

# Developing working methods in monitoring radicalisation trends and risks

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## Gaps and needs in radicalisation monitoring

- No systematic collection and analysis of statistical data related to extremist crimes and perpetrators
- Limited understanding of **root causes, factors and manifestations** of radicalisation
- Little knowledge of who is vulnerable and to what extent, and **how to identify vulnerability** early on
- Limited or lacking prevention measures - need to be based on better evidence
- Need to engage wider array of stakeholders in counter-radicalisation (public sector bodies, civil society, communities) - raising their awareness of relevant risks is key

## Objectives and aims


- Provide a methodology for drafting an **annual situation report** on trends and threats of violent radicalisation/extremism
- Designing a **tailor-made national risk assessment methodology** for identifying, monitoring and evaluating manifestations and risk indicators of radicalisation
- Enable relevant authorities to:
  - use **appropriate risk indicators** for analysis of radicalisation phenomena;
  - **monitor trends** in a systematic manner

## Definitions of radicalisation


- **Radicalisation** is the process by which individuals come to hold or embrace radical views in relation to the status quo / adopt an extremist belief system
- **Violent radicalisation** is a process in which radical ideas are accompanied by the development of a willingness to directly support or engage in violent acts, incl. terrorism to attain the stated goal / as a method to effect societal change

# Understanding radicalisation processes

## ROOT CAUSES, DRIVERS AND FACTORS OF RADICALISATION



## Monitoring radicalisation trends and risks



## Developing a template for a situational report on extremism (1)

Criminal  
statistics, open  
source data


- **Spread, nature and trends in violent radicalism, extremism and terrorism**
  - Extremist/terrorist crimes
  - Extremist/terrorist perpetrators
  - Event data (protests, marches, concerts)

Strategic  
intelligence  
analysis, threat  
assessment

- **Threat posed by extremist/terrorist actors**
  - activities, structure, members, spread
  - ideology, strategy, tactics
  - influence, fundraising and recruitment
  - capability and intent to cause harm

## Extremist/hate crimes in Bulgaria

**Serious bodily injury with hooligan, racist or xenophobic motives (Art. 131, Par. 1, It.12, CC)**





## Situational report (2): criminal acts and perpetrators

Category	Indicators	Sources
<b>Criminal offences (extremism and violent radicalism)</b>	<p>Number of crimes recorded, crimes cleared up, persons prosecuted, region, verdicts (for each crime as per Criminal Code), regional variations, trends over time</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Hate crimes (offences motivated by hatred against Roma, Muslims; motivated by homophobia; anti-Semitic)</li> <li>- Crimes against the state / terrorism</li> <li>- Crimes with anti-democratic motive</li> <li>- Crimes against religious denominations</li> </ul>	<p>Ministry of Interior, Prosecutor's Office, Courts</p> <p>Criminal statistics, Victimization surveys, Media monitoring, Open source data</p>
<b>Perpetrators of extremist criminal offences</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Socio-demographic and socio-economic profile (age, gender, occupation, education)</li> <li>- Type of crime committed / charged with</li> <li>- Criminal record (clear/investigated in the past/recidivists)</li> <li>- Weapon possession (proportion between overall legal weapon possession and perpetrators of extremist crimes who have obtained weapons legally)</li> </ul>	<p>Criminal statistics, Victimization surveys, Media monitoring, Open source data</p>

## Situational report (3): threat assessment template

Category	Indicators	Source of information Type of analysis
<b>Actors: organisation, groups, movements (terrorist, extremist)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Structure and organisation</li> <li>- Membership base</li> <li>- Leadership</li> <li>- Resources and channels of financing</li> <li>- Areas of operation</li> <li>- Ideology/grievances/motivation</li> <li>- Strategy/tactics/mode of operation</li> <li>- Major activities (violent/non-violent) and targets</li> <li>- Legal status (bans)</li> <li>- Recruitment and propaganda</li> <li>- Media reach (magazines, blogs, social media)</li> <li>- Links and cooperation with other/foreign extremist groups (strategic, tactical and structural similarities and differences)</li> <li>- Criminal activity</li> <li>- Confrontational potential</li> </ul>	<p><b>Sources:</b></p> <p>Mol Intelligence services Media, internet Interviews with supporters and former members</p> <p><b>Type of analysis:</b></p> <p>Qualitative and quantitative analysis, Strategic intelligence assessment of capability and intent</p>

## Risk assessment by first-line officers

- **Community police** can spot and record facts, detect behaviour, observe different processes, events and other related to potential radicalisation risks.
- Need to develop clear, objective, detectable, measurable **risk indicators** of radicalisation that can be monitored on a regular basis.
- Observable indicators for first-line officers used across the EU/US fall in the following categories: **behaviour, appearance, cognitive factors** (identity, ideology, attitudes)
- Not all of these can be recognised/observed by police – we need also **other methods and sources** (other frontline practitioners or sociological researchers).

## UK ('Channel' approach) – 3 categories of 22 vulnerability indicators (focus on violence)

### 1. Engagement with a group, cause or ideology

- Spending time with other extremists; changing style and looks to match group; behaviour centred around group, cause, ideology; loss of other interests
- Possession of ideological materials, symbols; attempts to recruit

### 2. Intent to cause harm

- Identifying a group as threat, blaming, labelling
- Speaking of importance of action now, imminence of harm from a hostile group; **justifying offending** in the name of a cause, ideology; **supporting violence or harm**; plotting and conspiring

### 3. Capability to cause harm

- History of violence, criminally versatile
- Skills potentially supportive of terrorism (engineering, IT, chemicals, military training)
- Access to networks, funding, equipment

## FRANCE: warning signs and indicators for risk assessment

- ◆ Disruption with family, isolation
- ◆ Disruption with old friends
- ◆ Disruption with school
- ◆ New behaviours
- ◆ Behaviour and identity changes
- ◆ Withdrawal
- ◆ Sudden and exclusive interest for a religion or an ideology
- ◆ Relation with Internet and social networks: Consumption of sites with a radical or extremist nature

Two **questionnaires** with indicators distributed to National Police:

- for first-line officers (basic)
- for territorial intelligence services (detailed)


## COPPRA – guide for first-line police officers on risk indicators

- Indicators of **radicalisation processes** being underway:  
**identity, ideology, behavior**
  - Changing names, clothing, physical appearance (beard etc), tattoos
  - Contact with extremist groups, possess propaganda material, secret meetings, change in religious practices
  - Glorification of martyrdom and violence, travel patterns, becoming outspoken with an extremist viewpoint, radical demonstrations
  - Social isolation, changed attitude towards others, minor crimes
- Indicators for preparation of **terrorist activity: residence, transport, currency, (forged) documents, objects, preparation**

## Risk indicators Islamist radicalisation: community/group level

### TRIGGERS:

- Social, religious, ethnic conflicts and tensions
- Extremist rhetoric by (right-wing) politicians
- Repressive measures by authorities (demolishing illegal housing /mosques, arrests, refusal of social benefits, legal bans on religious freedoms)
- Media
- Terrorist acts in the vicinity or abroad



**RED FLAGS:** Military and combat training provision in area; contact/support for foreign fighters in transit; spread of propaganda glorifying violence; demonstrating allegiance with terrorist/extremists groups and causes

**BEHAVIOURAL:** growing number of converts, people with religious education in Middle East; noticeable changes in appearances/religious practice; foreign emissaries in locality; Salafi charities; informal mosques; strikes, protests

**COGNITIVE:** hate speech by community leaders, voicing grievances, discontent, disrespect for (secular) authorities


**BACKGROUND CONDITIONS:** Socio-economic problems, encapsulation, weak moderate Muslim leaders, contested religious leadership, crime rates, in-group conflicts



# Risk indicators Islamist radicalisation: individual level

## TRIGGERS:

Personal trauma or crisis  
 Victimization or conflict  
 Contact with recruiters  
 Perception of international or domestic events (e.g. Syria)



**RED FLAGS:** Travel to risk countries/conflict zones; contacts with radical groups; literature on military training or making explosives; received combat training; buying weapons, explosives, forged docs; criminal activity; death or revenge rhetoric

**BEHAVIOURAL:** convert or religious education abroad; sudden change in appearance (dress, grooming) and religious practices; cutting ties with family and friends; engaging with extremist websites and literature; forcing religious beliefs on others

**COGNITIVE:** Openly voicing grievances, glorifying violence, attitudes against an expressed target; voicing support for terrorist organisations and causes; dichotomous worldview (us vs. them); dissatisfaction with religious leaders

**BACKGROUND CONDITIONS:** Psychological problems, history of violence; criminally versatile; prison experience; relevant skills (IT, chemicals, weapons); addictions; family problems; financial problems; education and employment situation



## Challenges and questions

- The risk assessment tool cannot measure risk with certainty – but aid professional judgement
- Community police are no intelligence officers - need proper training
- How can the monitoring be integrated into police daily work?
- Risk of misinterpretation and misuse of information
- Risk of alienating target communities through increased surveillance
- Should not be used as a surveillance tool for initiating legal charges / repressive measures
- Does not include a referral mechanism for institutional response to intervention needs
- Information should be centralised and analysed by experts / trained analysts to draft meaningful policy recommendations

## Challenges and questions (2)

- Need to test which of indicators are adequate, observable and measurable by **frontline practitioners**
- A system for **weighting** different indicators as per the level of risk in the local context is required
- Need to develop **detailed guide and manual** for police officers on how to detect risk indicators (questionnaires, protocols), as well as for those who will analyze and interpret the data
- An **institutional mechanism** for implementation of the monitoring tool is essential
- Need for a **coordination mechanism at local level** for responding to risks identified – multiple stakeholders engagement

THANK YOU

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