

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY

ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN EASTERN EUROPE:
SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS

NATIONAL QUESTION, MINORITIES¹ PROBLEM
AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN ROMANIA OF TODAY
(1990-1992)

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Ethnic misunderstanding, disagreement and conflicts on internal or interstate level might happen as a result of inequality of the national majority and ethnic minorities civil rights (economic, political, cultural, etc.) in the process of formulation and implementation of the state policy of a country. The index of aggressiveness of these, should any such cases occur, will be determined by the following criteria:

1. Oppression of minorities;
2. Implementation of double standards for the foreign national minorities in a country and the respective country's minorities in foreign countries;
3. Use of institutions that represent the interests of a country's ethnic minorities for achievement of goals alien to the regions concerned;
4. Statement of territorial claims;
5. Centralization of the political and administrative systems;
6. Pursuance of high-charge nationalistic concepts in national history;
7. Mobilization of masses of people versus other ethnic groups presented as their greatest enemy.(1)

This thesis is aimed at clarifying the applicability of the above criteria of aggressiveness to Romania of today (December, 1989 - beginning of 1992).

1. OPPRESSION OF MINORITIES

In the period of Chaushesku's regime (1965-1989) the national policy of the Romanian Communist party (RCP) established the concept of Romania as a *uni-national country where different nationalities lived together*.(2) This ideological doctrine of the RCP was reflected in the basic law of the country, the Constitution, regardless of the fact that in the early 1980s the Romanian nationality amounted to 87.8% of the total population of 21.9 mln and the national minorities were 12.2% (8.4% Hungarians, 2% Germans, 1.8% other nationalities).(3) The Council of Workers of Hungarian and German nationality were included on institutional basis in the Front for Democracy and Socialist Unity (FDSU). These councils were a formal structure which violated the rights of these minorities since Chaushesku himself was president of FDSU.

After the collapse of the totalitarian dictatorship of the RCP in the night of December 21-22, 1989 the decrees of the new government - the Front for National Salvation (FNS) - were adopted. The Decree (a law of the new government of December 29, 1989) declared equality of rights of the national minorities and the Romanian nationals. Hereby, we might

quote: "To create a truly democratic society in this country and guarantee and defend the basic human and civil rights the Program of the FNS shall foresee: "...obedience to the rights and liberties granted to the national minorities as well as guarantees for their absolute equality". (4) In fact, provisions to this meaning were included for the first time in the FNS's *Official Statement to the country and its people* of December 23, 1989. (5)

The Romanian Constitution was voted by the Constitutional Assembly of the Parliament on November 2, 1991. This Constitution merited a definition of the national - ethnic minorities' collective rights in that country but it did not include provisions defining the minorities' own form of allegiance or separate government. Paragraph 6 *Right to Identity* specifically defined the minorities' rights: "The government shall acknowledge and guarantee to the persons belonging to national minorities the right to preserve, develop and express their ethnical, cultural, linguistic and religious identity". The limits to the above rights were also stated: "The protective measures with respect to the national minorities shall be in accord with the principles of equality and non-discrimination as applied to the rest of the Romanian citizens". (6)

It is one thing, however, to declare rights and another thing to create real environment for these rights to be respected. The reality in communist Romania evidenced rude violation of human, civil and minorities' rights. Suffice it to say that almighty Securitates with its 70,000 uniformed recruits and nearly 2 mln agents turned the lives of the common people into living hell. Securitates had one agent per every ten people and they were completely at his mercy; he had the power to decide on their place of employment, amount of remuneration, permission to travel outside the country. Corruption was at full swing even at the lowest level where humiliation of the common Romanians was beyond description.(7) Romanian women were deprived of the right to abortion before the birth of four children. During the last years of Chauskesku's dictatorship the country was practically in an informational blockade. By the order of Elena Chauskesku foreign press was not received in the country and because of this refused transcription annual economies of \$75,000 were made.(8)

The genocide towards the uprising Romanian people (December 21-30, 1989) organized by the communist dictators who were determined to keep their power at all costs destroyed 1030 human lives.

The New Constitution of Romania of November 21, 1991 formulated for the first time the right and duty of the Romanian state to give support to the citizens of Romanian nationality in foreign countries. Paragraph 7, item 1 *Romanians in Foreign Countries* states as follows: "The government shall support the establishment of strong connections with the Romanians outside the country's boundaries and shall help the preservation, development and expression of their ethnical, cultural, linguistic and religious identity while respecting the laws of the country of their citizenship". (9)

To finish with the new Constitution of Romania of November 21, 1991 we will quote Chapter 2 *Basic Rights and Liberties*: 1. Right to life and physical integrity (paragraph 22); 2. Personal freedom (paragraph 22); 3. Right to defence (paragraph 24); 4. Unrestricted travelling (paragraph 25); 5. Intimate married and private life (paragraph 26); 6. Inviolability of home (paragraph 27); 7. Secreteness of correspondence (paragraph 27); 8. Freedom of conscience (paragraph 29); 9. Freedom of speech (paragraph 30); 10. Right to information (paragraph 31); 11. Right to education (paragraph 32); 12. Right to health care (paragraph 33); 13. Right to vote (paragraph 34); 14. Right to be elected (paragraph 35); 15. Freedom of meetings (paragraph 36) 16. Right to cooperate (paragraph 37); 17. Labor and social protection of labor (paragraph 38); 18. Prohibition of forced labor (paragraph 39); 19. Right to goon strikes (paragraph 40); 20. Protection of private property (paragraph 41); 21. Rights to heritage; 22. Living standard (paragraph 43); 23. Family; 24. Protection of children and juniors (paragraph 45); 25. Protection of the non-mentis (paragraph 46); 26. Right to petitions (paragraph 47); 27. Personal rights violated by public authorities (paragraph 48).

The above present the full volume of the civil rights and liberties provided by the new Constitution to all citizens.

The general constitutional arrangements provided good conditions for observance of the civil rights including those of the minorities. However, the reality was not always perfect. The right to be educated in their own schools was refused to the Hungarian minority and so was the right of the Jewish minority to be elected for top government positions. Here is a shocking case that happened in 1991 related to the trade with children. After the disclosures on the affair the Romanian government took respective measures by organizing a special board at the Ministry of Health with the duty to monitor the adoption of orphan children and their transfer to the respective foreign countries. (10)

2. IMPLEMENTATION OF "DOUBLE STANDARDS" TO FOREIGN NATIONAL MINORITIES IN A COUNTRY AND THE RESPECTIVE COUNTRY'S MINORITIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

The national question after being manifested as government ideology, juridical formula and party foreign policy in Romania might be finally considered righteously solved. To support the above stated I would like to recall a somewhat forgotten meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the Balkan countries in Tirana, Albania on October 24-25, 1990. There were forwarded sixtys proposals and initiatives for multi-lateral cooperation on the Balkans. The ministers agreed that the individual and collective rights of the national minorities should be respected according to the UN's Charter, the Closing Act of Helsinki and other international documents concerning the human rights and the rights of the national

minorities.(11) And indeed, within a year's time, Romania made the necessary corrections in her home jurisdiction and constitution according to the agreement of Tirana. The meeting in Tirana closed with a communique and address to the Forum of the EC in Paris. It was no secret that Romania through her minister of foreign affairs Adrian Nastase raised the idea that the Balkan Forum should accept the European standards and laws with regard to ethnical minorities instead of applying the special laws and regulations of each European country. The Romanian initiative for a Balkan institution for the minorities was aborted as a result of the crisis in Yugoslavia and of some other factors as well.

We would like to review the national question as ideology and home policy of today's Romania by a comment on an important document on the home policy of this country. This is an act of executive power, i.e. Declaration of the Romanian government on the problems of the national minorities of November 20, 1992. Because of this particular importance the complete text of this Act is applied as a supplement to this Thesis.

The Declaration of the government stated that the Romanian government should favourize the ethnical, linguistic, cultural and religious identity of all 16 nationalities living on the territory of Romania, in an environment respectful to home and international legislation for territorial and state unity and integrity.

We have to point out that the Constitution of Romania (paragraph 13) states the following: "The Romanian language shall be the official language in Romania". Romania has accumulated a comparatively large experience, both positive and partly negative after the revolution of December, 1989. A commission for the minorities was formed at the FNS and, after February 1, 1990 - at the Temporary Committee for National Unity. Following the parliamentary elections for government institutions of May 1990, a new commission was formed, this time at the Parliament. This was the Commission for human, religious and minorities rights. The Commission had broader functions and did not focus on minorities problems so much. (12) In other words, no Ministry of Minorities was opened up in Romania after the parliamentary elections in 1990 as it had been planned.

It was a Romanian precedent on the Balkans that all 16 minorities in Romania (Hungarians, Gypsies, Germans, Ukrainians, Russians, Turks, Serbians, Tatars, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Jews, Croatians, Greeks, Poles, Czeches and Armenians) went to the parliamentary elections of May 1990, each with their own political party. A very democratic election law was adopted in this country on March 15, 1990. Following the provisions of this law all 13 organizations of the national minorities except the parties of the Hungarians, Gypsies and Germans, that were going to get seats in the Parliament according to the number of votes, got a deputy's mandate each in the Assembly of the Deputies (the Congress) regardless of the number of votes and by force of the provisions of the law for the representation of national minorities.

It shall be our task to show to what extent the principles of the Romanian home and foreign policy on the national problem are implemented in the real political life.

A well-known indicator for the use of "double standards" were the attempts to violate the rights of the minorities. An example for the violation of political rights was the attempt to ban the Democratic Union of the Hungarians in Romania (DUHR), the second strongest political power in the country after the elections of May 1990. An example for the violation of minorities' economic rights was the fact that the greatest numbers of unemployed were registered in the regions populated mainly by minorities - the districts of Moldova and Dobrudja (Konstanza and Tulcha): 7 to 10 thousand people in each district. An example for the violation of the cultural rights was the refusal of the Romanian authorities to open specialized schools for the Hungarian minority and to permanently solve the problems of the minorities' rights to have radio and TV programs on their mother tongue.

3. USE OF INSTITUTIONS REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF A COUNTRY'S ETHNICAL MINORITIES ABROAD FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF GOALS ALIEN TO THE REGIONS CONCERNED

Obviously we cannot speak about a clear nationalistic policy of today's Romanian government, the FNS, while witnessing the fact that all ethnical minorities living on Romanian territories were allowed to form their own political parties in 1990. No other Balkan country (with the partial exception of Bulgaria with its Movement for Rights and Liberties, the political organization of the Bulgarian Turks) has ever witnessed such a thing. (14)

Reality proved, however, that the activities of the Romanian Parliament might have given cause for grounded criticism. There were heard opportunities for annexation of Northern Bukovina and Southern Dobrudja to Romania despite the presence of deputies representing the Ukrainian and Bulgarian minorities (more details will be given in chapters *Ukrainian Minority* and *Bulgarian Minority*).

At the same time it was only natural for the Romanian authorities and various political forces to tolerate the national consciousness of their own national minority to develop and gather strength in the neighboring Balkan countries. After the formation of the Wallachian party in Serbia in 1990, Vatra Romaneasca, the Romanian Nationalistic party of ex-Securitate members published a map of "Great Romania" and declared that two million Wallachs lived in Serbia (Oct. 1990). In the summer of 1992 there was formed a Wallach Association in Bulgaria. We have no precise information about the number of Wallachs living in Bulgaria today (neither do American or other sources avail of such information) but it must be the fifth most numerous national minority in Bulgaria after the Turks (8.5%), Gypsies (2.6%), Armenians (0.3%), Russians (0.2%) and it falls into the "miscellaneous" group with 0.6% according to Richard Starre's statistics of 1987. (15) We can hardly doubt that Ivan

Alexandrov, chairmen of the Wallach Association in Bulgaria sought the support and authority of Romania while pleading for support at the UN's National Center for Human Rights to register this association at the District Court of Vidin, Bulgaria. And, indeed, in June, 1992, though delayed, the registration of the Wallach Association in Bulgaria became a fact.

The dimensions of the relations between Romania and Moldova are quite different. They will be discussed in a separate paragraph and here we will point out that Russia and Ukraine accused Romania of rendering military support (both equipment and specialists) to Moldova. The Romanian authorities have never officially acknowledged their military support to Moldova but the Bulgarian press published plenty of information for the interference of Russians, Romanians, Ukrainians and Moldovians in the Pridnestrovie conflict, immediately after the declaration of the independence of Moldova the Romanian government made it clear that they regarded the annexation of Moldova to Romania as a historical necessity (August 1991). In February 1992 the President M. Snegur signed the Closing Act of Helsinki. At the same time many political organizations in Romania expressed extremist views on the conflict in Pridnestrovie. The Democratic Convention in Bucharest, the main power of the opposition, a union of 14 parties, insisted on a special declaration to the Parliament and government that "any attack on Moldova be considered an attack against Romania". They insisted on the "citizens of Moldova obtaining Romanian citizenship". The president Iliiesku diplomatically declared that "Moldova's self-determination should be settled by its ethnical Romanian population before the merging of this ex-Soviet republic with Romania". But the banned Committee for Democratization of the Army openly stated that "should the military actions in Moldova expand, the Committee would not remain a passive bystander" of the conflict. On March 17, 1992 the ethnic Bulgarians in Moldova published a declaration. It appealed for cessation of military actions and foreign interference in Moldova's foreign affairs and it also declared that they "shall not obey the laws of any foreign country but choose their own future". More than 400 people were killed in Benderi after June 20, 1992. The *Duma* newspaper of July 4, 1992 claimed that the number of Bulgarians living in Moldova was about 100,000. During the battle of June 20, 1992 15,000 inhabitants of the Bulgarian village Parkani were killed. The BNRP in Bulgaria raised its voice in defence of the Bulgarian population in Moldova. They even qualified the "policy of Romania and Moldova as a genocide to the Bulgarian population in Pridnestrovie". Perhaps a peace-making corps under the aegis of the UN shall be a final means to stop the bloody conflict in Moldova, Pridnestrovie and Gagaouz regions. Meanwhile a convention between Bulgaria and Moldova will settle the citizenship problem of the Bessarabian Bulgarians migrating to Bulgaria: whether they should have double or Bulgarian citizenship.

4. STATEMENT OF TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

In the period 1990-1992 we witnessed claims of the Romanian government declared both by the President (December 1, 1991), the minister of foreign affairs and the Romanian Parliament, to fully reveal the historical reality. Pretences were claimed on Southern Dobrudja which belonged to Romania only from 1913 to 1940. With regard to Transylvania Romania has no reason for territorial claims because the whole of Transylvania is on Romanian territory. That land which belonged to Hungary in the Medieval Ages was annexed to Romania after the First World War. Romania is striving to keep Transylvania in its possession and she has great appetites for Western Banat (contemporary Voivodina) and Northern Bukovina (the Eastern Pridnestrovie in Ukraine) which are inhabited by various nationalities. Further on we shall prove this.

5. CENTRALIZATION OF THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS.

The degree of centralization of the political and administrative system in Romania can be regarded as an indicator for insufficiently guaranteed conditions for true respect of civil and minorities' rights. Here is a statement of the DUHR member Zabo Karoli: "One of the most serious drawbacks of the new constitution is the lack of distinction between the executive power and the enormous power of the President (16). According to the new Constitution the President of Romania is entitled to the following (paragraphs 85 to 100): Paragraph 85: to appoint the ministers of the cabinet; Paragraph 89: to dismiss Parliament under certain conditions; Paragraph 90: to summon referendum; Paragraph 91: to sign international agreements, to appoint diplomats; he is commander-in-chief and chairman of the Supreme Council of Defence. He might declare war, mobilization and state of emergency. The Parliament defines (para 72.3) the electoral system, the activities of the political parties, appoint members of the Cabinet and the Supreme Council of Defence, the mobilization in a state of emergency, the punishment code, amnesty, Court activities, the statute of the social employees, conditions of ownership, labor relations and heritage, education, administrative subdivisions of the country and definition of predominantly industrial areas (17).

In fact, the authority of the Parliament to pass laws for predominantly industrial areas is yet another power of the government, constitutionally delegated, to act preferentially towards certain areas of the country.

A new point in the Romanian constitution (para 101 -109) is that the Romanian government apart from executing the home and foreign policy of the country shall also support the public administration (para 109, item 1): "The government shall appoint one prefect to each district and municipality" and para 22, item 2: The prefect shall represent the

government on local level", it has become obvious now that there is great centralization of power in Romania. This leads to insufficient respect for civil and minorities' rights. The President was criticized that he "did not resist hard enough the nostalgia for the past". The two laws voted by the Parliament, the law for establishing of a Supreme Council of Defence, intended to act as a second pole of power against the President and the law proclaiming the army to be the guarantor for the Constitution with a right to interfere in the political life of the country, were regarded by the Movement for Defence of Human Rights (MDHR) as an attempt to restore Ceausescu's era. The provisions of the second law entitled the Romanian authorities to deprive of Romanian citizenship those Romanians who expressed their negative attitude towards Romania in foreign countries (18).

6. PURSUANCE OF HIGH CHARGE NATIONALISTIC CONCEPTS IN NATIONAL HISTORY.

The supranationalist concepts of history, as we shall explain, were fabricated by certain nationalistic organizations such as Vatra Romaneasca (Romanian Hearth) that sometimes stated extremist views. This party is not presented in Parliament, though it was expected to be some success in the elections of September, 1992. Nationalism as a feature of some other parties formed in Romania is a counteraction against the minorities' parties: the National Romanian Party, the Party of the National Unity of the Transilvanian Romanians, the National Union of Romania, the Party of the National Union of the Romanians in Transylvania - AUR and the Republican Party.

In separate cases, however, nationalistic feelings and interpreting of historical events are not alien to other political bodies: the Oppositional Democratic Union, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the President and the Parliament in Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary have been accused of violation of the rights of the Romanian minorities in these countries. Statements have been made for "two million Wallachs" in Serbia, for "hundreds of Wallachs" in Bulgaria and a map of "Great Romania" was published in *Naziunea* in October, 1990 (publication of Vatra Romaneasca). There have been numerous attempts to forge historical events for one-sided benefit.

It has not been stated that the borders of contemporary Romania have been substantially broadened as a result of the peace treaties of the WWI.

The Saint Germain peace treaty with Austria (10.09.1919) annexed Bukovina to Romania. The Trianon peace treaty with Bulgaria (November 27, 1919) restored the Bulgarian-Romanian border according to the clauses of the Bucharest peace treaty of 1913. Thus, Southern Dobruja fell within the state boundaries of Romania and was included there from 1913 to 1940. The Trianon peace treaty with Hungary (March 21, 1919) annexed Transylvania to Romania, and also Crișana, Maramureș and Eastern Banat. We traced out a source,

"willingly forgotten" by the Romanian historians that contains the following data for the growth of territories and population: "The old kingdom had an area of 137, 908 km². After the war the territory of Romania became 316,132 km², which meant enlargement of 12% (or additional 178,224 km², note of KN). The population of the country which was 7, 904, 404 after WWI became 17,343, 549, i.e. its growth was 118,5%. (19)

Thus, the minorities' problem came into existence only after the WWI and as a result of the annexation of considerable foreign territories inhabited mainly by population of foreign origin.

7. MOBILIZATION OF MASSES OF PEOPLE VERSUS OTHER ETHNICAL GROUPS PRESENTED AS THEIR GREATEST ENEMY.

The bloody conflict in Turgu Mouresh in March 1990 organized by the ex-Securitates of Vatra Romaneska against the Hungarian minority in Transilvania remained an isolated event. The same cannot be said for the war in Moldavia, Pridnestrovia and Gagauzia where facts point at Romanians' direct involvement, both with specialists and weapons, though the Romanian government have always denied it.

Of primary importance for the complete understanding of the minorities' problem will be the survey of the information presented for all the 16 minorities living in Romania today. This information has been provided by the Declaration of the Romanian National Commission of Statistics in the light of the preliminary results of the census and residential fund taking of 7 Jan. 1992. According to this document the total population of Romania was 22,760,499. The inhabitants of Romanian nationality were 20,352,980 with rate of growth about 1,3 % for the period 1977-1992 (the relative share of the Romanian nationals has grown up from 88,1 % to 89,4 %). At the same time, the national minorities accounted for 11,6 % of the Romanian population in January, 1992.

We deem it necessary to present the following table:

POPULATION (BY NATIONALITIES) ACCORDING TO THE CENSUS 1977

Nationality, Number of people number	% of the total	7 Jan 92, Number of people number	% of the total	5 Jan. 1977,	'92 to '77 (%)
Total	22 760 449	100	21559 910	100	105.6
Romanians (1)	20 352 980	89.4	18 999 565	88.1	107.1
Hungarians (2)	1620199	7.1	1713 928	7.9	94.5
Romi	409 723	1.8,	227 398	1.1	180.2
Germans (3)	119 436,	0.5	359 109	1.6	33.3
Ukrainians	66 833	0.3	55 510	0.3	21.0
Russians (5)	38 688	0.2	32 696	0.2	118.4
Turks	29 080	0.1	23 422	0.1	126.1
Serbians	29 080	0.1	34 429	0.2	84.5
Tatars	24 649	0.1	23 369	0.1	105.5
Slovaks	20 672	0.1	21286	0.1	97.1
Bulgarians	9 936	Same	10 372	Same	95.8
Jews	9 107	Same	24 667	Same	36.9
Croatians	4180	Same	7 500	Same	55.7
Czeches	5 800	Same	7 683	Same	75.5
Poles	4 247	Same	4 641	Same	91.5
Greeks	3 897	Same	6 262	Same	62.2
Armenians	2 023	Same	2 342	Same	86.4
Others (6)	8 420	Same	5 279	Same	159.5
Undeclared	1047	Same	452	Same	231.6

Notes:

Same: below 0,1%

(1): including 21 089 Romanians and 6 999 Makedonoromanians

(2): including 831 Sekoui

(3): including 1 843 Sashis and 6 292 Boches

(4): including 350 Routeni

(5): out of which 8 914 Russians

(6): including 2 775 Karashoveni and 2 165 Cheangui

We cannot approve of the definition attached to another table included in the document for the census and presenting the "structure of the population of the main nationalities within the boundaries of the historical provinces" (in %):

Total	Romanians	Hungarians	Romi	Germans	
Romania	100	89.4	7.1	1.8	0.5
Banat	100	82.3	6.6	2.1	3.6
Krishana-Maramouresh	100	71.9	21.2	2.6	1.4
Dobroudja	100	90.8	0.1	0.7	0.1
Moldova	100	98.4	0.1	0.8	0.1
Muntenia	100	97.7	0.2	1.8	0.1
Oltenia	100	98.2	0.1	1.5	below 0.1
Transilvania	100	72.3	23.9	2.8	below 0.9

A document containing information on the census of the population of a country necessities statement of up-to-date results in contemporary administrative units and the former "historical provinces". Unfortunately such information is missing. How was it possible, for example, to objectively take the census of the "historical province of Dobroudja" since one half of it was part of contemporary Bulgaria? The same goes for Banat and Moldova. Moldova is an independent state inhabited by Romanians, Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgarians and Gagaouz. Banat, besides its Romanian population, is also inhabited by Hungarians, Germans, Romi, Serbians and Bulgarians. Can we say that the omission of Bulgarians, Turks and Tatars in the statistics for the "historical province of Dobroudja" (90,8 % Romanians, 0,1 % Hungarians, 0,7 % Gypsies, 0,1 % Germans) is involuntary? How relevant to the true facts is the above information?

Our study requires the following data about the ethnical groups living in Romania and Bulgaria:

The nationalities in Bulgaria, 1987

Nationality	Number	%
Bulgarians	7 643 519	85.3
Turks	761 664	8.5
Gypsies	232 979	2.6
Macedonians	224 019	2.5
Armenians	26 882	0.3
Russians	17 922	0.2
Other	53 764	0.6
Total	8 960 749	100.0

Ethnical groups in Romania, 1966, 1980, 1987

Nationality	1966		1980		1987	
	Number	%	Number	%	Total	%
Romanians	16 746 510	87.7	19 402 740	87	20 436 424	89
Hungarians	1619 592	8.5	1784 160	8	1389 047	7.8
Germans	382 596	2.0	446 040	2	344 048	1.5
Jews	42 888	0.2	35 000	0.1		
Ukrainians	54 705	0.3				
Russians	39 483	0.2				
Bulgarians	11 193	0.1				
Gypsies	64 197	0.3	-			
Turks	18 040	0.1	-			
Gagaouz-Tatars	22151	0.1				
Other	101809	0.5	*634 060	2.9	*366 984	1.7
Total	19103163	100	22 302 000	100	22 936 503	100

* This figure is a sum total of the number of Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgarians, Gypsies, Turks, Gagaouz-Tatars, and others.

It has to be noted that the table *Nationalities in Bulgaria, 1987* did not present the Wallaches and the Romanians as separate ethnical minorities. But if all "other" nationalities in Bulgaria (53 764, i.e. 0,6 %) were of Romanian origin, which was obviously impossible, again they would not have been enough to justify the predictions of the contemporary Romanian statistics for 90,8 % Romanians in the "historical province of Dobroudja". Only on the Bulgarian territory of Southern Dobroudja, district of Silistra, the population was about 173 000 (1975) and the population of Dobrich district was 242 000 in 1973. Southern Dobroudja has total area of 7,57 km² (2,9 km² for Silistra district and 4,77 km² for Dobrich district). Dobroudja had population of 415 000, 95 % Bulgarians, 20 years ago. (20) There was not any migration during the last 20 years on the territory of Southern Dobroudja.

Below is a table of the religions in Romania, although our good wish is in future documents these religions to be presented within the contemporary boundaries of Romania, If "historical provinces" are used, it should also be stated to which contemporary country do these "historical provinces" belong today.

	Total	Ortho- dox	Catho- lie	Refor- mist	Greek	Pente- costal	Bapt.	Adv.	Unit.	Mos- lem
Romania	100	86.8	5.0	3.5	1.0	1.0	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2
Banat	100	80.3	11.4	1.7	1.0	2.4	2.0	0.2	-	-
Krishana	100	65.7	11.3	11.7	4.2	3.0	2.0	0.5	0.1	-
Maramuresh										
Dobroudja	100	91.0	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	-	5.1
Moldova	100	2.1	5.2	-	0.1	1.0	0.1	0.3	-	-
Muntenia	100	97.7	0.6	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.4	-	-
Slovenia	100	99.1	0.3	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.2	-	-
Transilvania	100	68.7	10.7	11.7	2.4	1.5	0.7	0.4	1.6	-

We consider the next table to be of particular interest because after WW2 such information has never been presented.

Religions in Romania, 7 Jan. 1992

Religion	Number of people	Structure in %
Total	22 760 449	100
East Orthodox	19 762 136	86.8
Roman Catholic	1 144 820	5.0
Reformist	801 577	3.5
Greek Catholic	228 377	1.0
Pentecostal	220 051	1.0
Baptist	109 677	0.5
Adventist	78 658	0.3
Unitarian	76 333	0.3
Moslem	55 988	0.2
Christian-Evangelist	49 393	0.2
Evangelist-Augustians	39 552	0.2
Ancient-Ritualistic Christians	31 914	0.1
East Orthodox Old, Calendar	23 634	0.1
Evangelist-Sinodal Presbyterian	21 160	0.1
Other religions	66 152	0.3
Atheists	36 079	0.3
Not declared	14 949	0.1

Political pluralism in Romania after December 22, 1989 can be related to the perspectives for the new role of the Church in the political life of the country. Conditions have been created for the "true revival" of the Romanian Orthodox Church. Such was the opinion of the Romanian Patriarch Theoktist and the minister of ecclesiastical matters Nikolae Stoichescu in the first half of 1990. The Christian Party in Romania united with the Tzarantist party and shared with it a common platform for the joint participation in the elections. The year 1990 will remain in history with the restoration of the Roman Catholic Church by the Vatican. On 14 March, 1990 the Pope appointed twelve bishops: six for the Catholic church and six for the East-ritual church which had suffered oppression for more than 40 years.(21) In fact, this

was the greatest achievement of the Vatican in Eastern Europe and in Romania where, according to the AP reports the catholics were 2,8 mln. (22) We can see the great difference in numbers stated by App (2,8 mln.) and the census document of 7 Jan. 1992 (1,1 mln.). The revival of the religious traditions in Romania provided yet another possibility for the defence of human rights.

The conclusion is that the term "historical provinces" for Dobroudja, Banat and Moldova abuses the interests of Serbia (Western Banat stands for the autonomous region of Voivodina), Bulgaria (Southern Dobroudja includes the districts of Silistra and Dobrich and has total area of 7,57 km² and population of 415 000), and partly of Russia and Ukraine {the ex-Moldavian SSR was inhabited by Moldovians of Romanian nationality, 2,3 mln., but there also lived Ukrainians: 507 000, Russians 414 000, Gagaouz 125 000, Jews 98 000, Bulgarians 74 000}.

8. NATIONAL MINORITIES

1. The Hungarian national minority in Romania

This is the most numerous national minority in Romania. They were 1 620 199 according to the last taking of the census of 7 Jan. 1992, and they form 7,1 % of the relative share of the other national live mainly in Transilvania within the boundaries of its Romanian districts. Thus the share of the Hungarian and Romanian inhabitants for certain districts is the following: Kovasna: 79,4 % and 19,3 %, Hargitsa: 88,1 % and 11,1 %, Mouresh: 44,5 % and 49,5 %, Satu Mare: 41,1 % and 56,7 %.(23) The Hungarian minority was the only one that underwent demographic growth of 207 000 during the period 1940-1977, i.e. the period of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

The peak in the nationalistic policy of the communist rule in Romania was the idea to change the administrative division of the country 1988-1989 through the so called "systematization of towns and villages". It planned re-allocation of half of the villages. The idea was to assimilate the minorities destruction of their villages and forcing their inhabitants to migrate. This produced a grave effect upon the public feelings of the Hungarian minority. And Hungary did not remain uninvolved. The border was opened and that allowed about 35 000 Hungarians to migrate from Romania to Hungary in the period Dec. 1988 - Feb. 1990.

An interesting aspect of our study is the information about the social practices of the Romanian authorities towards the Hungarian minority. These social practices were partly dictated by the agreement signed by the ministers of foreign affairs of Romania and Hungary in Dec. 1989. After Dec. 1989 the Romanian television resumed its programmes in

Hungarian. The Hungarian community was assured that they would be entitled to their own printed media. The right to education in their own mother tongue allowed plans for opening of Hungarian schools, colleges and a University in Kluz. (24) According to the 1990 data the share of education done in Hungarian was as follows (25):

	1940	1987
Elementary School	17.1%	5.4%
Secondary school	9.3 %	5.5 %
College	18.7%	2.2%

The vice-minister of education of Romania informed that since the beginning of 1990 only 527 minority members out of 9 000 conducted their studies in their own mother tongue and out of 88 000 Hungarian school children only 33 000 did.(26) A reasonable question is: how objective is this statistical information? How is it possible a population of more than one million and a half to have only 80 000 school children of age between 7 and 19? At the same time there have not been observed restrictions of the Hungarian minority in the field of culture. There are opera houses and theaters in Oradea, Timishuara, Turgu Mouresh, Kluj, Satu Mare that hold their performances in Hungarian, even in German.

The two main issues discussed by the Hungarian and Romanian diplomats at the beginning of 1990 were the following: 1. What should be the nationality of the 35 000 Hungarians who passed the border and settled in Hungary during Dec. 1988 - Feb. 1990? 2. Necessity of opening a general consulate in Kluj.

The issues for the statute of the Romanian refugees in Hungary (the Romanian side refused to treat them as refugees) and the opening of a Hungarian general consulate moved to a dead point. It is known that general consulates of Yugoslavia and Germany were opened in Romania in Nov. 1990. However, the Romanian side constantly postpones the opening of a Hungarian consulate in Kluj because visa regulations between those two countries no longer existed.(27)

DUHR was a marked success in the elections in May 1990. It had 7,2 % of the votes for the Senate and 7,23 % of the votes for the Assembly of the Deputies. DUHR grew into the second political power in the parliament after the FNS (355 seats in the parliament) with its 41 seats.

However, the events turned unfavourable for DUHR in 1991. The problems rose after DUHR's insisted for referendum to decide on the autonomy of the "Hungarian districts" Kovasna and Hagritsa. This gave reason to the FNS and the Party of the National Unity of the Romanians to propose DUHR to be banned; their report presented before the parliament of 17 Oct. 1991 contained numerous accusations against the "Hungarian extremists".(28)

One particular reason for the conflict in Turgu Mouresh was the decision of the Romanian authorities of Feb. 1990 to stop the TV programmes in Hungarian. The discontent of the Hungarian minority burst out into open protests and strikes of the students of Hungarian origin who claimed their right to be educated in their mother tongue. At the same time Romania was in the eve of parliamentary elections. Romanian national organizations were formed as a counter reaction against the minorities' organizations, particularly against the Hungarian ones and DUHR. The chauvinistic organization Vatra Romaneasca (Romanian Hearth) was formed then, and not by mere chance, in Turgu Mouresh in Feb. 1990. A Party of the National Unity of the Romanians in Transylvania was also formed and it put onto its platform the requirement for territorial integrity of Romania.

According to journalistic reports of 22 March 1990 the nationalistic wave on both sides of the border was heaving higher and higher. Transylvanian towns saw demonstrations of protest and demonstration of reaction and 50 000 Hungarians went out in the streets of Budapest. The slogan was "to stop the Romanian interference". The prime minister Miklos Nemet warned that the consequences might be very serious. The official Hungarian speakers assured that Hungary would have no territorial claims to Romania.(29)

The president of Romania Ion Illiescu in an interview for the Swiss newspaper *Journal de Geneve* (24-25 March 1990) explained the wave of violence that had preceded the bloody conflict in the following way: "The events of Turgu Mouresh were indicative of a crisis of long history. The hatred between population and political authorities had been accumulating for many years. This did not concern only the minorities. This was an economic, political and moral crisis that had been torturing all the citizens of this country."

The *International Herald Tribune* reported in the following way the conflict in Turgu Mouresh of March 1990: "In this place the violence burst out in March when two groups started to fight in the street. People from near-by villages came to town. They were equipped with axes, knives, clubs and even planks torn from the garden benches. Five people were injured and 269 taken to hospital."

An article in the NIN magazine of Apr. 1990 commented on the events and moving forces in Turgu Mouresh in a manner which we cannot accept: "During the time of unrest in Turgu Mouresh two organizations of clearly identified orientation made themselves well see: Romanian Hearth and Iron Guards." It would be too far fetched to look for fascist presence in Turgu Mouresh. It was rather the still existing nationalism that the communist government had been nursing for 45 years, the Hungarian government that had been keeping alive the nationalistic feelings of the Hungarians in Romania and the indecisiveness of the Romanian government towards the Hungarian problem.

1991 brought certain changes both for Romania and DUHR. The spokesman of DUHR Odon Bintai said in the spring of 1991: "The autonomy of Transylvania is not in DUHR's programme." At the same time Vatra Romaneasca in the permanent column "1991: a year of

fight against the Hungarian terrorism" in the Romania Mare magazine declared its goal to defend the national integrity and sovereignty while fighting the efforts to disintegrate the country.(30)

Those fears had not been absolutely groundless. In the autumn of 1991 DUHR demanded in the Romanian parliament a referendum for the "autonomy" of the Gungarian districts of Kovasna and Hargitsa. Thus we could understand the insistence of certain parties to ban DUHR since DUHR had offended the regulations of the constitution. And the Romanian parliament defined DUHR as a party "inciting irresponsible chauvinistic actions of the Hungarian irredentists." Yoje Antal declared more than once that he considered himself the spiritual prime-minister of 15 mln Hungarians. (It is known that the number of the Hungarians in Romania is 1,6 mln.) "The irredentist holidays" of the Hungarians found expression in "group visits of thousands of Hungarians to celebrate the Hungarian historical holidays on the territory of Romania." An example of that was 6 Oct. 1990 (31) We consider the results of a study of the public opinion in Romania to be rather interesting. The conclusion was that 56 % of the Romanians, including the 5 mln Romanians from Transilvania sympathized with the "Xenophobic movement" of Vatra Romaneaska that supported the disfranchisement of the Hungarian minority of their basic rights.

At the end of 1991 DUHR made itself seen on the political stage. At a time when the Romanian society needed its unity most badly, i.e. after the constitution had been voted on 21 November. 1991, the Romanians in Transilvania refused to participate in the referendum for the constitution, maybe out of fear that the laws of the bigger brother would forcefully assimilate them.(32) Elections for local administration were held in Feb. 1992. 33,6 % of the votes went for the FNS and 24,3% went for the DC.(33) DUHR won the elections in six districts, including Hargitsa and Kovasna.(34)

The settlement of the problem of the Hungarian minority is an inseparable part of the overall process of democratization of the country.

2. German national minority in Romania.

The German national minority is the third largest after the Gipsies. According to the census of 7 Jan. 1992 the Germans are 119 436, or 0,5 % of the population of Romania.

The Table in the Declaration of the census (preliminary results) shows decrease of 2/3 of the German minority within the period 1977-1992. The German minority of 119 436 includes 1 843 Sashis and 6 292 Boches. The Germans in Romania live in Transilvania and Banat.

In 1990 the German newspaper in Romania Neue Vek made a survey of the public opinion of the German minority. The data showed that 80 % of the German minority members had definitely decided to emigrate. Only 6 % had decided to stay and 14 % were hesitant about their decision. In this respect the speaker of the German embassy in Bucharest

prognosticated that only about 35 000 - 40 000 Germans would remain in Romania mainly old people who were not willing to migrate. Germany raised certain requirements before the prospect immigrants to prove their German origin by three criteria: fluency in German, surname and religion (Catholic or Protestant). In fact that was one obstacle before the legitimation of 40 000 Romanian immigrants of non-Germanic origin who settled in Germany during 1990 and the first half of 1991.(35) At the same time Deutsche Welle estimated the number of the Romanian Germans in Germany to be 80 000 for the first quarter of 1992. At the end of April 1992 a new agreement was signed between Germany and Romania. According to this agreement for friendship, cooperation and partnership Romania was expected to oblige the clauses of the Conference of the CCE for protection over the national minorities.(36)

December 1989 brought new realities for the economic, political and cultural rights of the German minority in Romania. The political rights included the right to their own political organizations. A request for help from Germany was raised in the field of education and culture. The federal government planned the sum of 10 mln DM for immediate aid in culture. Horst Wafenschmidt, parliamentary secretary at the federal chancellor's department of immigration pointed out that such help would be of no use in a situation of unprecedented migration of this minority to Germany. (Europäische Werkunde, 7,1990 "Against communism instead of democracy", Fritz Feder.)

There were still 19 000 students registered at the middle of 1991 but their number was constantly decreasing. Solution to this problem was sought by merging together of the schools of few students.

The German minority in Romania has ever been flattered, since Chaushesku's time "to be better 'patriots'" compared to the Hungarians. The cabinet of Petre Roman even founded a committee with the task to attract German capital to help the German minority in Romania. However, the reasoning of the Romanian government was hardly appreciated with view of the rapid decrease of the number of that minority (average decrease of 115 000 for 1990 only). Hunger and cold and high prices forced those people on the road to Germany. The German minority was not likely to provoke conflict situations on ethnical grounds and blood-shed conflicts could be definitely excluded from the forecasts.

3. Ukrainian minority in Romania.

According to the census of 1992 the Ukrainians in Romania are 66 833, or 0,3 % of the population, their number having creased with 121 % compared to 1977. The Ukrainians in Romania live mainly in the region of Southern Boudovina which corresponds to the Romanian district of Soucheava. Southern Boudovina is part of the Chernovits district in Ukraine.

The status of the Ukrainian minority changed after Dec. 1990. They formed their own political party, the Union of the Ukrainians in Romania. This party was presented in the

parliament with one deputy, Stepan Tkachouk, after the elections of May 1990, and according to the law for the minorities' rights of 15 March 1990.

On 27 Aug. 1991 the Republic of Moldova officially declared its independence. And the territorial claims to Ukraine were expansively discussed in the Romanian parliament on 20 Sept. 1991. The Ukrainian deputy Stepan Tkachouk was helpless to prove before the Romanian parliament that Northern Bukovina was Ukrainian land. In an interview for the Chernovtsi radio he said: Bukovina has never been Romanian land. Poutna, Voronets and other monasteries that the Romanians are so proud of, are Ukrainian; however, this has never been acknowledged in Bucharest." Tkachouk supported the idea that 350 000 Ukrainians lived in Romania, in Southern Bukovina (district Suceava, respectively). At the same time the Romanian version, i.e. the census of 1992 stated 66 833 Ukrainians, i.e. 1/10 of 350 000.

The status of the Ukrainians in Romania was defined by the outcome of the armed conflict in Pridnestrovie, where Moldova and Ukraine were directly involved, and Romania indirectly.

4. Bulgarian national minority in Romania. Wallach national minority in Bulgaria.

According to the census of 7 Jan. 1992 the Bulgarian population rates eleventh in number in Romania, it is 9 935 and is below 0,1 % according to the census of 1992. It was 10 377, or 0,1 % according to the census of 1977, i.e. the decrease was 4,2 % for the period 1977-1992.(37) Another Romanian source after Dec. 1989 published quite different information about the number of the Bulgarian minority, i.e. 112 000. (38) According to estimations done by the Bulgarians living in Romania their number was 300 000.(39) The newspaper *Duma* (18 Sept. 1990) published an article titled "200 000 Bulgarians in Romania".

Regardless of the striking differences in the above data, the Bulgarians living in Romania are real. The Bulgarian population in Romania is concentrated in certain regions: Banat, Bucharest, the Danubian towns. The ancestors of the first Bulgarian settlers now live in the large Romanian towns in Banat, Galats, Turno Mogourele and in Bucharest. The first places where the Bulgarians settled were in Banat, the villages Boulgara, Besheniov, Breshtia. The last two of these villages have schools today, where the Bulgarian language is an optional subject.(40) An example for observance of the Bulgarian minority's rights are the 30-minute monthly Bulgarian programmes of the Arad television that started in April 1992.(41)

In the era of communism the Bulgarians in Romania were not allowed to study their mother tongue, to issue newspapers or have cultural or political organizations. The Bulgarian presence was under oppression and the evidences of Bulgarian tradition were mercilessly destroyed.(42)

Dec. 1989 changed positively the political status of the Bulgarian minority in Romania. The law (March 1990) allowed the minorities (the Bulgarian one inclusive) to participate in the

political life of the country. There was formed a Union of the Bulgarians in Banat and a Cultural Society of the Bulgarians in Bucharest. The Bulgarian minority had a deputy in the parliament.

We, Bulgarians, noted with confusion that in 1991 the Romanian nationalists formed a "Dobroudja Front". The weekly newspaper Natsiunea of the organization Batra Romaneaska persuaded the idea that the Krayova agreement which restored the Bulgarian sovereignty over Southern Dobroudja was forced on the Romanians. Other editions of Romanian nationalistic organizations (Romanoul, Romania Mare) stated their claims for restoration of the Romanian boundaries as they were after WWI, many times after Dec. 1989. These boundaries of "Great Romania" included Southern Dobroudja together with Moldova and Northern Banat.

The data are contradictory and sometimes mutually exclusive. Eg: "Danubian Romanians are nearly extinct (22 Oct. 1990)", "unenviable plight of hundreds of thousands Romanians in Bulgaria" (Natsiunea, end of March 1991), "I'm not afraid of my enemies, God save me from my friends." And then came NUN's groundless claims for 2 mln Romanians living in the Southern Danubian Tribalia (Northern Bulgaria and the north-west regions of ex-Yugoslavia) in the summer of 1992.

The agreement for friendship, cooperation and neighborly relations of 27 Jan. 1992 signed by the presidents of Bulgaria and Romania was followed by the official declaration of the Romanian president that Romania should not raise any territorial claims to Bulgaria, especially with regard to Southern Dobroudja.(43)

In 1991 the Parliament, the Ministry of foreign affairs and the President of Romania on various occasions made statements that put under suspicion the territorial arrangements between Bulgaria and Romania.

1. On 24 June 1991 the minister of foreign affairs of Romania made a statement before the Romanian parliament where the treaty Ribentrop-Molotov was associated with the "loss of Southern Dobroudja" "occupied by Bulgaria".(44)

2. On Dec. 1, 1991 in a speech on the celebration of the national holiday of Romania (Transilvania was annexed to Romania on 1 December) the president Ion Illiesku qualified as "historical, ethnical and natural" the "boundaries of Great Romania", these including Southern Dobroudja.(45)

The Romanian authorities declared many times that their statements about Southern Dobroudja bore no hints at territorial claims. They were just attempts to clarify the historical truth.

The attempts of Romania to annul or revise the Krayova agreement of 1940 would not contribute to the peace on the Balkans. The restoration of Southern Dobroudja to Bulgaria was achieved in a direct bipartite agreement without involvement of Russia, Germany or other European country. To reach this agreement Bulgaria made considerable compromise too, knowing the fact that this land was within Romanian possession only from 1913 to 1940. 66 800 Bulgarians migrated from Northern to Southern Dobroudja. Leaving for good their homes

and properties. However, Bulgaria paid one billion lei for the development of Southern Dobroudja, though it had been done free by the Bulgarian inhabitants (area of 7 726 km² corresponding to the contemporary Bulgarian districts of Silistra and Dobrich).

5. Jewish minority in Romania.

The Jewish national minority rates tenth according to the census of 7 Jan. 1992. It includes 9 107 members (under 0,1 %).

1989 changed the situation of the Jews in Romania. After the parliamentary elections of May 1990 and by the provisions of the law of 15 March 1990 the Jewish minority formed their own political organization Ravinat and had their rabbi deputy. The favorite accusation of the opposition before and after the elections of May 1990 was that there were not only communists but too many Jews in the supreme bodies of government.

Separate articles of the Europa magazine also bore anti-Semitic spirit. They claimed that the "Jews plan to conquer Romania". The genocide of the Jews in the WW2 when 400 000 Jews were killed in Romania was denied.(46) In the middle of June 1991 the Romanian prosecutor's office initiated investigation in connection with the published anti-Semitic articles and information. These were qualified as "nationalistic and chauvinistic propaganda" even by the Romanian press. The chief rabbi on Romania, M. Rozen, asked the personal protection of the president of Romania to curb the anti-Semitic attacks. Then the Romanian prosecutor's office started its investigation.(47)

9. REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA.

An important component of the national policy of the is its relations with the Republic of Moldova and its attitude towards the conflict in Pridnestrovie. The Pridnestrovie conflict necessitate clarification of the relations between Romania and Moldova on one side and between Russia and Ukraine on the other.

About four million people live on the territory of the ex-Moldovian SSR. The Moldovians are 2,5 mln, i.e. 65% of the total population. According to *Le Mond*, December 5, 1990, there are 1, 700, 000 Ukrainians, Russians, Gagaouz, Bulgarians and Jews living in the territories claimed by the Republic of Moldova. Judging by the relatively obsolete data of 1970, 507, 000 Ukrainians, 414, 000 Russians, 125, 000 Gagaouz, 74, 000 Bulgarians, 98, 000 Jews, and 10, 000 Byelorussians lived in the territory of the Moldovan SSR.

According to the public opinion poll of October 1, 1991, 29% of the Russians and Ukrainians expressed their will to leave Moldova and only 32% wanted to stay.

The collapse of Chaushesku's dictatorship in December, 1989 gave further impetus to the democratic processes in Moldova.

At the beginning of February, 1990 a *Cultural Association for Bessarabia and Boukovina* was formed in Romania. Its goal was to bring together the spiritual and cultural achievements of the Romanians living in Bessarabia and Boukovina and Boukovina with the Daki-Roman cultural space; visa-free passage for the Romanians on both banks of the Prout river, and to provide stimuli for scientific research work proving the belonging of Bessarabia, Boukovina and the region of Kerch to the Romanian cultural space. (48)

Political elections took place on December 25, 1990 in the former Soviet Socialist Republic. The Moldavian people's front declared itself for a new Parliament, new Constitution, new Parliamentary system and even Moldova's

own monetary unit and complete control over the Moldavian natural resources. It was then when the idea for direct unification with Romania was brought in the first time. It should be remembered that the president of Romania Ion Illiesku for the first time appealed for annexation of Moldova to Romania on 4 Dec. 1990 before a meeting of many thousands of people.(49)

Already in 1990 Romanian was declared to be the official language in Moldova. As a reaction to this decision (and to the then following unification of Moldova with the Romanian state organization) the Gagaouz and the Russian-speaking population split off, forming their "own republics". Tiraspol become capital of Pridnestrovie (60 % non-Moldavian population, Russian-speaking predominantly) and Nomrad became the center of Gagaouzia.

The situation in Moldova had already been complicated. So had been the relations between Romania and Russia. The agreement for friendship and good neighborly relations signed in Moscow on 22 March 1991 had not been endorsed by the Romanian parliament. The draft contract included a clause on inviolability of the border. Romania reserved to itself the right to sign this contract after the Moldavian referendum for the status of Moldova. The Romanian ministry of foreign affairs declared on 18 Sept. 1991 that the agreement needed further particularization.(50)

The process of political unification with Romania passed through the following stages:

1. The parliament voted the law proclaiming Romanian to be the official language (31 Aug. 1989), the Latin alphabet was introduced.
2. The national flag of the Moldavian SSR was changed and identified with the Romanian national flag (22 Apr. 1990).
3. A new state coat of arms was approved (3 Nov. 1990).
4. The official name of the state was proclaimed to be Republic of Moldova.

The Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova stated: "The Republic of Moldova shall be a sovereign and independent country that shall freely and without outside interference decide of the future plight of the fatherland in accord with the ideals and sacred will of the people living within her historical and ethnical space."(51)

The reactions to this Declaration were quite different in Romania and Russia. The president, parliament and prime minister of Romania in their official declarations unreservedly approved of and congratulated the national sovereignty of Moldova. They declared their will to establish diplomatic relations between those two countries.(52)

Russia reacted to this Declaration with frustration. The reason was that Moldova had claims not only over the territory of the ex-Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova, but also over Besarabia and Northern Bukovina, i.e. over Odessa region of 11 000 km² and Chernovits region of 8 100 km² in Ukraine; 8 100 km² of the Moldavian autonomous SSR which was on Ukrainian territory and the whole Pridnestrovie (the area between Dnestr and Southern Bug).(53)

The Gagaouz Republic (153 000 Gagaouz people) denied the independence of Moldova (22-23 Aug. 1991). Many Gagaouz people were arrested.

One of the reasons for the bloodshed in Pridnestrovie was the national animosity of the Moldavians towards the Russian speaking people who split off in republics of their own. The Russians and Gagaouz people in Pridnestrovie held elections on 28 Oct. and 25 Nov. respectively, for their own bodies of legislation which was reason enough for the Moldavians to qualify them as separatists. The first seven victims fell on 13 Dec. 1991. The reason was the hard methods used by the government of Mirche Snegur to control the local authorities in Pridnestrovie. The first attempt for political settlement of the conflict by M. Snegur, president of Moldova and Igor Smirnov, leader of Pridnestrovian people, was aborted (15 Dec. 1991). No truce was reached. A civil war burst out. The Moldavians nationalized the army units on their territory and Boris Eltsin dislocated the 14th Army which was under the jurisdiction of Russia in Pridnestrovie. The involvement of the Don Cossacks was the cause for Kishineu to accuse Russia of direct action against the sovereignty of Moldova. The cease-fire decision was taken at a 4-lateral meeting in Kishineu in May 1992. The participant countries were Moldova, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. Military observers of the four countries arrived in Benderi to control the truce. The Pridnestrovie deputies went back to the Moldavian parliament to discuss over an autonomy. It was then (20 June 1992) when the conflict between the guards and the Moldavian police burst out and rapidly grew up into a slaughter where 400 people found their death.

The Bulgarians in Moldova. They are about 80 000. Eight deputies, Besarabian Bulgarians from Gagaouzia worked in the parliament of Moldova. The Besarabian Bulgarians support the idea of Independence of Moldova and disapprove of its unification with Romania. They support the idea of coalitional government of the national agreement supported also by

the president M. Snegur. On 17 March 1992 the ethnical Bulgarians voiced a declaration. The cause for it was the state of emergency in Pridnestrovie announced by the newly formed Russian Republic. The declaration read: "The further development of the conflict in Pridnestrovie might spread out on international level and jeopardize the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the republic... The ethnical Bulgarians living in Moldova appeal for immediate cessation of military action and deny any foreign interference in the home affairs of Moldova."

CONCLUSIONS

The study on the "National question, minorities' problem and ethnic conflicts in Romania of today" lead us to the following conclusions:

1. The Romanian authorities try to ideologically tinge the problem of the minorities' rights in the home affairs and jurisdiction. The ambition to present refined legal regulations for the national problem might turn into a convenient pretext to violate the minorities' rights in real life.

2. The official policy of Bucharest is oriented towards preservation of a uni-national Romanian state. A policy of so called "Romistion" is applied which ultimate end shall be a trans-historical unification of all Romanians within the boundaries of a unified national state. This context hosts the claims of Romania over Besarabia, Northern Bukovina, Banat or Southern Dobroudja. By raising the idea of its national integrity Romania insists for territorial revisions with almost all of her neighboring countries and aims to gain territories to her own benefit. The policy of "Romisation" is very prominent in the platform of certain political organizations but on several occasions the Romanian government came very close to the policy of "Romisation", too.

3. At the same time the jurisdiction of Romania (the constitution), her government and the nationalistic organizations do not allow any foreign territorial self-government on Romanian territory. Autonomy is forbidden on Romanian territory since it means a form of government alien to the central power. A Hungarian autonomous region will never exist; the proof is the doomed-to-failure referendum for Hagritsa and Kovasna; and DUHR was declared illegitimate only because it brought the issue to the parliament.

Further proof for a portion of nationalism in the policy of Romania on political, governmental and social level is the following: highly centralized political system of government; use of double standards for the minorities; failure to prevent ethnical conflicts (the bloodshed in Turgu Mourash).

4. Nationalistic trends reaching even to chauvinism bear the tendencies of nationalistically charged interpretation of historical events and bring territorial claims to Romania's neighboring countries (and also attempts to clarify the historical truth). Regardless of the fact that Romania accepted the Helsinki Act (1975) Romania is striving after territorial revisions to her own benefit on the basis of the Paris treaties (1947). We might hope that Bucharest will understand that the national problem might be solved best when the issue of the national boundaries grows less important in Eastern Europe and when the national minorities there act only as mediators of good neighborly relations, friendship and cooperation among the new democratic states in the changing world of today.

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