational goals of these agencies and to inform broader government strategies and policy measures on countering violent extremism by providing a situational picture of trends and related threats.

The current publication provides a **methodology for the establishment of a viable mechanism for monitoring and assessment** of the current state and developments over time in **extremism-related acts and actors on the national level**. More specifically, methodology intends to capture the current state as well as variations in time in the capabilities, activeness and attractiveness of extremist actors and ideas through measuring group membership, the proportion of different types of extremist acts committed as part of the general crime environment in a country and the spread of radical views among the population at large.

The situational assessment includes **12 core indicators** aimed at presenting the national threat picture, as well as **subject-specific indicators** providing more in-depth information on specific areas of interest (e.g. right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, Islamist extremism). The first set of core indicators captures the **spread and nature of criminal activity** and comprises incidence, share in violent criminal activity, and share in overall criminal activity. It accounts for the number of crimes of interest and how they figure in the general crime picture in the country. It also captures the nature and differences between extremist offences – proportion of specific crime subtypes. The second cluster of indicators measure the **spread and nature of actions** pertaining to the active supporters of extremist scene, as denoted by notable events and their participation, as well as the propensity of such gatherings to turn violent. The last set of indicators focuses on the **penetration of extremist ideas in society** measured by the participation in extremist or support organisations, share of the population offering only electoral support or active support beyond electoral, and general approval of radical ideas. Furthermore, depending on the issue examined, **subject-specific and supplementary indicators** should be taken into account to ensure a comprehensive analysis. These include the profiling of perpetrators, as well as reviewing the core characteristics of major known extremist organisations or movements in order to assess their intent and

capability to cause harm. Supplementary indicators include analyses of **extremist content, activity and engagement on the internet** through different techniques.

The indicators are distributed in **five domains of national level threat and risk picture**: spread of criminal activity, nature of criminal activity, spread of actions, nature of actions and approval/social penetration. Such an approach to indicators enables the compiling institution to maintain relevance, give an accurate picture as to the state of play and remain firmly in the realm of unclassified information, while being parsimonious enough not to over-stretch the resources of the institution.

CORE INDICATOR DOMAINS AND NATIONAL THREAT SIGNIFICANCE

National significance		
Active threat	High risk	Potential risk
1. Criminal activity (spread) / 2. Criminal activity (nature)	3. Actions (spread) / 4. Actions (nature)	5. Approval/social penetration

All sets of core indicators are dependent on the availability and quality of statistical data and intelligence gathered systematically by the respective institutions, as well as the analytical and resource capability of the compiling authority to process such data and utilise alternative sources of information on proxy indicators, for example through monitoring of online content. Regular surveys of social attitudes as well as victimisation surveys are also required to complement the assessment of the national threat picture.

The foundation of the tool based on statistical data (the core indicators) captures the core violent and non-violent manifestations of extremism, while the adjustable (qualitative) component (supplementary indicators) allows for an in-depth analysis of all facets relevant to specific phenomena of interest in the national setting.

The applicability of the situational assessment methodology was tested in three countries from Central and Southeast Europe – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Greece. Pilot national studies were conducted in each country aiming at evaluating the data collection and analytical capacity of all relevant national institutions, providing review of extremist trends as per available data and formulating recommendations for improvement of national data collection systems in view of the preparation of regular situation assessment reports of extremist trends. The three countries differ in terms of the specifics of the policy and legislative context, the historical development of extremist threats, the availability of data and the

level of preparedness of respective institutions to produce analytical products in the field of extremism and related trends.

In the Czech Republic an annual situational report on extremism is already in place, compiled by the Ministry of the Interior, which largely served as the base for developing the present methodology. Furthermore, there is a well-established tradition in monitoring, statistical reporting and assessment of extremist trends since the 1990s. At the same time, the existing approach has some shortcomings in terms of analytical depth and the scope of indicators covered. These are addressed in the following sections through specific policy recommendations for improvement of the situational assessment in terms of data collection, analysis and presentation of findings.

In Greece, there is no dedicated situational report on extremist trends released by government institutions. Nevertheless, the national study established that several institutions have rich raw data that form a solid starting basis for the compilation of core as well as supplementary indicators, given that a more systematic approach to data quantification, extraction and subsequent analysis is introduced.

In Bulgaria, there are several practical obstacles which currently impede the direct application of the situational assessment methodology due to specifics of the criminal law framework and the lack of a unified system for statistical recording of relevant crimes across the respective institutions. Crimes with xenophobic or racist motives (such as bodily injury and murder) cannot be distinguished in the statistics from those with hooligan motives, which makes the calculation of core indicators on extremist criminal acts impossible at present. Further problems with respect to the registration of extremism-related crimes, high latency rates, and notable events are explored and recommendations are put forward that will facilitate the development of a sufficient evidentiary basis and analytical capacity within law enforcement, intelligence and criminal justice institutions allowing for the establishment of analytical tools capturing the present state and trends in extremism in Bulgaria.

Despite these differences, in all three contexts, the **proposed methodology enables a more comprehensive and systematic assessment of extremist criminal tendencies that would allow for the formulation of specific, evidence-based strategic as well as operational priorities**. To achieve this, a number of steps can be undertaken in each country.

Czech Republic

- Include in situational reporting data on hate crime perpetrated by individuals not affiliated with any specific radical organisation in order to ensure for a more comprehensive representation of extremist criminal tendencies.
- Draft clear guidelines on how crimes are to be recorded in order to minimise mistakes in registration by police officers.
- Deepen the degree of analysis. More reflection is needed on figures presented both in the extremist actors and activities section as well as in chapters on criminal statistics.
- Institute a systematic approach for assessing the degree of agreement with

radical ideas among the general population in order to be able to account and anticipate rises in popularity of extremist actors.
- Fine-tune terminology and data collection practices and among different institutions to ensure comparability of statistics.

Greece

- The Hellenic Police should try to increase their data collection capacity across the area of far-right events, as quite often such events pave the way for racist attacks.
- The Hellenic Police should quantify the available data regarding prosecuted individuals for potential hate crimes. It should further adopt indicators on the proportion of hate crimes sub-types in order to extract as much information as possible from the victims' testimonies regarding the qualitative characteristics of racist attacks.
- The Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN) should quantify the qualitative information at its disposal, which concerns the modus operandi, characteristics, perpetrators, victims, and sites of racist attacks. It should improve data collection on attacks against religious and ethnic minorities. It should also draw on public opinion survey data in order to complement its own data.
- RVRN and the Hellenic Police should start collecting data on a regular basis regarding online hate speech.
- The General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights should ensure the validity and reliability of collected data by producing a single template, which will be used and completed by competent authorities (i.e. courts and the Hellenic Police) during data collection process. Each incident of racist violence that is reported to the Hellenic Police should be assigned a unique ID number, which will enable the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights to follow-up each case at a later stage.

Bulgaria

- Amend the *Criminal Code* to include racist and xenophobic motives in the qualified constituent elements for all types of violent crimes. A more immediate solution can be the introduction of a requirement to record the motivation behind the crime in police, prosecution and court data.
- Develop clear definitions of core legal concepts such as racist and xenophobic motivation, fascist and anti-demoractic ideology, etc., to facilitate identification, investigation and prosecution under the appropriate *Criminal Code* provision.
- Establish data gathering mechanisms that allow for the release of aggregated data along the proposed indicators that do not compromise confidentiality and actively encourage its publication to foster analysis by actors outside of law enforcement.
- Develop an institutional mechanism for the collection of data on the relevant indicators and designate a responsible authority for the compilation of the situational assessment as part of its functions.
- Conduct regular victimisation surveys in order to assess the share of latent criminality. Conduct regular surveys of the public attitudes towards extremist ideas and agendas in order to assess the level of penetration of radical and extremist ideas within society.

1. INTRODUCTION

Violent extremism is one of the major challenges Europe is currently facing. The threat is both external as well as internal as indicated by the rise in home-grown Islamist terrorists. In addition, dormant inter-ethnic tensions have been reinvigorated by the refugee crisis and have contributed to the rise of nationalistic and anti-immigrant movements in Europe and an increase in far-right aggression.

Given the significance of the phenomenon within Europe and beyond, national institutional infrastructures are faced with the challenge to adopt new methods and capacities which would allow governments to address the complex security and social challenges presented by such processes. Without recognition of the real scope, nature and potential harm of such trends by a wide range of institutional actors, issues of radicalisation and violent extremism cannot be tackled at their roots, while if they remain unaddressed, they can further advance division and polarisation and trigger reactionary and extremist attitudes in other parts of society.

The current situational assessment methodology focuses on the phenomenon of non-violent and violent extremism, including hate crimes. While radicalisation is understood as a process which may or may not lead to violent actions, the current methodology is concerned with **the end products and manifestations of radicalisation,**[1] such as **violent and non-violent extremism and associated crimes** (including hate crimes and hate speech) and terrorism.

1.1. DEFINITIONS

Although there is no universally accepted definition, extremism more broadly is used "to refer to political ideologies that oppose a society's core values and principles. In the context of liberal democracies, this could be applied to any ideology that advocates racial or religious supremacy and/or opposes the core principles of democracy and human rights. However, the term can also be used to describe the methods through which political actors attempt to realise their aims, that is, by using means that 'show disregard for the life, liberty, and human rights of others'. Many governments refer to terrorists as 'violent extremists'".[2]

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[1] See further CSD (2017) *Monitoring Radicalisation: A framework for risk indicators*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

[2] Neumann, P. (2011) *Prisons and Terrorism. Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries*. London: ICSR. p. 12.

Violent extremism in turn is understood as "advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives", although no universal definition exists.[3]

The term „extremism" is more often used as an umbrella term in law enforcement and criminal justice practice rather than as a legal one. From the perspective of criminal law, a number of criminal offences with extremist motivation can be included in a situational assessment as per the present methodology, depending on the national legal framework and the nature of the threat. Most notably such crimes may include: hate crimes, crimes against the equality of citizens, crimes against humanity, crimes against the state and the constitutional order, terrorism, among others.

**Box 1.   Examples of policy definitions of extremism
            and related terms at national level**

Policy definitions of extremism and related terms used at national level differ.

According to the **UK** *Counter-Extremism Strategy 2015*, extremism is "the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs".[4]

The **Norwegian** *Action Plan against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism* defines violent extremism as „activities of persons and groups that are willing to use violence in order to achieve their political, ideological or religious goals", while hate crime is understood as „criminal acts that are fully or partially motivated by negative attitudes to a person or group's actual or perceived ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, sexual orientation, gender expression or disability. Violent extremism is the most extreme form of hate crime".[5]

Germany has implemented an effective and transparent registration standards for **politically motivated crimes** and a definitional system was introduced in 2001 for the statistical recording of such offences.[6] Politically motivate criminality captures:[7] 1) *crimes against the state* (high treason, use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations, membership in a terrorist organisation, denigration of the state and its symbols, abduction) and 2) *crimes with a political motive*, including: a) crimes against the political process, the achievement or the prevention of political aims, or the implementation of political decisions; b) crimes against the liberal democratic order or its essential characteristics, the existence and the security of the federal state structures; c) crimes which through the use of violence (or preparatory actions) endanger the foreign interests of the country; d) crimes against persons because of their political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, race, skin colour, religion, sexual orientation, disability, outward appearance and social status (hate crimes).

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[3]   USAID (2011) *The development response to violent extremism and insurgency.* p. 2.

[4]   HM Government (2015) *Counter-Extremism Strategy.* Command paper 9148. London: Counter-Extremism Directorate, Home Office. p. 9.

[5]   Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security (2014) Action Plan against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism, p. 7.

[6]   Bundesministerium des Inneren (2016) *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2015.* Berlin: BMI.

[7]   Bundesministerium des Inneren (2016) Politisch motivierte Kriminalität.

> **Box 1.**   **Examples of policy definitions of extremism and related terms at national level (continued)**
>
> In the **Czech Republic**, the term extremism is understood as "ideological attitudes which deviate markedly from the rule of law and constitutional law, show elements of intolerance, and attack democratic constitutional principles as defined in the Czech constitutional order."[8] In its annual report on the issue of extremism, the Ministry of the Interior uses extremism as a unified term to denote "activities aimed at the destruction of the constitutional establishment and the values it protects".[9] The term "crime with an extremist context" is also used in the annual reports on extremism, which is understood as "such types of crime which are reasonably judged to have been motivated or influenced by extremist attitudes".[10]
>
> In **Bulgaria**, the national *Strategy for Countering Radicalisation and Terrorism 2015 – 2020* defines violent extremism as "a phenomenon where individuals or groups of people support or carry out ideologically motivated violence to achieve their ideological goals".[11]

1.2. NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ASSESSMENT REPORTS ON EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

Many European states carry out terrorism and extremism threat assessments and situational analyses, resulting in estimates of the levels of threat (often publicly communicated) and knowledge of the spread, nature and trends in extremist and terrorist activity (which may or may not be made public). Such situational reports are of interest for politicians, professionals from law enforcement and intelligence, but also other state and non-state bodies and practitioners, academia, civil society, media and the general public. They can be part of an overall assessment of security threats, or stand-alone annual reports. While it is within the main tasks of national intelligence and security agencies to monitor such trends, it is not always the case that such information is translated into analytical and strategic products that are used beyond the tactical and operational goals of these agencies and that are used to inform broader government strategies and policy measures and setting priorities in counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism through providing a situational picture of trends and related threats.

More comprehensive analyses of horizontal trends and threats are produced on an annual basis by specialised intelligence and law enforcement agencies, providing statistical data and analysis of the scope of extremist violence and

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[8]   Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2003) *Report on the Issue of Extremism in the Czech Republic in 2002*. Prague: Ministry of the Interior, pp. 9-10.

[9]   Ibid, p. 9.

[10]   Ibid.

[11]   *Стратегия за противодействие на радикализацията и тероризма 2015 – 2020*. Приета с решение № 1039 на Министерския съвет от 30.12.2015 г.

crimes committed over the past year. They often draw on a wide range of data and information sources, such as government statistics, media reporting, academic studies, surveys etc. However, not all countries publish such reports. Where this is the case, the reports often include information on the situation regarding extremist groups and radicalisation trends.

There are different approaches in compiling strategic analyses, depending on whether they are retrospective (reporting on past developments and actions undertaken by the authorities), situational assessments (taking stock of the extent and scope of the current threat) or focussed on forecasting future threats and scenarios, or a combination of all elements.

The *Annual Threat Assessment* published by the Norwegian Police Security Service includes information on trends and risks posed by Islamist, far-right and far-left radicals in the country.[12] The Czech *Extremism Report,* published frequently since 1999 and the German Report on the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungschutzbericht)[13] published since 1968 are other examples of a mapping of extremist groups and trends, being mainly of retrospective and situational nature. The quarterly *Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands* has been published since 2005 and together with policy implications since 2013. Often, information on global developments as they pertain to the national context is taken into account in these threat assessments. Some countries carry out a systematic mapping of international developments that impact on their national security – the Danish Defence Intelligence Service annual intelligence risk assessment is one example.[14]

Situational and threat assessments are usually carried out by the police and/or intelligence services. The UK and Belgium are examples of a wider involvement of institutions in conducting these analyses. In 2006, Belgium established a Coordinated Unit for Threat Assessment. The Unit includes representation from a number of institutions in order to ensure a comprehensive picture of the risk radicalisation and terrorism pose to Belgian society: the State Security, the Military Intelligence Service, the Integrated Police Service, the Federal Public Service of Home Affairs, the Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Public Service of Mobility and Transportation and the Federal Public Service of Finance. The Coordinated Unit for Threat Assessment is involved in the preparation of the terrorism, extremism and radicalism section of the National Police Security Image which forms basis for the National Security Plan.

Examples of well-developed instruments for situational analyses are the German Verfassungschutzbericht or the Czech annual *Extremism Report,*[15] which served as a basis for developing the current methodology. The German report goes beyond

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[12] Norwegian Police Security Service (2014) *Annual Threat Assessment 2014*.

[13] Bundeministerium des Inneren (2015) *Verfassungschutzbericht 2014*. Berlin: Bundesminister des Innern.

[14] Danish Defence Intelligence Services (2015) *Intelligence Risk Assessment 2015. An assessment of developments abroad impacting on Danish security*.

[15] Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic (2016) Documents on the Fight against Extremism http://www.mvcr.cz/mvcren/article/documents-on-the-fight-against-extremism.aspx

describing situational developments, and also includes an assessment of their significance as well as the threats and risks associated with observed phenomena. The German Verfassungschutzbericht is by far the most comprehensive annual report in terms of scope and depth of the data and analysis presented, including on:

- Overview of the nature and quantity of politically and religiously motivated criminality and extremist acts, trends over time.
- Analysis of main trends and developments pertaining to right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, Islamism and Islamist terrorism, the Salafi scene, foreign nationalist movements. The indicators analysed include supporters and sympathisers base of the extremist scene, use of violence and motivations.
- Analysis of main actors: extremist groups, organisations, movements and political parties (members, ideology and motivations, propaganda, recruitment and radicalisation factors, targets, weapons possession, mobilisation and threat potential).
- International conflicts and their domestic impact.
- Analysis of main repressive and preventive measures.

This data is provided by intelligence agencies mainly, but also by law enforcement bodies and other government agencies (most notably ministries of defence and foreign policy), judicial bodies (courts, prosecution, and probation services), academics and sociological researchers. Open source data (media, internet, opinion polls) and academic studies can also serve to complement the situation analysis. Collating this data allows putting together a more comprehensive picture of the spread and nature of violent radical activities and the actors involved.

Beyond the detailed overview and situational analysis of horizontal trends across consistent indicators, such reports could include two further aspects of particular added value for policy-makers and operational planning: threat assessment and projections (estimative intelligence analysis). **Threat assessment of intent and capability** of extremist actors to cause harm should be ideally an integral component of such a situational assessment report. It allows the assessment of available intelligence, law enforcement information and open source data on the intent and capability of extremist actors to cause harm, or the immediate threats associated with extremist actors.

Methodologies for extremist and terrorist threat assessment in some cases are similar to the standard methodology for organised crime threat assessment and focus on the capability and intent of actors to cause harm. National agencies such as the UK National Crime Agency use unclassified annual threat assessments of organised crime to raise public awareness and law-enforcement sensitive versions to inform both law enforcement priorities for tackling serious organised crime and other relevant initiatives, such as changes in legislation, regulation or policy.[16] Similar reports exist also on the internal and external threats of extremism and terrorism. For example, the Europol *Terrorism Situation and Trend Report* (TE-SAT)[17] provides an overview of terrorist attacks, arrested suspects, convictions

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[16] Ratcliffe, A. (2008) *Intelligence-led Policing*. Oregon: Willian Publishing.

[17] Europol (2015) *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trends Report 2015*. Europol.

and penalties imposed, violent extremist activities related to religiously inspired terrorism, ethno-nationalism and separatism, right-wing, left-wing and anarchist terrorism and single issue terrorism in the EU.

Another example from the USA is the *Virginia Terrorism Threat Assessment*[18] which provides specific analysis of "the presence of extremists, evidence of trends linked to terrorism, and the abundance of potential targets". It provides analysis of potential extremist and terrorist threat groups and makes projections on their attack capability, level of influence, fundraising and criminal activities.

Table 1. Assessment of capability, limitations and vulnerabilities of criminal groups

	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Group 5
Corruption	High	High	Unknown	Medium	Nil
Violence	High	High	Unknown	Low	Low
Infiltration	High	High	Medium	High	Low
Expertise	High	High	High	Low	Medium
Sophistication	High	High	Medium	Medium	High
Subversion	High	High	Medium	High	Nil
Strategy	High	Medium	High	Medium	Unknown
Discipline	High	Medium	Medium	Low	Medium
Insulation	High	Medium	High	Medium	Medium
Intelligence	High	Medium	Nil	Medium	Unknown
Mult. Enterprises	Medium	High	High	Low	Medium
Mobility	High	Medium	Medium	Medium	High
Stability	High	High	Medium	Medium	High
Scope	High	High	High	Low	High
Monopoly	Medium	High	High	High	Low
Grp. Cohesiveness	Medium	Low	High	Medium	High
Continuity	Medium	Low	Medium	Nil	Medium
Links to Other O.C.	High	Medium	High	Low	High
Links to Crim Ext.	Low	Low	Nil	Low	Low

Legend: High / Medium / Low / Nil / Unknown

Source: Project SLEIPNIR: An Analytical Technique for Operational Priority Setting.

[18] Commonwealth of Virginia Department of State Police Virginia Fusion Center (2009) *2009 Virginia Terrorism Threat Assessment.* Virginia: Department of State Police Virginia Fusion Center.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police have developed an analytical technique for **Operational Priority Setting** known as SLEIPNIR.[19] It is used to rank-order organised criminal groups, as well as terrorist groups, in terms of their relative capabilities, limitations and vulnerabilities. As a component of strategic intelligence assessments, the tool is aimed at producing assessments to recommend strategic enforcement and criminal intelligence priorities to senior law enforcement officers.

1.3. ABOUT THE SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT

The present **situational assessment methodology** aims to close the gap in dealing with violent and non-violent extremism and associated crimes through developing a mechanism for continuous observation of macro trends. The situational assessment methodology on extremist trends provides a methodological framework for the systematic collection and analysis of statistical data, open source data and intelligence information pertaining to extremist actors and activities, for the purposes of developing **regular situational reports** of the spread, nature and trends in extremism and violent radicalism. The present methodology is designed to aid law enforcement and intelligence experts and analysts involved in compiling regular assessments of extremist trends.

Situational assessment is understood here as the systematic process of gathering, analysing, triangulating and communicating data to inform planning decisions. The output of the assessment is an analytical product (usually in the form of annual reports). The end users of these reports are politicians, managers of law enforcement and intelligence bodies, academic experts, media and the general public. Classified sections of the reports can be compiled to serve operational decision making within the respective specialised bodies involved in countering violent extremism.

A situational assessment monitors and analyses the spread, nature and trends in **crime-relevant behaviour,** spread and nature of **extremist activity and support for it,** presenting different threat levels (active criminal threat, support and approval).[20] It also provides an assessment of the current capability and intent of known extremist actors and individuals, so that the potential harm to society can be determined and respective mitigation strategies designed. Where terrorist acts are rare occurrences, situational analysis of trends in extremist acts can be complemented by assessments of the threats associated with extremist groups and known individual extremist actors, by analysing their intent and capabilities to cause harm to society. The idea is to enhance the situational analysis of present trends by providing estimative intelligence on the likelihood and direction of future developments related to the extremist environment (both violent and non-violent) and the potential harm they could cause.

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[19] Strang, S. (2005) *Project SLEIPNIR: An Anlytical Technique for Operational Priority Setting*. Ontario: Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

[20] For further details on the concepts of support and approval, please refer to Figure 1 and Table 2.

Furthermore, on the basis of trend analysis, prognoses of future developments in the extremist environment and potential threats should be made so that resources for countering these trends can be allocated appropriately. This analysis would be based on sources such as official government statistics, criminal statistics of police, prosecutors and courts, open source intelligence (media, other open data), as well as intelligence information gathered by specialised intelligence and law enforcement services. However, in many countries a major obstacle to compiling such an analytical product is the lack of consistent body of legal and policy definitions of relevant criminal offences. Another key obstacle is the lack of mechanisms for collection of such statistical data based on clear indicators. This methodology aims at addressing this gap through providing such indicators and guidance on their systematic collection and analysis.

Chapter 2 lays out the basic methodologic framework and indicators for the situational assessment of extremist trends. Chapter 3 presents a summary of the key findings of a study on the applicability of the methodology in Bulgaria, Greece and the Czech Republic based on review of currently available data, as well as a preliminary analysis of the key indicators.

2. COMPILING SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENTS OF EXTREMIST TRENDS

2.1. SITUATIONAL REPORTING APPROACH

The review of comparable European documents reveals two broader approaches to situational reporting on violent political acts along the following dividing lines:

- Focus – current intelligence vs estimative/predictive intelligence;
- Detail – narrow, regionalised or otherwise fractured vs general, aggregate or fuzzy;
- Depth – only actual data vs estimates on latent phenomena;
- Data – statistics-driven vs issue-driven.

This methodology adopts a data-driven approach to current intelligence that only includes further elaborated supplementary qualitative assessments at an appropriate level of the analysis. Such an approach is advantageous in terms of incremental innovations and on-going enrichment throughout the yearly iterations.[21]

Notwithstanding the limits of such methodological choice, the picture provided by such a report would be understandable and rich enough to fulfil the needs of the security system in the respective country. Most importantly, its products would be actionable. Its only major shortcoming is the omission of latent criminality (unregistered for various reasons, usually cultural or local) and exclusion of informed estimates on subcultures or clandestine memberships in open or clandestine organisations. Although documents intended for publication should include only independently verifiable information, the option to include additional indicators (such as estimative ones) remains open and the following text presents a basic model for a report. The aspect of latent criminality can be measured by including results from victimisation surveys, if available, in the analysis. To include a classified section in the report, not for public presentation, is another possible solution.

As a so-called current intelligence product, the situational assessment should meet intelligence drafting standards and protocols.[22] However, to be used by policy makers and the general public (therefore to be unclassified), provisions should be made for:

- Consistency and comparability;
- Parsimony;
- Full protection of sources and methods.

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[21] Assuming the annual period of report compilation; at operational level, the data on indicators included should be evaluated monthly, for operational purposes only.

[22] E.g. Clauser, J. (2008) *Intelligence Research and Analysis*. Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow Press.

In order to enhance its added value, the report should provide a clear picture of the change happening throughout the reporting interval, indicate wider trends and context information, and become the basis for further exploration by interested readers. The recommended content structure of such report should include:

- Executive summary;
- Context and background information, rationale for reporting;
- Data sources identification (to the level permitted while respecting previously set criteria of confidentiality); conceptualisations (definitions of key terms) and, where necessary, criteria for inclusion/exclusion at the level of individual indicators (definition of scope);
- Core indicators and their role in portraying the overall situational picture;
- Breakdown of the subjects of special interest (using a fraction of the core and supplementary indicators amended by problem-specific set – e.g. Islamist extremism, right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, etc.);
- Geographical breakdown;
- Short-term, medium-term, and long-term trend analysis;
- Actionable, policy-relevant review.

2.2. INDICATORS FOR SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT

The situational assessment reporting s structured along three domains of indicators and analyses:

- **Core indicators**: aimed at presenting the essential elements of the national threat picture. These pertain to the spread and nature of extremist activity among three different segments of society:
  - *active threat: criminal activity spread and nature* (incidence of crime of interest, share in overall violent crimes, share in overall criminal activities; proportions of each type of crime of interest);
  - *high risk: actions spread and nature* (number and type of notable events, participation, violence present);
  - *potential risk: approval/social penetration of extremist ideas* (membership in extremist or support organisation, active support, passive support, general approval).
- **Subject-specific and supplementary indicators**: more in-depth analysis of each subject of interest (e.g. right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, Islamist extremism), including the main organisational actors and their characteristics, characteristics of perpetrators and crimes/activities, analysis of internet content, activities and engagement.
- **Trend analysis:** short, medium and long term.

2.2.1. Core indicators: national threat picture

In order to ensure clear understanding and accurate assessments, it is suggested that the most clearly visible and understandable indicators are examined to achieve two objectives:

- to determine the intensity of actual activity of extremist elements (notably organisations);
- to determine – by including wider indicators – scale and scope of potential support on the ground.

The information should be gathered continuously, using modern means of reporting via information systems. Information on wider social issues, which is less dynamic than information on the criminal environment, can be gathered on a two to three-year basis through population surveys, although this would entail additional costs.

In order to generate sufficient information at a desirable level of accuracy, the situational assessment should be structured along 12 core indicators. These indicators are distributed in five domains of national level threat and risk picture (see Figure 1): (1) criminal activity – spread, 2) criminal activity – nature, 3) actions – spread, 4) actions – nature and 5) approval/social penetration. Such an approach to indicators should enable the compiling institution to maintain relevance, give an accurate picture as to the state of play and remain firmly in the realm of unclassified information. Yet, it is parsimonious enough not to over-stretch the resources of the compiling agency.

Individual indicators are described in the Annex. An overview of the core indicators, their brief explanations and the respective data requirements are shown in Table 2.

Figure 1. Core indicator domains and national threat significance

Source: Authors.

Table 2.   Overview of core indicators, meaning and data sources

Threat level	Core indicator	Explanation/significance	Sources and data generation needs
Active threat (criminal acts)	Incidence (crimes of interest)	This indicator reflects the number of registered crimes as per each of the Criminal Code provisions included in the scope of the assessment. It shows how heavily affected is the geographical area of interest by the specific crime group. The definition and scope of the indicator "crimes of interest" would differ depending on the national legislation.	**Primary source**: Crime statistics **Alternative source**: Victimisation surveys **Essential requirements**: ability to register crimes by type/nature with supplementary information, ability to regularly report/collect such data centrally
	Share of crimes of interest in violent criminal activity	This indicator shows how big a problem the violent actions with radical motivation are nation-wide (or regionally). The use of this indicator allows to establish the significance of the phenomena in terms of immediate societal security. Generally, the higher the value of this indicator, the more repressive or pre-emptive posture needs to be adopted; the lower the number, the more effective becomes the political and preventive approach.	
	Share of crimes of interest in overall criminal activity	This indicator shows the significance of crimes with extremist motivation nation-wide (or regionally). Generally, the higher the value of this indicator, the more immediate action needs to be taken. The indicator's relevance may be contested when other types of crime do rise or fall substantially over short period of time. The share of crimes attributed to extremism and violent radicalisation may then rise or decline without any change in own numbers.	
	Proportion of specific crime sub-types	Number of specific crimes registered per sub-type. This indicator shows what shape the criminal extremist activities take. The use of this indicator allows to prioritise interventions according to the risks from various behavioural patterns within the extremist domain.	
High risk (actions)	Number and type of notable events Participation Violent attitudes presented	This indicator shows the overall incidence and nature of non-criminal and/or public facing activities in support of radical/extremist political* agenda. Allows to assess how wide spread extremist front-end activities are (signifying how organised the respective movement is) and their predominant locations.	**Primary**: Law enforcement **Complementary**: Open source data **Requirements**: dependent on law enforcement monitoring and after-action reporting ability

Table 2.   Overview of core indicators, meaning and data sources (continued)

Threat level	Core indicator	Explanation/significance	Sources and data generation needs
Potential risk (agreement/social penetration)	Membership in extremist or support organisations	Official or estimated number of members of known extremist movements/groups/organisations. Membership size of various ideological denominations gives relatively accurate picture of the importance of the agenda brought to bear by such movement. Hence, it should be used to decide the prominence which should be given to such issues in mainstream political agenda.	Depending on the definition/ choice of organisations to be covered. Can rely on intelligence, official data or indirect estimates based on other open source data.
	Active support by the general public beyond electoral support Electoral support by the general public Social penetration by radical ideas (approval of radical ideas)	This indicator pertains to different levels of willingness among the population to support radical agendas (active support beyond electoral; electoral only; general approval only). It aims to establish wider societal risk from a spread of radical ideas. People providing or considering to provide active support to a movement beyond the electoral support are at higher risk from recruitment into the rank and file. By revealing the wider population strongly feeling about the issues shaped by the movement and willing to engage in its activities, the indicator helps to understand the popular appeal of such movement, and success of its strategy. Understanding overall penetration by prejudicial and other ideas signifying inclination to radical worldview completes the risk picture and represents the missing information useful in intervention designing at the widest scale and longest timescale.	Regular surveys

* *For the purposes of this indicator list, the term political describes also religious and single issue agendas, prejudicially motivated or any other world-view specific actions.*

Source: Authors.

While it is customary to present nation-wide assessments, which are of interest to policy makers, media and even the general public, for intervention purposes the relevant level of initial analysis begins with the local administrative area (depending on public administration structure). First, such an approach allows for granularity sufficient for local targeting in terms of specialised personnel, resource allocation

and intervention focus. Second, this approach reveals a picture accurate enough to be used in higher-level evaluative work or policy development. Third, there is the issue of comparability. While regional level indicators can provide useful internal comparisons, the national level indicators provide a reference framework, e.g. some indicators might carry the same name, yet be intrinsically different. Thus, it is advisable to compile the indicators at regional level and using aggregate value for national level. This principle is universally applicable to any drill-down option in terms of statistical indicators.

This building blocks approach allows to:

a) Compile relevant information at various administrative levels, enabling the report to be tailored to specific users;
b) Establish credible information on elements of society that are active or potentially active in various radical and extremist movements (indicators are organised in subsets focusing on active criminals, potential recruiting ground of active sympathisers of the movement, and, finally, of such elements of society displaying a risk of transition to active support);
c) Establish a set of core indicators to allow future trend analysis and, thus, provide a basis for limited predictive assessments.

There are certain resource requirements common to all such indicator sets whose absence may hamper such report preparation. First, there is the **data availability issue**. Most of the indicators used in the proposed set require precise crime statistics gathered continuously and reported periodically to the respective body at central level. Moreover, standard crime statistics are not sufficient, each crime of interest would have to be accompanied with metadata specific to its nature, characteristics, and motivation, etc., based on the list of issues of interest. The substantial differences between diverse sources of statistics need to be taken into account as well. The very same act of crime, both violent and non-violent, may be reported and classified in a completely different manner in the police statistics, which reflects the initial assessment and qualification of an individual act, and in the court's statistics, which reflects the final stage of the criminal proceedings. Here, after longer or shorter period of time, the incident may fall into a quite different category of crime or even completely lose the initial "extremist" or "radical" attributes.

Some indicators presented in Table 2 require meticulous intelligence collection and after-action reporting at the level of security measures implemented in relation to known extremist activity. Information such as the scale and scope of participation at individual events, any extremist content presented or level of violence occurring, or sympathy to violence displayed are usually beyond the realm of information systems gathering standard crime statistics. Hence more sophisticated reporting mechanism needs to be in place, covering specialised units in touch with the community of interest in both the preventive and enforcement domains.

Lastly, in the indicators used in domain 5 – measuring the level of general penetration of public consciousness by extremist ideas – the information is beyond the reach of law-enforcement agencies, and should remain so. Repeated national-level surveys are advisable here. The cycle of two to three years is

generally sufficient as the penetration levels remain more stable than actual individual resolve to engage actively in extremist activity. Should there be major challenges in establishing such a survey cycle, more sophisticated indicators can be constructed, or generally available data on other survey results can be used and recalculated to give at least an indicative picture. To conduct such an approximation is highly recommended to supplement previous components.

2.2.2. Subject-specific and supplementary indicators

Having established the general national threat picture, the second section of the report should focus on topical subjects of interest both in terms of policy and security. For this exercise, three principal **subjects of interest** have been identified – right-wing extremism (RWE), left-wing extremism (LWE), and Islamist extremism. However, any other subject of interest, for example variations of single-issue extremism (animal rights, separatists, etc.) can be identified and added to the report. For methodological purposes, subject matter identified as "other" should be introduced in all mechanisms.

Again, the building block structure is used to construct these thematic sections of the situational report. At this depth of analysis, the departure point to assess the individual influence of subjects of interest on the general national threat picture is from already known (recorded) indicators, supplemented by further qualitative analysis and subject-specific indicators. Qualitative elements of analysis should cover major issues, ideological changes and hot topics influencing the particular extremist segment/scene.

More in-depth analysis of **perpetrators of specific crimes** or sympathisers/participants in registered events can be included, focussing on aggregated data on indicators such as the socio-demographic and socio-economic profile, criminal histories, weapons possession, type of verdict, motivations, victims (see Table 3).[23] Where such data is not specifically systematised and recorded for the purposes of the situational assessment, complementary analyses of court files can be undertaken, which is however more labour-intensive.

Active extremist organisations and actors can then be included with basic profiles.[24] Such a **description of the most important known extremist groups** and movements should be attempted, including assessment of their current capability

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[23] The demographic profile of perpetrators may be easily misleading – it can only help to identify the background of the broader population group from which those willing to engage in certain type of activity emerge; however, the actual planners, or key logisticians – the vanguard of the movement – may have a completely different background, thus escaping the radar. Collecting relevant complementary data, such as former military service, employment histories and other elements of full personal profiles may be beyond the authority of the reporting organisations, in breach of data protection legislation, and, most importantly, seen as beside the point of national reporting.

[24] Any more than a basic profile should be retained for classified distribution only, as any estimates or threat analyses relating to individual groups would have to be sourced from criminal intelligence or intelligence services, thus disclosing the actual level of understanding such an organisation has about the actor in question. It should also be remembered that publicly distributed reports are often used as an intelligence source by rival parties.

and intent to cause harm, so that respective mitigation strategies can be designed. Ideally, the situational assessment of present trends should be enhanced by providing estimative intelligence on the likelihood and direction of developments related to violent extremism and the potential harm they could cause. Possible core themes include qualitative analysis of organisational characteristics such as structure, leadership, membership base, rhetoric and ideological goals, online presence strategy and tactics, main targets, use of violence and confrontation potential, links with other organisations/criminal world, etc. However, such an analysis is likely to rely largely on intelligence data, hence a more comprehensive assessment may be limited to the classified version of the report only. Open source information can also be used to complement such assessments.

The overview of potential variables and themes for further assessment at subject matter level is presented in Table 3. It should be stressed, that the subject specific section of the *Situational Assessment Report* can take different shapes and sizes, depending on the level of detail required and purpose of such section within the overall approach to the study. The content of these subject-specific sections would be largely determined by the actual spread and level of threat each subject matter represents in the country, as well as the available intelligence and other data. Hence, specific and detailed indicator profiles – as used for the core indicators – are not provided here; rather, examples of such indicators and tentative themes are suggested in Table 3.

A uniform pattern to reporting on each indicator should be followed, using same method of representation to ease the understanding. Furthermore, the subjects of interest should be coherently reported in a dedicated sub-section of the report, hence the indicators should not depict shares of all subjects of interest at one indicator, but rather show the share of individual subjects of interest in each indicator in a row. This approach should enable the reporting authority to conduct trend analysis within each subject of interest without unnecessary clutter and distortion.

In order to estimate the dangers related to each of the subjects of interest, it is necessary to determine their **share in the general threat** described by the indicators in section 2.2.1. While the logic and requirements of each individual indicator apply, all registered crimes and events need to be accompanied by supplementary information on the specific motivation driving the perpetrator/organiser.

Supplementary indicators should allow the reporting authority to put a specific light on the subject of interest with respect to its specific features, generally complementing the five domains described above. Preserving the domain structure enables the reporting authority to preserve the general coherence of the report.

Supplementary indicators should be constructed to evaluate the spread and the nature of activities within the subject of interest. In their construction, the reporting authority should consider the behavioural models typical for this subject area. This can pose significant constraints on attempts to produce valid assessments of Islamist extremism, as the current nature of this threat is highly distributed, with a loose-network organisation, or none at all, and loose ideological ties.

Table 3.   Sample themes and indicators for subject-specific assessment

Report sub-sections	Subject-specific indicators, variables and themes	Source of information and type of analysis
1. Overview	Provide a narrative of recent developments and trends and an overall assessment of the threat presented by the specific extremist scene over the past year, emergence of new actors, magnitude of activities, etc.	
2. In-depth analysis of specific criminal offences and perpetrators	**Incidence and nature of crimes of interest** • Number of crimes recorded, cleared up, persons prosecuted, types of sentences • Regional breakdown • Analysis of nature, characteristics, and motivations • Estimated latency rates • Victims **Perpetrators of crimes of interest** • Socio-demographic and socio-economic profile (age, gender, occupation, education, marital status) • Type of crime committed/charged with • Criminal record (clear/investigated in the past/recidivists) • Weapons possession (proportion between overall legal weapons possession and perpetrators of extremist crimes who have obtained weapons legally) • Indicted, convicted • Other	**Source**: Ministry of Interior, Prosecutor's Office Courts **Type of analysis**: Statistical analysis, regional and national level, qualitative analysis Victimisation surveys
3. Actions (violent and non-violent)	• Number and nature of notable events (protests, marches, demonstrations, public gatherings, concerts with extremist background) • Number of participants, profile of participants • Number and background of arson attacks, violence against persons – not recorded in criminal statistics (frequency, target, motivation, etc.)	**Source**: MoI Other government bodies NGOs Media monitoring Social media, internet Victimisation surveys **Type of analysis**: Qualitative and statistical

Table 3.   Sample themes and indicators for subject-specific assessment (continued)

Report sub-sections	Subject-specific indicators, variables and themes	Source of information and type of analysis
4. Main actors **(organisations, groups, movements, individuals engaged in specific areas of activity)**	Overall estimates of the member/activist base of the respective extremist scene (possible categories: leaders, activists, militants/violent, followers, passive supporters) **Organisations/groups** • Structure and organisation • Membership base (overall and in the respective municipality/locality) – quantity and key characteristics (average age, background, social/educational status, etc.) • Leadership (name of key former and current figures and their operational function, background and criminal record) • Resources and channels of financing • Headquarters and areas of operation • Ideology/grievances/motivation • Strategy/tactics/mode of operation • Key moments in history/milestones • Major actions and targets • Recruitment and propaganda • Rhetoric • Media reach (magazines, online channels and social media) • Links and forms of cooperation with other/foreign extremist groups (strategic, tactical and structural similarities and differences), links with other radical subcultures • Criminal activity • Confrontational and violence potential • Standing with authorities (bans, sanctions, repressive measures, etc.) **Individuals** • Foreign fighters (detected number passed through the country, own citizens departed to war zones) • Known local persons with links to foreign extremist/terrorist organisations • Foreign nationals with terrorist links **Other subjects of interest** • Hidden places of worship or number of mosques identified as high-risk/radical; gathering places of extremist supporters, number of attendees • Other	**Sources**: MoI Intelligence Media (including social media) Interviews with supporters and former members Other open-source data **Type of analysis**: Qualitative and quantitative analysis, Strategic intelligence assessment
5. Other thematic areas		

Source: Authors.

The profiling of extremist organisations and groups may also be difficult to achieve in such detail as indicated in Table 3 (especially if the respective extremist scene is highly fragmented and lacks any firm organisational structures), and will mostly rely on intelligence data. Where an assessment of the **intent and capability of the most significant organisational actors** can be provided, it may be confined to the classified version of the report, while including only basic profiles in the public version.

In the case of **Islamist extremism**, additional indicators can include the estimated proportion of mosques where extremist ideas are preached in the total number of mosques and their geographical distribution, average membership in such radical mosques, and even existence and estimated number of hidden places of worship, subdivided into those hidden only and hidden for conspiratorial purposes can be included. Again, such information needs to be obtained from particular sources that may wish not to disclose the depth of knowledge they possess. This data, on the other hand, can supplement the "event" data collected easily on RWE and LWE, as activities in these subject areas do tend to have higher public profile.

Similarly, criminal statistics can be supplemented by estimated numbers of local inhabitants engaging in activities criminal or under scrutiny domestically, or who have or wish to travel abroad to "fight jihad" in countries such as Syria and Yemen, (commonly referred to as foreign fighters); these appear in all subject areas of interest. It can also include those who travel to Ukraine, a destination more likely for politically driven individuals of the extreme right.

Internet presence, activity, communication

The internet presents a promising source of information on the activity and communication patterns of extremist actors and the penetration of extremist ideas. The huge increase in the use of various social media, including favoured discussion fora (RWE/LWE) and the use of Facebook and similar direct social networking sites enables the security apparatus to compile indicators of indirect participation, support or idea penetration, even in conspiratorial movements. Quantitative indicators in this domain could be "visits per period of time" (for a predefined list of discussion fora); "articles posted per period of time" (for domestic fora); "mobilisation time" measuring the time interval to reach 1,000 members/likes for a page or post on Facebook or Twitter; number of followers for predefined figures and tags with extremist connection, etc.[25]

Another category of supplementary indicators can be developed along the lines of **content analysis of primary means of communication** between the individuals involved in subject area of interest. An easy, yet representative source would be internet fora and discussion groups. Supplementing mostly domain 5 issues of the core indicators (approval/penetration of radical ideas in society), there are three major areas of indicators providing suggestive evidence as to developments within the area of interest.

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[25] Measuring these indicators requires specialist skills, sometimes access to data restricted to internet providers, or commercial partner with such social media analytics capability, usually not present in law enforcement and naturally, undisclosed by intelligence agencies.

Figure 2. Suggested indicator domains for assessing extremist content and activity on the internet

Extremist content and online activity			
Spread		Nature	Engagement
Number of websites, forums, social media sites with extremist content; number of posts	Number of extremist organisations/ movements being present online	Type of content (ideas, propaganda) distributed and consumed via the internet	Number of members, followers, active and passive supporters; people engaging in discussions; number of visits; nature of discourse

Source: Authors.

First, it is the focus of discussions – notably which groups of population are targeted, blamed or confronted. Approaches to the study of this indicator may differ. However, if technically possible, the data should be collected on a monthly basis. The **content analysis** methods should be utilised to include supplementary text in an annual report, should there be a turbulent change within the movement, monthly reports can be made at operational level but continuous assessment should be the objective.

Second, there is the interpretation of political issues and worldview features. Again, conducted on the data preferably collected monthly (best to use same dataset for all three indicators under discussion), the **discourse analysis** should offer method selection wide enough to cover possible differing requirements of the audience consuming the situational assessment report.

Last, but not least, trending topics should be followed in each subject area of interest to grasp what issues facilitate the mobilisation of supporters or what events shape the strategy of actors involved. The dataset should preferably be scrutinised using automated **semantic analysis** software which, however, may require certain skills and knowledge in the field. Thus, it is advisable to limit the inquiry into the inner discussions going on between the supporters to the level of detail conforming to the audience which is targeted by the situational report.

Undertaking assessments of such subject-specific and supplementary indicators are likely to present significant challenges in terms of data availability and the

analytical capabilities required, especially where no similar analytical products have been compiled previously. Therefore, it may be more appropriate and feasible to first establish systematic and robust procedures for collection and systematisation of data on the core indicators before enriching the analysis with additional indicators.

2.2.3. Trend analysis

Summative reporting (at the end of the annual cycle), such as the situational assessment, although often utilised at its face value to directly link the findings to modifications of ongoing interventions or formulation of new, better tailored ones, is merely the data background for evaluative work. It is also, and more importantly, a basis for trend analysis which enables truly formative (ongoing) use of the report.

There are three trend layers available for exploration, each offering different information and different level of understanding of the phenomenon of extremism in the country.

The recommendations of this guide are limited to the most telling and most useful general analytical approaches, to preserve methodological parsimony, limit the capabilities required to conduct such analysis, and give an accurate picture. It is, of course, possible to amend this simple list by various other analytical approaches, especially if the data reporting system used for the Situational Assessment report is sophisticated and rich enough in terms of information, to allow data mining and/or use of more specific indicators summarised in Figure 2.[26]

Short-term (year to year)

As early as the second iteration of the report, the short-term trends can be observed. While it is possible to compare the statistical findings even at this stage, one should refrain from doing so due to the limited value of such comparison. Exceptions should be made if sharp changes in certain indicators are observed as it may point to significant events in the area observed via that indicator.

Usually, the short term trends should be given attention at the level of subjects of interest, notably the content and agenda, changes in strategy and significant developments on the scene. That implies the predominance of qualitative methods. A **structured, focused comparison** of year to year should be

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[26] Additional analytical approaches can include the use of Social Network Analysis methods (building the networks of co-offenders in support of medium term trend analysis) and Dynamic Network Analysis (connecting various features of individual crimes, people, organisations, etc., in time for the purposes of dynamic modelling in support of medium-term predictive analysis). For further reading on these methods see: Scott, J. (2000) *Social Networks*. New York: Sage; Carley, K. M. (2003) "Dynamic Network Analysis", In Breiger, R., Carley, K. and Pattison, P. (Eds.) *Dynamic Social Network Modelling and Analysis: Workshop Summary and Papers*. Washington, DC, Committee on Human Factors, National Research Council, National Research Council, pp. 133-145.

conducted. A descriptive approach should suffice, as any further inquiry would require linking the developments in the particular subject of interest to world or home events, conducted interventions or effectiveness of the security operation which, to be accurate, demands thorough evaluative work. Should such an evaluation be conducted separately, and it is advisable to link its findings to substantial changes in content and approach of actors covered by the Situational Assessment report.

Medium-term (from survey to survey)

It has been suggested above to conduct repeated surveys covering general public's attitude towards extremist ideas and agendas, every two to three years. This recommendation is based on two assumptions. First, conducting such surveys requires substantial costs.[27] Second, the attitudes of general public scarcely change so rapidly as to give significant observable differences year to year.

Medium term trends should, thus, be understood to include changes in general public's attitude and link them to developments in each subject of interest. In the long run, domain 5 indicators should provide a baseline for comparison with other domains. Yet, the stability of a foothold of radical ideas within society can change in response to successful political engagement by mainstream politicians or by radical political actors. Hence, the comparison should be made after every iteration of the survey, linking the changes in domains 1-4 across the interval to changes in domain 5.

The more iterations of the survey, the more reliable the baseline data, and the more useful the report becomes in terms of predictive value. For simple predictive use, the trend projections using **simple statistical methods** (such as regression analysis) can be constructed.

Long-term (across the timeline)

The predictive value of the report becomes most valuable only after several iterations of the above mentioned survey. In 10 years of consistent measurement and record keeping,[28] mathematical and statistical approaches can be employed to analyse the data further.

First, there is the trend in the data itself. Long-term retrospective trends again indicate the changes in the overall societal risks. Moreover, sudden changes in the values of the indicators can point to significant events or significantly successful/disastrous interventions.

The true value of long-term timeline analysis lies in its predictive use. The projection of data trends into the future (given the reliability condition of sufficient data – hence the recommended monthly interval for indicators in

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[27] In an ideal situation, such a survey should be conducted every year, yet the costs would become considerably higher, hence it is advisable to do it only when the issue gains predominance and such survey results become vital to decision-making process or to policy evaluation.

[28] In fact, limited to domains 1-4, one can successfully start longer-term trend analysis and predictive analysis after three iterations of the report.

domains 1-4) can serve as a basis for intervention/policy evaluation and giving the "what-if" picture prior to the start of such an initiative. Also, for some indicators closely linked to deployment of law enforcement and its workload, more sophisticated methods of trend projection (generally from the realm of **demand prediction functions**)[29] should be used in operational planning at the regional level or to perform other tasks, such as targeting of the preventive and pre-emptive measures.

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[29] It is advisable not to use extremely sophisticated methods such as machine learning algorithms, that are costly and their results are only marginally more precise than easier and more balanced approaches. For problem such as force planning, the exponential smoothing techniques should suffice in terms of ease and reliability balance.

3. APPLICATION OF THE SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHEAST EUROPE

The applicability of the situational assessment methodology was tested in three countries from Central and Southeast Europe – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Greece. Three pilot national studies were conducted in each country aiming at evaluating the data collection and analytical capacity of all relevant national institutions, providing review of extremist trends as per available data and formulating recommendations for improvement of national data collection systems in view of the preparation of regular situation assessment reports of extremist trends.

The three countries where the situational assessment methodology was tested differ in terms of the specifics of the policy and legislative context, the historical development of extremist threats, the availability of data and the level of preparedness of respective institutions to produce analytical products in the field of extremism and related trends.

In the Czech Republic an annual situational report on extremism is already in place, compiled by the Ministry of the Interior, which largely served as the base for developing the present methodology. Furthermore, there is a well-established tradition in monitoring, statistical reporting and assessment of extremist trends since the 1990s. At the same time, the existing approach has some shortcomings in terms of analytical depth and the scope of indicators covered. These are addressed in the following sections through specific policy recommendations for improvement of the situational assessment in terms of data collection, analysis and presentation of findings.

In Greece, there is no dedicated situational report on extremist trends released by government institutions. Nevertheless, the national study established that several institutions have rich raw data that form a solid starting basis for the compilation of core as well as supplementary indicators, given that a more systematic approach to data quantification, extraction and subsequent analysis is introduced.

In Bulgaria, there are several practical obstacles which currently impede the direct application of the situational assessment methodology due to specifics of the criminal law framework and the lack of a unified system for statistical recording of relevant crimes across the respective institutions. Crimes with xenophobic or racist motives (such as bodily injury and murder) cannot be distinguished in the statistics from those with hooligan motives, which makes the calculation of core indicators on extremist criminal acts impossible at present. Further problems with respect to the registration of extremism-related crimes, high latency rates, and notable events are explored and recommendations are put forward that will facilitate the development of a sufficient evidentiary basis and analytical capacity within law enforcement, intelligence and criminal justice institutions allowing for

the establishment of analytical tools capturing the present state and trends in extremism in Bulgaria.

Despite these differences, in all three contexts, the **proposed methodology enables a more comprehensive and systematic assessment of extremist criminal tendencies that would allow for the formulation of specific, evidence-based strategic as well as operational priorities**.

The country studies draw on a combination of data collection methods including desk research, written questionnaires to relevant institutions as well as stakeholder interviews. Desk research involved collection and analysis of institutional web sites, publicly available institutional data bases, reports and analyses, secondary academic literature including relevant sociological surveys, media coverage and court data where relevant. In addition, written data inquiries were sent to respective agencies and institutions requesting relevant data for the period 2010 – 2015. Furthermore, twelve qualitative semi-structured interviews with representatives of respective agencies and institutions were conducted after information from desk research and written data inquiries were collected and analysed. The aim of the qualitative semi-structured stakeholder interviews was to: a) collect information that has not been obtained through the first two methods (mainly related to the qualitative assessments of key indicators, threats and trends); b) clarify the reasons for the absence of data along certain categories and baseline indicators and various methodological issues; and c) discuss the potential of the respective agencies and institutions to collect presently missing data. The study in Bulgaria was complemented by review of court cases on extremist and hate crimes to explore to what extent such data could feed into regular data set along quantitative and qualitative indicators on perpetrators' and victims' profiles and the nature and motivation of the crime.[30]

3.1. CZECH REPUBLIC

3.1.1. Policy context

While West European countries have experienced varying degrees of radicalisation and Islamist attacks, the Czech Republic has generally been spared from terrorist acts. However, international developments like the situation in Syria, outgoing and returning foreign fighters, the resurgence of the far-right and increasing cross-border cooperation between radical actors can also have an impact on previously less affected countries. Furthermore, the presence of established domestic far-right and far-left radicals has necessitated the establishment of an advanced counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategic, institutional and policy framework in the Czech Republic.

National authorities including respective departments at the Ministry of Interior, national police, and intelligence services have been monitoring and assessing the state of the domestic extremist scene since the 1990s. Since its conception, Czech policy

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[30] A total of 34 cases were uncovered, 16 of which contained (possible) hate crimes prosecuted under CC articles not related to discriminatory offences.

on extremism has focused on a wide scope of related issues: radical beliefs and attitudes, actors and events as well as violent and non-violent criminal acts against groups or individuals. The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic and the national strategies for countering terrorism and extremism and related annual reports form the basis of the Czech approach towards terrorism and extremism. The 2015 Security Strategy emphasizes "the combatting of all forms of terrorism", including "measures to counter terrorist financing, radicalisation and recruitment."[31] Additionally, the Czech Republic is "to consistently detect and prosecute manifestations of extremism, including xenophobia, racism and other forms of intolerance and discrimination."[32]

National situational reports and a strategy on how to tackle the issue are released annually by the MoI since 1997 and are publicly available. The same definition of extremism has been underlying these national reports at least since 2003.[33] All the respective documents are authored by the MoI's Security Policy Department, on the basis of inputs from a number of other institutions, namely intelligence services (Security Information Service), the Police of the Czech Republic, the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, and Defence, the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office, and the Probation and Mediation Service of the Czech Republic, as well as academia. The document is produced annually and its aim is to inform the public about developments on a regular basis. The Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2015 is the most recent document in a long sequence of annual reports on extremism.

3.1.2. Data availability

Considering the fact that authorities in the Czech Republic already compile a situational report on extremism, data availability is generally not an issue compared to other contexts where no such instrument has been instituted. The annual summative Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic already deploys most of the quantitative indicators suitable for situational assessment as per the present methodology. Nevertheless, some issues with regard to data collection and presentation remain.

Statistics on criminal offences[34] are present, giving the opportunity to calculate all of the indicators related to data on offences, even if not all of these are

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[31] Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2015) Security Strategy of the Czech Republic.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2015) Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2014. Prague, MoI, p. 6.

[34] The following criminal offences are considered crimes with extremist overtones: Establishment, support and promotion of movements aimed at suppression of human rights and freedoms (Section 403); Expressing sympathies for movements seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms (Section 404); Denial, impugnation, approval and justification of genocide (Section 405); Violence against a group of people and individuals (Section 352); Defamation of nation, race, ethnic or other group of people (Section 355); Instigation of hatred towards a group of people or of suppression of their rights and freedoms (Section 356); Disorderly conduct (Section 358); Murder (Section 140); Grievous bodily harm (Section 145); Bodily harm (Section 146); Extortion (Section 175); Damage to the property of another (Section 228); Violence against public authority (Section 323); Violence against public official (Section 325); Subversion of the Republic (Section 310); Terrorist attack (Section 311); Terror (Section 312); Sabotage (Section 314).

actually presented in the report. Czech situational assessments specifically feature data on the following indicators: incidence (crimes of interest), share in overall criminal activity and proportion of specific crime sub-types (for which a variety of configurations are possible). Crimes directed against Roma and offences with anti-Semitic[35] anti-Muslim[36] overtones are recorded as well. However, hate crimes are not divided by the discriminatory motive.[37]

Furthermore, numbers on crimes perpetrated by figures of authority such as policemen or army personnel are recorded as well. Data is compiled on the regional level and aggregated nationally. Nevertheless, due to a change in the number of statistical regions in 2009, comparisons of regional data from before and after that year are not possible.[38] Data on events and registered crimes is gathered by the police, whereas figures on perpetrators and their characteristics are based on information of proven criminal activity.

Despite the availability of figures, however, there are certain problems which diminish the comprehensiveness and value of the analysis. The concept of criminal offences with extremist background, which is utilised in the report, in principle also covers acts of hate crime. However, in the statistical data, extremist crime is defined not by the characteristics of the criminal act but by affiliation of the offender to a registered and monitored extremist organisation or group.[39] Therefore, the criminal statistics as represented in situational reports overlook a potentially large proportion of discriminatory crimes and offenders.[40] Similarly, the designation of crimes against Roma as extremist crimes necessitates the assessment of the police of the crime as such as well as the victim's willingness to state his/her ethnic background, which many are unwilling to do.[41]

Furthermore, there are significant differences between the datasets of the police, courts, and public prosecutors. The systems for collecting data are significantly different and not interconnected.[42] Inconsistencies in terminology mean that once a crime with extremist overtones has been recorded and investigated, it is unclear if it is also prosecuted accordingly by the public prosecutor's office and eventually decided on by courts.[43] Such potential inconsistencies between figures

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[35] Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2011) Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2010. Prague: MoI.

[36] Included as a separated section in the report for 2014.

[37] European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2015) ECRI report to the Czech Republic (fifth monitoring cycle). Strasbourg: ECRI.

[38] Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2016) Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2015. Prague: MoI.

[39] Organisation for Aid to Refugees (OPU) (2016) National Report on Hate Crimes monitoring (Czech Republic). Prague: OPU.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2015) Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2014. Prague: MoI.

[42] European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2015) ECRI report to the Czech Republic (fifth monitoring cycle). Strasbourg: ECRI.; Mareš, M. (2011) Problematika Hate Crime. Zahraniční zkušenosti a možnost aplikace tohoto přístupu v ČR s důrazem na trestné činy z nenávisti proti cizincům. Praha: MV ČR.

[43] Mareš, M. (2011), p. 40.

from different institutions can shed light on issues of crime classification and investigation and should therefore be reflected on. Furthermore, approaches in registering data on hate crimes are not uniform between local police departments and distortions have occurred due to misinterpretation by police officers of offences as hate crimes.[44]

Data on events organised or attended by extremist groups as turnout numbers are recorded as well, giving the opportunity to trace extremist activity beyond purely criminal acts. The events are disaggregated according to their nature (public gatherings/demonstrations, concerts and other such as negotiations or lectures), type of extremist ideas represented and presence of violent clashes. However, numbers of visitors are not provided for every event discussed in the reports. Figures on membership in extremist organisations are available but are not commented in all reports.

Electoral support can be traced through poll results, which are discussed in the annual reports when relevant. However, the indicators of non-electoral support and support for radical ideas among the general population are only explored in more detail in the 2010 edition of the Extremism report which was accompanied by an evaluation of extremism policy in the Czech Republic.[45] However, systematic examination of the factors support beyond voting and social penetration of radical ideas has not been repeated since. On the other hand, it should be noted that relevant developments on the European level are discussed in the reports.

3.1.3. Main trends in extremism

The implementation in the Czech Republic of annual situational reports on the state of extremism allows the tracing of the main developments along an extended period of time. The current section explores the key developments from the period 2010 – 2015.

Extremist organisations and events

In 2010, the extremist scene remained stable. Far-right groups were more active in terms of organisation of events but these remained relatively small scale with event participation rarely exceeding 200 people.[46] Far-left groupings organised more events, which however were poorly attended with protests during the year drawing 20-25 participants and concerts between 90 and 120 visitors.[47] The following year registered increases in activity in both extremist scenes. Both sides of the spectrum would incorporate into their agendas the growing dissatisfaction of the general public with economic recession and budgetary restrictions. Nevertheless, the far-right was also heavily focused on anti-Gypsy rhetoric. Violent crime, especially

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[44] Organisation for Aid to Refugees (OPU) (2016) National Report on Hate Crimes monitoring (Czech Republic). Prague: OPU.

[45] Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2011) Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2010. Prague: MoI.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

on the side of the far-right increased during the year. Anarchist groups increased their activities especially, drawing on the momentum in international action against political and economic elites exemplified most prominently by the Occupy movement.[48] In comparison, 2012 was a relatively uneventful year with regard to both scenes[49] despite a significant increase in right-wing events (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Number of events organised or attended by far-right and far-left organisations in the Czech Republic

Source: *Annual Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic 2011 – 2016.*

During 2013, there was a spike in inter-ethnic tensions exemplified by a variety of anti-Roma protests organised by far-right actors. These demonstrations included persons from the localities where such protests were held, which swelled attendance numbers. The events drew an estimated total of 1,500-2,000 and had a knock-on effect raising tensions in areas that were considered low-risk.[50] However, by later in the year and in 2014, the participation of the local population dropped leaving members of the extremist groups as the main attendees of their own events, as the wider population realised that the far-right offered few concrete decisions of the problems raised.[51] In response to the increase of anti-Roma sentiments, far-left groupings engaged in a number of counter-actions.

Contrary to the previous year, 2014 was characterised by a number of militant actions by far-left formations, most prominently exemplified by a number of arson

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[48] Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2012) Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2011. Prague: MoI.

[49] Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2013) Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2012. Prague: MoI.

[50] Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2014) Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2013. Prague: MoI.

[51] Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2015) Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2014. Prague: MoI.

attacks aimed against the police, private business and fur farms.[52] Beside such criminal actions, the far-left was also able to draw larger numbers of attendees to its events compared to its rival extremist groups. On the other hand, the failure to replicate the short-lived success of the anti-Roma gatherings of the previous year or to identify another salient theme that can galvanise significant support resulted in the diminished visibility and importance of the far-right. However, already a turn towards xenophobia and Islamophobia could be observed.

As of 2015, an important shift in rhetoric of both sides of the extremist spectrum was observed with migration becoming the predominant issue. Organisations critical of Islam gained prominence. Despite being in general supported by the far-right, however, these entities distanced themselves from the traditional far-right groups. The largest event which drew both high attendance from the general public and far-right sympathisers was supported by the most important of these anti-Islam entities and drew an impressive 4,000 people.[53] At the demonstration held in Prague in July 2015 protesters carried gallows, with no immediate reaction by the police. Strong criticism was advanced against such inactivity, upon which criminal prosecution was launched against the organisers under a variety of *Criminal Code* provisions.[54] Furthermore, mobilisation of the far-left was observed in opposition of anti-Muslim and anti-migration sentiments, as well as against law enforcement authorities, which had launched an operation in response to the arson attacks which occurred during the previous years.

In addition, a number of important trials were initiated during 2015. The first case includes a few members of a left-wing extremist group who were arrested and charged with plotting a terrorist attack against a military transport train, including the other members of the group with failure to prevent a criminal offence and unlicensed arming. This case is important as a possible sentencing would only be the second conviction for a terrorist attack in the history of the country since 2004 – in 2012 one offender was sentenced for sending threatening emails to the Minister of Finance.[55]

By and large, during the period, both right and left wing actors appear to be fragmented and have remained so despite intermittent surges in activities. As can be seen most recently, the support that the anti-migration and anti-Muslim rhetoric has not led to a substantial consolidation of far-right entities. Any increased appeal for right radical ideas can instead be described as a development by proxy as the main groupings which were able to harness anxieties about the refugee crisis were critical of the far-right.[56] With regard to political representation, the far right performed poorly in the elections that took place in 2010, with the most prominent far-right party gaining 1.4 % of the vote in the Czech legislative elections. However, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, the only far-

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[52] Ibid.

[53] Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2016) Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2015. Prague: MoI.

[54] Lidové noviny, 3 července 2015.

[55] *Lidovky.cz*, "Policie obvinila tři levicové extremisty z terorismu. Hrozí jim doživotí," 6. května 2015.

[56] Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2016) Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2015. Prague: MoI.

left party came in fourth with 11.3 % of the vote in 2010 and gained 14.91 % in the 2013 Chamber of Deputies election.[57]

Membership of that particular strand of extremism was estimated at 5,000 sympathisers, 50 core leaders and activists and 15 militants.[58] The far-left, on the other hand, is made up of more engaged and radical campaigners, having a base of 4,000 adherents but 800 active followers and 400-500 militant activists (with a core of about 50 die-hards).[59] Generally the far-right scene has received substantial attention from law enforcement. Nevertheless, considering mobilisation of the rival extremist spectrum both in its own terms with the series of arson attacks and suspected preparation of a terrorist acts and in response to the resurgence of far-right in the country and across Europe, this is liable to change. Other significant trends being observed in the period were the growing importance of ties with international like-minded organisations and the growing importance of the internet as a tool for communication and propaganda of radical ideas.

Criminal statistics

With regard to crimes, criminal activity associated with extremist organisations is generally low as part of the overall criminal environment. As Figure 4 demonstrates, with small deviations, offences with extremist overtones retain a generally stable proportion of all illicit activity in the country. While this indicator does not account for changes in absolute numbers, it shows that generally the increases or decreases are in line with respective fluctuations in overall criminal activity. Such a stable trend might indicate that broader criminogenic factors such as economic crises affecting the whole environment account for variations in absolute crime numbers.

The data show that the number of charged perpetrators usually is commensurate with the number of registered criminal acts. However, the number of convicted persons tends to be relatively low, showing that about half of trails fail in court. This might indicate that there are problems with crime classification or investigation and evidence collection practices, especially considering that about usually there are high rates of recidivism (see Figure 7). As can be seen from the data, this is an on-going trend which could already be observed before the period 2010 – 2015. However, the section of the annual reports which deals with statistics on crime usually just reports on the numbers, not providing much analysis on trends or potential red flags. This can be considered as a shortcoming, as inconsistencies and significant discrepancies between data can indicate potential issues to be explored further.

As regards perpetrators, the vast majority of them tend to be male (see Figure 6), even though female participation went as high as 16.8% of offenders in 2012. As mentioned above, the data on perpetrators refer to instances where guilt has been proven and to persons affiliated with extremist organisations. It is thus notable that

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[57] Czech Statistical Office (2013) Election to the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic held on 25-26 October 2013. Prague: Czech Statistical Office.

[58] Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2014) Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2013. Prague: MoI.

[59] Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2013) Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2012. Prague: MoI.

Figure 4. Share of crimes with extremist overtones in overall criminal activity

Source: Annual Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic 2011 – 2016.

Figure 5. Registered crimes, charged and convicted individuals for crimes with extremist overtones

Source: Annual Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic 2011 – 2016.

female extremists enjoy at least some representation. However, it is unclear why there is such a surge in female participation in 2012, a year which can generally be described as a non-eventful year for the extremist scene in the country.

Figure 6.   Percentage of male perpetrators of crimes with extremist overtones

Source: Annual Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic 2011 – 2016.

Figure 7.   Percentage of recidivist perpetrators of crimes with extremist overtones

Source: Annual Report on Extremism on the Territory of the Czech Republic 2011 – 2016.

As Figure 7 illustrates, there is a rather high proportion of recidivists among offenders, which – considering the fact that statistics take into account only perpetrators affiliated with extremist organisations – indicates that there is a dedicated core of activists who do not shy away from perpetrating crimes when it comes to behaving in accordance with their beliefs. On the other hand, it is important to account for recidivism among non-affiliated perpetrators of these crimes in order to assess the degree to which group association is correlated with recidivism.

3.1.4. Recommendations

While the policy approach in the Czech Republic with regard to extremism is advanced and multi-faceted, problems remain. Data collected from different institutions differ, hindering tracing the process from registration of offences and perpetrators all the way to conviction. Furthermore, the report focuses heavily on group activities, which while not per se a shortcoming, leads to extremist individuals unaffiliated with formations being overlooked. Similarly, the report is largely narrative in its sections focusing on extremist, their positioning in the extremist scene and activities engaged in. On the other hand, when discussing criminal data, the figures are usually just presented and described. Deeper analysis and interpretation of the data available is necessary. In addition, as the analysis of the most recent five year period showcases, both sides of the extremist spectrum are actively trying to generate support for their causes among the wider public. This is well illustrated by the way the far-right utilised hot issues such as Roma criminality following periods of increased inter-ethnic tensions and immigration to generate backing from the population. This underscores the importance of levels of latent acceptance of radical ideas for the respective thriving or waning of extremism.

Considering these issues, the following steps can be undertaken to improve annual reports and to gain deeper insight not only into the extremist scene in the Czech Republic, but also in any potential problems of registration, investigation and prosecution practices and procedures:

- Include data on hate crime perpetrated by individuals not affiliated with any specific radical organisation in order to ensure for a more comprehensive representation of extremist criminal tendencies.
- Draft clear guidelines on how crimes are to be recorded in order to minimise mistakes in registration by police officers.
- Deepen the degree of analysis. More reflection is needed on figures presented both in the extremist actors and activities section as well as in chapters on criminal statistics.
- Institute a systematic approach for assessing the degree of agreement with radical ideas among the general population in order to be able to account and anticipate rises in popularity of extremist actors.
- Fine-tune terminology and data collection practices and among different institutions to ensure comparability of statistics.

3.2. GREECE

3.2.1. Policy context

The phenomena of radicalisation and extremism have been present in Greece since the mid-1970s when the country made the transition from a military dictatorship to democracy. Greece displays one of the most persistent problems of terrorism in Europe, raising anew the question of why extremist and revolutionary organisations continue to emerge and be active in democracies.[60] In the course of the 2000s, and especially since 2010, right-wing and left-wing extremism and radicalisation have intensified. In the past seven years, their intensification has taken place in the context of a deepening social and economic crisis linked to the country's external debt problems and the consequent adoption of austerity policies. The sharply deteriorating socioeconomic conditions in the country have been accompanied by the fragmentation of what used to function as a two-party political system and by a profound legitimacy crisis of the Greek political system as it was known until then.

In view of the rising number of incidents against immigrants since 2010, the Greek government took few important steps towards both monitoring and tackling the phenomenon. In late 2012, the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection established the Departments and Offices for Combating Racist Violence within the Hellenic Police to monitor and tackle racist violence. They are responsible for receiving anonymous complaints regarding incidents of racist violence, carrying out in-depth investigations into racist attacks, and opening an investigation ex officio. In addition, the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice has included the elimination of racism and intolerance in the 2014 – 2016 National Action Plan. The main goal of the programme has been the 'prevention and active suppression of endemic racism and xenophobia' in Greece. As a measure to combat far-right extremism an appointment was made in 2013 of Public Prosecutor for the prosecution of acts of racist violence. In the same year, the Greek Parliament changed the rules for the public financing of political parties, which can now be cancelled in case a party's leaders, or 10 % of its MPs, are found guilty of involvement in a criminal organisation or acts of terrorism, an offence for which the far-right party of the Golden Dawn has been charged and for which it currently stands trial.

While the phenomena of terrorism and political violence in Greece emerged in the 1970s, terrorism was not perceived as a serious threat, or as a political priority, until the 1990s.[61] Since the 1970s, Greek policy approach to dealing with terrorism has evolved in three phases, progressively towards the recognition of terrorism as a security threat. During the first phase (1974 – 1989), Greek political elites and authorities failed to recognise the significance of terrorism and the threat that it posed. The second phase (1989 – 1999) was characterised by intense political debate and saw the first, albeit largely unsuccessful attempts to countering it. The third

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[60] Kassimeris, G. (2013). *Inside Greek Terrorism*, London: Hurst & Co. Publishers, p. 132.

[61] Karyotis, G. (2007). Securitization of Greek Terrorism and Arrest of the 'Revolutionary Organization November 17'. *Cooperation and Conflict, 42*(3), 271-293, p. 272.

phase (1999 onwards) marked the securitisation of terrorism, namely its undisputed recognition as a cardinal security threat for the Greek state and society.[62]

Since the late 1990s the political and policy approach to terrorism began to be fundamentally re-evaluated. Law 2928/2001 was the first serious attempt to tighten the relevant legislation. According to it, as it is in effect after its amendments, offences related to the operation of terrorist or criminal organisations enable the use of special investigative techniques by the Hellenic Police, which apply for a limited time, when there is serious evidence that a terrorist/criminal action has been committed, and when the disbandment of the organisation is otherwise impossible. Furthermore, according to Article 187B of the Greek *Criminal Code*, in order for the authorities to obtain the information required for the disbandment of terrorist or criminal organisations, or gangs, "lenience" measures are provided for those participating in such organisations or gangs, if they make it possible to prevent the perpetration of any planned crimes or to disband the organisation or gang.

Greece increased its security spending and strengthened its security infrastructure in the context of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games. Significant investments were made for police training, infrastructure, surveillance and the development of intelligence networks.[63] In 2000, Greece established a seven nation Olympic Advisory Group, which actively participated in intelligence exchange and the training of Greek security forces in dealing with transnational terrorism.[64] Within this context, around 50,000 persons received security training. Furthermore, bilateral cooperation agreements on terrorism were signed with many countries, including the US and Turkey. Additionally, the anti-terrorist squad was reorganised following the visits of counter-terrorism experts in Britain and the US for retraining in surveillance techniques and bombing analysis.[65]

3.2.2. Data availability

Three main institutions in Greece collect and produce data relevant for the preparation of situation assessment of extremist crime and trends in the country. These institutions are the Hellenic Police, the Racist Violence Reporting Network (RVRN) and the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights. In terms of the data required for the situational assessment, these institutions demonstrate average capacity to collect and analyse data regarding (potential) hate crimes/incidents of racist violence. More specifically, the Hellenic Police have the capacity to produce data along the following core indicators: incidence of potential hate crimes, share in violent criminal activity, and share in overall criminal activity. However, the latter

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[62] Karyotis, G. (2007) Securitization of Greek Terrorism and Arrest of the 'Revolutionary Organization November 17'. *Cooperation and Conflict*, *42*(3), p. 276.

[63] Kollias, C., Messis, P., Mylonidis, N., and Paleologou, S. M. (2009) "Terrorism and the effectiveness of security spending in Greece: policy implications of some empirical findings." *Journal of Policy Modeling*, *31*(5), 788-802, p. 791.

[64] Ibid., p. 798.

[65] Karyotis, G. (2007), p. 285. After the end of the Olympic Games, Greece drastically reduced its security infrastructure, while specialised in domestic security officers were transferred from the counter-terrorism unit to other services (Borgeas, A. (2013) "The evolution of Greece's security legislation and policy." *St. John's Journal of International & Comparative Law*, 3(2), 161-208.).

two indicators are not utilised by the Hellenic Police, as the share of potential hate crimes in overall criminal activity and violent criminal activity is statistically insignificant. The Hellenic Police could provide data along one more core indicator – proportion of hate crimes sub-types – based on the following type of available data: proportion of different bias motivations in the total number of potential hate crimes and proportion of different types of violence in the total number of potential hate crimes (physical/verbal). Finally, the Hellenic Police also utilise two additional indicators, which measure the efficiency of the institution, and which were not foreseen in the methodology presented in the first section of this publication: proportion of (non-)cleared potential hate crimes in the total number of potential hate crimes and number of prosecuted individuals per potential bias motivation.

The Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN) demonstrates high data collection capacity, in terms of the data required for the situational assessment. More specifically, RVRN has the capacity to produce data along the following indicators: incidence of racist violence incidents (per administrative region and year), membership in extremist or support organisation, and proportion of hate crimes sub-types baseline indicators. With specific regard to the latter indicator, RVRN can produce data on:

- the proportion of different bias motivations in the total number of racist violence incidents;
- the proportion of different types of violence in the total number of racist violence incidents;
- the proportion of different levels of organised violence in the total number of incidents of racist violence;
- the share of group attacks in the total number of racist violence incidents per year;
- the proportion of different levels of violence in the total number of racist violence incidents sub-indicators.

Additionally, it can produce data on the proportion of incidents of racist violence per victim's profile and year, the gender of racist violence perpetrators per year, and the gender of racist violence victims per year. Some of these indicators are not foreseen in the methodology presented in the first section of this publication however, they constitute particularly useful additions.

The General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice demonstrates average data collection capacity, in terms of the data required for the situational assessment. More specifically, the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights has the capacity to produce data along the following indicators:

- total number of convicted hate crimes perpetrators;
- total number of prosecuted individuals in relation to hate crimes;
- share of cases for which criminal proceedings have been initiated;
- share of cases for which disciplinary measures have been taken.

Moreover, the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights has at its disposal data regarding the demographic and socioeconomic profile of prosecuted and convicted individuals in relation to hate crimes.

3.2.3. Main findings – far-right extremist trends

The data produced by the Hellenic Police and RVRN show a gradual increase of racist violence in the country since 2010, which peaked in 2015. The largest increase was observed between 2011 and 2012, a period during which the far-right extremist party Golden Dawn gradually established itself in the Greek parliament. This increase is attributed to the rise of incidents of racist violence motivated by biases against the national or ethnic origin of the victims. In 2015, however, a significant increase in the number of racist attacks motivated by biases against the sexual orientation or gender identity of the victims was recorded.

According to Hellenic Police data, potential hate crimes are widespread across all but one (i.e. Epirus) administrative regions of Greece, while the largest volume of such incidents is observed in Attica and Central Macedonia – the largest, most populous, and with the highest concentration of migrants administrative departments of the country. While the share of physical and verbal violence in the period 2010 – 2015 is almost equal (51 % to 49 %) in the years between 2012 and 2014 a considerable rise in the number of physical racist attacks was witnessed. In 2015, racist violence became "softer" but at the same time more diffused.

Figure 8. Proportion of different types of violence in the total number of potential hate crimes per year, 2010 – 2015

Source: Hellenic Police, Department of Social Issues and Combating Racism.

In comparison with statistics from Hellenic Police, RVRN data shows higher proportion of incidents of physical violence and also demonstrate an important further categorisation, beyond the physical/verbal dichotomy. According to this

categorisation 35 % of incidents of racist violence included some form of body injury of the victim, while 22 % included severe body injuries. The latter is an important feature of racist violence in the country, since approximately 1 out of 4 racist violence attacks might have cost the victim's life.

Figure 9.   Proportion of different levels of violence in the total number of racist violence incidents, 2011 – 2015

Source: RVRN.

The vast majority of potential hate crimes concern national or ethnic origin biases, which renders migrants/refugees the most frequent targets of and the most vulnerable group to such crimes.

Figure 10.   Proportion of bias motivations in total number of potential hate crimes, 2010 – 2015

Source: Hellenic Police, Department of Social Issues and Combating Racism.

In the same manner, the majority of suspected perpetrators of such crimes have been prosecuted for biases against the national or ethnic origin of the victims. The number of prosecuted individuals for potential hate crimes peaked in 2012.

Figure 11. Total number of prosecuted individuals per potential bias motivation, 2010 – 2015

Source: Hellenic Police, Department of Social Issues and Combating Racism.

It should be noted, however, that no suspected perpetrators of such crimes have been prosecuted for biases against the sexual orientation or gender identity of the victims, despite the fact that a considerable number of such incidents has been officially recorded. Additionally, suspected perpetrators have not been found for more than half of the officially recorded incidents, which suggests that racist violence is a particularly complex and hard to deal with phenomenon. However, the number of relevant cleared cases steadily increased in tandem with the number of potential hate crimes, and peaked in 2015.

According to the RVRN data, the vast majority of racist violence perpetrators are, unsurprisingly, males. However, one can observe throughout the years a considerable increase in the number of incidents that involved exclusively female perpetrators, and groups including members of both genders.

Moreover, up to 2014, racist violence targeted mainly male individuals. Yet, in 2015, the number of recorded racist attacks against both women and transgender individuals significantly increased.

Furthermore, 1 out of 4 racist attacks involves the participation of members of extremist groups, according to the victims' testimonies. In 2012 and 2013, 1 out of 2 incidents of racist violence involved the participation of members of extremist groups.

**Figure 12.   Gender identity of racist violence perpetrators
              per year, 2011 – 2015, number**

Source: RVRN.

**Figure 13.   Gender identity of racist violence victims
              per year, number**

Source: RVRN.

Figure 14. Membership in extremist groups in incidents of racist violence, 2011 – 2015

26%

74%

■ Members of extremist groups

■ Non-members of extremist groups

Source: RVRN.

Since 2014, the characteristics of racist violence in Greece gradually started to change, a development which might be related to the prosecution of the vast majority of Golden Dawn's MPs and leadership. More specifically, racist violence became "softer" (i.e. verbal abuse, rather than physical racist attacks, became the predominant form of racist violence in the country), but at the same time, more diffused, as the total number of group attacks decreased while the officially recorded incidents of racist violence skyrocketed (2015). The possibility that members of extremist groups still participate in racist attacks without wearing their characteristic t-shirts, emblems, and other visible insignia cannot be ruled out. The period since 2014 is marked by a significant increase in the number of racist attacks motivated by biases against the sexual orientation or gender identity of the victims, including increased number of attacks against women and transgender individuals. This shift in the characteristics, modus operandi, and victims' and perpetrators' profiles of racist attacks presents Greek authorities with a considerable challenge in relation to their data collection and analysis capacity in monitoring the phenomenon.

3.2.4. Recommendations

The data collection capacities of the relevant institutions in Greece with regard to monitoring extremist trends are quite good in some respects and need improvement in other. Hereby a number of recommendations are provided for the improvement of the data collection and analysis capacity of these institutions.

Hellenic Police

- There is a surprising lack of data regarding notable far-right events, level of participation in such events, and their evolution. Hence, due to a lack of relevant data the Hellenic Police are not capable of producing data on

the following core indicators: notable events – overall count, participation, events by type, and violent attitudes presented. In this respect, the Hellenic Police should try to increase their data collection capacity across the area of far-right events, as quite often such events pave the way for racist attacks.

- The Hellenic Police should quantify the available data regarding prosecuted individuals for potential hate crimes. At the moment, the Hellenic Police have at their disposal rich raw data regarding the demographic and socioeconomic background of potential perpetrators of hate crimes. If processed and quantified such data can be particularly useful for the purposes of extremist trends monitoring and analysis.
- In a similar way, much more information can be extracted through the processing and quantification of raw data regarding victims' profiles.
- The Hellenic Police should adopt four indicators on the proportion of hate crimes sub-types that have been used by RVRN, and appear to be particularly useful in the monitoring of hate crime/racist violence trends in Greece: membership in extremist organisation, share of group attacks in the total number of racist violence incidents per year, proportion of different levels of organised violence in the total number of incidents of racist violence, and proportion of different levels of violence in the total number of racist violence incidents. In other words, the Hellenic Police should try to extract as much information as possible from the victims' testimonies regarding the qualitative characteristics of racist attacks.
- The Hellenic Police should start collecting data on a regular basis regarding online hate speech. At the moment, relevant data are collected by the Hellenic Police only on an ad hoc basis, which cannot be utilised in the consistent monitoring of online hate speech.

Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN)

- RVRN should attempt to quantify the rich qualitative data at its disposal, which concern the modus operandi, characteristics, perpetrators, victims, and sites of racist attacks. Indeed, the vast majority of the aforementioned baseline indicators are not presently produced by RVRN, despite the availability of relevant data, due to the focus on purely qualitative reports. Quantitative data have a higher impact among policymakers, and, in this regard, RVRN can increase its impact through the quantification of some of its data.
- Racist attacks against religious and ethnic minorities in Greece seem to be particularly underrepresented in the RVRN data. In this respect, RVRN should improve its data collection capacity among these communities.
- RVRN should try to draw on public opinion survey data in order to complement its own data. Indeed, public opinion survey data can identify the level of penetration of radical ideas and support to extremist acts among the Greek society at a given time, which can be particularly useful information in the study of racist violence trends.
- RVRN should start collecting data on a regular basis regarding online hate speech. Despite the fact that it constitutes a phenomenon that appears to be on the rise in Greece at the moment, neither the state nor civil society actors have the capacity to monitor online hate speech.

General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights

At the moment, the biggest challenge of the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights has to do with its ability to follow-up a case from the point of recording by the Hellenic Police to the initiation of criminal proceedings and conclusion of the case before the court. In this respect, the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights should try to ensure the validity and reliability of collected data by producing a single template, which will be used and completed by competent authorities (i.e. courts and the Hellenic Police) during data collection process. In this way the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights will be able to coordinate the collection of data among all competent authorities in a more effective way. To this end, it can be assisted by the newly established National Council against Racism and Intolerance and the regional special prosecutors for hate crimes/racist violence. Each incident of racist violence that is reported to the Hellenic Police should be assigned a unique ID number, which will enable the General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights to follow-up each case at a later stage.

3.3. BULGARIA

3.3.1. Policy context

With the exception of the terrorist attack committed at the airport of the city of Bourgas in 2012, Bulgaria has so far been spared from large scale terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, the country's position on the major European route to and from the Middle East means it is prime transit area for both the refugee flow and potential and actual foreign fighters. At the same time, these processes have intensified the emergence of a wave of extreme right populist movements on the Bulgarian political scene, both formal and informal. International developments and the evolving understanding of terrorism and related phenomena both at the EU and at the domestic level have prompted increasing government attention to the issues of terrorism and extremism. In 2015, a number of amendments were made to the Bulgarian *Criminal Code*, expanding its scope with relation to terrorism by criminalising among other the assistance on the territory of Bulgaria to foreigners to commit terrorist acts abroad.

More importantly, an attempt was made to institute a more holistic approach to the problem of violent extremism. In December 2015, the landmark *Strategy for Countering Radicalisation and Terrorism 2015 – 2020* was adopted by the Council of Ministers[66] along with an implementation plan. The Strategy is intended to work in synergy with a number of other strategic documents such as the *National Strategy on Migration, Asylum and Integration, National Roma Integration Strategy* of the Republic of Bulgaria and the *Strategy for Educational Integration of Children and Students from Ethnic Minorities.* Among other measures, the strategy foresees the implementation

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[66] *Стратегия за противодействие на радикализацията и тероризма 2015 – 2020.* Приета с решение № 1039 на Министерския съвет от 30.12.2015 г.

of mechanisms for analysis of tendencies, assessment of risks and monitoring concrete manifestations of radicalisation processes.

Despite such progress, however, Bulgaria generally retains an underdeveloped institutional infrastructure in terms of prevention and the necessary supporting analytical efforts. The focus has remained firmly on deterrence, with little involvement of actors beyond law enforcement and intelligence services. While it is unclear what analytical capacities and products these agencies use internally, reports released to the wider public tend to be general and focused on the broad threats facing the country with little actual assessment of the current state and tendencies over time. These are usually annual reports outlining general developments and risks, and providing a brief description of activities of the respective institutions. There are few ad hoc analyses which focus on specific topics and provide more detail and analysis.

Moreover, recent efforts at establishing a more holistic normative, conceptual, institutional and policy framework have been uneven. While the risk of Islamist radicalisation and the transit of terrorist foreign fighters has been dominating the public debate in Bulgaria and beyond, the issue of counter-reactions to migration flows by far-right elements and illegal actions performed by vigilante groups has received limited to no attention from authorities. This is the case even though both political and non-political far-right radical groups have long been an established feature, having targeted primarily the Roma and people of different sexual orientation prior to the refugee crisis.

3.3.2. Data availability

A number of official bodies are engaged in data collection relating to extremism in Bulgaria. Data from the **Ministry of Interior** (MoI) includes registered and cleared crimes for articles of the *Criminal Code* (CC) which proscribe discriminatory crimes. Furthermore, information on perpetrators is disaggregated according to characteristics such as place of perpetration, gender, age, nationality, presence of criminal record, employment status, education and physiological state upon carrying out the crime, allowing in principle for the development of a provisional profile of extremist offenders. However, MoI does not record data on offences related to crimes against the Republic or crimes against humanity and peace, such as terrorism and preparatory acts, preaching a fascist ideology and propagating war, which is done by the prosecution and courts. The **Prosecution Office** compiles data on initiated pre-trail proceedings, indictments, number of indicted persons and number of victims of crimes. The **Supreme Judicial Council** aggregates information received from lower courts on ongoing and completed trials (including those terminated and the ones which resulted in conviction) and on convicted persons according to the sentence received. The **National Statistical Institute (NSI)** compiles data on offences (according to region, outcome of court case, sex and age of perpetrators), defendants and convicted persons (according to region, gender, age and sentence). However, NSI statistics are not arrived at independently but are instead aggregated institutional figures and relevant data is also organised according to CC provisions. Other systematic data collection sources (coming from anti-discrimination or non-governmental bodies) do not exist, respectively no alternative data banks are available to account for possible differences in registered offences and latent criminality for the acts of interest.

In the Bulgarian context, a number of *Criminal Code* articles are relevant for the core indicator "crimes of interest", which deal with criminal manifestations of extremism and related phenomena, including crimes against the Republic, crimes against the equality of citizens and against the religious denominations (including hate crimes), crimes against humanity and peace and certain crimes against the persons with discriminatory motivation.[67] All these have been considered for the potential calculation of core indicators related to extremist criminal acts, although the availability of data and the potential to extract the information required for the situational assessment differs widely across the different criminal provisions. While this data is gathered on a local level and subsequently aggregated nationally it is often not disaggregated along clearly distinguished identifiers of bias motivation. This reality constitutes a major shortcoming in the presently existing data collection system regarding extremist crime and trends in Bulgaria. In particular it affects the quality of data regarding extremist offences and profiles of perpetrators and victims.

While data on criminal offences is available (although with shortcomings with regard to hate offences), data on indicators related to notable events organised or attended by extremist groups and membership of extremist organisations is **absent from the present national databases**.[68] In addition, little data is available with regard to indicators related to support for radical formations and ideas among society. Electoral support for extremist parties can be reliably measured by **election polls**. This is possible for far-right parties, as Bulgaria lacks partisan organisations espousing other extremist ideas. The compilation of data regarding general approval among the population for radical and extremist ideas (including for other types of extremism) and for non-parliamentary groups and organisations is possible through **social surveys** which however are not systematically conducted. Most opinion polls usually probe attitudes on a specific issue (e.g. refugees)[69] or sample specific populations (e.g. Bulgarian Muslims)[70] and are **ad hoc,** thus not allowing for identification of trends in support beyond voting behaviour. One

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[67] The *Criminal Code* provisions included in the study of the applicability of the situational assessment methodology in Bulgaria include: Art. 108 (1) – preaching a fascist or other anti-democratic ideology or forcible change of the public order established by the Constitution; Art. 108a (1-7) – terrorism and related preparatory acts; Art. 110 (1) and (2) – preparing to commit crimes against the Republic and training of foreigners on the territory of Bulgaria for committing terrorist acts abroad; Art. 116 (1) Item 11 – homicide motivated by hooligan, racist or xenophobic attitudes; Art. 131 (1) Item 12 – heavy bodily injury motivated by hooligan, racist or xenophobic attitudes; Art. 162 (1) – incitement to racial or ethnic discrimination, violence or hate; Art. 162 (2) – violence motivated by racial, ethnic, religious or political beliefs; Art. 162 (3) – leadership or participation in a group established to commit such crimes; Art. 163 (1-3) – participation in a crowd gathered to commit racist or ethnic violence; Art. 164 (1) – preaching or inciting religious hatred, violence or discrimination; Art. 164 (2) – desecration of religious temples; Art. 165 (1) – using violence to prevent others from practicing religion; Art. 165 (2) – forcing others to practice a certain religion; Art. 166 – establishment of a political organisation on a religious basis; Art. 407 – propagating war. These are referred to in the analysis as extremist crimes or crimes of interest, unless specified otherwise.

[68] In a response to a formal CSD inquiry, the Ministry of Interior stated that it does not gather information on events attended or organised by extremist individuals and formations.

[69] Кючуков, Л. *Влияние на бежанската криза върху българското общество и българската политика: страхове, но не омраза.* София, Фондация Фридрих Еберт, 2016 г.

[70] „Нагласи на мюсюлманите в България 2011", изследване проведено от Алфа Рисърч и Нов български университет в периода март-ноември 2011 с научен ръководител Е. Иванова.

significant exception is a study on social distances between Bulgarians and a number of ethnic groups, which had been conducted eleven times in the period 1992 – 2012.

Data on supplementary indicators is largely missing both from official authorities and other sources such as non-governmental organisations, necessitating the gathering and analysis of primary data to compensate for such scarcity.

3.3.3. Main findings

A number of factors contribute to the present unreliability of official data on extremist trends in Bulgaria. These factors relate to the misclassification of recorded offences, the poor definitions of some aspects of extremist and discriminatory offences in the *Criminal Code*, the under-reporting of extremist offences and the lack of established investigative approach and judicial practice with regard to crimes with discriminatory motives.

Data on crimes related to extremism are compiled according to the classification of crimes as per the Bulgarian *Criminal Code*. However, as the legislative framework in the country is underdeveloped in respect to hate offences and these remain hidden within more general criminal classifications. For example, the law recognises the presence of xenophobic, racist and hooligan motives as an aggravating circumstance in the violent acts of bodily injury and murder but all three motivations are part of the same CC item, meaning that actual hate crimes cannot be distinguished from acts of hooliganism. Furthermore, since Bulgaria currently has no hate speech laws, some non-violent offences against individuals are often prosecuted under alternative provisions, such as hooliganism. Thus, **any analysis based on data which does not separate hooligan from discriminatory motivations will lead to threat exaggeration**. On the other hand, **analysis restrained only to data on CC provisions involving recognition of extremist or hate motivation as inherent to the offence will lead to a serious underestimation of the threat** and in particular of the degree of violent activity.[71]

Figure 15 demonstrates the magnitude of exaggeration or underestimation of crime incidence resulting from a potential subtraction or inclusion of figures on hate crimes recorded as hooliganism. The number of cleared cases of bodily injury for almost all years is **about two times larger** than the total of crimes registered under all other relevant CC provisions combined for the whole period 2010 – 2016 (112 recorded crimes).

The poor definition of aspects of the offences (e.g. what constitutes xenophobic and racist motivation) and the relatively recent (2011) adoption of some of the provisions on hate crimes make law enforcement and the judiciary less familiar in working with CC articles which explicitly recognise a discriminatory

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[71] Due to the problems outlined, the number of recorded cases of bodily injury and homicide with racist, xenophobic or hooligan motives is much higher than offences under all other relevant Criminal Code articles. In the analysis other CC provisions which explicitly recognise discriminatory motive or proscribe inherently extremist acts such as terrorism are often examined separately as only such offences can be considered with certainty as extremist and hate crimes.

Figure 15. Number of registered and cleared crimes – bodily injury with hooligan, racist or xenophobic motive*

* Art. 131, Par. 1, Item 12.

Source: Ministry of the Interior.

motive. In effect, judicial practice is under-developed and there is **avoidance of investigation and prosecution of acts** under provisions directly linked to hate crime or discriminatory motivation and **preference for the use of more familiar alternatives**. The number of recorded offences with provisions with discriminatory motivation inherent to the act tends to be very low.

Last but not least, due to factors such as low trust in authorities and fear of repercussions (especially among minority groups such as asylum seekers and sexual minorities), the **latency rates** of these crimes are likely very high, a phenomenon reported by a number of non-governmental organisations.[72]

The above shortcomings are reflected in the official data[73] which is not sufficient to establish accurate picture of the spread and nature of extremist crimes and perpetrators' profiles.

Considering MoI data, very few discriminatory crimes have been recorded in the last six years – under five instances per year or in some cases none at all

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[72] E.g. Amnesty International (2015) *Missing the Point: Lack of Adequate Investigation of Hate Crimes in Bulgaria*. Sofia: Amnesty International.

[73] None or very few instances of the extremist crimes related to terrorism and preparatory acts are recorded as well, even though this appears to be the result of a lack of such offences.

(Figure 16). The only exception relates to the non-violent crimes "desecrations of temples" and "inciting or propagating discrimination, violence or hate". The increase in registered cases of this kind can be attributed to incident-driven protest activities in 2011 (against Roma) and in 2014 (against a court ruling in favour of the Chief Muftiate), both of which generated significant public attention. Such spikes together with otherwise very low numbers and high latency rates indicate a tendency for the cases that have generated a public outcry to be taken more seriously in terms of investigation in order to showcase that authorities do not overlook extremist crimes.

Figure 16.   Number of registered crimes against the equality of citizens and against the religious denominations per CC article, 2010 – 2016

Legend:
- Incitement to racial or ethnic discrimination/violence/hate (Art. 162, Par. 1)
- Violence motivated by racial/ethnic/ religious/political beliefs (Art. 162, Par. 2)
- Leadership/participation in a group established to commit such crimes (Art. 162, Par. 3)
- Participation in a crowd gathered to commit racist/ethnic violence (Art. 163, Par. 1-3)
- Preaching or inciting religious hatred/violence/discrimination; (Art. 164, Par. 1) Desecration of religious temples (Art. 164, Par. 2)
- Using violence to prevent others from practicing religion; Forcing others to practice a certain religion (Art. 165, Par. 1 and 2)
- Establishment of a political organisation on a religious basis (Art. 166)

Source: Ministry of Interior.

However, even when crimes under articles explicitly recognising discriminatory motive or act (such as crimes against the equality of citizens and against the religious denominations, Art. 162-166) are registered, they are still rarely solved (Figure 17). The clearance rate fluctuates significantly from about 5 % at the lowest to 30 % at the highest in the period 2010 – 2016. This appears to be a stable trend, as similar clearance rates were recorded by another study for the period 2007 – 2012.[74]

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[74] Върховна касационна прокуратура (2013) *Престъпления, извършени от омраза (расова, национална, етническа и религиозна)*. София, ВКП.

Figure 17. **Share of cleared up crimes against the equality of citizens and against the religious denominations*, 2010 – 2016**

* *Art. 162-166.*

Source: Ministry of Interior.

Low points in clearance rate largely correspond to times of elections and change in government. In comparison, the clearance rate jumps to 50%-40%[75] when bodily injury and (attempted) murder with racist, xenophobic or hooligan motive are included, illustrating that **law enforcement is significantly more confident when it comes to offences for which there is more familiarity regarding investigation and prosecution procedures** as police and court practice with regard to hooligan offences is much better developed.

Data on acts related to terrorism, preaching fascist or other anti-democratic ideology or the propagation of war, which is available in prosecution data banks, reveals only an isolated number of offences indicating that Bulgaria has generally been spared from terrorist attacks and related activity. It has to be pointed out however, that such offences generate significant media attention.[76]

While the rate of cleared discriminatory crimes is low, the rate of those that end with indictment and enter the court[77] is even lower. This leads to a very low number of convictions, ranging from zero to a maximum of nine persons convicted in 2011 under respective CC provisions (see Figure 18). Exception to this trend is seen with regard to offences related to bodily injury and murder where the discriminatory crimes cannot be separated from hooligan acts. However, even when taking into account the violent offences of bodily injury and homicide with racist, xenophobic or hooligan motivation, the vast majority of sentences are mild (up to three years imprisonment and alternative sanctions), suggesting that there are often attenuating circumstances.[78]

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[75] The trend decreased between 2010 and 2016. Ministry of Interior data.

[76] Prosecution office data on indictments.

[77] Prosecution office data.

[78] National Statistical Institute data.

Figure 18. Number of convicted individuals for crimes of interest as per CC article, 2010 – 2015

Legend:
- ☐ Preaching a fascist/antidemocratic ideology/forcible change of the public order (Art. 108)
- ☐ Propagating war (Art. 407)
- ☐ Establishming a political organisation on a religious basis (Art. 166)
- ☐ Using violence to prevent others from practicing religion; Forcing others to practice a certain religion (Art. 165)
- ☐ Inciting religious hatred/violence/discrimination; Desecration of religious temples (Art. 164)
- ☐ Participation in a crowd gathered to commit racist or ethnic violence (Art. 163)
- ☐ Incitement to racial or ethnic discrimination/violence/hate; Violence motivated by racial/ethnic/religious/political beliefs; Leadership/participation in a group established to commit such crimes (Art. 162)
- ☐ Preparing to commit crimes against the Republic; Training foreigners in Bulgaria for committing terrorist acts abroad (Art. 110)
- ☐ Terrorism and related preparatory acts (Art. 108a)

Source: Supreme Judicial Council.

The presently available data on offender and victim profiles is prone to the same imperfections as data on criminal offences. It shows that the share of repeat offenders among all cleared perpetrators under all relevant CC articles is about 14 %. However, it is not possible to ascertain whether the same type of crime has been committed previously (see Figure 19). The vast majority of convicted individuals are males (if murder and bodily injury with hooligan and discriminatory motivation are excluded, for all remaining CC articles perpetrators are male) and fall between the ages 18-39 (with the age group 18-24 accounting for most perpetrators, followed by 30-39).[79] Analysis of the type of **information available in court case files** reveals that this data source could not be integrated for regular and comprehensive data collection purposes regarding offender and victim profiles. Data in court case files is **not sufficient to make up for shortcomings in official statistics** and currently can only provide limited additional insights. For example, the profiles of perpetrators of (potential) discriminatory crimes tried under alternative CC provisions are dominated by males with high school diploma who are single, employed and with at least one previous conviction. The average perpetrator of crimes with established extremist motives tends to differ from the above only in that he tends to have no prior convictions.

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[79] National Statistical Institute data.

Figure 19. Perpetrators of cleared-up crimes against the equality of citizens and against the religious denominations* per presence of a criminal record, 2010 – 2015

Persons without previous convictions

Persons with previous convictions

* *Art. 162-166.*

Source: Ministry of Interior.

Quantitative data about **notable events** and participation with extremist background is either entirely missing or gathered unsystematically by different actors, most often media or research institutes. It should be stressed that information on participation in events organised by or affiliated with extremist groups is not difficult to compile and respective institutions should consider making the events-related indicators part of the regular data collection effort at national level.

Electoral support for right-wing parties can be directly observed through poll results. Data tracing poll results[80] show that the influence of the most prominent right-wing party in the country has been falling since 2009. Small right-wing parties have generally been unable to pass the 4 % threshold necessary to enter parliament.[81] Nevertheless, a right-wing coalition part of the government which was in power between 2014 and 2017 is almost at par with the prime minister in terms of popularity.[82]

With regard to the **support for radical or extremist ideologies**, a series of social surveys measuring prejudices among Bulgarians with regard to a number of ethnic and national minorities in the country is a notable exception to the prevalence of ad hoc studies. The six surveys carried out in the period 1992 – 2007

[80] Poll results in the period 2005 – 2014. 2005 is the year of establishment of the largest far-right party while 2014 marks the last parliamentary election in Bulgaria.

[81] See CSD (2015) *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends.* Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

[82] *Offnews.bg* „Красимир Каракачанов почти настигна Бойко Борисов по рейтинг". 8 януари 2017 г.

showed strongly entrenched prejudices against the Roma.[83] However, a series of subsequent surveys carried out in the period 2008 – 2012 show that there is a significant improvement of attitudes towards both new and old minorities among Bulgarians (see Figure 20).[84] Still, the refugee crisis gave rise to significant anxieties about the influx of migrants since 2015[85] and is likely to have negatively impacted public attitudes.

Figure 20.   Survey results on Bulgarians' acceptance of members of some minorities*

*   *Share of Yes responses to question: "Would you agree for [ethnicity] to live in your home town/village?"*

Source: *Пампоров (2012).*

Extremist organisations

Profiling of the main organisational actors on the extremist scene in a given country can provide valuable insights into the mobilisation potential and the nature of threat posed by such groups. Data along such indicators, however, is collected neither comprehensively nor regularly by law enforcement institutions which presently process and analyse only data on football fan groups.

A brief sketch of the far right organisational actors in Bulgaria could be based on open sources; however, such sources cannot constitute reliable alternative to intelligence information or missing law enforcement data. Since 2013, a revival in

[83] Пампоров, А. (2008) *Социални дистанции и етнически стереотипи за малцинствата.* София, Институт Отворено общество.

[84] Пампоров, А. (2012) *Социални дистанции в България в периода 2008 – 2012 г.* София, Институт Отворено общество.

[85] Кючуков, Л. (2016) *Влияние на бежанската криза върху българското общество и българската политика: страхове, но не омраза,* София, Фондация Фридрих Еберт.

the far-right extremist scene was observed after a period of diminished relevance and public visibility. A series of protests prompting growing political instability served to invigorate some established far-right actors and triggered the emergence of new ones. During demonstrations against the government and counter-protest supporting it, a number of political parties, most prominently nationalist formations paid football hooligans to appear at the respective events in support of the parties' strategy.[86] Furthermore, the last parliamentary elections of 2014 established the far-right as decisive factor in government for the first time.

In addition, in the fall of 2013, the refugee crisis came to the fore as a salient issue. In the public space, the migrant influx was represented as an existential threat by a number of political and non-political actors. In 2014, a number of so-called "vigilante" groupings and individuals emerged which undertook actions against migrants, mainly in the form of patrolling the border and either apprehending undocumented foreigners or reporting them to the authorities.

The most prominent new far-right organisations target former and current military and law enforcement personnel for recruitment and are engaged in organising border patrols, quasi military trainings and protests. They represent a departure from the ideology and approach of older formations – the military element and the existential nature of the threat facing Bulgaria necessitating urgent action with respect to the refugee crisis and the corrupt political elite are central tenets in the rhetoric of these formations. Compared to established non-parliamentary organisations, new far-right groups have toned down ideological sophistication, merging different and sometimes contradictory ideological strands. On the other hand, in comparison to skinhead gangs and other informal and unorganised movements, new actors showcase more ideological commitment, political ambitions and a degree of organisational capacity.

An assessment of the threat posed by these new far-right groups is difficult to arrive at based on open source information alone, as many of the claims made by the organisations appear unrealistic and exaggerated. Nevertheless, the strong focus on militarisation, the formation of parallel structures and the calls for taking action to counter the corrupt political elite and to stem the migrant influx coupled with the targeting of a disillusioned population with violent potential are worrying developments, which necessitate further monitoring and analysis based on verifiable data.

Internet propaganda and activity

Internet monitoring is used by Bulgarian intelligence services as a complementary tool to their intelligence and operative work but figures and other important information are rarely released. The State Agency for National Security noted in its report for 2015, that there was an upward trend in attempts to fan social tensions through underscoring divisions on the basis of ethnicity and religion, especially "in some localities and regions in the country", mainly done through the internet.[87]

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[86] Bezlov, T., et al. (2015) "Football Hooliganism," In: CSD, *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, pp. 101-142.

[87] Ibid.

The importance of the internet for propaganda purposes can also be seen with regard to the communication strategy of new far-right groupings. Social media especially seem to be preferred both for communication with members and for the recruitment of new ones. Facebook and Twitter accounts are actively used to disseminate further the information (about ideology, planned events, etc.) already published on the official websites and YouTube channels as well as to publish news and events that suit the ideology of the formations.

3.3.4. Recommendations

Although the full implementation of the proposed situational assessment instrument is at present not feasible in Bulgaria, a number of steps can be taken to facilitate the development of a sufficient evidentiary basis and analytical capacity within law enforcement, intelligence and criminal justice institutions allowing for the establishment of analytical tools capturing the present state and trends in extremism in Bulgaria:

- Amend the *Criminal Code* to include racist and xenophobic motives in the qualified constituent elements for all types of violent crimes. A more immediate solution can be the institution of a requirement to record the motivation behind the crime in police, prosecution and court data.
- Develop clear definitions of core legal concepts such as racist and xenophobic motivation, fascist and anti-democratic ideology, etc., to facilitate identification, investigation and prosecution under the appropriate *Criminal Code* provision.
- Raise awareness on the importance of investigating and recording discriminatory motives, underscore the differences with other offences such as hooliganism and train police and prosecutors on how to identify, record and investigate extremist and discriminatory crimes.
- Establish data gathering mechanisms that allow for the release of aggregated data along the proposed indicators that do not compromise confidentiality and actively encourage its publication to foster analysis by actors outside of law enforcement.
- Develop an institutional mechanism for the collection of data on the relevant indicators and designate a responsible authority for the compilation of the situational assessment as part of its functions (ideally at the MoI, or a joint task force with the participation of the State Agency for National Security, the prosecution and other bodies).
- Conduct regular victimisation surveys as a tool aiding the assessment of the actual scope of the problem by bringing to light the share of latent criminality.
- Conduct regular surveys of the public attitudes towards and level of approval of extremist ideas and agendas in order to assess the level of penetration of radical and extremist ideas within society.

ANNEX. DESCRIPTIONS OF CORE INDICATORS

Name: Incidence (crimes of interest)	
Type	Quantitative
Description	Shows how heavily affected is the geographical area of interest by the specific crime group.
Policy relevance	Allows to compare the significance of the phenomena in each region and compare across regions, thus enabling effective intervention targeting. Indirectly, this indicator shows what the probability of victimization is region to region.
Variables	Number of specific crimes registered, number of inhabitants
Source of data (data generation needs)	Utterly dependent on crime statistics produced by law enforcement bodies. Essential requirements are: ability to register crimes by type/nature with supplementary information, ability to regularly report/collect such data centrally.
Compilation approach	Index of incidence = ((number of registered crimes/number of inhabitants)* (100 000/1))
Scope and coverage	The incidence index shall be constructed at the level of an administrative region. The national level index can be used, yet its informational value remains low. Definition of "crime of interest" can vary depending on national legislation. Commonly used categories are hate crime, crime against the state, crime with prejudicial motivation, crime with extremist background. The difference in covering the same act of crime between diverse sources of data needs to be considered – e.g. between the crime incidence from police registers and the statistics of judicial verdicts.
Unit	Single recorded crime
Representation	Incidence index is best represented graphically, on administrative map, using darkening shades for higher index
Data update interval	N/A (can be used for various purposes, as for the annual report, the useful period to follow for long term evaluation is a calendar month)
Rating: Complexity	2*
Rating: Labour intensity	3

*   *On a scale of 1 to 5, 5 being with the highest.*

Name: Share in violent criminal activity	
Type	Quantitative
Description	Shows how big a problem the violent actions with radical motivation are nation-wide (or regionally).
Policy relevance	Allows to establish the significance of the phenomena in terms of immediate societal security. It can, thus, be used to decide on the nature of any intervention into this domain. Generally, the higher the value of this indicator, the more repressive or pre-emptive posture needs to be adopted; the lower the number, the more effective becomes the political and preventive approach.
Variables	Number of specific crimes of violent nature registered of violent nature, number of all violent crimes registered
Source of data (data generation needs)	Utterly dependent on crime statistics produced by law enforcement bodies. Essential requirements are: ability to register crimes by type/nature with supplementary information, ability to regularly report/collect such data centrally.
Compilation approach	(Number of specific violent crimes registered/number of all violent crimes registered) x 100
Scope and coverage	This indicator has a nation-wide scope, however, the value for individual administrative regions is of importance too. Depending on the approach to the study, one shall seek to construct regional level values.
Unit	Single recorded crime
Representation	Pie chart should be used to represent the indicator. The use of multiple categories of violent crimes is strongly encouraged as they provide the comparative perspective.
Data update interval	N/A (can be used for various purposes, as for the annual report, the useful period to follow for long term evaluation is a calendar month)
Rating: Complexity	2
Rating: Labour intensity	3

Name: Share in overall criminal activity	
Type	Quantitative
Description	Shows how big a problem the crimes with extremist motivation are nation-wide (or regionally).
Policy relevance	Allows to establish the significance of the phenomena in terms of immediate societal security. It can, thus, be used to decide on the urgency of any intervention into this domain. Generally, the higher the value of this indicator, the more immediate action needs to be taken. The indicator's relevance may be contested when other types of crime rise or fall substantially over short period of time. The proportion of crime attributed to extremism and violent radicalisation may then rise or decline without any change in own numbers.
Variables	Number of specific crimes registered, number of all crimes registered
Source of data (data generation needs)	Utterly dependent on crime statistics produced by law enforcement bodies. Essential requirements are: ability to register crimes by type/nature with supplementary information, ability to regularly report/collect such data centrally.
Compilation approach	(Number of specific crimes registered/number of all crimes registered) x 100
Scope and coverage	This indicator has a nation-wide scope, however, the value for individual administrative regions is of importance too. Depending on the approach to the study, one shall seek to construct regional level values.
Unit	Single recorded crime
Representation	Pie chart should be used to represent the indicator. The use of multiple categories of crimes is strongly encouraged as they provide the comparative perspective.
Data update interval	N/A (can be used for various purposes, as for the annual report, the useful period to follow for long term evaluation is a calendar month)
Rating: Complexity	2
Rating: Labour intensity	3

Name: Proportion of specific crime sub-types	
Type	Quantitative
Description	Shows what shape the criminal extremist activities take.
Policy relevance	Allows to balance the intervention according to the risks from various behavioural patterns within the extremist domain.
Variables	Number of specific crimes registered per sub-type
Source of data (data generation needs)	Utterly dependent on crime statistics produced by law enforcement. Essential requirements are: ability to register crimes by type/nature with supplementary information, ability to regularly report/collect such data centrally; ability to distinguish specific sub-types of interest (beyond violent/non-violent).
Compilation approach	N/A
Scope and coverage	This indicator has a nation-wide scope, however, the value for individual administrative regions is of importance too. Depending on the approach to the study, one shall seek to construct regional level values.
Unit	Single recorded crime
Representation	Pie chart should be used to represent the indicator. The use of multiple categories is essential. The division lines can be constructed according to legislative provisions (coherent with law enforcement crime statistics) or above such level, by compiling higher order categories, should it be necessary.
Data update interval	N/A (can be used for various purposes, as for the annual report, the useful period to follow for long term evaluation is a calendar month)
Rating: Complexity	3
Rating: Labour intensity	3

Name: Notable events[88] – overall count	
Type	Quantitative
Description	Shows the overall incidence of non-criminal and/or public facing activities in support of radical political agenda.[89] Also, one can approach the indicator from regional perspective and identify the locations important for such movement's activities.
Policy relevance	Allows to see how wide spread extremist front-end activities are (signifying how organised the movement is) and their predominant locations. This in turn enables medium and long term decisions in the capability planning domain. Also, the information may provide interesting clues as to the movement's strategy, should there be significant changes monitored.
Variables	Number of specific crimes registered per sub-type
Source of data (data generation needs)	Utterly dependent on law enforcement after-action reporting and deployment evaluation data. Security measures taken in response to planned or unplanned extremist activities need to be accompanied with classification of the event and open source data about its properties. Ex-post sourcing of the data is also possible, however, the relevance of the indicator can be lowered.
Compilation approach	Count; the decision whether to include an event or not should be done at the operational level.
Scope and coverage	This indicator has a nation-wide scope, however, the value for individual administrative regions is of importance too. Depending on the approach to the study, one shall seek to construct regional level values.
Unit	An event
Representation	Bar chart should be used for representation; useful way is to present either monthly data or regional data
Data update interval	N/A (can be used for various purposes, as for the annual report, the useful period to follow for long term evaluation is a calendar month)
Rating: Complexity	1
Rating: Labour intensity	4

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[88] Any assessment report should be preceded by conceptualisation phase which must set criteria of reporting, notwithstanding the standards for "events" to be included.

[89] For the purposes of this indicator list, the term *political* describes also religious and single issue agendas, prejudicially motivated or any other world-view specific actions.

Name: Participation	
Type	Quantitative
Description	Shows the popularity of extremist events; the participant has to be determined or feel strongly about particular issue to take part in such event, hence the number of participants is telling both about the mobilization capability of the movement and sentiment over its agenda.
Policy relevance	Allows for force deployment planning, long term capability development and to support policy decisions over issues shaping the popularity of the radical movement.
Variables	Number of participants (estimated by law enforcement or by organizer), or, if possible, counted exactly by surveillance and analytical tools)
Source of data (data generation needs)	Utterly dependent on law enforcement after-action reporting and deployment evaluation data. Security measures taken in response to planned or unplanned extremist activities need to be accompanied with classification of the event and open source data about its properties. Ex-post sourcing of the data is also possible, however, the relevance of the indicator can be lowered. The use of modern photogrammetric surveillance and approximate methods brings more accurate results.
Compilation approach	Sum of estimates or exact count of the number of participants/overall count of events
Scope and coverage	This indicator has a nation-wide scope, however, the value for individual administrative regions is of importance too. Depending on the approach to the study, one shall seek to construct regional level values.
Unit	An event
Representation	N/A
Data update interval	N/A (can be used for various purposes, as for the annual report, the useful period to follow for long term evaluation is a calendar month)
Rating: Complexity	1
Rating: Labour intensity	3

Name: Events by type	
Type	Quantitative
Description	Signifies the strategy of the movement in support base engagement and public communication.
Policy relevance	Allows to distinguish whether the movement tend to radical politics, conspiratorial capability building, or subculture self-presentation. This in turn helps to determine the overall risk of violent outbreak.
Variables	Character of event
Source of data (data generation needs)	Utterly dependent on law enforcement after-action reporting and deployment evaluation data. Security measures taken in response to planned or unplanned extremist activities need to be accompanied with classification of the event and open source data about its properties. Ex-post sourcing of the data is also possible, however, the relevance of the indicator can be lowered.
Compilation approach	% of each event type in sum of events
Scope and coverage	This indicator has a nation-wide scope, however, the value for individual administrative regions is of importance too. Depending on the approach to the study, one shall seek to construct regional level values.
Unit	An event
Representation	Pie chart is the useful tool for representation of event type mix.
Data update interval	N/A (can be used for various purposes, as for the annual report, the useful period to follow for long term evaluation is a calendar month)
Rating: Complexity	1
Rating: Labour intensity	2

Name: Violent attitudes presented	
Type	Quantitative
Description	Signifies the general affinity of the movements under review towards violence.
Policy relevance	Allows to distinguish whether the movement tend to radical politics, conspiratorial capability building, or subculture self-presentation. This in turn helps to determine the overall risk of violent outbreak.
Variables	Message broadcasted during event, level of violence
Source of data (data generation needs)	Utterly dependent on law enforcement after-action reporting and deployment evaluation data. Security measures taken in response to planned or unplanned extremist activities need to be accompanied with classification of the event and open source data about its properties. Ex-post sourcing of the data is also possible, however, the relevance of the indicator can be lowered.
Compilation approach	% of each type of violent propaganda as per below typology: • event turned violent – police intervention needed and opposed • event turned violent – police intervention needed, event broken • event in support of violent actions by other actor home or abroad conducted without resort to violence • event in general support of violent solution of pressing issue conducted without resort to violence • event without specific violence related agenda, symbols and gestures generally related to violent actions, actors or ideologies displayed • event without specific violence related agenda, no specific violence related symbols displayed
Scope and coverage	This indicator has a nation-wide scope, however, the value for individual administrative regions is of importance too. Depending on the approach to the study, one shall seek to construct regional level values.
Unit	An event
Representation	Pie chart is the useful tool for representation of the event mix.
Data update interval	N/A (can be used for various purposes, as for the annual report, the useful period to follow for long term evaluation is a calendar month)
Rating: Complexity	2
Rating: Labour intensity	3

Name: Membership in extremist or support organisation	
Type	Quantitative
Description	Allows to establish mobilisation capability of the movement under official organization.
Policy relevance	Membership size of various ideological denominations gives relatively accurate picture of the importance of agenda brought to bear by such movement. Hence, it shall be used to judge the extent which is needed to cover such issues in mainstream political agenda.
Variables	Official membership
Source of data (data generation needs)	Utterly dependent on the states capability to produce such numbers. The registration policy and legislation for political movements and parties, churches and other social organisations bears relevance. Also the reliability of such statistics and its accessibility has to be established.
Compilation approach	Count of members across all organizations of interest. Which organization is to be included, needs to be decided by the reporting authority in order to preserve the coherence of the report.
Scope and coverage	This indicator has a nation-wide scope. With some effort, one should be able to count the membership at the regional level, this would, however, raise the labour intensity for this indicator quite significantly, especially for the first time publication.
Unit	A member
Representation	Bar chart for comparative purposes, otherwise, the total number shall suffice
Data update interval	N/A (can be used for various purposes, as for the annual report, the useful period to follow for long term evaluation is a calendar year)
Rating: complexity	2
Rating: labour intensity	3

Name: Active support offer among general public	
Type	Quantitative
Description	Allows to establish wider societal risk from a spread of radical ideas. People offering or considering to offer active support to the movement beyond the electoral support are at higher risk from seduction into the rank and file.
Policy relevance	By revealing the wider population strongly feeling about the issues shaped by the movement and willing to engage in its activities, the indicator helps to understand the popular appeal of such movement, and success of its strategy, in turn such data should allow for better targeting and intervention development on a wider programme scale beyond immediate or directly preventive measures.
Variables	Willingness to support beyond electoral
Source of data (data generation needs)	Should be included in tri-annual survey conducted nation-wide, representatively throughout regions. Standard way to proceed would be a questionnaire section using Likert scale questions to establish individual respondent's willingness to engage in various types of support activities, on the scale starting from electoral support, finished with violent attack under orders.
Compilation approach	Proportion of respondents suggesting positive attitude to any action beyond electoral support should be counted.
Scope and coverage	This indicator has a nation-wide scope. Yet, it is the most telling in comparative perspective at the level of administrative region.
Unit	A respondent
Representation	Bar chart for comparative purposes across indicators in domain 5; this indicator should otherwise represented graphically, on administrative map, using darkening shades for higher shares
Data update interval	3 – 5 years
Rating: Complexity	4
Rating: Labour intensity	5

Name: Social penetration by radical ideas	
Type	Quantitative
Description	Enables the calculation of the wider societal risk from a spread of radical ideas.
Policy relevance	Understanding overall penetration by prejudicial and other ideas signifying inclination to radical worldview completes the risk picture and represents the missing information useful in intervention design at the widest scale and longest timeframe.
Variables	Approval of radical ideas
Source of data (data generation needs)	Should be included in tri-annual survey conducted nation-wide, representatively throughout regions. Standard set of questions should be developed characterising major ideological features of each movement of interest. Likert scale type of answers should be used.
Compilation approach	Proportion of respondents showing consistent approval of typical ideas should be counted.
Scope and coverage	This indicator has a nation-wide scope. Yet, it is the most telling in comparative perspective at the level of administrative region.
Unit	A respondent
Representation	Bar chart for comparative purposes across indicators in domain 5; this indicator should otherwise be represented graphically, on administrative map, using darkening shades for higher shares
Data update interval	3 – 5 years
Rating: Complexity	4
Rating: Labour intensity	5

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