

# **Clientelism and Corruption as Crisis Generators: Obstacles towards Integration and Development**

Misha Popovikj, IDSCS  
Vlora Rechica, IDSCS

The New Enlargement Strategy for the Western Balkans: How to Enhance  
the Civil Society Role in Anti-Corruption and Good Governance

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
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
# Levels of Corruption



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EXPERIENCE WITH CORRUPTION PRESSURE (%)  
SELDI CMS DATA

■ 2001 ■ 2002 ■ 2014 ■ 2016




# Clientelism

- Operational definition:  
Political clientelism: particularistic distribution of certain benefits in exchange for political support (Hopkin, 2006)

# Reach of clientelism(%)

## INFORM data



# Reach of clientelism (vote projections)

	Albania 2013	Bosnia 2014	Kosovo 2014	Macedonia 2016	Montenegr o 2016	Serbia 2016
(A) registered voters	3.271.885	3.278.908	1.799.023	1.784.416	528.817	6.739.441
(B) % of reported pressured voters	20,6	15,4	12,5	7,4	22,5	8,4
(C) projection of pressured voters	674.008	504.952	224.878	132.047	118.984	566.113
size compariso n to parties	4th	1st	1st	3rd	2nd	2nd



# Vote capture – increase of odds that parties will ask for vote if citizens turned for help

	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
<b>ALB</b>	9.386607	3.751046	5.6	0.000	4.288982	20.54296
<b>BIH</b>	7.060694	2.145831	6.43	0.000	3.891857	12.80967
<b>KOS</b>	11.00233	4.196782	6.29	0.000	5.209529	23.23652
<b>MKD</b>	6.273709	2.074904	5.55	0.000	3.281002	11.99616
<b>MNE</b>	3.329183	0.9804644	4.08	0.000	1.869191	5.929549
<b>SRB</b>	3.793714	1.537452	3.29	0.001	1.714369	8.395083


# And informal ways are efficient

SUCCESS OF INFORMAL PRACTICE (%) INFORM data






## SUCCESS OF INFORMAL PRACTICE BY COUNTRIES (%)



## CLOSENESS OF BROKERS WHO HELPED MOST (%)



ALB

BIH

KOS

MKD

MNE

SER

# Conclusions

- Administrative corruption is widespread in WB
- The same types of clientelism manifest differently in different countries
- Capture of practices – low resistance to corruption pressure and high odds that in attempts of getting things done people end up as clients
- This creates a vicious circle of impeded social development (and of institutions)
- Informal institutions are much more efficient
- Informal practice is not a result of solidarity networks but much more centralized and brokered by political parties