

# Monitoring Corruption and Anticorruption in Southeast Europe Results and Perspectives

Countering Corruption and State Capture in Southeast Europe 29–30 September 2016 Skopje, Republic of Macedonia







#### Contents

- Corruption Monitoring System
- Corruption and Anti-corruption Dynamics
   2014 2016: Main Findings
- Understanding anti-corruption efforts in SEE









#### Structure of the Corruption Monitoring System

Experience based corruption indexes

Corruption pressure

**Involvement** in corruption

Attitude based corruption indexes

Awareness (identification of corruption)

Acceptance (tolerance) of corruption)

Susceptibility to corruption

Assessments of the corruption environment indexes

Likelihood of corruption pressure

Corruptness of officials

Feasibility of policy responses to corruption










## Corruption pressure and involvement in corruption (2016)

% of the population 18+ who have been asked to give and have given a bribe (money favour, gift) in the last year












#### Corruption Dynamics: Difference 2016 - 2014, %











#### **Experience with corruption**

- All indexes are based on population surveys, conducted in each of the SELDI countries with at least 1000 respondents, representative samples and identical methodology which allows cross-country comparisons.
- Experience based corruption indexes are built upon victimization-like questions which reflect actual experiences being asked for a bribe (Corruption pressure) or/and giving one (Involvement in corruption).
- **Corruption pressure** is the main indicator not only for the levels of administrative corruption in a country, but for the overall corruption environment in a country.
- Corruption pressure is highly correlated with actual transactions (Involvement in corruption). It is the preferred indicator from the two experience based indicators.










#### Corruption pressure, % (2014 and 2016)



Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, 2016









A project implemented by a consortium led by the Center for the Study of Democracy

#### Corruption Pressure Bulgaria 1999 - 2016

% of the population 18+, who have extended an informal payment or have been asked to make an informal payment (money, gift, favour) 45% 39% Corruption pressure 40% 34% 35% 31% 30% 28% 28% 25% 24% 25% 23% 22% 23% 20% 21% 21% 21% 19% 20% 18% 14% **15%** 12% 10% 5% 0%










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### Corruption Pressure Bosnia and Herzegovina 2001 - 2016

% of the population 18+, who have extended an informal payment or have been asked to make an informal payment (money, gift, favour)



Corruption pressure










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#### Corruption Pressure Macedonia 2001 - 2016

% of the population 18+, who have extended an informal payment or have been asked to make an informal payment (money, gift, favour)












#### Corruption Pressure 2001, 2002, 2014, 2016











#### Corruption trends 2001 - 2016

- Some improvement for the SEE region as a whole between 2001/2002 and 2014/2016
- Individual countries seldom show stable improvement over time.
- Decline in corruption pressure is typically followed by another increase with average levels of pressure remaining very high over a period of several years.
- What are the reasons for this pattern?










#### Feasibility of policy responses to corruption (%)

(% of the population 18+)











#### Anticorruption policies and legislation

Macro level policies


Principles of governance

#### National policies

Standards (protocols) for the operation of the administration

### Policies/measures at public organization level

General and specific rules for operation in concrete situations





Whenever you have contacted officials in the public sector, how often in the preceding year have they:

**Directly demanded** cash, gift or favor **A12A** 

Not demanded directly, but showed that they expected **A12B** 

cash, gift or favor

In all cases In isolated cases In most of the cases

In no cases

General population

A12. In working with citizens, companies or employees of other institutions, how often in the preceding year have they:

**Officials** 

**Directly offered** something to you (money, gift, favour) **A12A** in return for you doing some service for them

Not offered directly, but **showed that they would give** something **A12B** (cash, gift or favor) in return for you doing some service for them.

In all cases In isolated cases

In most of the cases In no cases





## Corruption Pressure, 2015 Bulgarian and Italian Public Organizations Incidence rates reported by <u>officials</u>







# Monitoring Anti-Corruption in Europe Bridging Policy Evaluation and Corruption Measurement





## Rethinking corruption measurement and understanding why anticorruption policies don't work

- Corruption decline is very slow in SEE and the reason is not the lack of anti-corruption legislation.
- Assessing, monitoring of AC policies and policy tools is important in order to understand corruption dynamics.
- Deep understanding of national-level AC policies requires studying and monitoring how these policies are implemented at the level of particular public organizations.
- We cannot really understand corruption without understanding the failure of anti-corruption in SEE.









### Thank you!










#### Resilience to corruption pressure

(among those pressured into bribing)



Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2016, base: respondents who experienced corruption pressure










## Involvement in corruption with or without corruption pressure












#### Acceptability of corruption

(% of the population 18+, who accept different forms of corrupt behaviour)












#### Susceptibility to corruption

(% of the population 18+ that would give and/or accept a bribe in the role of citizen and/or official)











#### **Key recommendations**

Deliver effective prosecution of high-level corruption

 Sentencing of corrupt politicians from the top political echelon provides a strong example for everyone and have proven very effective in strengthening anticorruption measures in Croatia and Slovenia.

Adopt an independent corruption and anti-corruption monitoring mechanism

 The mechanism should be implemented through national and/or regional civil society network(s), and should be independent of direct national government funding. It should serve as a vehicle for opening up administrative data collection and public access to information.

Anti-corruption efforts should be focused on critical sectors

 Energy, public procurement, corporate governance of state owned enterprises, large-scale investment projects.







