In countries with an established parliamentary
tradition, political self-determination after elections usually
coincides with the actual result of the elections. Any differences
are in favour of the winners. Having in mind the complex
psychological relations of Bulgarians to political power, we
expected originally that answers in our poll would show a wider
following of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP (formerly
Communist), than revealed in its electoral percentage. And yet we
find exactly the opposite. 38%* claim they have voted
for the BSP, and 40% for the Union of Democratic Forces, UDF. What
is the reason for the substantial differences between the
officially published results and electoral attitudes acknowledged
by voters one month after the "magic of the dark room?" The problem
is very serious, because if the sample is representative (and such
it is) then it becomes obvious that someone is not telling the
things as they are.
BACKDATE VOTING?
The natural answer of the "radical oppositionists"
would be something like this: Here is finally a real evidence that
the elections were manipulated. Too simple, however, to be true. If
there is something certain here, it is the fact that the
discrepancy cannot be explained by forgery or falsification.
Firstly, it is difficult to imagine an organization in our ruined
country which would be able to effect such a large scale action
secretly. Secondly, the discrepancies between stated electoral
behavior and the election results working against the BSP come
mainly from Sofia and other major cities, where falsification is
practically impossible due to their being oppositional strongholds
where every move of the BSP and government agencies is under close
scrutiny. So, we must look for another explanation for the
discrepancies.
We are probably witnessing a kind of "backdate
voting". In other words, some of the inquired people do not really
reply to the question "how did you vote", but indicate how would
they vote now. The data reported by the Central Electoral Board,
CEB, show that some 9% of the voters did not enter the "dark room"
on 10th and 17th of June. In the poll, the answer "I abstained" to
the question "Who did you vote for" is chosen only by 2.3% of
respondents. We may conclude that a proportion of abstainers now
claims to have participated in the elections. This is confirmed by
a control question, on the strength of which we can indirectly
conclude that the percentage of abstainers is about 9%; and that
coincides with the figures reported by the CEB.
"Backdated voting" explains the differences in the
percentage, but gives no answer as to why a "blue" (oppositional)
orientation is chosen. It may be suggested, that during the
elections we witnessed a momentary over-mobilization of electoral
potential outside the genuine field of influence of the BSP. In any
case, the political polarization and pre-electoral tensions
favoured the ruling party. In fact, the estimate of our Center from
the pre-electional poll of May (39 - 44% for BSP in the
proportional representation constituencies) is actually a better
indicator of the legitimate political weight of the Socialists in
our society than the election results.
Another element turning the "backdated voting" in
favour of the UDF is the fear syndrome. As early as the
pre-electional poll we established that political attitudes were
formed to a certain extent under the influence of the fear of the
"others". In the post-electoral situation when the opposition
seized the political initiative there are obvious inducements to
withhold demonstrating sympathies for the BSP. This confirms
indirectly the significant influence of extra parliamentary
politics on the political situation and on political self
identification. Finally, we cannot neglect the disappointment of a
part of the BSP voters, witnessing the stunning degradation of the
economy in a sharpening contrast to the calm and hopeful
pre-election platform of that party.
MOTIVATION OF ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR
The motives influencing the respondents in their
vote seem to be in many ways similar. Nearly half of the BSP voters
as well as UDF ones claim to have arrived at their political choice
because they agree with the programs and ideas of their respective
parties. There are different motivations, however, behind this.
While the BSP was suggesting changes within the "already familiar"
(and in familiar language), the UDF was trying to mobilize a
radical disagreement with the "familiar" and presented their ideas
in language new to this country.
Secondly, trust was found to be leaders is another
motivation of the vote. About a quarter of BSP voters give
this motivation as primarily determining their electoral choice.
Among the electorate of the UDF these are only 16%, revealing a
more distanced attitude to the leaders and confirming the stated
differences in the attitude to the "familiar". While those, who
support the "familiar" naturally trust the familiar leaders, those
radically abandoning the "familiar" feel considerably less engaged
with following definite political personalities.
With the other two parliamentary powers the
situation is rather different. While 38% of the followers of the
Movement for Rights and Freedoms MRF motivate their choice with
trust in the leadership of the movement, among the voters of the
Agrarians Popular Union, APU, this percentage is very small. The
dominating motivation here is agreement with the program and ideas
which in the specific context could mean trust in agrarian ideas in
spite of the distrust for the central APU leadership.
There are differences between electoral bodies also
in the motivation for participation in the elections. Among the
voters of the BSP, the highest proportion, 30%, choose the
motivation "I wanted to support the worthy candidates". The
sympathizers of the opposition differ considerably, the most
popular motivation being a personal one, an understanding of the
importance of individual participation in the political process
("my vote could change something", 31%).
There are two electorates behind these real
motivations and these show opposing digressions from the national
average in terms of age, education, distribution in various types
of communities. The poll confirms data obtained by other studies
that UDF voters are considerably younger than those of the BSP.
While only 8% of the voters of the BSP are below the age of 25,
among the sympathizers of the UDF people of this age group comprise
22%. Vice versa, voters above 60 constitute 25% of the electorate
of the BSP and only 11% of that of the UDF. 55% of the voters of
the BSP are above 45, while 69% of those of the UDF are below
45.
The electoral bodies of the other two parliamentary
powers show even greater differentiation in terms of age. Theca
electoral body of the APU is markedly elderly, with 60% of its
voters being above 45. The voters of the MRF reproduce the picture
of the opposition in general: 69% are below the age of 45.
It is obvious that the better, educated have more
cause to be unsatisfied with the "familiar". It is not therefore
surprising that more than half of people with primary and lower
education have voted for the BSP and only a quarter for the UDF.
From the voters with higher education, 53% have favoured the UDF
and 36%, the BSP. Half of the people with secondary education voted
for the UDF and 1/3, for the BSP. Rather obviously unfavorable is
the educational structure of MRF and APU voters. 43% of the
agrarian voters have primary (and lower) education and 47%
secondary; for MRF these figures are 56% and 39%. The conclusion is
that the more educated voters unsatisfied with the "familiar" and
identifying it with the BSP, are oriented to something "new" - new
values relationships, behavior It is c1ear that this "new" hasn't
succeeded in attracting the aged and those with low education. They
have either not been made aware of this "new", or have rejected it
in favour of the "old familiar thing" evident in BSP slogans like
"security", "tranquillity", "change without stress".
BOUNDARIES OF TOLERANCE
The dynamics of the interrelationship between the
electorates of the two main political forces is rather curious. BSP
followers after 1he elections tend to show increasing tendency to
recognize the legitimacy of the UDF. At the same time, among the
followers of 1he opposition, there is a growing non-acceptance of
the legitimacy of the BSP. Estimating the mobilizational capacity
of the electorates we come upon the already familiar phenomenon of
"periphery" and "core" (see "Kultura", June 1). The irreconcilable
"cores" of the different political followers are isolated by
answers to the question "Is There a party that has no place in
Parliament?". According to 1/10 of BSP followers there is no place
for the UDF, and 1/3 of the same people say the same of the MRF.
According to 40% of UDF voters, however, Parliament is no place for
the BSP, while 17% want to see the MRF leave. The followers of
other parties are also against the presence of the BSP in
Parliament: 20% of the MRF voters and 12% of the APU think in this
way (in contrast to 3% and 5% rejecting the participance of UDF).
Comparing the data about mobilization potentia1 and about levels of
mutual non-acceptance leads to the conclusion that the UDF
electorate has an active "core" which is 3 or 4 times greater than
the one of BSP. The active core of BSP comprises about 10 - 15% of
its followers, while up to 50% of UDF voters are
activistica11y-minded. The "core" percentage of BSP is similar to
the one which exists in Western Europe, i.e, in a situation of
traditional political stability. At the same time, the gigantic (by
European standards) "core" of the UDF corresponds much better to
the complicated political situation in Eastern Europe.
The fact is not reassuring that, taken nationwide, a
great many voters think that there is some parliamentary party (and
it is different for different people) which should not be present
in Parliament. This means that the legitimacy of the election
resu1ts, and of institutionalized politics itself, is not at all
universally accepted. Consequently, it is not difficult to foretell
that extraparliamentary politics will influence for a long time the
whole development of the political process. It is obvious that this
situation is objectively defined, it involves quite a lot of
people. And if there is a big socioeconomic crisis, it may grow
into a serious social and political strife with an
anti-institutional thrust.
CAPACITY FOR ELECTORAL RE-DISTRIBUTION
The data suggests that at the moment one should not
expect cardinal changes in electora1 sympathies. If, of course, the
reticence to admit socialist sympathies is not already in itself
signal for reorientation. Both political blocs may count on the
loyalty of the majority of their followers (if we take into account
the non-declaration of socialistic sympathy, the proportion is more
favorable to the UDF than the data suggests by itself).
Nevertheless, there are great differences. About a quarter of 1he
BSP electorate is dubious about its choice or declare intentions of
changing their vote in new elections. Even among the members of BSP
around 20% are not certain that they will vote again for this
party. The electoral defeat of the opposition and its renaissance
after it are two great factors for consolidating the multicolored
and "undisciplined" electorate of the UDF. Almost 90% of "the blue"
followers claim that they will vote again for the oppositional
union, only 3% feel disappointed with their choice. In other words,
the oppositional electoral body seems to be more loyal in
comparison to the electors of the party in power. The MRF
electorate stands somewhere between the BSP and the UDF ones: 84%
of them will vote the same way again (only 16% of them are not sure
or they'll vote in another way). Although the election result is
favorable to the Movement, 36% of its electors are not satisfied
with the elections because they think "there was too much ado about
nothing". About 27% value the elections as a "step towards
something better". It is not certain whether this dissatisfaction
has to be treated as the result of a distanced, supra-party view of
the political situation in the country. It is rather the expression
of a deep distrust on the part of the minority Turkish population
to everything outside it. On the other hand, the moderate optimism
of MRF followers seems to be a potential for a future trust in
politics as an instrument for solving problems. It is not
surprising that the APU followers are very dissatisfied with the
election results: only 4% think the results are favorable for their
party, while 46% think of the elections as "Much about nothing".
The dissatisfaction is connected with the fact that agrarian
followers show the smallest percentage of readiness to give their
vote to the APU again (66%). And 1/3 of them either hesitate or
they'll vote in another way. Taking into account the unfavorable
sociological profile of the Agrarian electors, such data confirms
again the crisis of the APU.
SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS
The polarization between the electorates of the main
political powers decreases once we move from politics and ideology
to economics and everyday life. Here we see a deal of pessimism
concerning the future. Pessimistic expectations are clearly
dominant: around 1/3 of respondents generally think that after the
parliamentary elections we will live better, while 47% say we will
live worse or, "without any changes". And 16% have no opinion.
Expectations of the near future are strongly influenced by personal
social status, i.e. by people's opinion about their own living
standard. It is usual that people who estimate their social
position as "good" are more optimistic in comparison than those who
think they live "a bearable life" or that their life is "not good".
For example, the percentage of people who estimate their own status
as good and hope they'll live better is 30% bigger than people that
have the same optimistic attitude but have a subjectively low
social status. Not all respondents have the same opinion as to the
lowering of their living standards, even if this resulted from
decisions of the party of their choice. The majority of them, 53%,
would agree to lower living standards "if it is for a short time
and will bring improvements". About 28% agree with the statement:
"Hardship has to be equally distributed". Most respondents are able
to make a realistic estimation of the situation in the country: the
majority (64%) think there is no escape "without tightening of
belts". People hesitate about other inevitable consequences of the
economic crisis. In agreement with the inevitability of
unemployment are only 40%, of high prices - 44%, of shortage of
goods - 30%, rationing system - 44%, invasion of foreign capital -
52%, poor and rich scissors - 31%, returning 1and to its former
owners - 44%, and privatization of industry - 33%. There is no
agreement about the economic crisis and its overcoming. The
respondents were asked to point to the most radical means
guaranteeing solution to the crisis. They give preferences to such
means as "stopping strikes and demonstrations" (38%); "getting rid
of incompetents" receives a value of 32%, and "change of political
power", 10%. It is interesting that the part of those who re1y on
free private initiative and on Western help is smaller than
expected (8% and 3%). The weakness in the polarization between the
political blocs once we enter the socioeconomic sphere is seen
clearly in the attitude towards the adverse effects of dealing with
the economic crisis. Above 60% in both electorates do not want lack
of goods and half of them reject high prices; and half would accept
a rationing system. On many issues that carry a strong ideological
component and thus make for political polarization, the UDF has
succeeded in making its followers believe in its ideas. For
example, more than 60% of its electors suggest that unemployment is
inescapable, while the same percentage of the socialist electorate
thinks of it as inpermissible. Above 70% of BSP adherents think
that there should be no strikes and demonstrations, while the same
part of the "blue" electors do not think so. About 70% of the BSP
supporters do not want to see a return of the land to its former
owners, while more than a quarter of the opposition supporters see
this as an element of the cure for the crisis. Almost half of the
BSP electors think the invasion of foreign capital inadmissible,
while 83% of the UDF adherents think the cure is impossible without
it. More interesting answers are given to the question "Should
there be rich and poor?" and "Is industry to be privatized?" The
differences for the first question are clear - 3/4 of the BSP
electorate does not want such a degree of social differentiation,
while more than a half of the opposition electors think of it as
something inevitable. The most contrasting answers are given to the
second question: above 80% of the socialists do not accept "private
industry", while 2/3 of UDF electors think of it as a necessity for
the overcoming of the crisis. Age and education influence opinion
about the most effective means for overcoming the crisis. The
younger - ages between 25 and 45, "getting rid of incompetents",
and, in second place - "stopping strikes and rallies". The o1der
(above 45) see the abolishment of strikes and rallies as means of
dealing with the crisis (46% aged between 45 and 60, 56% for the
over-60 group). It seems that the dividing line in the attitude
towards this crucial problem comes at the age of 45. This is not
accidental. People aged around 45 constitute the generation that
suffers from the drastic transformation of the whole social system.
From a psychological point of view, these people have the right to
consider this change as a fiasco of their long efforts towards
personal realization within the limitations of the previous
system.
Attitudes concerning social justice also differ
along variables of age, education, and political preferences. There
are two basic groups: about 42% of respondents choose the option
that justice means the ability of everybody to obtain profits
without limitations within the framework of the law. This brings in
question the established concept about the collectivistic culture
of Bulgarians. A similar to the above proportion of people choose
the traditional egalitarian option and link justice with the
absence of poor and rich. The correlation between the two variants
is influenced by age, education and the political structure of the
electoral body. The individualistic attitudes are concentrated
among the young and active age groups.' Egalitarian answers
increase with age, with opposition to social differentiation
reaching above 2/3 in the over-60 age group. The same is seen in
relation to levels of education: the higher the educational level,
the more individualistic the answers. Concepts of social justice
are not influenced by party sympathy. But the same can not be said
about the correlation between the idea of freedom and party
sympathy. The desire for personal freedom - seen as freedom of
individual initiative - obviously stands above the values of the
collective body. BSP electors stick to more traditional ideas about
freedom, while UDF supporters lean towards individualism. Why does
party preference have such an influence upon the idea of freedom
and no influence on the idea of social justice? The possible
explanation lies in the character of the election campaign of the
UDF. It laid stress on freedom. That was the dividing line between
the rejected past and the desirable future. The topic of social
justice was rarely discussed. For this reason populist
understanding of social justice may be seen both among the UDF
electors and BSP ones.
ATTITUDE TOWARDS POWER AND POLITICAL
ACTION
In the light of the paradoxical political
development after the elections, when the formal losers took the
political initiative, there is one important question - the
mobilizing abilities of the different political formations. 1/5 of
the BSP supporters claim that they have participated in mass
political events before the elections and only 6% - after them.
This strong activity decline confirms the rather passive character
of BSP supporters. There is some activity decline among UDF
adherents, but it is on a different level. More than 40% have taken
part in mass political actions in the election campaign and 1/4 -
in the period after it. The orientation towards extraparliamentary
political activities is seen in answers to the question - "Where
must the political struggle, take place?" Only 19% of UDF voters
think that politics should be confined to the Parliament building;
6% think just the opposite and 75%, combine the two kinds of
politics -"street" and parliamentary. Dealing with BSP supporters
the situation is different: 59% want politics to be carried on only
in Parliament, supporters of "street" politics are at 4.4%; 37%
agree with the combination between "street" politics and politics
in Parliament. All of which confirms some comments after the
elections, according to which the BSP enjoys passive support only.
It does not have an electorate capable of being mobilized in
support of the politicians of the party in a situation of acute
political struggle. The UDF adherents have a strong orientation
towards extra-institutional political activity. This, combined with
the weak inclination to follow leaders, provides at least a part of
the explanation about the appearance of a "street" opposition
structurally autonomous from the UDF.
All of this is also evident in the attitude towards
the legitimacy of decisions imposed on the government the street
action. Half of the UDF adherents think of such decisions as
legitimate, while 66% of socialist supporters reject them. The
level of personal readiness to take place in "street" events in
order to impose decisions on the authorities is again different,
with 67% of UDF adherents willing to take part in such an action,
while among the others it is only 18%. The differences in the
mobilizational capacity for politics out of Parliament confirms the
basic conclusions out of the election results. Evidently,
dissatisfaction with the election results is a great stimulus for
extraparliamentary political activity for the UDF adherents.
There are great differences in opinion about the
role of the opposition in Parliament. 66% of BSP supporters think
that the role of the opposition is "to help the government", 65% of
opposition voters want their representatives "to be the vox populi"
in Parliament. The preference for this answer in comparison to "to
criticizing the government", speaks again of the fact that the
opposition does not accept the idea of limiting po1itics to
Parliament only. In the eyes of the opposition, the motions "out of
Parliament" and "in Parliament" form an unbroken political
continuum.
RELIGIONS AND ETHNIC GR0UPS
Our study elucidates some aspects of the political
behavior of the ethnocu1tural and religious groups in the country.
It is clear that Bulgaria isn't an exception to the general rule
evident in other countries of Eastern Europe: the abolition of
totalitarian oppression over national sentiment leads to a revival
of national consciousness in various communities. This process
seems natural for societies on the way to democracy, and just as
naturally leads to various perils.
In our case, the Bulgarian Turks and Pomaks
(Bulgarian speaking Moslems) are a representative sample.
Nevertheless, the obtained data and our analyses are only
preliminary, these groups not being the main object of this study.
The poll tries to establish some of the most characteristic types
of political behavior and attitudes of Turks and Pomaks in the
conditions of an ongoing ethnocultural crisis.
The first surprise came with the religious
orientations of the studied groups. 2% of the Turkish minority say
they are Christians; 1% - Catholics, 18% - atheists. From the Pomak
ethnocultural group 4.5% say they are Christians, and 31% -
atheists. These figures destroy the established stereotype,
according to which the Bulgarian Turks and the Pomaks are always
Moslems.
The Turkish and Pomak population lives main1y in the
countryside (69% and 64% respectively) and the population is poorly
educated (61% of the Turks are with primary education, only 2% have
higher education). In respect to their political organization, over
24% of the Turkish ethnic respondents and nearly 20% of Pomaks are
supporters of the MRF. 87% of Turks and 74% of Pomaks approve of
its activity. They opt "that this organization protects the
interests of a great part of the Bulgarian people". Only 3% of
Turks and 11% of Pomaks do not approve of this organization,
because "it favors outside interests". This attitude shows a
tendency towards ethnopolitical homogenization.
Under certain conditions this tendency could
stimulate confrontational attitudes in these two groups. These
conclusion are indirectly confirmed by two other factors: the
attitude of these groups towards the activity of their organization
and their participation in nationwide po1itical organizations like
the BSP and the UDF. More than 64% of Turks are not members of any
organization and only 12% are members of nationwide organizations.
With the Pomaks, the situation is different - 29% are members, and
51% are not. Gypsies are the least organized, 80% of them
participating in no political organization.
Preference for the MRF has its roots in Communist
policy on the national problem. This is corroborated by the
negative attitude towards the heirs of the BCP. The greater part of
these people shows distrust towards the activity of the BSP. They
see its electoral victory is a prelude to the restoration of old
injustices. On the other hand, negative attitudes towards the BSP
do not channel their sympathies towards the UDF, although the
1ater's sharpest criticism of the ruling party was on national
issues.
ARE THERE MACEDONIAN NATIONALS IN
BULGARIA?
One of the aims of this study was to provide answers
to the following questions:
- Is there a non-Bulgarian national consciousness
among the Christian S1avic popu1ation in Pirin Macedonia?
- What are the forms of expression and the relative
proportion of non-Bulgarian national consciousness?
- What is the attitude of other ethnic groups
towards the Macedonian problem?
The hypothesis for the existence of a separate
Macedonian national consciousness was not proved valid by direct
questioning: only 3 respondents (two of them living outside Pirin
Macedonia) see themselves as Macedonians by national affiliation.
This is statistically insignificant. It is natural to suppose that
forms of expression of Macedonian self-identification could be
rather less evident due to the decades of fear around the
nationalities problem. But they could be gauged in the degree of
support for the All-Macedonian Organization "Ilinden", an
organization that clearly supports a Macedonian identification.
Most respondents do not know the character and the program of the
Organization. Most tend to connect it in some way with the Ilinden
anti-Ottoman uprising of 1903.
This organization is not popular among the Bulgarian
voters only 9% approve of its activity.
The ethnic and religious minorities in the country
look rather more: favorably on "Ilinden" in spite of a similar
degree of lack of knowledge about it.
Attitude towards the "Ilinden" Organization
Approval Disapproval Don't Know/Don't Care
Bulgarians
Turks
|
8% 38% 54%
15% 9% 76%
|
Pomaks |
24% 21% 47% |
Others |
33% 11% 56% |
WHAT DOES THE STUDY SHOW ABOUT PIRIN
MACEDONIA?
The study gives the following ethnic correlation:
81% claim to be ethnic Bulgarians, 4% Turks, 10% Pomaks, 3%
Gypsies, and only 0.3% Macedonians. From this population, 77% are
(Orthodox) Christians, 5% belong to another Christian religion, and
18% are Moslems.
Having in mind the geographic proximity of the
source of "macedonism", and because of the socialist policy
concerning the Macedonian problem, the results change when we study
the attitude towards the "Ilinden" organization. 18% of the
respondents approve of its activity, 32% do not, 12% have no
opinion, and 37% are not acquainted with it. For comparison - in
the whole country 9% approve it and 34% do not. In Pirin Macedonia
itself, the data is different when concerning the attitude towards
other organizations based on ethnicity. The activity of the MRF is
approved by 24% of the respondents, and 46% do not approve of
it.
We may conclude that the "Ilinden" Organization is
"let to live" negatively, there being no real interest in its
activity and ideology among the population; and, on the other hand,
positively, because some minority groups approve of its activity on
the basis of their own already established stereotypes of political
behavior
GEOPOLITICAL PROJECTIONS
What about the attitude of the Bulgarians towards
the world and the processes of world politics and world economy?
Only a small part of the questions in the poll deals with foreign
problems, so the following analysis does not claim to be
comprehensive.
Generally speaking, the attitude towards the outside
world is a difficult problem for Bulgarians. It is bound up with
national difficulties in the past, and also with the crisis of
societies in Eastern European countries. It is obvious that, from a
geopolitical point of view, Bulgaria has to again change - as it
had to 45 years ago - the direction and the model of social
development under the impact of factors outside itself...
The data shows generally amorphous and
undifferentiated attitudes concerning international relations. This
fact correlates with the traditional isolation from the world, and,
on the other hand, with the strongly ideologized and inadequate
notion about the direction of processes in it. This makes it rather
difficult to gauge the international relations attitudes along the
"traditional - contemporary" axis. But it is evident that the
ideologized thinking in this sphere, which defines our place in the
world in the logic of "blocs", is on the way out. Only 14% want
Bulgaria to keep relations mainly with the Soviet Union, and 2% -
with the countries of the former Eastern Bloc. The pragmatic,
unideologized attitude is dominant - 57% prefer relations with all
countries, from which Bulgaria may benefit. It is obvious that this
includes maintaining relations with the Soviet Union, but these are
no longer treated within the logic of the notorious "unified blood
circulatory system".
The bipolar structure of the international community
is now destroyed and Bulgarians begin to understand their native
land as a separate country with its own specific interests as a
nation and as a state, which do not coincide with the interests of
its allies from the Warsaw Pact. To the question "Is there any
country threatening us?", 31% answer in the negative, for 30% the
answer is difficult; for 39% there is such a country, and for 3/4
of them that country is Turkey. Obviously these people relate the
threat to the specific geopolitical situation on the Balkans, and
not to the propagandist East - West confrontation. Another fact is
that 20% of think that in difficulties, our country mist rely on
itself: A greater part, 22%, see the Soviet Union as the country we
could rely on in hard times, and 13% think we should rely on
deve1oped Western countries. Of those 13/ the largest part, 4%,
indicate the Germany, 3% the USA, and 6% - the rest of the Western
world. These attitudes are new, given our ideological background,
although in fact they are projections of traditional, pre-communist
ones, submerged over the decades. Partly they should be a result of
the emerging geopolitical silhouette of unified Germany as a
European superpower.
Because of this change of orientation in
international relations thinking, to "get to Europe" is seen as an
economic necessity, and as the means to overcome the orienta1
backwardness of the country. This may explain the curious fact that
on1y 0.6% give preference to relations with the rich Arab
countries, where Bulgaria has considerable and we11 known
interests.
International relations attitudes correlate more or
less predictab1y with party sympathy. Among those who would rely on
the Soviet Union in case of difficulties, 73% are BSP supporters
and 13% are UDF supporters. Such an orientation is shown by 31% of
the BSP members and only by 2% of the UDF members. Active
preferences towards the developed Western countries are shown
largely by the UDF electorate and the inhabitants of Sofia and
other big cities. Among those, who would rely on Germany, 9% are
BSP voters and 77% UDF. For the USA the figures are, respectively,
5% and 80%.
On the other hand, it is a positive trait that
pragmatism in foreign affairs is not a monopoly of a given
political force. There is an even distribution among the BSP and
UDF voters, 39% and 40%, of those who think that good relations
should be kept with all countries where this is profitable. It is
this kind of pragmatic approach that would lead to stability and
predictability in Bulgarian foreign policies, and respect, by
foreign partners.
The ethnocultural composition of our nation also has
interesting geopolitical projections. The Pomaks and especially the
Turks show clearly different orientations from the nation as a
whole. The relative part of those preferring relations with the
Soviet Union is much lower, 4% among the Turks, and 6% among the
Pomaks, while the mean for the country is 14%. Supporting relations
with the Western countries are 8% of the Turks and 19% of the
pomaks, the mean for the country 20%. To the forefront come instead
the relations with the Balkan countries, 9% among the Turks give
this preference, and none of the Pomaks, the mean for the country
being 2%. The same holds for Turkey: 8% of the Turks and 2% of the
Pomaks, the mean for the country being 0.7%. The same groups show
greater, 2 - 3%, preference for the rich Arab countries, the
average being 0.6%. Obviously, this kind of attitude is a result of
religious and ethnocultural, and not of economical reasoning.
As opposed to attitudes in other spheres, the
international orientations of Bulgarians still have no immediate
expression in the field of social practice. These are mediated by
the international relations mechanism and the process of foreign
policy decision making. Only when this mechanism is sufficiently
democratized will our international policy actually correlate with
the dominating views and attitudes in the country.
POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL
STRUCTURES
In order to understand what in fact is the Bulgarian
nation as a political subject, we have to analyze values systems.
In our poll we tried to do this by using questions about religion
and God, and opinions concerning justice and freedom.
According to the data, more than a half, 52%, of
respondents believe in God. Very interesting and unexpected is the
distribution of the religious feeling in the various types of
areas. More than 60% of people in the countryside believe in God.
This is expected. The same is true about small towns. This is
somewhat less expected, but could still be explained, within the
old atheistic thinking by backwardness and mental proximity between
villages and small towns. However, in Sofia 55% declare themselves
believers. It is thus clear that the old explanation does not work.
It does not hold also for other big cities, where the religious are
exactly half of the population. Only in the moderately large towns
there is some dominance of unbelievers, 53% vs. 47%. While about a
half of the religious could be covered by explanations within
traditionalism, there evidently should be different explanations
for the rest. It looks very much as if two types of religious
cultures are beginning to take shape, which we will tentatively
call "traditional" and "new".
This conclusion is confirmed by the age distribution
of religious people. Most of them are above the age of 60, they
have been christened in the Orthodox re1igion, and have derived
their knowledge of religion in the pre-communist education system.
More than half of the youngest respondent group, those aged under
25, also declare belief in God. This is obviously nontraditional,
which has not been acquired by way of education or within the
family, but is the result of a conscious politically motivated
choice, conflicting with the former ideology of official atheism.
The less clear responses to this question from the generation
between 45 and 60 are possibly due to ideological fatigue.
The aged and rural population, believing in God so
to say by force of habit, without taking their own decision on the
problem, is the same population, from which the BSP draws its
support. At the same time the belief in God for the young, educated
urban population, supporting the UDF is another indication of
nontraditionalism, of conscious self-identification rejecting the
known reality. A possible conclusion would be that in their case
belief in God is part of the overall personal activism.
At the same time, it is clear that the formation of
the two types of religiosity ("traditional" and "poli1ically
motivated") is as yet unfinished. This is illustrated by the
distribution of religious people with respect to their educational
level, where the traditional picture is reproduced: the largest
part, almost 70%, is among the uneducated; 50% out of those with
secondary education, and only 40% of those with university
education declare belief in God.
Also familiar, although from Western research, is
the distribution of the re1igious peop1e along the political
spectrum. More than a half of the nonreligious have voted for the
BSP; the part of this electorate, declaring atheism, is almost 60%.
This is confirmed by European data which indicate that the "left"
political orientation is accompanied by increased proportion of
atheists, as well as by what has been already said of socialist
voters in this country willing to accept the officially promoted
thesis in the society, that there is no God. On the other hand,
more than 40% of the religious in the country have voted for the
UDF, among whose adherents believers are almost twice as many as
the atheists, 65% vs. 35%. As to the two other parliamentary
powers, it is quite to be expected that the largest part of
believers is shown by the electorate of the MRF, while for the APU
the level of religiousness is somewhere between the national
average and the "blue" opposition - close to 60%.
The differences between the adherents of the two
main political forces in connection with the value "freedom" are
rather clear. Surprising is the unexpected profile of the responses
nationwide: 57% of all voters accept the suggestion that "you have
freedom when everybody does whatever they want without violating
the law", while the alternative "when everybody bears in mind the
interest of the collective", designed to test collectivist
consciousness, gains only a fifth of the positive answers. The
structure within the electoral bodies is as follows. The first
variety, that freedom be restricted only by law, is chosen by 71%
of the UDF supporters, and by 49% of the adherents of the BSP.
Polar differences surface in the responses of the "collectivist"
variety: only 9% of UDF voters accept it as an expression of
freedom, while for the BSP these are 34%. The conclusion is that
the 1/5 of the population who see freedom in collectivist terms
tend to vote with the red bal1ot. However, in as far as
collectivism on this crucial question is a minority attitude, the
BSP strategists should avoid relying on it. Erosion of the
"collectivist" attitudes is likely to favour orientations towards
the UDF.
* * *
From a politological point of view the most
important point in such a study is to see how far the different
values systems form different political subcultures, and how
adequately these find expression in political formations operating
on the political arena. The degree of coherence among these three
levels would show the level of predictability and stability of the
po1itical situation as a whole.
There is a process of differentiation of two basic
values systems in the country: one inert, concentrated in smaller
settlements, in lower educated groups, and elderly people; and a
second, activist and individualistic, concentrated in younger age
groups and the inhabitants of major cities with higher educational
levels. These differences are re1atively adequately expressed in
the formation of two different political cultures, which can a1so
be expressed in terms of categories like inertia and activism,
collectivism and individualism. Finally, at present, the two
political subcultures are relatively adequately expressed by the
two political superpowers: BSP is the representative of the former,
while UDF is the carrier of the latter.
At the same time there should be no overestimation
of the separation of the two subcu1tures. It has yet to reach its
final shape. The two subcultures overlap along by many criteria.
They are to a similar extent egalitarian concerning the problems of
everyday life: people would accept deterioration in living
standards "if everybody bears it equally", respectively 27% of the
BSP electorate and 25% of that of the UDF. 48% in total say that
there should be no poor or rich, while 31% would agree to this
social differentiation. This reservoir of egalitarianism is by no
means small, and it is accompanied by considerable skepticism
regarding the sufficiency of institutionalized forms of political
activity. 59% of the respondents admit that political struggle can
take place also outside the National Assembly. On the other hand,
the electorate is evenly distributed with regard to more specific
activities: 41% think that strikes and rallies are inevitab1e, and
39% would take part personally. Those, who don't accept these
options are 40% and 40%, respectively. In the as yet unclear
political situation in the country, there are sufficient conditions
for a populist exp1osion.
Around half of the electorate is probably trying to
avoid the positions of extreme polarizatiori. This supports the
hypothesis that there exists a hidden desire for "centrism".
Squeezed as it is between the two political superpowers, and in the
conditions of growing social and economical instability, this
attitude finds neither adequate political or party expression, nor
indeed has become conscious of being politically centrist.
And so, where to after the "dark room"? The
situation is not likely to offer very much of a choice. Thus far
the rapid political structuration of all emerging social impulses
has helped us to avoid the "Romanian variation" of the
transformation beyond tota1itarianism. We should try to avoid
cardinal discrepancies between value orientations, political
attitudes, and their representation at a national level by way of
political parties. The political community has to convince the
nation in its competence to realize in practice the expectations of
the people. What is needed now is political consensus about the
principles of democratic transformation - and not acute debates on
the ultimate goals. This is, possibly, the main responsibility of
today's politicians of Bulgaria.
Published in "Kultura", August 17, 1990, Sofia,
Bulgaria
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