

Monitoring the Hidden Economy and Undeclared Work in Southeast Europe

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
Preliminary rationale

- Institutional asymmetry and non-alignment between formal and informal institutions provide better explanation of undeclared work's prevalence in Southeast Europe compared to more traditional rational cost-benefit optimization models for workers and employers
- The institutional incongruence might explain better the discrepancies in international trade statistics as provided by countries in SEE and by their partners
- Flows of goods and money across borders in SEE are instrumental for economic growth, but also the way it happens fuels illegitimate practices.





Openness of SEE countries (trade to GDP)








Mirror statistics

Discrepancies in reported imports vs reported exports by partner countries EU28+SEE







Major trade partner and discrepancy

Discrepancy (%)	MAJOR TRADE PARTNER	REPROTING COUNTRY				
-46	ITALY	ALBANIA				
-26	CROATIA	BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA				
3	BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA	MONTENEGRO				
-28	GERMANY	MACEDONIA				
-22	GERMANY	TURKEY				
85	GERMANY	KOSOVO				
-20	GERMANY	SERBIA				





Even if you don't see discrepancies at country level, they might appear on product level

20	PRODUCT/PARTNER	EXPORT TO MONTENEGR O		%
ŀ		0	^	/0
	MINERAL FUELS, MINERAL OILS AND PRODUCTS OF THEIR DISTILLATION; BITUMINOUS SUBSTANCES; MINERAL WAXES	19396.454	7726.939	2.510237754
	PHOTOGRAPHIC OR CINEMATOGRAPHIC GOODS	82.182	7.462	11.01340123
ı	COTTON	21.631	1.054	20.5227704
	CARPETS AND OTHER TEXTILE FLOOR COVERINGS	45.404	10.763	4.218526433
	FOOTWEAR, GAITERS AND THE LIKE; PARTS OF SUCH ARTICLES	29.070	3472.741	0.008370909
	HEADGEAR AND PARTS THEREOF	3.940	17.529	0.224770381
	NATURAL OR CULTURED PEARLS, PRECIOUS OR SEMI-PRECIOUS STONES, PRECIOUS METALS, METALS CLAD WITH PRECIOUS METAL, AND ARTICLES			
	THEREOF; IMITATION JEWELLERY; COIN	20.174	0.856	23.56775701
	IRON AND STEEL	17159.188	18298.594	0.937732593
	ALUMINIUM AND ARTICLES THEREOF	10111.241	2589.079	3.905342788
	ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT AND PARTS THEREOF; SOUND			
	RECORDERS AND REPRODUCERS, TELEVISION IMAGE AND SOUND			
ì	RECORDERS AND REPRODUCERS, AND PARTS AND ACCESSORIES OF SUCH ARTICLES	1851.490	3819.036	0,48480559
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by a consortium led by the Center for the Study of Democracy

Preliminary findings

- Immense diversity of scale and patterns
- Wage premium
- Role of minimum wage

- Demographics
- Location of hidden employment
- Choice or trap
- Corruption pressure

- Non-observed economy imputations
- Tax-gaps
- Schneider's Shadow Economy Estimates







Hidden employment

- No written contract with the employer at the main job;
- The actual remuneration received last month was higher than the one written in the contract with the main employer, but was agreed verbally with him/her;
- There is no social security on the main job;
- The base for the social security paid is at the minimum wage, despite the actual salary is higher;
- The base for the social security paid is the amount written in the contract and not the actual received, which is higher;
- There is no health insurance on the main job














A project implemented by a consortium led by the Center for the Study of Democracy


Where Hidden Economy Occurs?








Wage premium of formal vs. hidden economy








Role of minimum wage







Minimum wage dynamics








Demographics of hidden employment

- slightly younger (2 years on average),
- male (62%) more than average employed
- work more (longer) at job and at home (and private farm),
- tend to know more people also part of the hidden economy
- are more relaxed (not judgmental) towards morale in society
- subjective feeling of happiness is slightly lower than the country average, but this does not affect subjective positioning of self in hierarchy of the society.
- The only exception is Macedonia, where hidden employment significantly hinders self-esteem in terms of where one sits in the society






People in hidden employment are subject to higher corruption pressure







Tax gap estimates







Non-observed economy and SSE

- Immense differences also in GDP calculation with respect to hidden economy between 2 % to 4 % (Turkey and Montenegro) and 31% and 33 % (Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina) hence synchronization needed
- Unclear how SSE relates to non-observed economy imputations (if SSE is applied to observed GDP or the whole) – adjustments needed





 Countries should plan and implement holistic legalisation programs, sequencing complex measures to move undeclared or partially declared businesses towards full compliance, aligning with the principles of fair transition or procedural justice, employment protection and mitigating the negative effects of hidden economy. These programs would obviously differ from country to country, but would employ both direct and indirect controls and would target both the supply and demand sides of hidden economic activities (labour, sales).





- All National Statistical Institutes should implement carefully the Eurostat/OECD methodology for nonobserved economy adjustments to GDP and publish timely and comprehensive descriptions of imputations by non-exhaustiveness type and economic sector.
- The use of mirror statistics under well-defined algorithms might contribute both to the fairness of enforcement process and to quick full compliance in terms of imports and exports.





Prioritize and **sequence reforms** on **tax gap areas**, which have the strongest negative social impact (for example, health care security evasion in Kosovo, non-existent labour contracts in Turkey, and excise duty evasion in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania). Businesses and citizens should be widely consulted on these areas, so that society at large feels engaged in needed reforms and raise their trust in institutions. Conduct regular tax gap assessments (including per type of tax), following a common methodology and adjust policies according to findings.





 Design policies to target formalization of the whole economic value chain (or significant parts of it) and clusters of economic actors and relationships, as opposed to focusing on case-by-case legalisation, by increasing penalties and direct control of noncompliance. Reforms should tackle the social embeddedness of hidden economy, its cultural and educational predetermination.





- In remittance-incentive countries (e.g. Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina), stakeholders should design schemes to reduce the cost of transferring remittances, and match domestic entrepreneurship development schemes and foreign donor programs, offering special incentives for legalising workers abroad.
- Rely more on technology (electronic payments, cash registers with fiscal memories linked in real time to revenue agencies, electronic filing of tax forms, points of single contact, etc.), automation and algorithms (risk profiling and sampling for inspections), and less on personal judgement.





- Policies tackling the hidden economy should be linked to those countering corruption and improving law enforcement, while embedding them all in the overall economic growth strategy of the country. Countries in SEE need to double their annual average real GDP per capita growth rates at least, if they are to achieve and sustain lasting governance change.
- Countries in SEE should cooperate with each other, especially on cross-border issues linked to hidden economy - trade and travel.





