

**SECURITY RISKS AND TRANSFORMATION –  
EUROATLANTIC AND REGIONAL  
PERSPECTIVES**

November 19-20, 2005

Sofia, Bulgaria

This publication summarizes the discussions at the International Security Conference “*Security Risks and Transformation – Euroatlantic and Regional Perspectives*” held in November 19-20, 2005 in Sofia, Bulgaria. The conference discussions benefited from the participation of the Bulgarian Prime Minister Sergey Stanishev, Supreme Allied Commander Europe General James Jones, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria Ivailo Kalfin, Minister of Defense Vesselin Bliznakov, Minister of the Interior Rumen Petkov, senior officials from Southeast Europe (SEE), Russia, Ukraine, USA and West European countries, representatives of international organizations and aid agencies, diplomatic missions, academic institutions and non-governmental organizations.

The 2005 conference was a continuation of the high-level event “*Shaping a Common Security Agenda for Southeast Europe: New Approaches and Shared Responsibilities*”, held in September 2003 in Sofia with the participation of NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and Bulgarian and SEE officials and the International Security Conference “*NATO, EU and the New Risks: A Southeast Europe Perspective*” held in October 29-30, 2004 in Sofia with the participation of NATO’s Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister, Bulgarian and SEE officials.

The conference is recognized as a NATO Flagship Event. It aimed at generating further debate regarding the powerful adaptation that is already taking place in NATO and the member states, towards the changing conditions and the following necessary actions for the security in the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans. One of the main objectives of the conference was to promote further political, professional and academic debate on the broader issues of defense and security forces transformation.

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## THE ORGANIZERS



**CENTER FOR  
THE STUDY OF  
DEMOCRACY**

Founded in late 1989, the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) is an interdisciplinary public policy institute dedicated to the values of democracy and market economy. The Center achieves its objectives through policy research, process monitoring, drafting of legislation, dissemination and advocacy activities and building partnerships, local and international networks.

In the last five years CSD has focused its efforts on the linkages between a more traditional rule of law agenda and the newly emerging threats to both security and development in Bulgaria and Southeast Europe. Among these, smuggling and the international operations of organized crime pose one of the most serious threats to security and prosperity in the region and thus warrant the attention of a wider community of stakeholders. Thus CSD has been promoting the establishment of public-private partnerships in this area both in Bulgaria and internationally. Its pioneering studies of the role of corruption in the trafficking of commercial goods in Bulgaria have brought about changes in government policies increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement. Applied for a third year in Bulgaria, this method allows policy makers to identify weak spots in border controls and design responses that target the latest developments in the techniques used by organized crime. In addition to its policy analysis and recommendations work—which of late includes the mechanisms through which organized crime has impacted on the reform of the security services in Southeast Europe—CSD is providing training assistance to the government in enhancing the anti-corruption capacity in the security sector.

*With the support of:*

**GOVERNMENT OF BULGARIA**

**GOVERNMENT OF NORWAY**

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**ELECTRON PROGRESS**

**INTER TRUST**

**K**  **kintex**

**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION**



**Raytheon**

# **AGENDA**





INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
**SECURITY RISKS AND TRANSFORMATION –  
EUROATLANTIC AND REGIONAL  
PERSPECTIVES**

**November 19-20, 2005**

Boyana Conference Center, Sofia, Bulgaria

**Saturday, November 19**

**09.00**

**Opening**



**Dr. Ognian Shentov**  
Chairman, Center for the Study of Democracy



**Address by Mr. Sergey Stanishev**  
Prime Minister of Bulgaria

**09.30**

**First Panel: NATO and EU response to new security risks – conceptual and practical approaches**



Panel Chair

**Amb. Boyko Noev**



**General James Jones**  
SACEUR, USEUCOM



**Prof. Sergei Karaganov**  
Chairman of the Council for Foreign and  
Defense Policy, Russia

Discussion

**10.40-11.15**

Coffee break

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11.15-12.45

**First Panel (continued)**



**Gen. (ret.) Klaus Naumann**  
former Chairman of NATO Military Committee



**Gen. Nikola Kolev**  
Chief of General Staff, Bulgaria



**Andrzej Karkozska**  
Director SDR, Ministry of Defense of Poland

**Discussion**

13.00-14.15

**Lunch hosted by Mr. Vesselin Bliznakov**  
Minister of Defense, Bulgaria

**14.30-15.30**

**First Panel (continued)**



**Maj.-Gen. Alberto Notari**  
DCOS, Supreme Allied Command Transformation



**Maj.-Gen. Thomas J. Matthews**  
Vice Director of Joint War Fighting Center and  
J-7 (training) USJFCOM

**Discussion**

**15.30-16.00**

**Coffee break**

**16.00-17.30**

**Second panel: Transformation and the Black Sea and Caucasus regions**



Panel Chair

**Minister (ret.) Michael Durkee**




**Ivailo Kalfin**  
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria



**Anton Buteyko**  
First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine



**Prof. Dr. Ioan Mircea Paşcu**  
MP, Romania



**Rear Adm. Cem Gürdeniz**  
Chief Plans and Policy, Turkish Navy HQ

**20.00**

**Dinner hosted by Mr. Ivailo Kalfin**  
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria

**Sunday, November 20**

**09.30**

**Third panel: NATO and EU in the Western Balkans**



Panel Chair

**Amb. Lyubomir Ivanov**  
Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to NATO



**Rumen Petkov**  
Minister of Interior, Bulgaria



**Lt.-Gen. Giuseppe Valotto**  
Commander KFOR  
(**Gen. Valotto** did not arrive because of the bad meteorological conditions, but his report was presented by **Maj.-Gen. Notari**)



**Petrit Karabina**  
Deputy Minister of Defense, Albania



**Lubomir Kyuchukov**  
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria

**Discussion**

**11.30**

Closing remarks

**12.00**

**Lunch hosted by Mr. Rumen Petkov**  
Minister of Interior





## **CONFERENCE OVERVIEW**



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In the last years the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) ([www.csd.bg](http://www.csd.bg)), Bulgaria's largest think tank, has focused on contributing to the rethinking of the responses to the new security challenges through a variety of instruments, including policy studies, monitoring and high-level conferences. CSD has sought to highlight the risks stemming from the spread of cross border organized crime, the need for an adequate policy for making crime a priority issue in the framework of the newly defined regional and European security, and the innovative responses to the new security risks. In addition to a series of policy papers on these issues, CSD has provided regional platform for a debate engaging both NATO and EU partners and the countries of the region.

CSD's International Security Conferences have been held since 2003, successfully accommodating a high level of participation (NATO Secretary General, SACEUR, ministers of defense and of interior, political, military and security leaders from SEE, NATO and the EU, Council of Europe and other international organizations, policy analysts and media representatives) within a traditionally free and flexible non-government, non-partisan discussion environment.

The 2005 Conference, which took place in Sofia on November 19-20, was titled "Security Risks and Transformation—Euroatlantic and Regional Perspectives" with the aim to give more prominence to ideas, concepts and policies which dominate the agenda of NATO, the EU and the wider international community in this field. The Black Sea and Southeast European regions have been chosen as sources of only some security problems which complement the wider spectrum of concerns underlying the new security theories and practices.

The debate was structured in three sessions. The first, "**NATO and EU response to new security risks—conceptual and practical approaches**" benefited from the participation of Bulgaria's **Prime Minister Sergey Stanishev**, SACEUR **General James Jones**, **Prof. Sergey Karaganov** from Russia, **Gen. (ret.) Klaus Naumann**, former Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, **Gen. Nikola Kolev**, Bulgarian Chief of Defense Staff, **Maj.-Gen. Alberto Notari**, DCOS ACT, **Maj.-Gen. Thomas Matthews**, USJFCOM, **Dr. Andzey Karkozska**, Director SDI, MOD Poland. The speakers commended NATO and its member nations which have embarked on an ambitious programme to adapt their concepts, forces and capabilities to match the changed security environment. They also underlined that the future of the Alliance depends on the depth and speed of transformation. And although many relevant decisions have been taken since 2002, much remains to be desired in terms of national contributions, political will and capacity to overcome legacy thinking. Among the conclusions, which may be drawn is that the time up to the next NATO Summit in

2006 should be wisely and actively used for the preparation of the relevant decisions in the field of transformation.

The second session, devoted to **security issues in the Black Sea and the Caucasus regions** was based on the contributions of **Ivailo Kalfin**, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, **Anton Buteyko**, First Deputy MFA of Ukraine, **Prof. Dr. Ioan Paşcu**, MP from Romania and **Rear Adm. Cem Gürdeniz**, Turkish Navy HQ. The keynote speakers covered a wide spectrum of security issues, ranging from geopolitics to specific security issues in the Black Sea region. Among the important conclusions which may be drawn is that the security problems related to the Black Sea in terms of traffic control are manageable with present security instruments. It was interesting to note, that the remaining problems, which pertain mainly to coordination and cooperation among littoral nations in the area, are mainly of political nature and require comparatively little investment.

The third session focused on the **security in the Western Balkans**. As the nature of security had changed from military to non-military, the debate was joined by **Rumen Petkov**, Minister of Interior of Bulgaria. Then, the participants received a thorough review of the current security situation in a briefing on behalf of **Lt.-Gen. Giuseppe Valotto**, COMKFOR. A deep political analysis of necessary steps was presented in the contributions of **Petrit Karabina**, Deputy Minister of Defense of Albania and **Lubomir Kyuchukov**, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria. Generally, it was widely agreed that the conflict potential in the Western Balkans is reduced far below critical levels. NATO and the EU continue to play a key role in the security in the region, although questions persist as to whether the current conceptual and security framework is adequate to the new risks and threats, such as residues of ethnic hatred, organized crime, trafficking and the like. The states which emerged from the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia are in the process of rebuilding or reforming their security institutions, which heightens their vulnerability to those risks, as well as possibilities for spillover on a regional and wider European scale. There was a general consensus that NATO and especially the EU should accelerate the integration of the Western Balkan countries as a key instrument for change.

Overall, the 2005 CSD Annual Security Conference accommodated more than 200 participants, of them 32 foreign. This, together with the substantial aspect of the debate, gives it the highest rating in the series of these traditional events organized by the CSD.

NATO's support was clearly demonstrated, along with that of the governments of Bulgaria and Norway and non-government contributors.

## **SPEECHES**



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**Dr. Ognian Shentov**

Chairman, Center for the Study of Democracy

*Mr. Prime Minister,  
Ministers and Ambassadors,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,*

Today's conference of the Center for the Study of Democracy is dedicated to international security in the context of the national, regional and global aspects of transformation. The dynamics and the evolution of the new security threats pre-empt or at least seriously challenge the development of the institutional infrastructure of international security. In the past years, non-conventional security risks have substantially increased worldwide and are now threatening not only states but the life of ordinary citizens. The immediate dangers of terrorism and religious extremism have a deep impact on our understanding of the 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges, which, in turn, influences the new international security system.

Bearing this in mind, I would like to raise two, it seems to me, key issues:

First, there is the necessity to radically rethink the existing concepts of security allowing a stronger emphasis on the social and economic origins of insecurity.

The interests of terrorists, drug smugglers and organised criminals could perilously overlap and it requires closer international coordination to forestall the emergence of potential "unholy" alliances. This is crucial here in the Balkans where there is a strong symbiosis between corrupt politicians and domestic organised crime, on the one hand, and national and transnational criminal networks, on the other. The expansion of the grey and black markets of drugs and illegal labour in Western Europe indubitably strengthens the position of international criminal networks and is at the basis of the latter's financial power. Bearing this in mind, the economic and social determinants of the new threats should receive a much higher priority in our security concepts.

Second, we need a new, more adequate vision regarding the international security threats.

The new security thinking faces a dual challenge: it has to be innovative but at the same time consensual, daring but also accommodating, provocative but responsible. If innovation is the order of the day in all sectors of the economy and social life, it must be so also in the field of security. A new vision would require the use of modern analytical instruments and methods, which could be used to perform a damage and threats assessment, a financial and economic analysis, modelling and prediction of various social processes, an evaluation of the measures taken to combat crime, and so on.

In this sense, it is very important to understand that dealing with new security threats at various levels of governance could not and should not be limited to the use of conventional military and police force. This new vision, aimed at reduction of the harms of these threats, requires the use of new social technologies, including the use of civil society expertise. Such social technology is the public-private partnership in the field of security.

Partnerships between the public and private sectors, between government and civil society have proved their usefulness in a variety of areas; it is now the turn of the security sector. The dynamic nature of the threats this sector is dealing with makes it imperative to expand the range of institutions contributing to security, including by employing the resources the private sector and civil society. This is exactly what we are aiming to achieve through our annual security conferences.

I hope that today's meeting would be another milestone on the road of effective public-private partnership in the field of security.



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**Mr. Sergey Stanishev**  
*Prime Minister of Bulgaria*

*Ladies and Gentlemen,*

Allow me at the outset to thank the Center for the Study of Democracy for hosting already a third international security conference and thus providing a forum for informative, thought-provoking debates between high-ranking public officials, politicians and nonpartisan experts on both Euro-Atlantic and regional security.

I am truly honored to welcome you at such a high-profile event that brings together a number of countries. I believe that your expertise will produce valuable discussions whose ultimate goal will be to demonstrate a shared capability of cooperation and an ability to respond to the problems and challenges facing our countries. It is also an exceptional pleasure to welcome General James Jones, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and Commander of the United States European Command.

Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as Dr. Shentov already pointed out, presents us with the tough intellectual challenge to rethink our concepts. The world we live in is so dynamic, in such flux, that the changes are hard to predict. The present-day security situation is dramatically different than it was in the 1980s. International relations and security in the 80s were dominated by the two major political blocs that, despite their polarity, would restrain one another and behave predictably.

In the past century we looked at security through the prism of force. As we all remember, this approach had its price – decades of conflicts, wasted opportunities and mutual fear. The 21<sup>st</sup> century, already at its start, is so completely different. The world has, indeed, become much smaller. A very recent book that I read is even called *The World Is Flat*. Globalization, the Internet and new technologies bring the states extremely close to each other. What happens thousands of kilometers from Sofia or any other city of Europe or America has a direct influence on our security.

The 1990s brought a number of changes for the better in Central and Eastern Europe. These countries are steadily being integrated into NATO and the EU and thus attaining greater military, political and economic security. Still, new threats such as terrorism, organized crime and WMD proliferation have emerged to the forefront. Quite a few contemporary threats are aggravated by the social tensions, unrest and even rage due to the underdevelopment of some countries in the world or regions within the states.

What has brought us together today is the shared desire and the efforts we invest in finding answers to the questions about our global security, not simply military or

political, but also the daily security that affects people's lives most immediately, the security that creates conditions for economic stability and development.

Until recently it seemed we were in agreement as to the right path forward. Developments in the last few years, however, have disclosed to us a number of tensions. Our concept about how to achieve consensus and unity of action in tackling the new threats has yet to be sharpened.

I think that it would now be right to devote greater attention to security's social aspects. Only weeks ago France experienced serious turmoil, however far advanced this state may be in matters economic, political and democratic. No state in the world may consider itself immune to such confrontations. This is so because societies in the global world have been ruptured from the inside. Social solutions can only be found, if a new system of security concepts, resources and institutions is designed, so as to support the social integrity.

The new threats, as a product of modern times, tend to reproduce between themselves. They can also accumulate to a critical point. We are all fully aware that organized crime, terrorism, corruption and radical fundamentalism have a strong potential to destroy. Classic oppositions used by political and military men for a long time, i.e. military vs. civilian, domestic order vs. international milieu, domestic vs. foreign policy, are now breaking up. In this situation we are trying to create a different culture, a philosophy focusing on horizontal solutions, opening up space for flexible, preemptive action in the areas of possible conflict or risk. This is a remedy much more effective and strong than any reactive, even military, action.

This understanding, however, poses numerous questions about the efforts we make to counteract those threats. Some questions concern the stability of democratic institutions and the rule of law, the kind of stability that lays the ground for all other kinds – stable foreign policy, economic and social stability. Other questions concern the establishment of links between two traditionally separate worlds – the military and the civilian. This has to do with the proposed integration of all crisis management agencies in every single state into national networks. Anyone experienced in state governance has come across the conflicts between institutions, the competition between them and the bottlenecks in information exchange which pose great practical problems. We need to change this situation. On a wider scale, this also holds true for international cooperation. No state can win the fight against global asymmetric threats on its own.

Security is going to depend ever more strongly on a number of factors such as the integration of minorities, the level and quality of something important to each and everyone—economic development, the strength of social ties and social cohesion

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and the ability to overcome what I find a treacherous trend—the pursuit of private solutions to private problems, which is not within the power of individuals.

As to the international context proper, Bulgaria seeks to realize its views on security within NATO, where it is a member, and the EU, which it will join before long. There are numerous examples of our involvement through military contingents in joint endeavors across different regions and examples of involvement in these two organizations' political activities.

No less important is the regional dimension and the active support Bulgaria provides to the reforms in its neighboring countries in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region. The policy of integration into the EU and NATO is a policy that in itself leads to security. Each country of our region aspiring to become a member is on the road to strengthening its democracy, speeding up economic growth and enhancing security and the prospects for solving past or potential conflicts and risks. The new sources of insecurity gain a very specific prominence in our region. The price for failing to fight the threat in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region would be very high, indeed. This is why Bulgaria will continue its active support to the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the whole region.

The Kosovo problem is a setback to the region's economic advancement, political stabilization and tangible integration and, therefore, poses a major challenge to the international community in its effort to convert our region into a zone of peace and stable democratic development. After the UN Secretary General's recommendation that Status Talks for Kosovo should commence, the situation there entered a new stage, which we consider a strongly positive development. Of course, different scenarios for the future of Kosovo may be followed, but no matter what status it is going to be given, I think it is imperative that the conditions, the standards of economic effectiveness, of democracy, of human rights and civil society should be met. All this is part of the European orientation of both Kosovo and the region.

Bulgaria is determined to participate in the political process for resolving the future status of Kosovo. We voiced that position of ours during the recent official visits to Pristina and Belgrade of Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Lubomir Kyuchukov and it was welcomed and supported in both places. Bulgaria can play a crucial role in reinforcing the European orientation of the whole region and Kosovo in particular in several key areas:

- administrative capacity building and staff training;
- dialogue between civil organizations;
- the EU Communication Strategy and the accession process as a whole.

The initiation of Status Talks will allow Bulgarian officials to apply their specific regional knowledge and expertise and thus contribute to the work of various EU

bodies in Kosovo. Bulgaria could share its vision and negotiate with the EU specific initiatives to be implemented there together with both NATO and EU member states. I firmly believe that NATO and the EU will remain the chief stabilization factor in Kosovo and throughout the region as guarantors of security, which is a fundamental condition, main players in the political process and contributors to the overall reform process.

*Ladies and Gentlemen*, it is often the case that because of our immediate political agenda and the daily problems we have to tackle we forget the fact that our environment has really changed. Security is no longer a function of the number of weapons or military officers. It is now increasingly becoming a function of our ability to develop working mechanisms of cooperation both nationally and internationally, mechanisms that will allow us to respond quickly and prevent non-conventional threats.

Certainly, our joint trans-national efforts will have to limit the emergence of failed states and support the building of democracy, open societies and well-functioning economies. Inside our own states we will have to create a new security-breeding environment where institutions work together and resources are spent rationally, where transparency, dialogue and civil society unfold in full. The state as such does not contain the country. It is not equal to society either. It cannot handle all modern-day challenges on its own. The challenges ahead of us are formidable. But I am sure that today's discussion will provide some clues of how they can be met.

I am confident that such conferences and ongoing national debates can inform the forthcoming NATO summit in 2006 and that the Alliance will ultimately find more flexible mechanisms to respond to the new asymmetric challenges, risks and threats. I wish all participants success, an inspired debate and ample concrete ideas and outcomes. The Bulgarian Government and the officials representing it at the conference will take an active part in its work. We strongly hope to be able to use its outcomes to our common benefit.

Thank you very much for your attention.

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**General James Jones**  
SACEUR, USEUCOM

Thank you, Ambassador Noev, for that generous introduction. I am deeply honored to be here this morning. Prime Minister, thank you for your remarks, to which I listened with great interest. It's a great pleasure to be here, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Prof. Karaganov, it's an honor to be on the podium with you. To my good friend Gen. Kolev: it's always a great pleasure to be with you, either here in Bulgaria or in Brussels.

My task this morning is to briefly talk about transformation and, if you permit me, I would like to do so in a specific way. First, I'd like to make some general comments about transformation and then ask what perhaps is a more provocative question: for what purpose is the Alliance transforming? Transformation is a topic that has been around for a number of years. Transformation to me means change, but I've found that change is something that people generally like to do to somebody else, but not to look at themselves. The larger the organization, the harder it is to change.

But nonetheless, change is important. To put it in a business context, I would say that organizations must change in order to remain competitive; similarly, in order to face the new challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, NATO must also change. Happily, the Alliance has the capacity, interest and commitment to do just that. But change is not easy. In my lifetime, I would say the biggest change in the Armed Force of the United States, which actually happened in the mid-1970s, was when we decided to go to a professional force—an All Volunteer Force. For me, that triggered the most profound change in the American military, perhaps in its history. Change can also occur in several ways. Most of the time we think of change or transformation as a physical process where you acquire new capabilities or new technologies and integrate them into your structures so you become better at what it is you do. In the military context, it means you are better able to achieve your missions. But transformation also means you might need a structural reorganization. It means looking at yourself holistically to see if you are properly organized for what it is you wish to do. For NATO, the Prague Summit of 2002 was very dramatic and ushered in an era of transformation. One of the most visible pronouncements of the Prague Summit in 2002 was the decision to expand by seven member nations. While the accession of our new members is complete, we are still very much focused on transformation, to include a complete reorganization of the military structure. We eliminated a number of headquarters that no longer served a useful purpose. We disestablished the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic and replaced it with the Supreme Allied Command for Transformation, which is doing extraordinarily useful work today and will continue to do so in the years ahead. We committed to remedying the military shortfalls in the Alliance through the Prague Capabilities Commitment; the nations also declared the Alliance would develop the NATO Response Force, which is NATO's most visible

expression of transformation in terms of military capabilities. The nations also informally agreed to maintain their defense budgets at 2% of GDP or better. Let me congratulate our host country Bulgaria for being true to that informal agreement, which is so very important. Change can also be defined not only as a physical change that I just described, but also as a cultural change, the way we think about the things we do. We are very much at the crossroads of two very different centuries in terms of how NATO is viewed and how NATO sees itself. In the twentieth century, everyone on both sides of the Atlantic—and particularly in our public domain—knew very clearly what NATO stood for. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, is that understanding as clear as it needs to be? In my personal opinion, it is not. We need to do a better job of explaining to ourselves and to our publics why NATO in the 21<sup>st</sup> century might be even more important in terms of our collective security than it was in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, NATO was a reactive, defensive and linear alliance. Things were clearer then. Our threats were easily defined and easily understood. NATO's level of ambition was not to leave its territory but to defend it and to defend it in a reactive way, which meant that NATO committed never to initiate any kind of conflict. Things were simple; there was order. All of the organizational structures were built to support a massive force that was largely unmovable, reactive and defensive in nature. However, the world has changed, the security environment is different, and the Prague Summit was a visible manifestation of the recognition of that fact.

As we execute the will of the nations expressed at the Prague Summit, we are also in the midst of a profound cultural transformation, which leads me to ask the question: to do what? The challenges we collectively face—being asymmetric and non-linear and attacking the very seams of our societies collectively and simultaneously in many different ways—argue for a capability and a cultural change that presupposes the fact that proactive engagement is better than reactive engagement. Flexibility and agility in our new force structure is imperative. Being able to deter is a great contribution to our collective security, but being able to react quickly is also uppermost of our minds. One thing is very certain: speed is important and speed is expensive. So as we restructure and organize ourselves to be able to be more responsive, more agile, and more proactive we are entering a period where common security perhaps has replaced the 20<sup>th</sup> century's theme of common defense. Common security, as we are seeing in the global security environment, means that NATO forces could be employed in, and deployed to, many different parts of the globe to do many different things. I'd like to quickly recap what NATO forces are doing today. In Afghanistan, NATO is preparing to assume an even larger mission. In the Balkans, as the Prime Minister mentioned, NATO's mission in Kosovo continues. On the Mediterranean, NATO's Article V mission, ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR—a counter-terrorism mission—is making the Mediterranean perhaps as safe and as secure as it has ever been. In Pakistan, NATO is bringing relief to thousands of people as winter approaches. In Darfur, the Alliance is assisting the African Union to build its peacekeeping capacity and, in the process, is also working in that region of Sudan as a partner with the United Nations and the

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African Union. In Iraq, NATO is making a significant contribution by training young future Iraqi officers, training Iraqis in our own nations and providing much-needed equipment for the emerging Iraqi Army. NATO is doing all that while at the same time developing the NATO Response Force, which will reach Full Operational Capability next summer. So change is going on around us. But I would suggest that in order to be true to the tenets of transformation—there is no magic in transformation—it is about hard work and about maintaining budgets so that you can finance transformation. I have said to all my colleagues who talk about transformation that you can truly be transformational provided you do not reduce your budgets and your military forces at the same time. If you do both simultaneously, it is not transformation, but simply developing a lesser capability. The virtue of transformation is finding savings through reorganization and downsizing so you can make the investments in the capabilities that allow you to be able to do more with less. With less people there is less topline investment in your manpower costs. When you reinvest those savings, you can acquire more capability and be more useful to NATO and for your own national priorities. This is a difficult concept to understand. The fact is that transformation—if it is done well—allows you to do more with less, and so allows you to reduce your overall costs and invest in other areas that make your Armed Forces more effective. I've told my own service and my own military that the best example of transformation I know is the infantry battalion of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, which—properly transformed—should be able to do the work of the infantry regiment of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In other words, increasing capability by a ratio of roughly 3 or 4 to 1. I think that's a good way to describe the positive results of change. Size of force equals neither commitment nor capability in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It is the usability of those forces that makes a difference, and we will see that more dramatically in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

In the time that I have left, let me try and answer the question I posed at the outset of my remarks: transformation to do what? The asymmetric challenges of the world are quite significant and pose perhaps an even greater threat to our collective security than anything that I have seen in my lifetime. We must ask ourselves what it is that we wish to be able to do and what it is that we wish to specifically task an organization like NATO to do in the future. For instance, what is NATO's fundamental role in confronting the challenge of terrorism? How do we respond? Is terrorism a NATO responsibility or is it just a national law enforcement operation? What does the Alliance do in the face of proliferation? What is the proper response of a transformed alliance to ensure that terrorists and non-state actors do not acquire the technology that gives them greater capabilities than they have already demonstrated, unfortunately successfully, in many of our capitals and in various parts of the world? What happens when a non-state actor makes a leap to another level of capability and lethality, with a biological weapon, a radiological weapon, or a chemical weapon, to say nothing of a nuclear weapon? What is the strategic value of NATO in such an environment? What is the role of the Alliance in shoring up critical infrastructure in a strategic sense? How do we shore up critical vulnerabilities in a world where terrorist and non-state actors can

penetrate the seams of our societies and find the Achilles heel of our infrastructure and attack it? How do we better protect the critical lines of communication for our energy supplies, the access to which we all depend on? What is our role regarding the very clear link between drug trafficking, criminality and the infusion of resources into terrorist organizations from those activities? Lastly, what might an organization like NATO be willing to do in the 21<sup>st</sup> century about proactively helping struggling democracies across the world to anchor themselves, by developing security forces and institutions through training and engagement, and by teaching militaries how to function in support of a democracy? Wouldn't that be an example of proactive engagement, where the proactive costs are always cheaper than the reactive costs in the long term? NATO clearly cannot do everything and NATO clearly cannot be everywhere. But if we act strategically, we can pick our times and we can pick our spots and we can make a difference. So with this transformation that is ongoing, if it is well financed, if it is adhered to, and if agreements are lived up to, we can in fact transform NATO in such a way that it can make a great difference in our collective security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It can make a great difference by being more proactive, agile, and flexible across the spectrum of operations. Very few people, myself included, would have thought three years ago that NATO would be in Afghanistan, or thought even one and a half years ago that NATO would have a mission in Iraq, or thought even six months ago that NATO would be involved in a humanitarian operation in Pakistan. But this is the transformation, this is the evolution. NATO cannot simply be a reactive force waiting for a conventional conflict the likes of which may not happen and hopefully won't happen. NATO cannot afford to sit idly by and be underutilized in responding to the asymmetric threats that are collectively attacking and threatening our collective security.

I was delighted to hear the Prime Minister this morning and my meetings with the President and the Defense Minister all reaffirmed Bulgaria's commitment to being a full member in the discussion and implementation of the strategy that would defeat these asymmetric threats by engaging them in a proactive way. This is encouraging, this is topical, and this is what is needed.

Ladies and gentlemen, it was a pleasure to be with you this morning. I look forward to our panel discussion. I thank you for your interest in the Alliance and for the ideas and the energy you bring to the discussion. Finally, let me thank our host country again for the hospitality and for the idea of this very important conference. Thank you very much.



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**Prof. Sergei Karaganov**  
Chairman of the Council for  
Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Prime Minister, dear colleagues and friends, it is indeed a great honor for me to be here and speak to such a distinguished audience. It is also a particular pleasure because about 25 years ago I was in this building, invited by a different leader with a different group of people. I must say the building is still very impressive but the words which I hear are much more impressive and much more interesting than they used to be. Although I am connected in many ways with my government (I am sitting on at least six governmental consultative and presidential consultative committees), I will give a view of an independent Russian analyst and a friendly neighbor to both NATO and the European Union. Friendly, but critical. My criticism is not meant to degrade NATO or the European Union or anybody, but is meant to give you a different point of view that might be useful.

First, what are the new security risks—that is exactly the task which I was given to talk about. Of course, the first and the greatest security risk is the gradual collapse of the larger Middle East. There are many reasons: Islam, which used to be one of the greatest civilizations of the world, is not living through its best times and by imposing limits on education, rights, women and many other things it brings about this deterioration of many countries. And these countries are not only sitting on our borders, they control most of the international oil and gas resources and are able to export instability, not to speak about the possibility that some of the forces in these countries may lay their hands on weapons of mass destruction. Especially volatile is of course the classical Middle East conflict, which is still very far from being solved. An area which is potentially very volatile is the area of the Persian Gulf, with Iraq, which is profoundly unstable, with Iran, growing, fighting for influence, but also fighting probably to get as close to nuclear weapons as possible in order either to face multiple security challenges or to get recognition and respect, very much like India and Pakistan did, by acquiring nuclear weapons earlier. Nobody feels secure in this part of Asia, everybody feels insecure and there is a huge security vacuum which has not been faced yet both intellectually and politically by the outside world. Less volatile and less dangerous is the Caucasus which nevertheless is composed of relatively failing states and keeps these three unrecognized states, waiting either to be recognized after fifteen years of de facto independence or gradually and peacefully remerge with the former Soviet republics which are their alleged mother states. But this is a minor problem. The bigger problem in the area is of course Central Asia where there are at least several failing states and the biggest problem of all is Uzbekistan, nobody knows how to deal with it. We try our best, even not to the liking of many of us, to stabilize the situation before it goes up in flames, exporting instability to the adjacent areas to the South, but mostly to the North. There is of course the Iranian problem, but the Iraqi problem is now the biggest of them all.

Now it is those bandits and terrorists who are fighting the forces of law and order and the guardian soldiers of the coalition. These terrorists and guerrillas, when and if the conflict is more or less stopped (and I hope it will happen soon), will spread all over the world. We are training, the international community is training there new cadres of terrorists by thousands upon thousands. There is of course an anticipated, a traditional geopolitical oil game now joined by not only traditional powers but the likes of India, China, Armenia and some other countries.

The great security and political challenge of the second order, but nevertheless very important, I would say strategically important, is the rise of the other Asia. It is very clear that 10 to 15 years ago the other Asia, that is South and Southeast Asia will be the center of international economy and probably the center of international politics as well. And we all know that these two Asias will occupy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century the geopolitical place Europe occupied in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. We will witness the struggle for influence in this area very much like the 20<sup>th</sup> century was the century of the fight for Europe. Hopefully, of course, with the great wisdom we have acquired fighting for Europe, we will be able to preempt the return of history in Asia, but some of the challenges and even dangers are there. There is a growth of nationalism, there is a growth of anti-Western sentiment in the pro-Western countries. They are shredding the cultural historic and political influence of the West, which the West imposed on them during the colonial times, and they are feeling much more assured of themselves and thus, probably much more arrogant, eventually, not yet. But some signs of arrogance are there. And of course they lack the security structure, which Europe has. So there is a huge security vacuum and a lack of security structure in the other Asia.

There are some secondary, but nevertheless very important risks. Degradation of most of Africa, population growth in many areas, which is spinning out of control and creating bases of conflict within these areas and also internationally because thousands upon thousands, even millions of young people who were born in Africa, in some of the areas of Asia, are now exposed by virtue of international communication to the other world, the world in which we live and they are aware of their absolute inability to improve their condition. These are the reasons for the growth of terrorism, anti-Western and anti-civilizational feelings in this area because at this juncture, like maybe nine centuries ago, civilization is the West. The West, which is very different from what it used to be, the West is Japan, the West is India. But it is capitalism and democracy. It used to be, by the way, the Muslim world only seven to nine centuries ago but now these forces are anti-civilizational, being anti-Western. There is of course a depletion of various resources and one could foresee that in five to fifteen years there will be very rough struggle for water resources. We have witnesses already some of the signs of that. China, for example, closed one of the rivers which flows to Russia and all of a sudden one of the greatest rivers of Russia could not run its power

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stations. Some of the cities were short on water. Of course, we will solve this problem, Russia has plenty of fresh water, more than any country in the world.

The most important thing is that the general background of meeting of these and other challenges is also not very good, it's uneven. In some places, things are getting better, but overall, the situation with the governability of the international system is getting worse. We will witness the gradual degradation of the non-reformable UN. We all wish the United Nations to reform, but we have to be realistic after so many tries. NATO, after winning the peace during the Cold War and fulfilling its role in putting down both Soviet and communist threats, is looking for a new task. Thank God it is surviving because there would have been another security vacuum and differences between foreign and defense policies in Europe, which is a distant, but very dangerous possibility. But it is fulfilling a useful role by spreading the feeling of stability and security to the adjacent areas, to their countries which either feel insecure, or are willing to be members of a club, it prepares many countries to become members of the European Union.

But there are two problems with NATO. First, I think it is on the edge of overexpanding by importing many countries which are consumers, rather than producers of security, and second, it now has to pay the price of, I believe, a great mistake it made in the beginning of the 1990s when there was a debate to get out of the area or die, or expand or die. It decided to expand, not to get out of the area. If it had gone by the first route, I believe that by now it would have had a hard nucleus for the new international security system based on the reformed NATO. NATO is reforming, of course, and we acknowledge that, but the problem is that NATO—the only military and security organization in the world which could play a constructive role in preventing, preempting many crises—is too timid in getting out of the area or else is not called to get out of the area. Sometimes the US does that, sometimes the US does not call on NATO, and NATO is still struggling to become a truly world, rather than a regional, actor. Of course, becoming a world or national actor it would have to reform itself more profoundly. NATO also plays a very useful role, and we acknowledge that, by more and more closely cooperating with Russia. First, doing away with the sense of insecurity which is in our bones. We have been fighting and looking through the barrel of the gun for too long. Second, by creating possibly some useful instruments for dealing with instability in a common way. Most of our cooperation is symbolic, but we cherish and value it.

So, anyway, NATO is alive and hopefully will play an increasingly useful role in the future, though this role is yet undefined. The EU has a greater success, I mean it is the first time the world has achieved some kind of a model of a humanistic world government. The EU has helped very much to do away with some of the sinister history of Europe, history of wars, of Germany becoming two times the war house of Europe. Now nobody expects from Europe anything bad other than stagnation.

It has overcome its history and we are very thankful. But in terms of foreign policy and security, it is less successful. I suspect that we will see some rationalization of the common foreign policy of Europe when countries see that Europe is not exporting its power and influence and is isolating itself and usually the foreign policy of Europe, of the European Union, is run by the policy of the lowest common denominator. This is one of the many reasons for the common crisis of Europe. There is another problem and that is that the military and security army of Europe after six tries, if I remember, now is the seventh, is not taking off. With all my great respect to my friends in the security forums of the EU, it is a non-player. It tries to play symbolic role of course, tries to show that Europe is there, but it is not a significant player in the security field except for internal security matters of course, for which it is very useful. Europe of the European Union has excelled in creating something which is very interesting, which I would call, along with a couple of good friends “a non-military army”, an army which could not fight, is not intended to fight indeed and is a part of the culture of transformation of Europe and of course a result of the underfunding of the military for decades.

Unfortunately, the military factor, though in a different way, is returning back to international politics. We hoped that it would not return but the world is dangerous and it could become even more dangerous so we need military forces of a modern kind to deter, preempt or prevent these risks and challenges. Europe unfortunately does not contribute much, not to this common effort. So, how do we solve the problem? I mean it's up to you. I am a friendly outsider, but I could give you a hint. I don't think you could solve the problem of profound transformation of NATO so it could really meet the challenges by simply reforming NATO. It is useful of course. You could not solve the problems or meet the risks which I mentioned even by a common effort of Europe and the United States. So I am returning back to my idea of the beginning of the 1990s, which is becoming popular again. There is a need for international security alliance of great powers. A new concert of nations which is able to help modernization of certain areas, deter certain challenges, especially those of proliferation and social instability. It could be formed on the basis of a formal treaty and even with a secretariat. NATO, if reformed, could become, together with Russia and other willing nations, the military arm of that great alliance which should be alliance for security, not only military security. Otherwise, it should be built together with the UN Security Council but I believe that the Security Council is unreformable, so we should build something close to it, cooperating with it, but never under the auspices of the UN, which is dominated by failed or failing states.

So, what is the role of Russia? I think we are playing a useful security role in the world, trying to calm down our security periphery, which is very risky for the whole world. Sometimes at a certain risk for ourselves. For example, taking some responsibility for the stability in Uzbekistan is such a risk and Uzbekistan is not a very pleasant country to keep your forces in. We could also play the role of a bridge between the

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Euro Atlantic and the Asian security system, which could be, if it emerges and it probably emerges around the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, thus linking the two security systems into one. But again, the situation calls for the filling of the security vacuums. Because otherwise even a successful NATO could not solve the problems the world faces, with all my great respect. Thank you.

**Gen. (ret.) Klaus Naumann**

former Chairman of NATO Military Committee

It does not make too much sense to discuss NATO responses without clarity on where NATO/EU stand in fall 2005. I am neither one of these notorious NATO well wishers who close their eyes to realities, nor do I belong to the pessimists who have given up NATO. I believe that Europe as well as the US need close transatlantic cooperation and that there is no better formula for achieving it than NATO. But NATO, although doing well in operations and making progress albeit slow in military transformation, is still in a crisis which got out of control during the Iraq dispute.

It is a crisis which seems to have revealed one point of permanent change: Europe is no longer confronted with the threat which had united the Europeans and which had made them so often to accept American proposals during the Cold War and the US no longer depends on Europe which provided the potential Cold War battlefield for a forward defence of the US, thus making the Americans willing to accommodate European concerns and to settle for compromises. But no longer being forced to find mutually acceptable compromises, the arrogance of power met during the Iraq crisis with the arrogance of the impotent, who in addition felt to be on the moral high grounds.

The Americans and some, if not most, Europeans have differing views on the use of force and its legalisation. Moreover, most Europeans wish to preserve some of the restrictions which the international law, in particular the UN Charter, imposes on the use of force.

Another concern is decision making. No doubt, the clear majority of the US allies wishes to preserve a decision making process in which the views of all allies should be taken into account and at the end of which a unanimous decision should stand. The present US Government, however, prefers “the mission defines the coalition approach”, although there is little to no hope that this approach will ever be accepted by NATO.

Finally, there is the capabilities gap which continues to reduce European influence on the US. As these and other questions remain unanswered for the time being, NATO is not as healthy as it needs to be in the present situation of international instability. My conclusion on the state of NATO at this time is therefore:

1. It is indeed no longer the primary place of transatlantic consultation and
2. It is no longer the option of choice for all NATO nations in crisis management.
3. There is no real agreement on how to cope with future crises since there are gaps between the US and its allies in:
  - the resolve to use all necessary means including military means;
  - the capability to act across the full spectrum of political options;

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- the military capabilities which seems to develop into a gap of conceptual thinking;
  - the absence of the political will in most European countries and in Canada to take appropriate steps to modernise their armed forces.
4. There are quite a few differences of views on the future role of NATO ranging from a global alliance on the one side ready to act in expeditionary operations where needed to being more or less reduced to collective defence plus some PSOs on the other hand.

The EU is not much better off. It is divided and appears to be in a deadlock. Moreover, its stubborn defence of an undefendable agricultural protectionism will most probably widen the transatlantic rift should the Doha Talks fail.

In a nutshell, in my view neither NATO, nor the EU are at this time capable of providing common responses to new security risks. Nobody can afford to leave things as they are. We need the US and they need us Europeans. This means as well that the Europeans must not tolerate an American failure in Iraq, which in my view, although hypothetically possible, is still unlikely, regardless of whether they were against or for the war. Iraq must not become a failure as then Europe will feel the consequences first. The challenge is therefore twofold: in the short term, to find a way of cooperation in Iraq and in the mid term, to repair both NATO and the EU. I will primarily focus on NATO when talking about responses to the new threats.

### **What is needed?**

First, a common appreciation of the situation and common and agreed conclusions. The experts in NATO and in the NATO nations do not suffer from a lack of threat awareness. There is a relatively strong consensus on the scope and the nature of the threats NATO is confronted with and there is not much difference in the threat assessments of NATO, the EU, the US and the US allies. The differences lie in the political preparedness to make the public aware of the threats and in offering views on how to cope with these threats which are global in their nature and trans-national in scope, including views on the use of military force.

You all are aware of the uncertainties, risks and dangers ahead of us. Therefore to offer to you a risk assessment would really mean to carry coals to Newcastle. I could imagine that most of us could agree to the following statement: "With the requirement to meet the threats from where they may come, the Alliance will operate in a wider strategic environment that is influenced by several key factors and drivers for change. Foremost among them are: globalisation, the increasing sophistication of asymmetric warfare, the effects of changing demography and environment, failing states, radical ideologies and unresolved conflicts. These factors are liable to lead to shocks to Alliance

security interests over the next 15 years, particularly as tensions, crises and conflicts will occur with little warning.” This is unfortunately not a quotation from NATO’s Strategic Concept it is from the Bi-SC Vision Paper, an unofficial document.

This is the reality but it is not the reality in which our nations live, notably not in Europe. Most Europeans believe they live in peace and the task of finding responses to new risks is not too prominently placed on the political agenda. Moreover, Europe is politically deeply divided on almost every issue of importance. But Europe knows, on the other hand, that there is no chance at all to be listened to in Washington as long as Europe does not speak with one voice, with a voice which is backed by capabilities. Henry Kissinger got it right when he recently said: Eventually there is a European telephone but it does not answer.

The first conclusion should therefore be that the transatlantic partners must develop the political will and the resolve to weather together the upcoming storms of globalisation and the determination to prevail. This requires more than a lukewarm commitment to military transformation. It may require a fresh look at military transformation and it will require to get a better return for Europe’s substantial defence expenditures inter alia through improved defence cooperation. First and foremost, however, the situation requires beginning with political transformation, an area in which almost nothing was achieved so far. This means, in addition to procedural improvements, to develop a better formula for EU-NATO cooperation since NATO, having exclusively military instruments in its tool box, simply does not possess the instruments necessary to manage today’s crises.

## **Elements of Change**

I have three categories in mind, in which changes are both necessary and urgent and which render themselves for decisions to be taken at the NATO Summit in fall 2006:

- Political transformation of NATO;
- Improved EU-NATO cooperation;
- Continuation and possibly reorientation of transformation leading to enhanced military capabilities.
- Political transformation

As the strategic environment changed and is likely to change further, NATO needs a new vision:

1. The strategic outlook is no longer regional, it is global.
2. The range of missions goes far beyond collective defence. It encompasses crisis prevention, crisis management including conflict pre-emption, expeditionary intervention, post conflict stabilisation and collective defence, should prevention fail.



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3. NATO must pursue a holistic approach which calls for a wider set of tools as well as much closer and deeper cooperation with other international bodies.

NATO must therefore, and that is my first answer to the question of what is needed, widen its scope of transformation, which must include political transformation, and it must further adapt to a profoundly changed strategic environment.

NATO must transform its political side of the house as profoundly as NATO asked the military to do. Such a transformation must in its procedural dimension raise quite a few sensitive questions, prominently among them the issue of decisions by consensus. At this moment all committees in NATO are bound to achieve consensus and the result is unavoidably that the best one could achieve after considerable time and efforts is the lowest common denominator. Is this really what we need in a time full of uncertainties, in a time in which prevention might be the appropriate answer? I could therefore imagine that NATO preserves the consensus principle for NAC decisions but opens the door for a majority rule at the committee level.

Political transformation calls also for a reaffirmation of all NATO nations to use NATO as their option of choice in all situations which will require co-ordinated transatlantic action and a consolidated transatlantic appreciation of the situation. To do so would require the Europeans to give up the idea of consulting first in the EU and US, to abandon the flawed idea to develop a concept in Washington and to ask the allies to join a coalition of the willing.

What I have in mind is consultation in NATO leading to a decision at 26 and delegation of the execution to a coalition of the willing. It is the moment of execution when the mission defines the coalition, but not necessarily the moment of the political decision. This obviously means at the same time that allies which do not contribute to the execution have no right to influence the conduct of operations.

Moreover, as the military transformation aims at the exploitation of the qualitative edge which NATO and its nations will enjoy through their ability to win and maintain information dominance, time will be of the essence in decision making and in the execution. Thus delegation, quite often pre-delegation of responsibility to the executing commander, will be indispensable.

Delegation of responsibility means as well to allocate all necessary resources to the commander in the field. NATO must therefore modernise its procedures of financing operations beyond the Cold War formula of "costs lie where they fall". To apply this outdated formula on the NRF could well mean that the NRF will remain a dormant force which will never be used for what it was created: a rapid response at the early stages of a conflict which may allow for extinguishing a spark before it became a fire. Delegation of responsibility means as well to reduce to the extent possible

national reservations which often hamper NATO commanders to use their forces in a proper and meaningful way and which prevent ROES without amplifying national instructions. None of these issues represents a military problem. They all require political solutions. Should NATO's nations be unable to find solutions, we might see an Alliance possessing a military rapid reaction capability, but being unable to use it in time for political reasons

### **NATO–EU Cooperation**

The best solution would be a decision to grant NATO access to other than military means, but the political climate for such a decision does not exist and it is not likely that it will exist in the foreseeable future.

But the next crisis might come tomorrow. We need to find a short term solution which will give NATO access to non-military instruments. I therefore believe that one should look into a “Berlin Plus in Reverse” approach, i.e. an agreement between NATO and the EU that the EU will provide non-military assets and capabilities for NATO in crises which affect both and in which NATO was asked to take the lead.

### **Military transformation**

Military transformation is at this time more or less reduced to getting the NRF operational by fall 2006. But with a NATO Summit in fall 2006 on the radar screen, it is simply insufficient to pocket the NRF's IOC as the main summit result. It would also lead to nowhere to shoot once again for new decisions such as those taken at the Washington 1999 and Prague 2002 summits respectively. In my view at the 2006 NATO Summit should invite its nations to agree on building the “roof” for the NRF aiming at the transformation of this force into a true 21<sup>st</sup> century expeditionary force.

To this end I envisage some multi-nationally manned, but NATO owned and operated assets for the NRF in the enabling forces and force multiplier category. Such assets are really urgently needed, otherwise this force would be condemned to fight, while remaining blind and deaf. This means focusing upon three functional areas:

- C4ISR
- Effective engagement
- Focused logistics.

Obviously, it is not sufficient to agree on generalities. The 2006 Summit should invite the nations to agree on certain specific capabilities, where possible as NATO owned and operated (NO&O) component forces following the most successful model of the NATO AWACS Component Force. Such forces could be:

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- a NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) component force;
  - a NATO Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) component force for long range precision strike;
  - a NATO Strategic Airlift component including an Air to Air Refuelling (AAR) component;
  - a NATO Roll on/Roll off (RoRo) Sealift component.

Such elements, multi-nationally manned, commonly operated and financed, would constitute meaningful, affordable and badly needed capabilities which would help to close to some extent the gap between the political aspirations of the non-US nations and their capabilities.

But force planning which is limited to intervention and post-conflict stabilisation does not suffice. Europe must focus as well on tackling new threats to its security stemming from terrorism and organized crime. This requires linking defence and homeland security in ways so far not foreseen in EU countries. One of the most important instruments that will enable nations to do so is one which the nations need to have for their military forces anyway: information management that produces information dominance.

Let me add two final thoughts. Such approaches might help both the US and the Europeans to leave some flexibility in their planning since one phenomenon must get much more attention than it gets today: we are facing opponents who seek to hit us where we are most vulnerable. To this end they watch and they analyse. Their desire is to attack us below the level at which we could use and take advantage from our security forces. Therefore we must remain prepared for the unexpected and we must remain capable of quick responses to unforeseen challenges. This requires as a minimum to leave some flexibility in the force planning of all NATO nations as well as of bodies such as NATO.

But I said earlier on that a reorientation of the ongoing military transformation might be necessary. It seems to me that too much of the political and military thinking is still devoted to winning a war, i.e. a war between nation states, and too little thought has been given to the utility of force in modern conflicts. I believe General Sir Rupert Smith got a point when he raised this question. We have to think through which instruments and which mix of instruments we will need in order to prevail in tomorrow's conflicts which might in addition be characterised by a shift of strategic paradigms that could well be the product of the next revolution in military affairs which we could see around 2020. Such a shift, should it occur, will no longer put the main emphasis of military operations on the destruction of an opponent's capabilities but on its preventive paralysation. For all these reasons, I would wish to see, in addition to my three technical proposals on military transformation, a conceptual one: a Summit decision in 2006 to begin work on a new strategic concept for NATO

which has to answer the question of the utility of force in tomorrow's world. Such a NATO Strategic Concept could do what the extant 1999 Strategic Concept fails to do: it could provide guidance to all NATO nations for the future development of their security organisations and forces.

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**Gen. Nikola Kolev**  
Chief of General Staff, Bulgaria

*Distinguished Ministers,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,*

I would like to start my lecture with expressing my personal gratitude and also the gratitude on behalf of the leadership of the General Staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces to the Center for the Study of Democracy for inviting me to participate in the annual International Security Conference.

As Chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces, I am privileged and honoured to be part of this conference, which for several years already has been generating rational ideas and suggesting solutions for the strengthening of security in the context of transformation on global and regional scale.

*Ladies and Gentlemen,*

The global geopolitical changes at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century have generated new contradictions, thus giving birth to risks and threats of a new nature. The advance in science and technology and the process of globalization have confronted the world with a new transition—the transition from a modern industrial society to a postmodern information society. This transition is characterized by unprecedented dynamic changes in the nature and dimensions of the security risks and threats.

The key factors defining the strategic security environment have turned to be the globalization, the growing complexity and unpredictability of the asymmetric war, the changing demographic and environmental media, the formation of regions with unstable political and social characteristics and low level of economic development and the radical ideologies and unsolved conflicts.

In the multidimensional character of the global security system, the military involvement has gone beyond the frames of the traditional allied and territorial defence, with a redirected focus on conflict prevention, crisis management, peace restoration, enforcement and preservation, and humanitarian assistance and support.

Against this background the military strategic environment has gained a new content. The complex character of the security environment requires a large spectrum of military involvement in finding solutions to the emerging conflicts—from preventive activities and humanitarian operations to high intensity military operations. The war against modern threats and especially against the basic one among them—terrorism, is a task that exceeds the individual capabilities of any country and calls for the engagement of all democratic forces.

In the common dynamics of the current security processes the military factor will continue to play an important role interacting closely with the diplomatic, political and economic factors.

In the context of the common security environment and the ongoing processes and developments in the world, the scale of the changes and the logic of the global transformation are becoming more and more comprehensive. The changed security environment has imposed adaptation and reconsideration of the basic role and tasks of the major security guarantee at present—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The decisions from the last NATO Summits clearly and unambiguously display that NATO is turning into a focal point for planning and coordination of the multinational military efforts for ensuring protection against the new asymmetric threats. A fundamental conclusion for the future development of the Alliance has been drawn based on the planning and building of the required capabilities for effective response to these threats.

**NATO** has consolidated its position of an organization for preservation and enforcement of peace, stability and effective counteraction to the new challenges. An evident expression of this position is seen in the Crisis Response Operations conducted on the Balkans.

An important factor for the strengthening of the regional and global security is the determination of the **European Union** to include a military dimension in its policy. The idea for **Common European Defence** has found a practical expression in the EU involvement in the post-conflict reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the activation of the operation ALTHEA.

These transformation processes have raised new requirements for the building and development of the modern Bulgarian Armed Forces. The concepts for the role and place of the Bulgarian Armed Forces in the common defence system of the country have changed. The new possibilities deriving from the integration and cooperation have been taken into account as formative factors for the military and strategic environment. An impressive amount of work has been done and significant results have been achieved in a number of fields such as:

- active and actual/determining participation in the integration processes of the country's NATO and EU accession;
- active and actual participation in the regional confidence and security building initiatives;
- international military cooperation and participation in the multinational formations;
- applying of the international legal regulations in the field of arms control and non-proliferation of weapons for mass destruction;

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- bilateral and multilateral military contacts and consultations on security issues;
  - exchange of personnel for short and long-term training;

The transformed characteristics, ways and methods for operations conduct have affected the organization of the Armed Forces operational training, the training of military leaders and the integration of operational capabilities.

As a main guarantor of security and territorial integrity of the country, the Bulgarian Armed Forces have an important role in **the integration processes of the Republic of Bulgaria's accession to NATO and EU and of the stabilization of South-Eastern Europe.**

Since the Republic of Bulgaria joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Initiative the Bulgarian Armed Forces have constantly followed the chosen road towards meeting the criteria and requirements of NATO in order to get an invitation for membership.

The reform of the Bulgarian Armed Forces, the elaboration of the normative basis of documents, and the implementation of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) were key to the successful preparation for membership.

The country's accession as full member of the Alliance was a recognition of the results of the achievements; the accession was also a realization of the most significant priority of the national foreign policy during the past years.

Serious structural and organizational changes were made with the purposes of development of the required operational capabilities, establishment of expedient balance between the active and reserve forces and stabilization of the reformed services of the armed forces.

The accelerated reform of the Bulgarian Armed Forces, the reduction of its peacetime and wartime strength, the establishment of flexible functional and organizational structure, the significant reduction of main samples of armament and equipment (tanks, combat armored vehicles, helicopters and ships), the increase of the interoperability and the start of the modernization are an expression of these changes.

Simultaneously with their large-scale transformation, the Bulgarian Armed Forces actively participate with contingents in the different crisis response operations which determines the practical dimensions of our country's policy of European and Euro-Atlantic integration and intensive regional cooperation. The participation of the Bulgarian Armed Forces in the operations of NATO (SFOR, KFOR, ISAF), EUFOR (ALTHEA), in **the Coalition of the Willing** (operation for stabilization and

reconstruction of Iraq), in missions of **the UN** (UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNMIL in Liberia and UNMIK in Kosovo) is a serious national contribution to world peace and security.

At present the Bulgarian Armed Forces participate with 539 servicemen in crisis response operations, which at this stage corresponds to our capabilities of funding expeditionary missions.

The participation of the Bulgarian Armed Forces in allied and coalition operations and missions of the UN is an expression of the Republic of Bulgaria's politics and contribution to the efforts of the international community to normalize the situation in the world and the region. This participation contributes to raising the international prestige of the country, accelerated and full integration in the Euro-Atlantic security structures, military cooperation and gaining new experience in the foreign policy for the purposes of the training the armed forces.

After the signing of the Accession Agreement, the role and contribution of the Bulgarian Armed Forces to the achievement of the strategic goal of the country—full membership in the European Union on 1 January 2007—gained particular importance for the General Staff.

Along with our participation in the EU operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a political decision for participation in Multinational Tactical Battle Group of the European Union with Greece, Romania, and Cyprus and our concrete contribution is being specified. Our participation in the military bodies and structures of the European Union is activated.

A lot has been done for the consolidation of regional security and confidence. This has been achieved through the significant contribution of the Bulgarian Armed Forces to the multinational military/political initiatives and bilateral agreements between the countries from Southeast Europe with special accent on the initiative of building a Multinational Peace Force in Southeast Europe as a key element for the military/political cooperation in the region. We are making any effort to contribute to the development of the task force for Black Sea cooperation BLACKSEAFOR with the purpose of enlargement of the activities and focusing the efforts on the fight against terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; creation of a permanent command post and communication and information network; transformation of the combat forces into an effective tool for accomplishment of the tasks of fighting terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; coordination of the activities of the established Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Centre.

The General Staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces participates actively in the implementation of the national politics of guaranteeing stability and security



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without operational deployment of the armed forces. This finds its expression in the implementation of the arms control activities; adapting and implementation of the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty; exchange visits of ships, aircraft, military units and personnel at different levels; exchange of experience in the process of building the armed forces, building and development of the armed forces on bilateral and multilateral basis; implementation of programmes for exchange of personnel, exercises, training courses, etc.

These facts outline the significant contribution of the Bulgarian Armed Forces to the consolidation of peace and security in the crisis regions in the world and on the Balkans as well as to the accelerated integration of the country in the Euro-Atlantic security structures.

This determines the new defence policy of the country expressed in the vision of the role, place, and tasks of the Bulgarian Armed Forces defined as result of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR). Our task is to build the required capabilities to accomplish three main missions:

- defence;
- support to the international peace and security;
- contribution to the national security in peacetime.

The goal of the Bulgarian Armed Forces is to be ready to guarantee the national sovereignty, security and independence, to protect the territorial integrity of the country and of the NATO nations, to be able to accomplish international and coalition engagements to fight terrorism, crisis and conflict prevention and management, to carry out the required activities in support of the developing European Security and Defence Policy, as well as the arms control activities, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international military cooperation, rendering humanitarian assistance, consolidation of confidence and cooperation.

*Ladies and Gentlemen,*

After briefing you about the role and place of the Bulgarian Armed Forces in the overall process of transformation and our national contribution to the process of building of one peaceful and secure world, I would like to underline that the Bulgarian Armed Forces are only one of the tools that Bulgaria should use wisely and actively in order to turn into a generator of confidence and security. Only in this way our country will be recognized as an active and valuable ally, a reliable partner with consistent policy, flexible in its approaches for implementation of the national interests and worthy participation in the collective systems and mechanisms to face the challenges to global security.

The balanced security and defence policy aiming at establishment of lasting peace and stability on a regional and global scale and the active formation of the security

environment are the most important condition to share the responsibilities for consolidation of peace and security and for adequate response to the existing and future risks and threats.

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**Andrzej Karkozska**

Director SDR, Ministry of Defense of Poland

Good morning and thank you very much, Ambassador, for all these nice words, especially the last passage. I hope that despite the turbulence of democracy we'll stay together, in a coalition, in those difficult places we are together. I am supposed to talk within the subject of NATO and EU response to new security risks. It will be about conceptual problems and actually the focus of my statement was to be on the experiences we have, I have, on the Strategic Defense Review of Poland, which is just in the problem of culmination, we are preparing the first draft by the end of the year. And I think our review which comes after many others, after many other similar experiences, is I would say, quite substantive and I want to share some of the findings with you. We will do the same on Tuesday, on the NATO-Russian Council where six of us, six nations will present their experiences. That shows that we are not completely on the same level, we do not have the same methodologies, we do not have the same concerns, but we are still working in the same setting, in the same frame, therefore we should compare this thinking. That is a preparation for the meetings, mentioned by Gen. Naumann, which are coming in 2006 and 2008.

But first, a few general concepts. Let me start with the new challenges. We are used to thinking or speaking of the terrorist threat and its consequences, especially if terrorists get the means of mass destruction. But let's realize that 9/11 is not a turning point from which everything started. Several threats, which are culminating now or coming to our attention, were already visible before. They came even more strongly afterwards because we are now also faced with a mass and forced migration on the continent, we have trans-border crime, illicit trade and movement. We have money laundering and financial crimes, we have the vulnerability of national critical infrastructures which is a subject in itself. We have also disproportional economic developments, ecological problems and when we think of what the citizens are concerned about today, it is actually on the screen: Paris and the rest of France recently, or New Orleans, or the 1997 Polish and German floods. These are altogether security concerns of today. Of course terrorism is on the top of the list, but it is not alone. It's altogether what we have to face within our state security systems to which our defense systems must adapt. The characteristics of the new risks are a long subject, let me just mention the basic points here. These are unstructured, in terms of organization and doctrine, they are non-linear in terms of time and space, they are asymmetrical or disproportional to the structures we have to confront them, they are unpredictable, not always irrational, although we made the mistake of calling them so, they are indiscriminate, and most important— they are global. They concern all of us.

These new challenges are a great stimulus to change. We must react to them, we all agree on this. But as it was said here, just a minute ago by Gen. Naumann, that the old democracies and the new democracies are not prepared to face the new risk,

neither politically, nor legally, as a legal structure within the states and in technical terms. One of the models to respond to these challenges we call homeland security, following the American example. But of course we have our own national examples, which are similar. I call it something like a crisis management system as a platform for change. One of the aspects of this is that no nation can face the threat alone. We need a systemic international response and that calls for many elements of that response—exchange of information, intelligence sharing, education, institutions, communication means, response of the forces of order, the police and others. So far we have seen that the Armed forces are trying to adapt by taking more external, instead of territorial functions. But we see that the actual first line of defense of today is not the battlefield. It's law enforcement and border management. And if we talk about intelligence, its main aspect today is not gathering information about the enemy, it's crisis prevention, a pro-active attitude of our structures. A few words of general characteristics of the defense restructuring and transformation. We have certain resistance to change in this respect, which is natural, of institutions, of people. We have the peace dividend problem: that every nation, especially in our new democracies, wants to get the budget resources shifted from defense concerns towards development, towards social and economic needs. And therefore we are facing the maintenance padlock, lower readiness, degradation of personal readiness and life standards. We all face, especially in the area of Central, East and Southeast Europe lack of cadres for change, weak management, long procedural delays. We are all fighting with underdeveloped legal norms and we have problems with the political use of military and security structures for the benefit of this or that political group.

We have all witnessed downsizing of military forces, budget, and infrastructure. We are all trying to rationalize the efforts, reemploy the forces. In another process taking place at the same time, we are trying to return the domestic security apparatus to the citizen, especially in the post-communism countries, where this apparatus was not trusted, was not linked to the basic interest of the citizen. We have to adapt our doctrines and functions of the military. Also, we are all making efforts to integrate our defense structures. All these processes are taking place at the same time, they are very complex, very difficult to execute.

Now let me talk a bit about our own experiences. The first experience which I should mention is the problem of keeping the continuation of efforts despite the dynamics of the democratic processes. I am not against democratic processes, I am telling you that the experience of my country and many of the countries which I observed during the last fifteen years is that the new political forces start everything anew. We do not have a paradigm for this and therefore we are losing time. We are constantly concerned about civil-military relations, the democratic principles of control over the security sector and the military must be constantly strengthened, renewed, adapted, otherwise we usually regress. It is the military who are, in this area, dominating intellectually and in the ability to influence. It is very difficult to

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catch up technologically with the leading nations. The pace of modernization within the frame of constantly declining budgets is a great task and depends on the state's economic development. But I think we have to discuss it somewhere at some time maybe within NATO that the demand of catching up is sometimes worthwhile for different reasons. Then of course, harmonization of national plans with the Alliance plans is an extremely difficult task. I want to mention here to this audience what dilemmas we have met. First, the most difficult is the discrepancy between traditional and new threat perception paradigms. Although intellectually we agree that we are now facing new threats, as it was proposed by Claus just a minute ago, we should think what to do with this military force. In political terms within our national framework it is very difficult to get out of the classical stereotype of threat because these stereotypes are used as a political instruments within internal debates. There is also the problem of uncertainty. Are we certain about the trends that we observe today if we talk about 10-15 years ahead? No one gives us this certainty so we must hesitate because we are used to preparing our military and security structures against the worst conditions. The next problem for us is NATO, EU context or relationship. Instead of being mutually supportive organizations, for which we very much hoped for all of us, these two contexts are muddling through and actually we have a lot of political problems with being enumerated in this or that, or against something. What is the future of these organizations in the next 15 years?

As to the crisis management problem, we agree it is the platform on which we will debate and prepare the future defense and security structures. But what is the role of the military within this crisis management? It is easy to say, it's an escalation dominance instrument. But when you talk about low-level local situations, putting in the military is very difficult. We are not prepared for that technically or educationally, our institutions within the countries are linear, they have different budgets, different schooling, different structures and functions and of course they have turfs to defend especially in the budget. We must change the paradigm of our thinking. Then the pace and the direction of technological reform as I mentioned already, it's not easy to decide, if you don't have enough money for most of your cherished programs.

And finally, methodological problems, which are not probably interesting to some of you, but I would like to mention them. We get out of the worst case analyses and the worst case perceptions, as I mentioned earlier. It's over. So how to measure by force. I have proposed three methodological ways of finding out what size, what direction, what command structure we should propose for our country. The first is financial, by calculations of different options. Here the most difficult thing is lack of appropriate methodological instruments. They exist, but they are not objective enough or trusted enough by the politicians. The second is playing scenarios, not the big wars, but several others which are very difficult to play. The third is something very new, going through operational capabilities. We have the least of capabilities in our strategies and doctrines but what do they mean in reality? What is the main technical element? To

fulfill this or that demand for capability. This gives us a direction for modernization, this gives us insight into future structures. Finally, we have four difficult problems, not dilemmas. One is the problem of linkage. I have found out that our force, which I am very proud of, is digitally equipped. We have several hundred subsystems, but how do we put them together? It is a very difficult decision to make because there are things already invested, already going on. We have to stop them, but there are vested interests behind them. A very complex and difficult issue. The second problem is one of professionalization. Most of our countries want to have professional, all-volunteer armies. I have found out it's very difficult in many respects: politically, in terms of mobilization and preparing the personnel for unknown needs and then of course there are problems of legal character. Why should you have for example, if you don't professionalize completely, a small portion of your society called in, and the rest not. There is a problem here. Third, the level of ambition, another issue which is connected with the NATO and EU future. The experiences of Iraq, Afghanistan and six other Peace Support Operations tells us it's too costly for us. While the demand from the alliance is even bigger, constant. We have to rearrange joint financing and more common support structures, so that we need not build up narrow national means or structures to support our own forces. But it is a very difficult proposition because then you depend on others for very important elements of your national security. Today, the egoistic positions of some big countries are not giving us good hope.

Finally, I mentioned in the beginning, there is a political interference of the democratic system in the analyses that we do in our strategic defense review and in the implementation process, the most difficult actually, which I feel now, because we have a change of government. But I must say that it's an issue that we all have to reckon with and somehow exchange opinions and use others as arguments for pursuing our own needs. Thank you very much.

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**Maj.-Gen. Alberto Notari**

DCOS, Supreme Allied Command Transformation

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Admirals, Generals, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my privilege today to be in Sofia and address this distinguished audience on a topic of very high interest to us, to the alliance. But before starting, let me first of all thank Bulgaria for the warm hospitality and their outstanding capacity to look after us in a very professional manner. I will of course in my 10-minute address to you try to avoid the NATO language and acronyms, I promise. And I will also promise you not to use quantitative elements. I am aware of the fact that there is a lot of debate in “we should have more, we should have less, we should have we don’t know what”. But for sure we should be fair to our taxpayer and make the best possible use of the resources that they put on our hands. So my address is to look into one of these topics and maybe leave you with some thoughts on how we can do better with what we’ve got. If we take a quick look at any newspaper and any TV news channel today, they illustrate very effectively the rapidity of change of the environment in which we live. So, globalization, media access, the reach of communication network and the rapid introduction of technology, often disrupting as you can be aware, leaves many grasping to simply catch up and stay ahead. In this context, the military is no exception. And it is a widely accepted fact that we need to transform our respective militaries to be able to respond to and operate in such a complex environments. NATO of course is no exception and the light command transformation is charged with driving this process on behalf of 26 nations. But the threats that we face today look nothing like those so obvious to us 10, 15, or even 20 years ago. They manifest themselves across the whole spectrum and not just in the physical domain. This timely seminar, to my mind, is aimed at discussing the new security risks as an important part of the process of transformation and I welcome of course the opportunity to outline how we at ACT are contributing to this important debate.

Let’s get into detail. One of the first problems that we face and try to predict and analyze is what the future security environment might look like. So this approach has several benefits. First, it forces us to be forward leaning and forward thinking. Easy to say but very difficult to do as Gen. Jones pointed out this morning. It helps us identify the capabilities we may require and that work needs to be done on them right now, and again, this is the message that Gen. Naumann gave shortly. Lastly, it allows us to reprioritize our effort when necessary and also to continually question the status quo—are we doing the right things, in other words. ACT is developing the answer to those questions—the NATO’s future security environment paper. The concept of such an action is by no means new in industry, academia and government and the think tanks have done this for years. If we look through the Internet on the subject that deals with future security environment we may easily find many examples. Industry for example, they need to be able to position themselves to take the advantage of the emerging markets. Governments need to assess immigration, currency fluctuation,

economic trends as a whole, as well as other factors. As for the military, we need to be conscious of them all. Developing such a paper for the future security environment is not an easy task and it will effectively require those 26 member nations to agree what the future could, should or might look like. But of course we are professional, we are not in the business of futurology and our approach is to look at subject, headings, identify trends, analyze those trends and pass them to the defense planners.

Let me give now an example that could be perceived as a contentious one—climate change. Our approach here is not to decide who may be right in the debate—is it global warming, is it the carbon cycle or is it a combination of both? Rather, we simply look at trends. Facts, in other words. The incidents of major climatic effect are increasing, the severity is increasing and the time between events is decreasing; and this is a trend. From these trends our planners, concept writers and analysts can look at the possible implication for NATO. We have already seen the Alliance contributing to hurricane and earthquake relief efforts as other arms of governments and society call for assistance. What is clear is that at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century security risks require the attention of much more than the military to resolve them. Cross-governmental coordination, inter-governmental coordination and the civil military interface and dialogue are the essential ingredients for success and for NATO this is captured by our work on what is known as the effect-based approach to operation. The effect-based approach to operation ACT is working on is related to the broad approach to security, which is envisaged by the “Istanbul communiqué” and it starts from the assumption that crisis in the new complex environment cannot be solved by the military alone. On the contrary, crisis solutions require the integrated application of all the instruments of power—political, diplomatic, military, economic, civilian. This approach needs to be realized at all level—from the ground strategic to the tactical. It requires the identification of the recognition of the effects that are needed to achieve it. It introduces the interdependent concept in the sense that in order to achieve the planning and execution of each single power—again political, diplomatic, military, economic and civilian—has influence on and is influenced by the others. Desired effects are achieved by concerted action executed by the single instrument of powers. Of course, an effect-based approach to operation as described here exceeds the limits of a light command transformation and therefore we are recommending that such a concept should be developed at the political level in NATO headquarters. From a purely military perspective the effect-based approach to operation reinforces the joint solution to operational and tactical problems by switching the focus of the planning from the achievement of operational/tactical objective to the effects desired. Therefore, joint actions are needed to produce the desired effects and it opens the way for a more robust cooperation with all the actors, including NGOs, international organizations (you can add to the list whoever you want), but all the actors that play a role in the crisis development. With this approach we engage communities of interest but there is far more that we can and must do. In the information age we have to connect them so that data, information and intelligence, if you want to use



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the military language, can be quickly moved around to those who need it the most. In other words, the need to know is replaced by the need to share. Getting people to talk is the easy bit. Getting people and organizations to share information is the hard part. But look at the compelling needs. Today we see soldiers, sailors, airmen, marine in the same buffer space as contractors, as government organizations, international organizations, all with different aims but united with the same purpose. In operational art this is not unity of command of course, you easily realize that. Neither is it unity of effort. It is unity of purpose. And to achieve this we have to be able to cross-connect, to share, to coordinate and deconflict our efforts. Fighting organized crime is a classical example. For example, the treasury or security commission, the local police, customs, Interpol, immigration, the military and others are all part of the equation.

The NATO operation active endeavor taking place as we speak in the Mediterranean Sea is working and improving on a daily basis. And experimental operations from the Joint Interagency Analysis Center in Naples have been highly successful. The Joint Interagency Analysis Center shows great potential for development of future unity of purpose. Our enemies use the information domain against us and we must not allow it to become their exclusive domain or sanctuary. For economies of effort and scale we must connect organizations horizontally and technically, it is feasible and it can be done. And the joint center in Naples is an example of this prototype. But problems arise in the social domain, where trust resides and for some states or agencies also in the legal domain which brings me to the last point. Many misconstrue transformation as a solely military endeavor and nothing could be further from the truth. It is a light command transformation remit to attain the military function of the transformationq but for those institutions of government that see access a holistic approach across government needs to be adapted. Only then can the synergies be achieved and the real capabilities be developed that will allow us to truly meet the demands of the emerging and future security environments.

Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes my presentation with I think this very easy message: we need to share information—technically it is absolutely easy to do, it is feasible, but this requires strong will from all parties and all interested powers. Thank you.

**Maj.-Gen. Thomas J. Matthews**

Vice Director of Joint War fighting Center and  
J-7 (training) USJFCOM

Let me add my thanks to Bulgaria for creating a perfect social and business environment to bring a conference like this together and create this kind of focus on some very important topics. Before I get into my formal remarks I just wanted to make a few comments about transformation. Joint Forces Command has been living through transformation for several years and I want to share some point with you that I think are important. The first one is that there are many definitions of transformation and one that we all need to avoid is the definition that says “transformation is the act of changing something in appearance but not in substance”. Transformation may change the appearance of something but it must also change the substance or we should not invest the time, the effort and the money into doing it.

The second thing is that a lot of people approach transformation with the idea that something should be made smaller or something should be made bigger. The important thing here is that bigger isn't better, smaller isn't better. Better is better. Transformation is about improving something about increasing your capability, about adding value to something. Transformation is also not about spending more or spending less. It is about spending wisely. It is very easy to make real large investments in the wrong thing. And as we look to build an organization to support transformation, Joint Forces Command, we didn't make it a smaller organization, we made it a larger organization. We also created an organization that is very different than the Napoleonic model of a military organization is a custom design to support the act of transformation. So as each of you go about the business of transformation I would suggest you keep those lessons learnt from us and places where we spent money maybe inappropriately as you are going through the act of transformation.

As I move into my formal remarks I wanted to start by thanking all of you and all of your nations on behalf of the United States for your thoughts and your support as we worked thorough the recent challenge of hurricane Katrina. We learnt very quickly that no matter how many resources you have, those resources are limited and you need unique resources and the global support we received in getting those was greatly appreciated. There are others lessons learnt that we got from that experience and those involved the cooperation because the civil and the military and if you look at that area of the United States as a region, it was the value of the training and the agreements that were put in place among the states in that region and the state of Louisiana which allowed for the right response and the timely response. And that really leads into what I'd like to talk about this afternoon and that is civil-military cooperation.

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Can I just state that the US Joint Forces Command was created to lead the transformation of the US military and to partner with commands like NATO's Allied Command Transformation, ACT, to work as a member in the transformation of the NATO alliance. As a Command with a global focus, US Joint Forces Command also offers the opportunity for nations to participate in bilateral and multi-national global security transformation through participation in experiments, training events and sharing lessons learnt. Bulgaria, through its Joint Operations Center has been active in joint training and information sharing for civil-military operations with our Joint War Fighting Center and is now working with the KWFC in formulating a standing Joint Forces Headquarters concept for crisis management. Over forty nations participate with USJFCOM in similar endeavors and the number of participants is growing.

Traditional civil-military cooperation must transform to encompass all levels of engagement from national to regional to global. To meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century we need a concerted and coordinated political, military, civil, economic, and scientific approach between governmental and non-governmental organizations. We need to plan for the full spectrum of crisis operations—from a weather event to a full out cyber attack. Support to post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization will have increasing importance. Nations and alliances do not need to be enhanced to meet this challenge, but must become more interoperable with their business partners in international, multi-national and non-governmental organizations. Response to crisis requires resources, speed, information sharing and interoperability. In a time of crisis, time is our enemy. The transformation of emergency relief operations needs to be accomplished through four venues. First, we must develop practical improvements to the existing infrastructure of our internal operations organization. And that is organizational design, doctrine and communications. This can be accomplished by reviewing and recording our lessons learnt in the past and standing ready to share those lessons learnt with others. We need to learn from our past success, and more importantly from our failures. We need a commitment to expand our training and education processes to ensure those lessons are not lost but are leveraged for future success. We need to be willing to develop and test new concepts, not fearing to fall short or make mistakes that we are prepared to accomplish our objectives when the "boots hit the ground".

Secondly, we need national and regional commitments to transformation, willingness to share experiences, and support for International Humanitarian and disaster relief efforts. Next we must expand our civil- military cooperation concept to include the utilization of the capabilities and experiences of the various multi-national and national organizations that have gained critical experience in humanitarian, stabilization and reconstruction operations. The excellent experiences gained by the European Union and in the Balkans and by the nations like Bulgaria come immediately to mind. Finally, we need to seek participation in global partnerships external to our current member and partnership networks. We suggest the formation of multi-national and

multi-organizational advisory groups focused on emergency operations to allow diverse organizations to work and deploy together with the common goal of offering assistance with the objective of granting the recipients control of their own destiny. In a few words, provide assistance, do no harm, create self-sufficiency and leave. We view these venues not as phases, but as a continuum of a flexible and cooperative system designed to address every crisis individually based on the unique capabilities, resources and services required for the emergency at hand. People need security from tyranny, and we must stand prepared to offer assistance in providing that security. However, people also need to be assured of those basic human services required for survival and civilization. Life saving and life sustaining and life enhancing assistance so often disrupted and denied in emergency situations. The loss of these basic needs is a national, regional and global challenge, requiring innovative solutions.

The United States Joint Forces Command suggests consideration of the following:

- The North Atlantic Council should examine the formation of a “Partnership for Stabilization” in cooperation with the United Nations and European Union.
- The North Atlantic Council should develop a concept, formulate a strategic plan, and provide strategic leadership as required in initiating this partnership. The initial goal of this project should be the provision of an action plan unifying the civil-military organizations of the EU and NATO into an expandable emergency services capability and network involving private organizations, voluntary organizations, UN, and other international organizations. This partnership should include those non-governmental or private volunteer organization that stand ready to work in cooperation with this emergency services network. The purpose of this project is not to change the face of NATO, the EU, or the UN. The objective is to create a unity of effort to leverage the capabilities and capacities of organizations regionally and globally by offering a center for rapid and adaptive crisis response to both natural and man-made disasters and crisis, through a cooperative and coordinated planning structure. We cannot allow geographical, organizational or bureaucratic boundaries to stand between those who have capabilities and those who need them. We in the US Joint Forces Command stand ready to participate.

The people we all serve are relying on us to get it right before – before, not during a crisis. The four “R”s of these operations—response, relief, recovery and reconstruction require planning, training and strong relationships built before the event. The military has 3CI—Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. Civilians have a different 3CI—Cooperation, Collaboration and Consenses and Information. We need to work together to build the bridge, to build the architecture to bring those capabilities together on behalf of the people that we serve and those are challenging cultures to bring together in a very effective way.

Thank you very much.

**Ivailo Kalfin**

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria

*Ministers, Generals,  
Your Excellencies,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,*

First of all, I would like to thank the Center for the Study of Democracy for organizing this regular and competent forum and for the honor of being invited to it. I believe that the debate during these two days on the topic of security will contribute to the formulation of successful practical solutions.

We live in an increasingly dynamic and globalizing world of the information technologies, of intensive exchange of goods, capital, people and more open societies. The interdependency becomes a major characteristic matched best by cooperation and integration. At the same time, the speed of an e-mail is also the speed of a cyber attack. Unfortunately, the growing vulnerability and insecurity are turning into the price we have to pay for the new opportunities and benefits brought by globalization. This new strategic environment requires change of thinking, approach and concepts, so that we could keep the benefits but successfully oppose the threats. This requires transformation of our resources and opportunities which would allow us to react adequately to the new challenges.

The above picture poses a new approach when defining the present security threats. From a most general perspective we must consider the shift of the classic military threats to a number of challenges linked to terrorism, corroding activities of organized crime, the various forms of trafficking and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the contemporary understanding of security directs us towards phenomena such as the “failed” or “weak” countries, which generate instability, sustainability of economic development, social cohesion, quality of integration of minorities in them. It is obvious that this requires formulation of new concepts and work approaches, new type of civil-military cooperation, new type of military power, which would put the creation of a certain number of high-quality capacities as a priority.

With its heterogeneity and complexity, the Black Sea and the Caucasus regions illustrate a part of the contemporary security challenges. In this area we have a unique interception of numerous processes: transition to democracy, accelerated social and economic changes, the beginning of integration within NATO and the EU, continuation of the process of state-building, reforms of the security systems, increasing emigration. With the last expansion to the East, NATO and the EU got closer to the countries in the region and more and more respond to their desire for a deeper cooperation. The new terrorism challenges and the place of the region as a

“doorway” to the Near East and Central Asia require our additional attention and support. The security of our available strategic energy resources is of great importance to sustainable development, both to the countries of the region and to those in the Euro-Atlantic area. The pointed strategic significance of the Black Sea and Caucasus could only find its realization if there is a clear vision, strong will for its realization and a wide, persistent outer support.

Let me summarize the main questions and the challenges that the stability and security in the Black Sea and Caucasus regions are facing:

Firstly, as a result of the democratic changes in the region, several countries took an unambiguous course towards a closer integration within the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. The fulfillment of the criteria is linked to conducting deep and often painful reforms in the sphere of the political, economic and social life, as well as in defense and security. The success of these reforms is a vital condition for the consolidation of the democratic powers in these countries, for the irreversibility of the processes and for the creation of a stable and secure environment. The creation of a working democratic institutional architecture remains the main instrument for foreseeing, stability, prosperity and security in the countries of the region. A great contribution to the process will be made both by the experience of countries of the region, which have already passed some of the way, and by tools and policies of international organizations. The key condition for success would be a better coordinated approach and “division of labor” between NATO, the EU and OSCE when conducting the transformation and reforms regarding the security system.

The second round of questions is linked to the solution of the so-called “suspended” conflicts. It is hard to imagine a successful transition and permanent stability and security without ensuring a territorial integrity of the countries of the region. In this context, any successful solution of the conflicts pass through their peaceful arrangement, as a part of the fulfillment of the already accepted commitments of the countries concerned. The last few months brought new dynamics in those processes, which increase the opportunities for positive developments. There is also partial progress regarding the control of sensitive border areas in the region. A welcomed fact is the activity of the governments of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldavia towards the achievement of a full progress.

The third round of challenges is linked to the problems of the so-called “soft security”: the various forms of trafficking, organized crime, illegal migration, border control. This complex of potential threats is a particular danger for the frozen conflicts, border arguments, insecure borders and the overall complexity of the situation brought about by systemic, difficult reforms. The eventual expansion of those types of threats put challenges not only ahead the perspectives for development of the communities in the region, but also to the countries from the Euro-Atlantic community. The security

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of the energy corridors could also be jeopardized. The support of NATO and the EU for the building of secure borders and professional border control services would be an important contribution. The institutional support for the fight against organized crime and the various forms of traffic could also be useful for the consolidation of security.

In an identical way to the changes in Southeast Europe, the ones in the Black Sea and Caucasus regions would hardly end without clear, long-term and systematic engagements of the international community and mainly of NATO and the EU. One condition of exceptional importance is the achievement of security and stability, in particular through a broad approach to these. This approach must successfully integrate the contributions of the two organizations and institutionalize the will for support of the different stakeholders. All major problems from the development of the democratic process and the successful implementation of the reforms to the fight against illegal traffic, terrorism, and proliferation of weapons for mass destruction should remain high on the agenda of the international community.

We have already taken certain steps in that direction. NATO and the EU reacted immediately to the expansion to the East in 2004 by reformulating their policies towards a closer engagement with the problems of the regional security and stability. As a result of this approach specific instruments were launched for development of the relations with the three Caucasus partner countries and support of the democratic reforms: on the one hand, the individual plans for action in partnership with the Alliance; on the other, the plans for action within the framework of the European neighborhood policy. A useful contribution to the regional cooperation in the spheres of defense, reforms of the security systems, the economy, fight against international crime, management of crises and border security. We also have a wide range of tools and mechanisms: the Organization for the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Black Sea Group for Naval Cooperation BLACKSEAFOR, the Black Sea Information Coordinating Center for Border Control in Burgas, the Black Sea initiative for port security and management of damages, terrorist attacks, etc.

As a Black Sea country and a NATO member, Bulgaria has the will and the ability to co-operate for the solution of a number of questions linked to the security in the region. As a member of the Alliance, the country is using the existing mechanisms for partnership for cooperation and support to the democratic changes and the carrying out of the defense reform in the member-states of the Black Sea and Caucasus. A successful tool in the implementation of this policy is the bilateral memorandum for cooperation in the sphere of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, already adopted or negotiated by a number of countries in the region. From a wider perspective, Bulgaria is an active participant of regional initiatives: in addition to the ones mentioned, the Clearinghouse Conference on the Southern Caucasus and many more bilateral and multilateral formats in the region. The active policy of Bulgaria is

a continuation of our conviction that without a stable and secure Black Sea region Southeast Europe will also be deprived of better conditions for its development. With the increase of our capacity for an effective support and participation we will continue to be at the heart of the efforts for development of the Black Sea and Caucasus.

In conclusion, I would like to say that the challenge that we are facing is serious. On the one hand, we are trying to understand and make sense of the huge changes in the contemporary world while seeking the concepts, approaches and instruments which would allow us to combine the benefits of the globalization with the counteraction of the numerous new threats. On the other hand, countries like Bulgaria continue to work on the creation of prosperity, order and security in the new institutional environment. We have a common stake in the success and transformation of the Black Sea and Caucasus regions in a zone of democracy, prosperity and security.

Thank you for your attention.



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**Anton Buteyko**

First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine

First of all, I'd like to thank the organizers for the hospitality that they showed and I thank them for the opportunity to speak before such an audience. When I was suggested to talk about transformation in the Black Sea and Caucasus area before the people that were linked with NATO, I really was in a sort of doubt what to speak about. Because all of you—you are the best experts on the threats and the means how to meet those threats and challenges. And I decided to talk about something, which perhaps may sound unusual. I'd like to draw your attention to the transformation, which is going on in my country and in the region. That transformation deals mainly with the change of perception of my people of NATO and the EU. It's not easy for the population, which for decades was brainwashed, to show that NATO is an imperialistic, aggressive block and the EU is the capitalist union to exploit nations, and to perceive it in other way. To perceive it as institutions of democracy, institutions of development and hope. I think that it is a remarkable change that happened in the minds of the Ukrainian elite because now both the EU and NATO are considered in a different way. We know that these organizations are not perfect, we know that they have drawbacks and I reply to some criticism that aired here. But we are convinced that, speaking in the terms of a businessman friend of mine, "these institutions are not perfect, but they are the best product on the world security market". Certainly this is a dramatic change in the conscience of the Ukrainians.

The next point I'd like to raise concerns the dramatic change in the area of the Black Sea and Caucasus in the context of aspirations of people. The revolution of Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine have demonstrated something which was not familiar for these nations for decades. What do I mean? There was an understanding among the people that they are the real source of power. And that happened during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, which was unprecedented. The people understood that they could not live in such conditions, that their will was falsified, that their desire to live in democracy was brutally broken. And they were standing at the square in Kiev, hundreds of thousands, millions of people, standing on the square under the snow, under the rain and singing and dancing. That was a singing and dancing revolution. They were doing that being surrounded by the police and special forces with guns aimed at them. And that was in my opinion a very dramatic change. And now Ukraine has new authorities born during these revolutions, born by the desire of the people to live in democracy, we want to spread those values of democracy over which both EU and NATO united. We want to spread it in other post-Soviet regions. And we are doing that both by our efforts, for example to arrange a conference for new democracies and traditional democracies and on 1st and 2nd December such a conference will be held in Kiev, Ukraine. We invited heads of states and governments from the countries of the Baltic region, the Caspian region, the Caucasus region and

the Black Sea region. We expect that there will be very good dialogue on the future cooperation.

We also consider that there is a very significant change in the area of the GUAM group. It's interesting that in the past many organizations were born by the will of some big powers. Now Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan united their efforts. They were concerned with solutions of problems. The first problem was the elimination of the weapons under the specific European agreement. So we tried to coordinate our positions. Then we added the need to solve the so-called "frozen conflicts". Both Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova had those conflicts on their territories. Ukraine borders these countries and we were also concerned, so we wanted to assist our friends to solve those problems and we united our efforts without any organizational structure. Then, an economic aspect was added to our cooperation and now we are on the way to effectively institutionalize this organization. Now it is also working in the context of strengthening democracy in this area.

Further transformation in this area is needed in the field of human rights. As I mentioned already, the new Ukrainian authorities were born in the fight for human rights and now we want to also solve the Transdnistrian conflict on this basis, on the basis of protection of human rights and making settlement on the basis of democracy. That plan, elaborated by President Yushchenko, is being now fulfilled, is being now implemented. And for the first time in our recent history the actors, important actors, joined our efforts to settle the Transdnistrian conflict. The EU and the USA joined the mechanism of the solution of the problem and we have signed a memorandum with Moldova and the EU setting up special monitoring mission on the border between Ukraine and Moldova. So we see good prospects for solution of the issue. Certainly we don't exaggerate the progress, but we look with optimism to the future.

And being aware that my time is limited I'd like to return to where I started: about the change of conscience, of perception. I will just refer to another example. Even a few years ago nobody could even imagine that in Ukraine there would be a possibility of the meeting of the National and Defence Security Council of Ukraine together with the North Atlantic Council. That happened a few weeks ago and the group of NATO ambassadors visited various regions of Ukraine. One of them visited Harkiv and Ambassador Ivanov of Bulgaria was also there. And can you imagine: the NATO group visited a physical and technical institute of Ukraine, the cradle of nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union. They split the nucleus for the first time in the former Soviet Union. And they have created the atomic bomb for the former Soviet Union. Could anyone imagine that the NATO ambassadors would visit those facilities. And it was interesting to note that the leadership of this institute, academics, those who were planning how to destroy NATO countries, are now proponents of the membership of Ukraine in NATO.

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And another example. You may know that Ukraine is manufacturing the largest missiles in the world—Zenit—the missile that was capable to carry up to 10 nuclear warheads to the targets both in Western Europe and in the USA and Canada. We have destroyed the third nuclear potential in the world, larger than that of the UK, France and China combined. And that was also a very big transformation. Today these missiles Zenit are used in a joint project—American, Ukrainian, Norwegian and Russian. We now launch these missiles carrying up to 12 commercial satellites and I was invited at the first launch. Can you imagine a long table in the Long Beach in the Headquarters of this project. And there are four teams—American, Russian, Ukrainian and Norwegian. There was a button pushed, the missile started off. There was a signal and everyone started to pour champagne, everyone was happy, there were also representatives of companies which were involved in making orders for use of satellites and then the signal stopped. Could you imagine the feelings of those people? They were high in the sky and then they suddenly went down on the floor. They started to raise up from their chairs and our designer Gen. Koniuhov said: “My missile cannot fail”. People were looking at him sceptically. And then the signal reappeared. It turned out that one company accompanied the satellite to one meridian and another company should have picked it up, but it didn’t. And that pause lasted 1.37 minutes. And I looked at those people from the American side, and Russian, and Ukrainian, and Norwegian. Only a few years ago they were sitting in different parts of the world thinking how to destroy each other. Now they were together, they were wishing each other success because a failure of one of them would mean a failure for all.

So in my opinion this fact manifests the major transformation of this world and I hope that it would be an optimistic one because, I repeat, we can say that NATO and the EU are not perfect, but they are the best available.

**Prof. Dr. Ioan Mircea Pașcu**  
MP, Romania

Thank you very much. My presence here, due to the kind invitation of Boyko Noev and the Bulgarian hosts, is a proof that there is life after government. I will try to open up a discussion which will come up afterwards because as Mike has already said I belong to a different subject and I will use this opportunity to open up a discussion to include that subject in your discussion afterwards. I think that you know that I would start with the last intervention of John Matthews and I am very glad that the thinking is going in that direction because more and more normality tends to become a succession of crises. When you don't have a crisis, it is abnormal. So in a way we have turned things upside-down and therefore, because of that, we have to somehow adopt this concept of security, which is much more complex. But the response in consequence to the concept should also be very complex, not only adding civilian or non-military means to the military ones to face such situations as natural disasters, but also trying to introduce into the mission of the airforces response to such situations. Then we will have a mix of means available to us and I would say that this is in tune with the expectation of the public. The public is always looking at the armed forces as the last resort to help them in such situation. Then there is also the potential for NATO to really develop a certain role. Inevitably NATO has stepped into it, but then, you know, we will have to formalize this. And this is also a good ground for cooperation with the EU, which is also capable of contributing to such situations. So look how many things only at a first glance can pop up from this area of the Black Sea and Caucasus. I think that the driving forces behind the change in Romania have been generally the democratic change, which happened after 1989, we had a changing military within a changing society within a changing world. How do you manage all these simultaneous changes and how do you reach a balance? This is something which the leaders of all these countries have faced since then.

A second driving force is NATO change, but not a static change because we came from a different culture and we needed to adopt a new culture, but also a changing NATO and the idea was: if you change for NATO, it's better that you change for a changing NATO and if you want to board the train, you do not run counter the train, you have to run in parallel, if you want to board the train. And finally, I think you know that Romania is placed between two areas—the Western Balkans, which was typical for the 1990s internal conflicts, failing states, new states and so on, and the Black Sea and Caucasus regions as part of the larger area in Central Asia. So I think that at that time we felt that we would be capable of responding efficiently to these two types of challenges— one old or traditional and one new— and therefore we had to equip ourselves mentally and physically with the necessary instruments. As to the Black Sea, nobody denies that after a hundred and fifty years since the Crimean War we are back in attention. And because of the energy routes, which are already passing through the area, it becomes even more important. Then we have a number of frozen

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conflicts around which need our attention. Thirdly, there are new alignments in the area. For example, states like Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania are into NATO and soon into the European Union. Actors like NATO and the EU through the neighborhood policy and action plans to implement that policy are also multinational actors in this geographical space. We have, of course, these new asymmetrical threats—terrorism, illegal trafficking of people and goods, organized crime and so on and so on, first to deal with. What is our adjustment to this, how do we try and cope with all these changing factors? I think you know that one reaction has been to increase our activism and diplomatically it is evident that Romania has enlisted, together with the other countries, not only from the region, but also from outside the region, in trying to deal with all these factors that are at work in the area.

Secondly, we do not rely only on military instruments, but also on political instruments. Politics is also important and probably sometimes even more important than the military aspect in this area. From a strictly military point of view we are discussing strengthening the naval and air component and a second aspect is intensifying the monitoring the surveillance of the area and intelligence sharing in order to counter these new asymmetrical threats, which are encountered here. And also another element would be that all our efforts, national efforts, should be cooperative, and should be conceived in a cooperative way. This space is too complicated and too small to allow a confrontation. And if we want to join in the bonanza of energy transportation there is no other way but through cooperation. And I think you know that this is a lesson we have learned and I am sure that in the future we will move in this direction.

So I will conclude with only one remark. This morning Gen. Jones mentioned Prague as the most important milestone in the transformation of NATO, but at the same time we should also reflect on the fact that it was also the place where EU's enlargement with seven new countries took place. So in a way, you would see that all our countries have joined a moving NATO and not a static NATO. And I only hope that the EU reflects my observation in the quality of observer there. I think you know that there will be common understanding that we have common challenges to which we have to respond commonly.

**Rear Adm. Cem Gürdeniz**

Chief Plans and Policy, Turkish Navy HQ

*First of all, on behalf of the Turkish delegation I would like to extend our thanks to CSD for their kind invitation.*

*Distinguished Ministers,  
Ambassadors,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,*

In my presentation, I will focus on transformation in the Black Sea with greater emphasis on the maritime security.

The Black Sea basin is no doubt gaining greater strategic significance and transforming itself, particularly within the context of wider European security as well as global security.

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the transformation of the Black Sea and Caucasus regions was manifested in the following areas:

- Increase in regional cooperation
- Democratization
- Partial integration to Euro-Atlantic security system
- Eruption of regional conflicts
- Integration into the global economy
- Emergence as a new energy corridor

For half a century the Black Sea was shared with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact members, the only NATO country being Turkey. However, despite being in different political camps, Turkey has always promoted peace and stability in the Black Sea, not only with the introduction of the Montreux Convention in 1936 as the most important instrument for maintenance of stability in the region, but also with bilateral and multilateral initiatives with littorals in order to first establish dialogue, then enhance understanding and cooperation.

This has led to mutual trust amongst the littorals. Concurrently, former Warsaw Pact members and the NATO member Turkey with their diverse political and strategic aspiration were brought together on an equal footing.

In the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union Black Sea states have demonstrated both political will as well as the necessary skills to join efforts and develop various methods of cooperation with one another, both bilaterally and multilaterally. For example, in the last fifteen years Turkey has signed 36 different agreements and protocols with Black Sea littorals covering a large spectrum of cooperation in many fields.

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Regional cooperation in support of security and stability in the Black Sea is reflected in the different initiatives and projects like BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR, CSBM in the naval field, Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Center, Black Sea Initiative and Black Sea Harmony.

Other than those, NATO's Southeast European Initiative, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, EU's European Neighbourhood Policy, Southeast Defence Ministerial, Southeast Europe Cooperation Process, SECI center, and the GUAM Group can be mentioned among other initiatives involving Black Sea security.

The effects of globalization and democratization in the Black Sea region are evident. Bulgaria and Romania have joined NATO and they are expected to join the EU next year. Democratically elected governments in Ukraine and Georgia are in power. The Russian Federation and Ukraine are attached to NATO under NRC and NUC frameworks. Georgia's aim is to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process and eventually become a NATO member. The country has been part of the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) mechanism since 2004 and also participates in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP).

The intensified dialogue with Ukraine was launched in April 2005 and is interpreted by the Ukrainian side as a first step towards membership. Ukraine expects that a positive message towards MAP membership will be given at the December 2005 foreign ministers' meeting and that an official decision on this issue will be made during the spring 2006 ministerial. An exchange of letters on Ukraine's participation in operation Active Endeavour was also completed. The same is valid for the Russian Federation. This country will also participate in OAE in the Mediterranean Sea.

Furthermore, the economic significance of Black Sea keeps increasing and its potential effects, both positive and negative, over global economic security are very high.

Most of the littorals' GDP growth in 2004 has been realized as above 5 percent. There is a continual increase in international trade in the region. The Black Sea, as large as one fifth of the Mediterranean Sea, is plied every day by roughly 300 to 400 merchant ships. This number corresponds to almost one tenth of the Mediterranean Sea.

Last year Black Sea waters were plied by 66,000 merchant ships of 85 different nations carrying more than half a billion tons of cargo. In the last 5 years, the number of containers handled at Black Sea ports has tripled.

The increase in shipping volumes is also manifested with a steady increase in the maritime traffic over the Turkish Straits. In 2004, the number of ships that crossed Turkish Straits was 150 ships per day, compared to 65 ships in 2001. The amount of Black Sea borne petroleum products carried over the Turkish Straits has reached 145

million tons in 2004. In other words, 3 million barrels of petroleum products are carried to the global markets on 25 tankers each day.

*Ladies and Gentlemen,*

As you know, global trade, with its 30 percent share, constitutes one of the main elements of world economy. Almost 11 trillion dollars worth of goods are transported over the world's seas, connecting 4,500 ports worldwide for global trade. The total amount of goods carried over the seas is about 6 billion tons, and world maritime shipping increases 3 to 4 percent each year. The global economic security depends on the sustainment of safe and mainly uninterrupted maritime shipping. Therefore, the security of ships, ports, choke points and sea lanes of communications are the main elements for maritime security. This is valid for the Black Sea as well.

Ensuring a safe and secure maritime domain does not only contribute to the well functioning maritime shipping, it also contributes to the national and international efforts to prevent terror, proliferation of WMD and other illicit activities over the seas.

The emerging security environment in the Black Sea maritime domain after the fall of the Berlin wall has created its own dynamics which is reflected in the following initiatives:

- Increased cooperation amongst Black Sea coastguards
- The BLACKSEAFOR initiative
- CSBM in the naval field

Later on, 9/11 has triggered new formulations in the Black Sea maritime domain security. Firstly BLACKSEAFOR commenced a transformation process in order to be tasked with maritime security operations such as shadowing suspect vessels. Secondly, Turkey launched operation Black Sea Harmony. Both aimed to fight against terror and proliferation of WMD in the Black Sea.

Since all maritime areas of the Black Sea fall into the categories of territorial waters' exclusive economic zone, literally there is no maritime area where state jurisdiction is not exercised. That facilitates the control of shipping through established EEZ protection patrols and maritime surveillance areas.

Recent statistics mainly derived from BBCIC Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Center show that most cases involving illegal activities in the Black Sea are different sorts of smuggling but not terror or proliferation of WMD and they were based on isolated cases, not on systematic patterns. This overall picture was also reflected in the BLACKSEAFOR document in an officially agreed risk assessment of BLACKSEAFOR, underlying the fact that there are no threats, but a number of risks in the Black Sea maritime domain. Although we face isolated cases of illegal action



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in the Black Sea, we all know that the risk of asymmetric threats and illegal actions in the Black Sea have a potential to increase and to transform themselves into threats as long as no deterrent action is taken.

From that point, now I would like to touch upon BLACKSEAFOR and operation Black Sea Harmony. The underlying philosophy of the BLACKSEAFOR initiative when it was first introduced by Turkey in 1998 was the reflection of a vision of gathering six littoral navies under a cooperative framework to accomplish certain maritime tasks. Following the inaugural activation of the BLACKSEAFOR, on 27 September 2001, the task group conducted its planned activities focusing mainly on search and rescue under the command of a Turkish admiral.

Since then, BLACKSEAFOR is activated annually. Starting in 2004 it has been activated twice a year. The fifth activation of the BLACKSEAFOR, under the command of Romania, was conducted between 8 and 27 August 2005 focusing its training activities on anti-terror as well as maritime security operations. During this sea period, the task group had conducted combined training with operation Black Sea Harmony for the first time stressing on maritime security operations.

The most noticeable achievement of the BLACKSEAFOR during the first sea period was the establishment of pc-to-pc secure communication network developed by Turkey with special crypto amongst the different warships of the forces, which enabled the Romanian task group commander exercise his command and control functions over widely dispersed units. The second sea period of the 5<sup>th</sup> activation will be conducted between 7 and 26 April 2006.

A new process envisaging the utilization of BLACKSEAFOR for maritime security tasks continues. All of the Black Sea littorals have expressed their will and intention for these efforts as a result of the two high-level representatives' meetings of the BLACKSEAFOR at the level of deputy foreign ministers or under secretariats in 2004 and 2005.

While the transformation of the BLACKSEAFOR continues, in order to have smooth flow of shipping through the Turkish Straits as well as maintaining navigational order along the vital sea lines of communication in the Black Sea maritime domain, the Turkish navy launched operation Black Sea Harmony on 1 March 2004. This operation has been carried out in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions. The mission of operation Black Sea Harmony (OBSH) is to:

- Conduct periodic maritime surveillance operations in the maritime jurisdiction areas and the airspace above those areas in accordance with international law.
- Conduct reconnaissance operations for suspect vessels/col's.
- Trail/Shadow suspect vessels/col's.
- Show naval presence in the traffic routes of merchant shipping.

OBSH is a NATO-OAE affiliated operation. OBSH-NATO cooperation can be summarized under two headings. The first one is contact of interest/suspect ship shadowing/trailing. We have shadowed every contact of interest coming from the Mediterranean in relation to OAE. The second one is information exchange, which also covers the transfer of recognized maritime picture as appropriate. We have been sending necessary maritime security information through NATO C4I systems with amplified information regarding merchant ship trafficking, suspected vessels and their movements.

Turkey invited all littorals of the Black Sea to join OBSH at the July 2004 meeting of BSF special representatives in Moscow. In March 2005, Ukraine became the first country to announce formally its intention to participate in OBSH. The Russian Federation has followed suit. Turkish and RF navy technical talks started in June 2005. The exchange of letter process was adapted to finalize the legal procedures for RF participation in OBSH. Our goal is to make operation Black Sea Harmony a multinational operation while continuing its NATO-OAE affiliated status and to transfer its mission to BLACKSEAFOR, when it is ready to take over such missions. Therefore, we consider this operation as a model to be adopted by BLACKSEAFOR in due course as well. Our approach for security in the Black Sea maritime domain is based on simplicity and applicability. We think OBSH satisfies the security needs of all NATO allies and partners alike.

In this regard, the acknowledgement of operation Black Sea Harmony as an instrument for regional cooperation in support of security and stability in the Black Sea, along with other regional institutions and initiatives, in NATO forums, is very promising. We expect NATO, as reflected in the Istanbul Summit communiqué, to continue to encourage cooperation achieved in the Black Sea, while maintaining its attraction and openness for increased interactions with OBSH, BLACKSEAFOR and the regional consensus behind them. What Turkey is striving for now through OBSH and BLACKSEAFOR as available and working instruments in the Black Sea maritime security domain, is to create an interface where the interests of NATO overlaps with those of littorals with a view to anchoring all of them in the Euro-Atlantic security system.

**Rumen Petkov**

Minister of the Interior, Bulgaria

*Ladies and gentlemen,  
Dear guests,*

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to participate in the annual international security conference organized by the Center for the Study of Democracy. The organizers have made an especially useful effort in bringing together high-ranking representatives of NATO and the EU, SEE ministers of interior, influential international organizations, members of the Bulgarian government, diplomatic missions, academia and NGOs.

The issues of stability and security in a period of significant socio-economic transformations in the Balkans are extremely important for each of the SEE countries because of their obvious interdependence in the current processes in the region. With their enlargement in Eastern Europe, NATO and the EU are facing the necessity to secure effectively their new borders in a region marked by instability for more than ten years. The conflicts in the Western Balkans during this period had a devastating effect on the economic and social infrastructure. They caused colossal crime escalation and obstructed investment and economic development.

During this period, the international security environment underwent significant changes. The integration processes spread across Central and Eastern Europe as a number of countries in the region espoused the Euro-Atlantic ideas and values. NATO became a main factor for the support and consolidation of Euro-Atlantic security. The Alliance provides exceptional guarantees for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members and of the whole of Europe. The future enlargement of the Alliance will significantly improve the security environment and will boost NATO's potential to influence security. The open-doors policy and the joining of new SEE members will contribute to the creation of a common area of security and stability.

The integration processes in the EU, going at ever deeper levels, have also strengthened the cooperation in the sphere of security. Security and law-enforcement services are already working in this new environment of numerous challenges, risks and threats. With such radical changes taking place, we are aware that in the medium and long term Bulgaria and its allies will not be confronting the classic military threat. In recent years, the necessity of typically military constraint measures rather widely used by NATO up until the mid-1990s has decreased. No state or significant political party in the region seeks purely military solutions any longer. On the other hand, asymmetrical threats are growing and we need to figure out the best types of response to them, seeking a balance between military and non-military approaches.

The 9/11 attacks forced the international community to reconsider its priorities and consolidate the existing international laws, institutions and mechanisms for maintaining and guaranteeing world peace and security.

Terrorism of today, unlike terrorism of the past, has the potential to inflict huge damages through WMD and other means. It can break the normal course of social, economic and political processes in every country. As information technologies advance so quickly, international transport, power and information infrastructure becomes ever more vulnerable and so do sites using interconnected information systems—nuclear power stations, airports, military sites, etc. The Internet allows international terrorist organizations to coordinate and provide logistic support to their operations and actions on a global scale. The events from the past few years showed that no country is fully secured against terrorist attacks whether on religious or separatist grounds. With its active support to the international anti-terrorist coalition Bulgaria is a possible target of international terrorist organizations. Its location in close proximity to centers of tension such as the Middle East and the Caucasus also raises concern.

The threats coming from illegal arms and dual use goods trading have not diminished either. The Ministry of Interior shares the opinion that the danger of terrorist groups getting hold of weapons for mass destruction is turning into the most serious potential threat for international security. This is why we are actively involved in countering illegal arms trafficking. The transformation of the region into an outer border of the EU poses new requirements for effective control over the traffic of hazardous items, the penetration of individuals linked to terrorist organizations, smuggling, drug trafficking and drug trade, illegal migration and human trafficking.

Trans-border organized crime also destabilizes regional security, erodes state institutions and exerts negative influence on all spheres of public life. To successfully counter this threat all countries in the region have to join efforts, increase border security and apply preemptive actions based on information exchange and effective international police cooperation.

Taking into account global developments and the EU integration priorities of Bulgaria and the region, the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior has established a legal base of over thirty international cooperation agreements with counterpart services in all EU member states, all neighboring states and Europol. These are agreements for bilateral cooperation against terrorism, organized and trans-border crime accentuating on mechanisms for active operational cooperation. Bulgaria is also a party to two trilateral agreements against organized crime (Bulgaria-Greece-Romania and Bulgaria-Turkey-Romania). The Ministry of Interior (MoI) also supports MFA's initiative aiming to enhance Euro-Atlantic integration efforts and guarantee regional

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security that the agreement be made quadrilateral (Bulgaria-Romania-Greece-Turkey) and a 2+2 ministerial meeting be convened.

MoI's investigation units are engaged in brisk information exchange under the cooperation agreement between Bulgaria and Europol regarding trans-border criminal organizations and networks involved in drugs, women and cars trafficking, money and documents counterfeiting and cigarettes smuggling. Bulgaria participates in six analytical working files and actively supports the efforts of member-state police services in cracking down criminal groups, including Bulgarian criminal enterprises operating in the EU, either independently or jointly with local crime groups.

Operational information is being exchanged pursuant to Protocol 6 to the Europe Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Bulgaria concerning mutual assistance in customs matters. The National Service for Combating Organized Crime (NSCOC) assists the experts from the European Anti-Fraud Office during their working visits for the coordination of investigative actions. The MoI has a permanent representative in the unit for protection of the Euro. As a result of the successful operations against the manufacture and proliferation of Euro counterfeits, which is a priority of the NSCOC, 3,045 false Euro notes of different nominal value to the amount of 309,750 Euro have been seized and twelve illegal printing houses for counterfeit currency have been cracked down.

The Bulgarian experience testifies that Europol offers the most effective form of cooperation in a multilateral and European perspective. We consider that enhancing Europol's role in the efforts against organized crime and the enlargement of its competence are preconditions for improving the cooperation and making common efforts even more effective. This is why Bulgaria supports the stepping up of negotiations between Europol and Western Balkan states for arriving at bilateral cooperation agreements. Both Europol and the concerned states will benefit from this process. Furthermore, enhancing cooperation in the frame of Europol will further galvanize police co-operation between SEE states.

The stabilization and association agreement between the Western Balkans and the EU, as well as Bulgaria and Romania's pending EU membership require increased cooperative effort against the illegal manufacture and smuggling of high-excise goods and against all types of frauds. Bulgaria is ready to share its experience and expertise in the sphere of institution and capacity building in the area of cooperation with OLAF.

Bulgaria is party to two regional agreements—the *Agreement on Cooperation to Prevent and Combat Trans-Border Crime in South-Eastern Europe (SECI Agreement)* and the *Agreement among the Governments of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Participating States on Cooperation in Combating Crime* with its two additional

protocols—on creating a network of liaison officers and on combating terrorism. Bulgaria actively participates in the joint operations coordinated by the SECI Center. The annual operations Containment and Mirage targeting illegal drug trafficking and trafficking in human beings led to the cracking down of significant drug channels and neutralization of criminal networks for trafficking people for sexual and labor exploitation in the EU.

The international police operation Mirage 2004 was aimed against the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation. 783 sites were checked, 528 women turned out to be prostituting, including 14 foreigners (7 from Ukraine, 6 from Russia and 1 from Moldova), 35 were underage Bulgarian citizens, 30 women described themselves as victims of trafficking and 8 of them were assisted by the International Organization of Migration, 36 procurers were identified, 6 investigations and 14 preliminary investigations were initiated against 20 people. Administrative measures were taken in 152 of the cases. Bulgaria is an active participant in regional law-enforcement cooperation in the frame of the SECI Center. It is important to take into account the prospective involvement of the Western Balkans in the mechanisms for cooperation with Europol when developing the overall pattern for regional cooperation.

Bulgaria is a recognized reliable partner of Europol and a number of EU member states such as Austria, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece in combating organized criminal networks involved in women trafficking. In relation to the risks and threats from such trans-border organized criminal activities NSCOC, both independently and in collaboration with other police services in the concerned EU states, continues its investigation and prevention efforts.

Pursuant to the European Police Chiefs' Task Force's Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking for 2004, the NSCOC continued its work along the Maritza analytical working file (AWF). It was opened in late 2003 for collecting and analyzing information for Bulgarian citizens, both perpetrators and victims of crime. Three men from organized criminal groups involved in women trafficking were arrested and are awaiting trial.

The MoI pursues a policy of enlargement and consolidation of the established network of liaison officers in most European countries as well as in the region—Greece, Turkey, Romania, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro.

The MoI services have developed schemes for crime detection and prevention. Specific partners have been identified, operative information is being shared, and monitored deliveries are conducted.

After an 18-month operation, in May 2005 the Milan police arrested Metush Bairami, of dual Bulgarian and Macedonian citizenship, who was a key figure in the channels

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for heroin trafficking from Turkey to Western Europe for the past seven years. A few months later, his closest connection was arrested in the Netherlands in an attempt to smuggle 35 kilos of heroin. The operation neutralized one of the most significant players in drug trafficking in the Balkans. Bairami was well-known for his connections with Balkan criminal networks in Kosovo, Western Macedonia and Albania, as well as his contacts with the radical political circles in Kosovo.

All this proves Bulgaria's unflinching determination to work for the stabilization, democratic development and prosperity of the region. We are convinced that our expertise and experience as an EU candidate country could be useful both to the Western Balkans and to the European Union in implementing its policies in this part of Europe.

The Ministry of Interior takes consistent steps to combat international terrorism and organized crime in implementation of the government policy for strict fulfillment of the UN Security Council resolutions on terrorism and for active support to the international anti-terrorist coalition. The MoI is guided by the principle that the resources of all state bodies and institutions should be used to this end. For that reason, on 26 August 2005 the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Finance and the Head of the National Investigation Service approved a set of joint measures to combat serious crime and organized criminal groups. The efforts of these institutions will be aimed at improving collaboration and implementing coordinated actions of the special services, the police, the judiciary, local authorities and crisis management units in information exchange, prevention and multi-level safeguarding of national security.

Over 6,000 police and gendarmerie officers participate in police operations across the country on a daily basis. During these operations 9,424 people have been checked, 7,688 of whom were known offenders and 61 were leaders or members of organized criminal groups. In operations overseen by the Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation 1,363 people have been arrested, 1,123 of them have been detained under police warrant for 24 hours, 85 have been detained under prosecutor's warrant for 72 hours, 15 have been held in permanent custody, 8 have been imprisoned, 4 have disappeared after receiving an imprisonment sentence and 198 suspects are wanted by security authorities nationwide. There are 640 temporary checkpoints in the country at which 172,380 vehicles and 136,607 passengers have been checked. 27 Bulgarians, 15 foreign nationals and 82 persons wanted nationwide have been apprehended during attempts to pass illegally through border checkpoints. 504 vessels have been examined at border checkpoints as well. In implementation of the above-mentioned measures over 180 financial inspections were undertaken referring to the period 1993–2005 with the purpose of revealing tax offences, unpaid taxes, tax-related crimes, tax concealment and tax frauds.

The Ministry of Interior works consistently to establish administrative capacity adequate to the new anti-terrorism and anti-organized crime environment and requirements both nationally and internationally. Parliament is currently deliberating a new Law on the Ministry of Interior which will be a key step to this purpose. Pursuant to its international engagements and the requirements of Resolution 1373 (2001) of the UN Security Council, in December 2001 Bulgaria drew the first National Report on anti-terrorist activities in the country. On 13 October 2005 we submitted to the UN the sixth such report on the implementation of the above Resolution.

In September 2005, preparation of a National Report in fulfillment of UN Security Council Resolution 1617 (2005) was launched. The deadline for its submission is 1 March 2006. Bulgarian legislation is completely harmonized with international law instruments and the *aquis* in that area. The relevant laws adopted are the following:

- *Law Amending and Supplementing the Criminal Code* (2002) containing special penal provisions for terrorism and the funding of terrorism;
- *Law on the Measures against Financing of Terrorism* (2003);
- *National List of Natural and Legal Persons, Groups and Organizations to Whom the Provisions of the Law on the Measures against Financing of Terrorism Apply.* The list contains data about individuals, legal persons, groups and organizations indicated by the UN Security Council (Consolidated list maintained by Committee 1267), as well as people, groups and organizations included in the Council of the European Union list. The National List is regularly updated;
- *Law Amending and Supplementing the Law on Measures against Money Laundering* (2003);
- *Law on Asset Forfeiture* (2005);
- *Law on Extradition and the European Arrest Warrant;* (2005);
- *Law Amending and Supplementing the Law on Administrative Offences and Penalties* (2005) regulating the culpability of legal entities that have benefited or might illegally benefit from certain crimes, including terrorism, for related offences committed by the managing bodies or the staff of such entities.

MoI services are completely ready for integration within the partner structures of NATO and the EU for the creation of effective mechanisms to counteract security risks and threats. The Ministry's primary goal is, in cooperation with international police structures, to disable illegal trafficking through the Balkans to Western Europe and bar terrorist organizations from using the smuggling channels of organized crime groups for terrorist purposes.

Together with our US and EU partners the MoI has achieved excellent results in combating drug trafficking, illegal manufacture and proliferation of synthetic drugs, counterfeit money and documents. In the first half of 2005, 40 cases of illegal trafficking of drugs and precursors were prevented. We captured a total of 480 kg of illegal substances, 305,748 tablets and 2,000 ampoules of drugs. In addition, 21 kg of



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heroin, 15 kg of cocaine and 158 kg of marihuana were confiscated. MoI services also participated in drug operations abroad during which 213 kg of heroin and 4,177 kg of hashish were captured.

The MoI is partner to Germany, France, Spain, the UK and Europol in projects aimed at counteracting networks for people trafficking, including the trafficking of women. There is constant information exchange with foreign services about terrorist actions, hazardous cargo accidents and the smuggling of goods, intoxicating, psychotropic and radioactive substances, arms and ammunitions.

In conclusion, I would like to assure you that the MoI will continue its cooperation and interaction with the police services of the EU and NATO member states in the efforts of weakening trans-border organized crime and international terrorism. We are headed to completing the integration of Bulgarian special services in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures and achieving synergy towards our common goal of tackling the new security risks and threats.

**Lt.-Gen. Giuseppe Valotto**  
Commander KFOR

## 1. FOREWORD

Ladies and Gentlemen, as Commander of the Kosovo Force it is an honor and pleasure for me to be here before such a prestigious audience.

I have to make some preliminary remarks: when I received the invitation to participate in today's seminar, I first wondered what would be my best thoughtful contribution to this seminar, designed to strengthen the development of democracy in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with the specific intent to facilitate dialogue among the political institutional actors in the Balkans. In this view, I preferred to favor my military role of Commander of the Kosovo Force.

Aware of the privileged observatory I enjoy, I decided to set up my intervention to elaborate on a picture of the general situation in order to provide valuable elements of information aimed to provide a better understanding/interpretation of the current issues in Kosovo. My intervention, therefore, does not have a political cut, but is aimed to illustrate my perception of the situation in Kosovo as Commander of soldiers, the course of the mission, its future prospects and some personal assessments.

Therefore, I will follow the agenda on the slide (SLIDE 1)\*; in particular:

- I will make a brief introduction on the origins of the mission;
- I will describe the activities and the principal assignments developed by KFOR, assessing military/civil aspects and their connections;
- I will illustrate some personal assessments on the general situation with specific reference to the operational aspects and those factors that influence the ongoing operations in Kosovo;
- I will delineate the future prospects of the mission and the next passage to the new Task Force concept, with particular reference to the aptitudes and positions of the contributing nations;
- and finally, I will formulate my conclusions.

## 2. INTRODUCTION

Before proceeding to an overall description of the Forces under my command, I believe it is necessary to remind you (SLIDE 2) that KFOR is a NATO-led Multinational Force deployed in Kosovo under a UN mandate since 12<sup>th</sup> June 1999, following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. In accordance with this Resolution, up to now, the mission assigned to my Contingent has not changed.

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\* The slides accompanying this presentation can be found after the text (pp. 92-99).

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Our task is still to maintain and develop a safe and secure environment in order to support the Special Representative of the Secretary General Mr. Sören JESSEN-PETERSEN and, therefore, UNMIK (the UN mission in Kosovo) in the transfer of increasing responsibilities to civil authorities and facilitate the progressive diminution of military operations in Kosovo.

Let me here underline that before the KFOR intervention Kosovo had become ground for clashes, a suffering society forced to face a major economic and humanitarian crisis, worsened by heavy interethnic tensions that caused the exodus of around a million people. Today, more than 5 years after the arrival of the Multinational Peace Contingent, I am absolutely convinced that the situation is radically changing.

The establishment of forces in the area has changed over time and, from the initial 50,000 soldiers, at the moment COMKFOR has an international force of around 17,000 soldiers to accomplish the mission (SLIDE 3). The decreasing trend of the commitment of the military international community, in terms of troops from the beginning of the operation until today, is underlined in the slide.

The units that are subordinate to me, are currently divided in four Multinational Brigades (SLIDE 4), with personnel from 35 NATO and non-NATO Countries. (SLIDE 5,6) These are light infantry units (SLIDE 7), motorized or airborne, particularly suitable to operate in a difficult environment, given the few routes that link the most important places, generally radiating from Pristina toward the bordering countries of the administrative boundary with Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Albania and FYROM, and a minor road system that is bumpy and almost completely worn out. Among the operational units, I mention the presence of a Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) vregiment (SLIDE 8) and a KTM Portuguese Battalion that are giving a valuable contribution for the strong professionalism of our Carabinieri who work both as a typical military unit and as military police for operations such as investigations, searches, arrests; when needed, they carry out crowd control operations (what we, at KFOR HQs, call “crowd and riot control operations”) and actively participate in the training phase of new units as they arrive in Kosovo.

### 3. ACTIVITIES AND TASKS ASSIGNED TO KFOR

To guarantee the accomplishment of the mission my Headquarters coordinates and directs the activities of subordinate units by planning, organizing and supervising the execution of various operations, activities and exercises to support the SRSG and UNMIK, so as to provide a safe and secure environment.

In particular, (SLIDE 9) the specific activities can be organized in three categories: presence and surveillance, deterrence, and direct support to the authorities and population.

Trying a simple outline (SLIDE 10) and without using technical details, presence and surveillance activities are carried out daily in order to assure freedom of movement, and for control of the territory and the borders. Examples of these activities include patrols, checkpoints, escorts and observation posts. Just to give you an idea of the figures, I can say that from September 1<sup>st</sup> to November 13<sup>th</sup> we conducted 23,886 patrols, both mounted and dismounted, and 5,759 checkpoints.

Deterrence activities (SLIDE 11) are aimed to show to everyone, and especially to those intending to sabotage the peace process, that KFOR is able to intervene with the firmest determination, timeliness, effectiveness and necessary strength against any negative change to the current scenario. All the activities in the sector of crowd control, rapid deployment, military operations in urban areas, defense of sensitive areas and vulnerable spots fall in this category.

The activities of direct support to authorities (SLIDE 12) and population are put into action through the active participation of KFOR units in police operations conducted by UNMIK Police and by the Kosovo Police Service, that resulted in 309 arrests (12 of which were of murderers and war criminals) from September to November and in the development of projects of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).

The support to police is implemented with the cordon and search of inhabited areas, while CIMIC projects (115 underway or completed from September to November) are aimed at the reconstruction of the social and economic fabric, such as construction of roads and bridges, and humanitarian interventions in the medical, veterinarian and educational sectors (SLIDE 13). We must consider also the activities of explosive ordnance disposal (mines and unexploded munitions), a dramatic problem in every post conflict period and still felt in Kosovo, considering that from September to November my soldiers destroyed 215 devices.

It is indeed a whole range of activities requiring professionalism and determination, a constant and stressing commitment for my soldiers, who are on the ground every day, with an operational strength equal to about 55% of the total (SLIDE 14). And the results are not lacking: to give you an example (SLIDE 15), in this slide are summarized the main achieved results since September 1<sup>st</sup>, the day I began my mandate.

But I remind you that KFOR is first of all a military force, well trained and above all well led, ready to intervene “on short notice Kosovo wide” to face any possible threat or aggression towards sensitive objectives. Not by chance, I have made specific reference to the tangible and evident determination, shown with periodic emphasis during realistic tests of rapid deployments, to face military threats or situations of internal instability (disorders, strikes, interethnic provocations, inter-religious hostility, etc.). This has been done to send a clear message to that part of Kosovo society (in my opinion it is only a small percentage) that does not believe in the

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principles of democracy and peaceful cohabitation, but, on the contrary, thinks they can solve controversies with violence, abusing the rights of the weakest ones.

KFOR will not allow events such as those of March 2004 to be repeated, and all our activities, all our training events go in this direction: our personnel are trained to automatically react with strong determination against any criminal initiative that is carried out for misguided political or religious ideals, and forgetting that ideals, above all the religious ones, should unite, and not divide people.

Everything has direct and specific reactions from my units on the ground, who are gradually rearticulating in order to adopt a more flexible and elastic set-up aimed to immediately intervene against any kind of threat. The practical application of this concept is the transformation of the Brigades into Task Forces (SLIDE 16), a gradual process that has just begun, but will probably last more than one year and will be hinged on the creation of 5 TFs out of 4 Brigades, each one with the capacity to swiftly move throughout Kosovo, each able to sustain itself for limited periods, and above all able to carry out any operation, military or anti-riot, with a professionalism never reached in the past.

Worthy of further mention, concerning the evolution of KFOR towards Task Force concepts, are the Liaison Monitoring Teams, recently established (SLIDE 17). They are the best tool to acquire and maintain contacts with the population and subsequently to improve trust in KFOR among the local population. Their job allows me to feel the pulse of Kosovo through daily and permanent contacts with people, municipalities and local leaders. Such daily contacts and accurate dialogue make sure that KFOR is not overtaken by events, acts quickly, and is able to rapidly and effectively face the events that can escalate a crisis from local to regional level.

In fact, at a local level, it is necessary to listen to everything, to understand what the concerns are, to explain the future responsibilities in security issues and, above all, to persuade the leadership to improve the standard of life of all the people of Kosovo. Instances of progress are numerous and have been achieved thanks to collaboration at all levels of the political-social scene in Kosovo, including the cooperation with all local and non-local organizations.

The highest level (SLIDE 18), for example, is represented by the extremely beneficial collaboration with the SRSG, the UNMIK chief, with whom I meet at least three times a week. During such meetings we discuss common problems; our objective is to realize the necessary coordination, an essential condition to proceed in the same direction, according to the same political common logic in all its forms, both in the working groups, and in the studies about the next state structures.

This common approach finds its practical realization during visits, sometimes joint, to various towns all over Kosovo, as well as in meetings with various political leaders during which we give the proof of the common action of the international community, or during the joint direction of fundamental processes such as the Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) and the development of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC DG). On such point, let me add that being immediately in tune with this dynamic UNMIK chief, expert in the area and its problems, allowed me to face Kosovo problems from the start at the beginning of September.

The relations with political-military counterparts from Serbia and Montenegro have also had an extremely profitable result: we develop meetings both at my level and at inferior ones. Such meetings allow us to exchange vital information, to avoid dangerous misunderstandings, as well as to plan and to conduct along the administrative boundary line of the province some joint activities (synchronized patrols) aimed to fight illegal trafficking and crime in general. The operational value of such activities is not very important; but the reached results, even though small from the military point of view, confirm the quality of the collaboration between NATO and the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro. Moreover, such connection represents also the only effective link between the International Community and Serbia and Montenegro.

#### 4. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

As COMKFOR and therefore as a soldier, I think it is not appropriate to give an assessment of the political situation and its potential developments in the next months.

I have my opinions that come both from my direct experience on the ground, and from my reading of EIDE's report, which I wish for you to read as well (SLIDE 19); I found it very balanced because it reflects the results reached by Kosovo authorities but also confirms the lack of progress in some areas, and decentralization is one of these. Based on my experience of these last two months, I agree with Ambassador EIDE that a meaningful decentralization of powers and competencies at local level would be a good contribution in reestablishing trust among the communities, without undermining the central institutions.

It is an ambitious and difficult objective, that will require generosity and above all the capacity to accept reasonable compromises from all the involved parties (SLIDE 20). The Status Talks will be led by a dexterous Diplomat such as the former President of Finland Martti AHTISAARI: he is a wise and balanced man, with a good team, and under his clever direction I believe in a satisfactory solution of the problem. In this respect, I am firmly confident: my trust comes from the direct knowledge of the most important authorities from all ethnic groups of Kosovo. I have found very prepared

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people, open to dialogue, animated by a highly constructive spirit, often illuminated and wise.

I am sure that all the parties who will participate in the Status Talks will know how to face with wisdom and far-sightedness the difficulties of a meeting that, as everybody knows, starts from different positions (at least from the statements we read), having as the only objective the good of Kosovo people, no matter what the ethnic group, religion, or place of residence are.

Nevertheless, I must share with you my current feeling. Apart from the political problems and their future developments that I do not consider secondary, my biggest concern is the economic situation in Kosovo. The great majority of the population is facing extreme difficulties in this field. For instance, it is not normal that, six years after the end of the war and with the oncoming winter, people still suffer cuts of electricity and water; the rate of unemployment reaches 70% and the existing infrastructures are absolutely inadequate for any entrepreneurial initiative. Recently, the World Bank stated that poverty is still widespread in Kosovo, and 52% of the population live on less than 1.42 Euro a day. This data is self explanatory.

As I recently stated during a meeting in Brussels with Mr. Javier SOLANA, the true problem in Kosovo is, in my opinion, the economic situation, and I basically think that the true keystone is the identification of economic development projects in all their forms (SLIDE 21). If the international community will be able to back up the region we will have more security, and if we will have more security we will have more investments. Increased investments will produce a better economy with consequent effects in terms of security.

It is a closed and “self-contained” circle, whose fulfillment must flow from, in my opinion, four essential elements: security (KFOR’s main task), the perception of security (linked to the image of the institutions and Kosovo society, as they are perceived by the population and ethnic groups from outside), foreign investments (that will take place only if this perception will be positive and broadcast to foreign countries the image of a Kosovo as a region in which it is possible to invest with a “low risk”) and economic revitalization (that will take place only if there are the above-mentioned investments and in turn, through the consequent reduction of tensions and crime, will close the circle helping KFOR to guarantee security). The facts show (SLIDE 22) that the core of the problem is security perception by the observers of the international community and all those who live “the Kosovo reality”.

And finally a glancing reference to IDPs who have not returned because they do not perceive a safe Kosovo, above all because they do not see reliable economic prospects, despite the fact that there is more than one municipality where Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians live in peace, in a multiethnic environment. Therefore, I think that

the key to success, to support Kosovo's population and reach the ambitious objectives of the international community, is to sustain the economic development of the region in all its possible forms (industry/agriculture and services). I think, in fact, that the absence of a true project of development is the motivating factor of phenomena such as destabilizing nationalism, crime, corruption, smuggling and prostitution. Only by seriously addressing the situation of economic development, will it be possible to produce stability in the long term, offering real prospects to the people.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

I believe (SLIDE 23) that we can and we must reach peace in the Balkans. It is an objective that goes well beyond the status of Kosovo, affecting Europe itself. The conclusion of my intervention will be a very strong and determined message: peace can be reached only if two crucial components are developed: dialogue between the parties, and economic development. I am sure we can win this challenge if all the actors will be able to work together. KFOR will always be one of the fundamental builders. It is in Kosovo to support this process and will do it as long as the international community will want.

The road will be uphill, but I, as COMKFOR, am confident. My motto is "Together We Can" and this is the best way to overcome fears, avoid misunderstandings and prevent incidents. For three months I have been meeting Kosovo people and I am convinced that Kosovo can peacefully face the process. At the same time, I cannot underestimate the sensitivity of the process and the challenges before us and as COMKFOR, above all on the military point of view, I want to reaffirm that KFOR is and will be determined to accomplish its mission to facilitate this process with all its energies and assets.






## TOGETHER WE CAN



20 November 2005



Security Risks & Transformation  
Euro-Atlantic & Regional Perspectives



SLIDE 1



## AGENDA



- Introduction
- KFOR activities & assignments
- Assessment of the current situation
- Future prospects for the mission
- Conclusions



SLIDE 2




## KFOR's MISSION




United Nations Security Council  
Resolution 1244:

“While continuing to maintain and develop a climate of safety and security, KFOR is to support UNMIK in promoting the transfer of increased responsibility to the civil authorities, in order to facilitate the withdrawal from large-scale framework operations in Kosovo.”

SLIDE 3



SLIDE 4




SLIDE 5

### 25 NATO NATIONS


IT	DA	SN
GE	HU	LI
FR	PL	ES
US	BE	LU
GR	UK	NO
	RO	NL
	LA	CA
TU	SK	
PO	BU	

≈ 14500












SLIDE 6




## 11 NON-NATO NATIONS




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AUT 	CHE 
FIN 	GEO 
MAR 	ARG 
SWE 	AZE 
UKR 	ARM 
IRL 	




≈2500



SLIDE 7



## Assets on the ground




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APART FROM THE CENTRAL PLAIN AROUND PRISTINA, KOSOVAR TERRAIN IS VERY HILLY AND FORESTED, WITH A POORLY-DEVELOPED ROAD NETWORK WHICH ALMOST COLLAPSES DURING WINTER SNOWING. THEREFORE, OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS REQUIRE UNITS WITH HIGH MOBILITY, FLEXIBILITY AND CRC/CBT POWER:

- PARATROOPS;
- LIGHT INFANTRY;
- WHEELED IFVs;
- HELI ASSETS.



SLIDE 8



## MSU



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SLIDE 9

 **FRAMEWORK OPERATIONS** 

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- **Presence and supervision**
- **Deterrence**
- **Direct support to Authorities and population**



SLIDE 10

 **Presence and supervision** 

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1. **OBSERVATION POINTS;**
2. **CHECK POINTS;**
3. **PATROLS.**

SLIDE 11

 **Deterrence** 

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1. **OPERATIONAL REHEARSALS;**
2. **CROWD RIOT CONTROL.**



SLIDE 12



## Direct support to the authorities and Population








**CORDON OPS.**  
**HOUSE SEARCH OPS.**  
**BORDER SURVEILLANCE**  
+ AGAINST  
**SMUGGLING**  
**WOODCUTTERS**  
**ILLEGAL TRANSIT**  
**ILLEGAL CROSSING**  
**CRIMINAL ACTIVITY**





SLIDE 13



## CIMIC






EXAMPLE

KFOR WILL SUPPORT KEK AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF OBI LIC BY BUILDING A BYPASS ROAD BETWEEN GRABOVAC AND OBI LIC. THIS ROAD WILL ENSURE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF ALL AND HELP KEK TO CONTINUE WINTER MINING IN A SAFE MANNER. KFOR SUPPORTS THE MUNICIPALITY OF OBI LIC, KEK AND THIS PROJECT FOR THE PEOPLE OF KOSOVO.


**PRESENT ACTIVITIES:**


- 115 projects underway or completed
- Reconstruction of the social and economic fabric, such as construction of roads & bridges *(new power plant road pictured at left)*
- Humanitarian interventions in the medical, veterinarian and educational sectors

SLIDE 14




## Operational situation of the forces






<span style="color: green;">■</span> Maneuver/CS units	55%
<span style="color: blue;">■</span> NSEs + HQs	20%
<span style="color: grey;">■</span> CSS	25%

**SLIDE 15**




### Main activities (1 SEP – 15 NOV)





ITEMS	QUANTITY	REMARKS	
ARRESTED	309	WAR CRIMINALS MURDERS	5 7
FRAGOs	159	EXTANT	57
JOINT ACTIVITIES (KFOR / UNMIK-P / KPS)	1.415		
SEARCH OPERATIONS	172	WEAPONS FOUND	206
VCPs	5.759	AMMO FOUND	5.194
		UXO FOUND	215
PATROLS	23.886		
		COMPLETED	67
		ON GOING	42
		PLANNED	6
		POLITICAL AUTHORITIES	57
		MUNICIPALITIES	14
		OTHER	91
COMKFOR VISIT IN/OUT	162		

**SLIDE 16**



### 4 MNBs → 5 MNTs





- Heli assets**
- Mobility**
- Flexibility**
- Rapidity**
- Centralized C2**
- Fewer caveats**

**SLIDE 17**



### LMTs - MISSION





**To feel the pulse  
of Kosovo**

Political

Economic

Social

- Provide KFOR with situational awareness throughout Kosovo
- Provide information on real issues affecting the political, economic and social indicators of all Kosovars
- Provide information to support intelligence-led operations



SLIDE 18

 **COORDINATION WITH LEADERS OF KEY INSTITUTIONS** 

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- SRSB (UNMIK) 
- Armed Forces of Serbia & Montenegro 
- Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and religious leaders 

SLIDE 19

 **EIDE's REPORT – Status Talks** 

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Comprehensive Review

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SLIDE 20


 **FINAL STATUS** 

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**Mr. Martti AHTISAARI**  
Special Envoy

SLIDE 21



SLIDE 22

**SECURITY: PERCEPTION vs. REALITY**

Security exists and is generally good,

... but some tell us that their *perception* of security is poor.

SLIDE 23

- 
- COMKFOR's CONCLUSIONS**
- Peace in the Balkans can be reached
  - Extreme sensitivity of the upcoming process
  - Kosovo can peacefully face the process
  - "Together We Can" is the best way to overcome fears, avoid misunderstandings and prevent incidents



**Petrit Karabina**

Deputy Minister of Defense, Albania

Distinguished participants, first, let me extend my thanks to the host nation for the outstanding hospitality and attention paid to conduct this conference. Let me also express my highest esteem to participants in this important event. The current situation demonstrates that Southeast European countries are increasingly faced with common regional challenges instead of individual national risks and threats. Terrorism, transnational organized crime, drug smuggling and human trafficking have become common security threats. Traditionally, the terrorist-associated activities have been most pronounced in regions close to their home nation. But developments, in the aftermath of 9/11, demonstrate that they are increasingly conducted across continents, often in conjunction with organized criminal groups from other parts of the world.

Governments are not totally immune towards terrorists' access or activities of transnational criminal organizations. The battle against terrorism and international organized crime is not like previous regional wars. The adversaries in this struggle feed on societies' weakness, corrupting the normal course of life and destroying civic culture. Terrorist crime organizations try to root out what our democratic societies have achieved. I think that there are many reasons urging the need for further enhancement of a common regional approach towards security. But current security risks make it indispensable to open the related regional approach to the Euro-Atlantic perspective. This is related to the need to develop same strategies and common mechanisms of our democratic states to include NATO and EU countries and partners. It is for that reason that Albania has defined integration in Euro-Atlantic structures as the top priority of its national security strategy: active participation of Albania in the Partnership for Peace program since 1994 and the successful development of negotiations with EU in the framework of the Stabilization and Association Agreement and the fulfilling of all requirements for membership in these most successful organizations of the modern-day security architecture. One of the most important indicators for that is the enhancement of interoperability with NATO and EU by contributing to multi-national peace support operations.

Since 1996, the Albanian armed forces have been providing their contribution to the NATO-led operations starting with the IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Today our armed forces participate with troops in ISAF NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, in the ALTHEA EU-led mission in BiH and in the mission of the coalition against terrorism in Iraq. The participation of about 1,800 soldiers, NCOs and officers in these missions so far has helped to develop a precious contingent of qualified personnel in our armed forces experienced in the Western standards of peace support operations. A new phase of participation in missions against

terrorism has already started by achieving participation of combined military units from countries of Southeast Europe in such missions. The establishment in May 2003 of the US Adriatic Charter between the US and three countries of the Western Balkans—Albania, Croatia and Macedonia—is an important element of joint efforts toward integration of our three countries in NATO. A very special moment in the history of this Charter was the establishment of the combined medical team that since 10<sup>th</sup> August 2005 participates in the NATO-led mission ISAF in Afghanistan. This contribution of Adriatic Charter countries is evidence of our commitment for participating in NATO-led operations and other missions that contribute to the fight against terrorism.

Another development is well underway concerning harmonization of regional cooperation with the strategy of the Euro-Atlantic community to face security risks. Having benefited from their cooperation since 1996 in the framework of Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM), member countries of these organizations have agreed in principle to engage headquarters SEEBRIG in the role of NATO headquarters in ISAF NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. For this they are developing their operational capabilities to NATO standards. This development will undoubtedly help to strengthen the role of our countries as security providers beyond our region.

Transformation of our armed forces to achieve the standards of NATO and EU member countries is a top priority in the agenda of our defense and security reform. The most distinct achievements in our defense reform include review of the new doctrine framework for the consolidation of the armed forces, new structure, contribution to peace keeping missions, enhancement of operational capabilities, progress in the planning and budgeting, improvement of military education, excess armament and ammunition disposal (where Albania proceeds at the fastest rate in the region), etc. The recent peaceful rotation of power in Albania is a crucial step for consolidation of democracy in our country and a good basis for further progress of our defense reform and integration process. The priorities of the defense reform include implementation of Force Structure, development of personnel management system, a concrete Initial Steps Program for modernization of equipment in the armed forces, establishment of the maritime surveillance integrated system, increasing the number of the NATO partnership staff element PSE, etc.

In aspiring for NATO membership our country is not passive toward the democratization process in the region. The main lesson Albania has learned in the twelve years of participating in the PfP is that it is an indispensable mechanism to support democratic reforms and the progress toward integration. In the framework of strengthening good neighborhood relations we will continue to invite representatives of the defense sector from Serbia and Montenegro and from Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the activities of the Albanian armed forces, to include participation of their observers in our military exercise.

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Finally, I would like to express my confidence that aligning the transformation process of our armed forces with Euro-Atlantic and regional perspectives will multiply the forces of our joint action and will prevail over the current security risks. Thank you.

**Lubomir Kyuchukov**

Deputy Minister of foreign Affairs, Bulgaria

*Distinguished guests and  
participants in today's discussion,*

I will try to make a smooth transition to the discussion part of our panel. Bulgaria's official position has been made known a number of times, so rather than making declarations on that, I will enter into a discussion mode. Let me, then, note that my views should not be considered official and do not engage the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

By way of introduction, I could say that the Balkans have embarked on a steady road of stabilization which is all in all a road to greater security, but that road is still uncertain. I will try to limit my presentation to two main points. On the one hand, I would like to analyze the security risks in the region from a policy angle; on the other hand, I would like to examine the region's European and Euro-Atlantic integration trends, which is in fact our panel's topic. I can employ two viewpoints to the security risks in our region. The first is the traditional outlook which may even be considered archaic in relation to the modern European situation. The second is the globalist, post-modern view. And when I say globalist I mean globalist, not global—that is, not global in terms of the scene on which these risks occur, but in terms of the type of risks we are confronting.

I find the „peaceful coexistence” of these two types of risks characteristic of our region, but they are also factors that trouble the region's peace. The first type of risks come at play on either the level of the nation state or that of ethnic communities and, for a region like the Balkans, they present a grave enough problem. We are reminded of the wars in Yugoslavia and the formation of new states in their aftermath, of the various ethnicities that are in opposition or even at war. Problems of this category are still of serious concern, both regarding the still undetermined status of Kosovo (for which talks are pending and from which we have every reason to expect a positive outcome) and a number of other issues that will surface in the Status Talks and are crucial to the overall situation on the Balkan Peninsula. Among these are issues brought up by one or the other side of the talks, for instance, the question about Northern Kosovo or the stunted integration of the Republic of Srpska as part of the BiH Federation.

Meanwhile, another no less important question needs to be considered. We are witnessing a peculiar clash between old and new nationalisms in the region. In using the terms old and new, I do not apply any judgment of morals or value, but merely try to represent the situation objectively. So, traditional nationalisms that have existed for a long time, such as Greek, Turkish, Bulgarian or Serbian nationalism, are now in competition with the new players: Bosnian, Montenegrin and Kosovar nationalism.

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In saying Kosovar and not Albanian, I have a very particular thing in mind. So I speak of new realities, new shades into the picture that go beyond our customary perceptions. These nationalisms do not always find a nation or state to attach to, but they do figure as active and dynamic elements of the larger picture.

The second type of risks that I called post-modern are situated one level lower than the ones on a national scale. These risks are posed rather by trans-national or trans-border groups and networks. I am speaking of all those modern problems of the globalized world and markedly of our region: arms, drugs, women trafficking and the like. Incidentally, these are some of the few areas where ethnic groups that are otherwise in conflict or at war practice mutual understanding and cooperation. This is so all over the Balkans and specifically in Kosovo where Serbs and Albanians of the underworld have rather fruitful contacts with each other.

To this group of risks I think also belong the attempts of cultivating Islamic fundamentalism in some parts of the region and the danger that some areas are becoming recruitment spots or scenes of action for international terrorism and organized crime. Having discussed this background, I would say that the course the Balkans must take is exactly the one mentioned in our panel's title—the region's NATO and EU prospects. But besides speaking about NATO and the EU *in* SEE, I would also add NATO and the EU *for* SEE. Thus, I want to underline that this is a two-way process. The Balkans and these two organizations have mutual interests and this fact should preclude a clichéd use of the terms European and Euro-Atlantic integration by politicians and diplomats as a surrogate of their will or skill to find concrete solutions.

I think the region's European and Euro-Atlantic integration should be considered at several different levels. The most fundamental one concerns the ultimate goal and the realistic prospects for achieving it. These prospects are not as short-term as the next year or two, they must be long-term, but still within the foreseeable future. Both NATO and EU policy, I should say, are sufficiently well-justified and responsible in this respect. Such is NATO's open-door policy to the Western Balkans and the Adriatic Charter giving NATO membership prospects to several Western Balkan countries. Such is the EU's step-by-step approach to the region in which countries have to pass through several successive stages, from the signing of a stabilization and association agreement, through gaining a candidate status, the negotiations themselves, to the membership agreement, etc. I have mentioned all these stages as they cover the whole range of commitments and relations to the EU that each Balkan state has to enter.

The second level of European and Euro-Atlantic integration, I think, is that of EU standards, especially in the area of human rights, minority rights, the rule of law and good governance. All these standards are of great relevance to the forthcoming Status Talks for Kosovo, but they are also significant as a model of democracy to be followed,

as a stimulus to the establishment of democratic institutions and mechanisms. This is why any mention of Kosovo's future status is accompanied by talks about these standards. But we should be most careful about what signal the final decision on the status, whatever that is, will send to Belgrade and to Kosovo, to the societies in these countries, and across the Balkans as well. We must be watchful lest this decision should make radical forces on both sides more extreme and even strengthen their position.

Our region's European prospects can be thought as a vision, as a historical trend. Europe is not in the process of making, it is in the process of removing borders and barriers. This is the European vision and course of progress, but, paradoxically enough, the Balkans have taken the opposite direction, creating borders, erecting barriers. I could imagine that this is a stage we need to pass through before being able to lift any barriers afterwards. But in the long run we should definitely remember this vision, this course of barrier removal that the region must finally aspire to.

There is yet another level that I consider important—the EU and NATO as a presence of a legal framework, a compendium of norms and values, but also a physical presence. The speakers before me emphasized how crucial for regional stability the presence of military contingents in Kosovo and BiH is. I think that we should define the long-term international military presence in some parts of the Balkans as a political necessity.

One more perspective that I see is EU's and NATO's decision to integrate our region as an investment. This is no less important than its other aspects. Recently, on a similar high-profile conference, it was said that investing one Euro in the region's stability and economy at present, will have saved the Union three Euro and a bunch of other problems ten years from now. Besides the investment perspective, there is also a political understanding that the problems created by ethnic and national differences and conflicts in the region could only be defused within a larger international community where they could be converted from a means of differentiation to a means of communication and mutual complementarity.

The prospects of the region are naturally associated with its NATO and EU integration. I think, however, that NATO is a little more to the fore in the agenda due to several objective factors. The situation with Bulgaria and Romania was very similar and yes, it was sensible to be so. EU's level of integration is much higher; it is a community, not an alliance of states. Moreover, the Union has its specific problems and not few of the member states' societies are showing signs of Euro-fatigue.

And the last element of my view on the region's Euro-Atlantic prospects is that they may be regarded as a process—and I mean process in a less common sense of the word. A process which is a value and a goal in its own right. To refer back to Kosovo: the very fact that a process of talks is about to start is a great contribution to seeking and finding

a solution. If a ready solution was to be imposed, it would be counterproductive. So the process in question does not merely constitute some countries' progress to the EU and NATO, it is also a development within the organizations themselves. The Balkan countries are given the chance, within the framework of these two structures, to adopt and establish in their own societies the new rules upon which the EU and NATO were built in the first place. It is with these remarks that I would like to conclude. Indeed, I think this is the right approach to the complex regional problems that have accumulated through the years and this is the way to reduce the two types of risks that I mentioned initially. This is the way and these are the mechanisms that will help the Balkans to no longer be regarded by Europeans as a place of instability.

Thank you very much for your attention.





## **MEDIA COVERAGE**



**СТАНДАРТ**  
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**Bulgaria Loses 500 Million Levs from Smuggling,**  
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19 November, 2005

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**Gen. James Jones: Terrorism Is the Biggest Risk That NATO Could Face in XXIc.,** 19 November, 2005

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**2 Lists of Bandits with Pending Cases About to be Revealed,** 21 November, 2005

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**Gen. Valotto Analyzes the Situation in the Region at the International Security Conference**, 20 November, 2005

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**Last Day of the International Security Conference**, 20 November, 2005

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**We Are Negotiating with Belgrade and Pristina about Kosovo**, 20 November, 2005

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**Deputy Minister Lubomir Kyuchukov:  
Security on the Balkans is Fragile,**  
20 November, 2005



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**Bulgaria Is Target of Terrorist Organizations,**  
20 November, 2005



BGNES

**R. Petkov: Bulgaria Is in the Scope of Attention of  
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**Bulgaria To Continue Active Consultations with  
Belgrade and Pristina about the Status of Kosovo,**  
19 November, 2005



**Stanishev: We Realize Our Security Concepts within  
the Euro-Atlantic Priorities ,** 19 November, 2005



**Veselin Bliznakov To Meet Gen. James Jones,**  
19 November, 2005



**Gen. James Jones: NATO Is Fighting Terrorism,**  
19 November, 2005



**International Security Conference in Boyana,**  
19 November, 2005



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**Gen. Jones: NATO Cannot be Everywhere, But It Can Chose the Time for Action,**

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**Security: the Intellectual Challenge of 21<sup>st</sup> Century,**

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**Gen. James Jones: The Risks that NATO is Fighting in the XXI Century are Linked to the Threat of Terrorism,** 19 November, 2005



**NATO and the European Union are in a Deep Crisis According to Gen. Klaus Naumann,**

19 November, 2005



Bulgarian National  
Television

**Georgi Parvanov Met Gen. James Jones,**

18 November, 2005

## PHOTOGRAPHS







Dr. Ognian Shentov, CSD Chairman, opens the conference.  
*From right:* Mr. Sergey Stanishev, Prime Minister of Bulgaria,  
 General James Jones, SACEUR, USEUCOM, Amb. Boyko Noev, CSD European Program  
 Director, Prof. Sergei Karaganov, Chairman of the Council for Foreign and Defense  
 Policy of Russia, General Nikola Kolev, Chief of General Staff, Bulgaria



**First panel.**

“NATO and EU response to new security risks – conceptual and practical approaches”.




**First panel.**

Mr. Sergey Stanishev, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, addresses the participants.



**First panel.**

General James Jones, SACEUR, USEUCOM, presents his report.



#### Second panel.

*From left:* Mr. Anton Buteyko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Mr. Ivailo Kalfin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Minister (ret.) Michael Durkee, Rear Adm. Cem Gürdeniz, Chief Plans and Policy, Turkish Navy HQ.



*From left:* Maj.-Gen. Slavko Puljić, Deputy Chief of Joint Staff BiH for Operation, Ministry of Defense of BiH, Mr. Florin Gabriel Manole, General Director, Security and Public Order Department, Ministry of Interior and Administration of Romania, Maj.-Gen. Florian Pinta, Deputy Chief of General Staff, Romania, Quaestor Ioan Iclenzan-Dimitriu, Deputy Director General, General Direction for European Integration and International Relations, Ministry of Interior and Administration of Romania, Dr. Tatyana Parkhalina, Vice President, Russian Association of Atlantic Cooperation.



**Third panel.**

On the tribune: Mr. Rumen Petkov, Minister of Interior of Bulgaria.  
*From left:* Maj.-Gen. Alberto Notari, DCOS, Supreme Allied Command Transformation, Ambassador Lyubomir Ivanov, Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to NATO, Mr. Petrit Karabina, Deputy Minister of Defense of Albania, Mr. Lyubomir Kyuchukov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria.



*From left:* General James Jones, SACEUR, USEUCOM, Amb. George Staples, Political Advisor, SHAPE, Ambassador John Beyrle, Embassy of the USA, General Nikola Kolev, Chief of General Staff, Bulgaria.



*From left: General James Jones, SACEUR, USEUCOM, Ambassador Boyko Noev, CSD European Program Director, General Nikola Kolev, Chief of General Staff, Bulgaria.*



*From left: Dr. Tatyana Parkhalina, Vice President, Russian Association of Atlantic Cooperation, Ambassador John Beyrle, Embassy of the USA, Ambassador Boyko Noev, CSD European Program Director, Dr. Andrzej Karkoszka, Director SDR, Ministry of Defense of Poland.*



*From left:* Maj.-Gen. Florian Pinta, Deputy Chief of General Staff, Romania, Ambassador Haidar Berk, Embassy of Turkey, Rear Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, Chief Plans and Policy, Turkish Navy HQ.



*From left:* Mr. Plamen Bonchev, Director, NATO and International Security Directorate, MFA, Bulgaria, Ambassador Rolf Baltzersen, Royal Norwegian Embassy.

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<b>Lt.-Gen. Atanas Zaprianov</b>	Deputy Chief of Defense Staff
<b>Maj.-Gen. Kolyo Bachvarov</b>	Chief of Joint Staff of Operations
<b>Brig.-Gen. Dincho Karamunchev</b>	Chief of J-1 Directorate
<b>Brig.-Admiral Nikolay Nikolov</b>	Chief of J-5 Directorate
<b>Maj.-Gen. Vasil Varbanov</b>	Chief of J-4 Directorate
<b>Brig.-Gen. Boyko Simitchiev</b>	Chief of J-6 Directorate
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<b>Maj.-Gen. Kircho Kurtev</b>	Deputy Chief of Land Forces Headquarters
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<b>Maj.-Gen. Rumen Tzokov</b>	Deputy Chief of Air Forces Headquarters
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<b>CDR Ostillo de Majo</b>	MA
<b>Maj. Jan Abts</b>	Aide

Raytheon

<b>Ingrid Walling</b>	Manager, Central Europe
<b>Alexander Alexandrov</b>	Representative for Bulgaria

Agency for Information Technologies and Communication

<b>Plamen Vachkov</b>	Chairman
<b>Tosho Nedialkov</b>	Expert

Electron Progress

<b>Krassimir Pingelov</b>	Executive Director
<b>Gen. Tsvetan Totomirov</b>	Director, Security Directorate
<b>Nikolay Rangelov</b>	Director, Projects Directorate
<b>Milen Tonev</b>	Director, Economic Directorate
<b>Nora Stoichkova</b>	PR Manager

*Foreign Missions in Bulgaria*

<b>Arild Sande</b>	Deputy Head of Mission, Royal Norwegian Embassy
<b>Ambassador Willem van Ee</b>	Royal Netherlands Embassy
<b>Joerd Hoekstra-Bonnema</b>	Defense Attache, Royal Netherlands Embassy
<b>Ambassador Bertil Roth</b>	Embassy of Sweden
<b>Anna Olsson</b>	Second Secretary, Embassy of Sweden
<b>Ltc. IT CC Lorenzo Lebini</b>	Interpol LNO, Embassy of Italy
<b>Emil Jacote</b>	Charge d'affaires, Embassy of Moldova
<b>Ambassador Kauko Jamsen</b>	Embassy of Finland

<b>Ambassador Haidar Berk</b>	Embassy of Turkey
<b>Kubilay Baloğlu</b>	Staff Colonel, Air Attache, Embassy of Turkey
<b>A. Fulya Yücekök</b>	Third Secretary, Embassy of Turkey
<b>Serkan Timuçin Üçok</b>	Third Secretary, Embassy of Turkey
<b>Aurel Georgescu</b>	Liaisons Officer, Embassy of Romania
<b>Capt. Ioana Florea</b>	Deputy Defense, Military and Naval Attache
<b>Ambassador Drazen Colić</b>	Embassy of Croatia
<b>Stanko Cmrečnjak</b>	Counsellor, Embassy of Croatia
<b>Damir Smolić</b>	Counsellor, Embassy of Croatia
<b>Ambassador Danilo Vučetić</b>	Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro
<b>Liuba Nepop</b>	Counsellor, Embassy of Ukraine
<b>Alexander Zhulyov</b>	Counsellor, Embassy of Russia
<b>Ambassador John Beyrle</b>	Embassy of the USA
<b>Neil Buhne</b>	Resident Representative, UNDP

#### *General Staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces*

**Brig.-Gen. Stoyan Genkov**  
**Col. Stefan Uzunov**  
**Col. Maxim Peshev**  
**Col. Vladimir Valchev**  
**Lt. Col. Stanimir Kostov**  
**Lt. Col. Plamen Stoyanov**  
**Lt. Col. Ivan Danov**  
**Lt. Col. Rumen Petrov**  
**Lt. Col. Tzvetan Francheshkov**  
**Lt. Col. Bogomil Galabov**  
**Lt. Col. Rosen Bochev**  
**Lt. Col. Yulian Ivanov**

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**Col. Angel Kanchev**  
**Col. Valentin Burov**  
**Col. Boyko Arabadjijski**  
**Col. Ivaylo Savov**  
**Col. Georgi Simov**  
**Col. Biser Kalinov**

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*Staff of Air Forces*

Col. Nikolai Pavlov  
Col. Dimo Demirev  
Col. Vladimir Tomov  
Col. Lyubomir Panchev  
Col. Marin Nachev  
Col. Alexander Lukanov  
Col. Georgi Georgiev  
Col. Angel Georgiev  
Col. Zlatko Zlatev

*Staff of Naval Forces*

Navy Captain Rumen Nikolov  
Navy Captain Emil Evtimov

*Defence and Staff College "G.S.Rakovski"*

Col. Mitko Hinkov  
Col. Stoyko Stoykov  
Prof. Yordan Avramov  
Assos. Prof. Stefan Michev  
Assos. Prof. Velichka Milina  
Col. Dimitar Nedialkov  
Navy Captain Yancislav Yanakiev  
Col. Georgi Dimov  
Col Petar Mollov  
Mr. Stefko Smolenov  
Ms. Irina Mindova  
Col. Krasimir Atanasov  
Col. Doychin Stoyanov  
Navy Captain Boyan Mednikarov  
Navy Captain Dimitar Angelov  
Col. Kostadin Stoychev  
Col. Bogomil Belchev  
Mr. Alexander Sogindolski  
Ms. Era Defurova  
Mr. Kostadin Hristov  
Mr. Georgi Stoyanov  
Col. Stanimir Chernev

**Col. Krasimir Vatov**  
**Col. Boyko Nikolov**  
**Col. Georgi Tzvetkov**  
**Col. Mihail Hristov**  
**Col. Radoslav Iliev**  
**Col. Boyan Petkov**  
**Col. Aliosha Stoyanov**  
**Col. Pavel Nedialkov**  
**Lt. Col. Ivan Kosev**  
**Lt. Col. Ivan Valkov**  
**Lt. Col. Ivo Marinov**  
**Lt. Col. Vasil Sabinski**  
**Lt. Col. Lyubomir Simeonov**  
**Lt. Col. Rumen Kasabov**  
**Lt. Col. Dimitar Jeliaskov**  
**Major Michel Millio**

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<b>Dr. Ognian Shentov</b>	Chairman
<b>Amb. Boyko Noev</b>	Director, European Program, Former Minister of Defense
<b>Boyko Todorov</b>	Program Director
<b>Gen. (ret.) Chavdar Chervenkov</b>	Senior Expert
<b>Philip Gounev</b>	Research Fellow, European Program
<b>Denislava Simeonova</b>	Project Coordinator, European Program
<b>Biliana Apostolova</b>	Assistant