It would seem that today the basic problem is one of
the content of the transition. This is frequently being reduced to
the opposition "communist totalitarianism - Western democracy". And
this is easy to explain from the point of view of psychology. But
this superficially self-evident opposition must not lead us to the
over-simplification of the problem of democracy.
There are at least two reasons that should make us
enter more deeply into the complexities of the problem. The first
is the fact that communism in Bulgaria did not appear out of the
blue. It did manage to find suitable and stable terrain in our
national reality because it answered - or seemed to answer - the
social expectations and needs of large enough sections of the
population. Communist ideas were not simply something "imported"
from the outside, but found an active and a relatively mass social
carrier who, although in reduced form, still exists today.
Moreover, social expectations connected with social justice and
equality continue to define the political behavior of large socia1
communities despite their disi11usion with the non-attainment of
the original ideals. Second, there are the difficulties that have
plagued Bulgarian society every time that it has attempted to
internalize foreign democratic experience as an element of its own
modernization. Such attempts have been present throughout our
history from the Liberation from Turkish rule (1878) onwards. But
they have frequently led to results opposite to the original "good
intentions" due to the resistance of the local national reality
masked under a certain" traditional authoritarianism".
For these reasons, the definition of the transition
to democracy as "a transition from Eastern communism to Western
democracy" is an overly problematic one. The democratization of
society can be defined as a complex, multi-leveled process of
simultaneous deconstruction of authoritarian and totalitarian
"traditional" mechanisms, and the construction (massovization and
implantation) of democratic structures and mechanisms into the
social self-regulation process. In the particular circumstances of
today's Bulgaria this would mean not only the deconstruction of
totalitarian communism which, after all, was up to a point based
organically on a set of traditional values (the primacy of the
community over the individual, the uncritical acceptance of the
authority of the established powers, ethnocentricity). The
transition to democracy also means an intensification of the
process of modernization, of the opening up to the world, of the
establishment of the autonomy of the individual, of personal
initiative, civic responsibility, pluralism and tolerance.
The process of democratization is also a process of
the creation and enlargement of guarantees for human rights. The
scope of effective guarantees for the rights of man (political,
civic, social, economic) is to a great extent the main indication
of the democratic nature of a society. In this sense, the
transition to democracy leads to the society aimed at by the
majority of the people, a society of liberty, justice, human
rights, only if democratization does not transgress human rights,
if it is carried out within bounds that do not threaten with
destruction social links, that do not lead to the falling apart and
atomization of the community. Democratic change means also the
break down of the old kind of stability, in a way it is the
destabilization of the "old" society. This all makes sense as long
as it takes place in a civilized manner, avoiding societal
violence. In this is the stabilization function of the transition
itself.
The stability of the transition to democracy depends
on a multitude of factors: the effectiveness of democratic
institutions, the degree of entry into the social tissue of
democratic mechanisms and procedures, the scope of support for the
democratic changes. The transition to democracy will inevitably
have its social price. It would seem that sacrifices will be needed
in the economic sphere; many people will be personally adversely
affected by the changes, others will have to change drastically the
set patterns of their lives, based on the expectation of the poor
that things should be done for them. Above all, the stability of
democratic change depends on the social consensus around the
underlying principles of the transition. The degree of this
necessary consensus can be measured by the "present societal
tolerance" (to other opinions, to differences, to the sacrifices
necessary).
This socio-psychological basis of the stabilization
of the transition to democracy were to a great extent the subject
of the studies undertaken by the Center for the Study of Democracy
in May and July of 1990. The part of the analyses of the
sociological data, originally published in the weekly "Kultura", is
presented in this pamphlet. It may form an effective basis for the
discussion of the problems of the stabilization of Bu1garia's
democratic transition.
THE POLITICAL CHANGE IN BULGARIA
PRE-ELECTORIAL ATTITUDES
During the fall of 1989 the democratic process in
Eastern Europe reached a new qualitative stage. State socialism was
rejected, a drive for reintegration into Europe became
characteristic. These trends continue to feed radical
transformations of public consciousness.
The changes in Poland, GDR, Hungary, Slovenia, and
Croatia are already legitimized in e1ection results. The pendulum
of political awareness there moved abruptly to the "right": the
se1f-identification against the state socialism was expressed in a
vote against the communist parties, commonly understood as its
carriers. A significant role in this process is played by the
reincarnation of the "mid-European idea" as a political priority in
Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia,
We observe no such clarity and definition in the
changes on the Balkans. The Union of Yugoslav Communists is still
on the political stage of Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Ion
Iliescu, accused of crypto-communism by the opposition, and the
Front for National Salvation under his leadership overwhelmingly
won the elections. Changes in Bulgaria also have their own logic.
There are sound historical, geopolitical, and psychological reasons
for this. First, in the 112-year long history of the Third
Bulgarian state Bulgarians have repeatedly shown themselves as
bound by conservatism and loyalty to ruling institutions. As a
result, ruling parties in Bulgaria have very rarely lost free
parliamentary elections. Second, the Eastern Orthodox church, as in
the whole Orthodox region, i,e. Russia, Serbia, Montenegro,
Macedonia, Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria, does not form an
independent social power, capab1e of affecting the course of
political events. Third, Bulgaria in the after-War period has no
tradition of social and political conflicts like those rocking the
GDR, Poland and Hungary; there is no experience like the "Prague
spring", or the ten years of Solidarnosc. The alienation between
ru1ers and ruled is therefore less acute. Fourth, the traditional
egalitarism of Bulgarian people and the traditional lack of radical
social differentiation in Bulgaria give rise to values which have
become associated with, and still feed the "socialist" wing in
political life. Fifth, tense relations with Turkey during the last
years naturally generate an inclination to maintain stable
relations with the Soviet Union, seen as a necessary foreign
political guarantee and a habitual economical partner, which on the
other hand determines a moderate nature of all political forces in
Bulgaria. Last, but not least the ruling party made serious
attempts for a reform "from above".
Consequently, Bulgarians do not evince the extent of
rejection of the state socialism characteristic for most East
Europeans. However multifaceted, the current political situation in
Bulgaria (33 single parties and 5 political blocs registered for
the coming elections) is dominated by two main political forces:
the Union of Democratic Forces, and the Bulgarian Socialist Party.
The specific question put to the country today is which of these
two political forces will manage to gain the confidence of the
voters.
POLARIZATION OF PREFERENCES
This opinions poll was carried out more than 20 days
before the actual vote. The majority of voters, however, had
already made their choice - 82% of respondents declare a vote
preference (at the beginning of the year, more than 30% declared
indecision). 12% of the electorate are still in indecision and this
part will have to be watched carefu11y at the last stage of the
campaign. Some 4% have definitely decided not to vote.
This, certain!y, does not mean that attitudes within
the separate groups of followers of one or another political force
are frozen and are no longer subject of serious variations. The
unstable ba1ance of forces contains the possibility of
reorientation under the impact of even a single major political
event. This kind of change, however, could scarcely affect
electoral campaigning, or change the number of abstentions from
political life. We expect the majority of Bulgarian voters, more
than 80%, to take part in the elections. Parliamentary elections in
Western Europe are attended normally by 70 - 80% of the voters, and
those in the U.S.A. by 50 - 60%.
The results of the opinion polls show a relatively
high degree of political polarization. More than 70% of the voters
are definite1y oriented to one of the two major political forces -
the Socialists and the UDF. Polarization is additionally indicated
by the fact that supporters of the one almost without exceptions
reject decidedly the possibility of voting for the opponents. This
kind of separation in the political attitudes of the society will
have its effect not only in the results of the elections, but also
in the stratification and stabilization of the political spectrum
in the country.
Opinion polls over the last three months show that
the polarization increases, the number of hesitating voters
diminishes, and the blocs "congeal". We are certainly aware of
risks invo1ved in comparing data from various polls at various
moments. We therefore give the data not for direct comparison, but
for a general orientation.
Total Percentage of Supporters of
BSP and UDF |
|
Jan '90 Institute of Sociology Poll |
50.8 |
Mar '90 Nationa1 Opinion
Research Center Poll |
61.2 |
Apr '90 National Opinion Research
Center Poll |
70.4 |
May '90 Center for the Study of
Democracy Poll |
70.7 |
The polarization is now at its culmination, for the
campaign started very early. There are however indications of some
decrease of tension between the two extremes, BSP and the UDF. The
rallies are now a familiar feature and no 1onger provoke sharp
reaction; aggressive behavior is marginalized. An important point
is the relative consolidation of the electorate of the Agrarian
Popular Union - an alternative to the harsh opposition between BSP
and the UDF.
Percentage of APU Supporters
|
|
Jan '90 Institute of Sociology
Poll |
8.8 |
Apr '90 National Opinion Research
Center Poll |
9.5 |
May '90 Center for the Study of
Democracy Poll |
12.6 |
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL BLOCS
We consider political blocs as consisting of nucleus
and periphery. The nucleus consists of "ideologists", supposed to
produce the positive ideas, and the peripheral consists rather of
"practitioners", supposed to implement the differentiation from the
others, from the opponents. Thus the congealment, of the blocks may
be grasped as the transition of activity from the nuclei to the
peripheries. What is the reason? The nucleus - the strongly
ideologically minded members of the two blocs - is a compact, but
minor formation, incapable of attracting large masses at least for
two reasons:
- for the BSP - crisis of the whole complex of
traditional ideas;
- for the UDF - nonconvergent positive ideas for the
Union as a whole.
Understanding of these facts clarifies also the
increased significance of the peripheries, the "opponents of the
rival", to the extent of rep1acement of the nucleus by the
periphery. For example, the UDF identifies itse1f more and more as
"non-BSP", while BSP attracts "non-UDF" attitudes. The two blocs
retain the distant nuclei and develop a homogeneous, though
mutually antagonistic peripheral, that is, they become strongly
polarized and conflicting. In the situation the "nucleus" is
attempting to encompass the "peripheral", and not to consolidate it
around itself but to superimpose some definite political frame. The
main role in the case belongs to negative, rather than to positive
ideas, to the syndrome of fear of the "enemy".
In this sense, the two blocs BSP and UDF are to a
considerable extent fictitious. They do not represent deep social
separation or patterns of rivalry. Nevertheless the opposition of
BSP and UDF is an expression, though deformed or "displaced", of a
significant social schism. The data indicate that the periphery of
the BSP is more conservative than the nucleus, whereas the
periphery of the UDF is more extreme than the nucleus. Therefore
the bloc of BSP seems more stable while that of UDF - more dynamic.
The bloc of BSP is endangered by breakdown of the connections
between the nucleus and the centrist conservative peripheral. Most
probably, this periphery will keep its entirety while shifting to
the right in the search of its genuine nucleus.
The UDF bloc is endangered by an explosion of the
consolidating nucleus. After this kind of explosion the
corresponding pieces of the periphery, each following its own path,
will possibly distribute over the left - right scale.
The extent of politica1 polarization is most clearly
manifested by the "negative" voters' attitudes given by the answers
to the question "Which party you would not vote for?" This sets
limits to the blocks BSP and UDF. 33% out of all responses reject a
vote for the BSP, 35% for the UDF. The negative responses for each
of the remaining political forces do not reach 5%.
ELECTORAL BORDERS OF THE POLITICAL BLOCS
The above considerations in the abstract set the
probable upper bounds of influence (for the BSP, 37 - 44%, for the
UDF 35 - 41%). They surprisingly coincide with the limits allowed
by the poll for the percentage of voters of the two political
forces, 37 - 43% for the BSP, and 28 - 33% for the UDF, where the
potential to win additional supporters is larger for the UDF. BSP
has already reached the upper limits of its potential electorate.
The two forces could safely compete for at least 8% of the people
in indecision, of which ca. 1% for the Socialists and 7% for the
UDF, building up their electorate on the basis of fear of the
political opponent.
The poll shows a relatively high prevalence of
authoritarian trends among the voters. 29% of the responses include
outlawing of a party, and 64% do not. The intention to prohibit a
party shows attitudes to solve political problems by
"administrative" means. Moreover, the amount of "outlawers" is
about the same in the electorate of the Socialists as well as in
the electorate of the UDF.
The polarization of election attitudes forms the
ground for distrust and fear of the political opponents. A primary
expression of this fear is the anticipated "settling of accounts".
43% of the potential UDF voters expect that, in the event of
victory the Socialists will seek retaliation over the opponents.
The same for the UDF is expected by 49% of the potential BSP
voters. As about the voters of the APU on the other hand, only 28%
out of these expect setting of accounts by any side. It is
indicative, that there are people from the two blocs, BSP and UDF,
expecting their own parties to conduct witch hunts in case of
taking power. This indicates aggressive attitudes. The number of
potentially aggressive supporters of the Socialists and the UDF is
approximately equal. Although being a minority, these people
support their parties in the confidence that, after the victory,
the party will take revenge over the political opponents and,
possibly, they support it exactly for this reason. It seems that
each bloc faces the necessity to control its own extremists, not
least because their activity has as the ultimate effect the
consolidation of the opposing bloc.
POTENTIAL POLITICAL CENTER?
There exists a "hidden" bloc of voters with centrist
attitudes, which is not represented politically, and is not
situated between the BSP and the UDF but rather opposes the
confrontation between these. The authoritarian and egalitarian
attitude in the mass of Bulgarian voters prevented the formation of
a third force in the short time after Nov. 10, 1989, capable of
serving as a political center. At the moment, the APU is scarcely
able to play this role, and the existing social democratic and
centrist trends in society are only expected to consolidate.
Nevertheless, there are supporters of a coalition government,
whatever its formula, which increases over time:
Percentage Supporters of Coalition
Government
Apr '90 |
State Department of
Statistics Poll 42% |
May '90 |
University of Sofia Po11 |
45% |
May '90 |
Center for the Study of Democracy
Poll |
48% |
The poll of the Center for the Study of Democracy
shows in particular enviable tolerance and realism among the voters
with regard to the future government. Only 10% of the respondents
support unipartite government of the Socialists, and 6% for a UDF
one. It is significant that 26% of the responses consider the
solution of Bulgarian problems only possible by a government of
professionals, independent of party attitudes. A coalition
dominated by the BSP is preferred by 18% of respondents. A
coalition dominated by the UDF is preferred by 13% of the voters,
whi1e a coalition, dominated by the APU is preferred by 7%. In
total, 73% of voters are against unipartite government; 11% give no
preference, and only 16% favour it.
The opinions of the different groups about the best
government team are significantly different. 21% of BSP voters
believe that a unipartite government of BSP would be able to solve
the problems, and 41% favour a coalition dominated by the
Socialists. 21% of BSP voters favour a government of experts. Of
UDF voters, 18% prefer their "own" government, 36% favour a
coalition dominated by the UDF, and 30% an expert government.
Indicative is the relatively small number of BSP voters preferring
a politically non-aligned expert government - about the same as
preferring unipartite government and almost two times less than
those preferring a coalition dominated by the Socialists. Among UDF
sympathizers coalition government is approximately equally popular
as an expert government.
The attitudes of potential voters of the Socialists
and of the UDF are in some aspects astonishingly close. The
sympathizers of both forces estimate the possibilities for a
coalition between the BSP and the UDF as relatively small, 9% of
the sympathizers of the Socialists, and 9.4% of the electorate of
the UDF. On the other hand, attitudes in the two opposing political
forces in favour of a coalition are twice stronger than those for
unipartite governments. These attitudes give reason to believe
that, in the longer term, the potential centrist bloc will gain
stronger influence in the transitions to a democratic social
structure.
POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS AND VALUES
The collected data make possible a preliminary and
approximate determination of the trends and local features of the
political consciousness and value priorities among the voters of
the major political forces. Obvious is the absence of homogeneity
within these groups. In spite of this, there is a polarization of
opinion in the treatment of the major problems of the country and
the society.
EVALUATION OF THE PAST
The evaluation of the Bulgarian society in which we
1ived before Nov. 10, '89 is of interest. 45% of the sympathizers
of the BSP give a global evaluation as "better than the Western
societies", 25% evaluate it as worse, and 30% see in it good and
bad features. Among the positive characteristics most approved are
"there was no unemployment and the people felt secure", and "there
was order in the country". Older people frequently agree with
"society was a socia1ist one". As for the negative evaluations of
"real socialism", most frequently mentioned by supporters of the
BSP is the opinion "equality was only verbal".
The supporters of the APU are considerably more
critical, 49% of them preferring the negative evaluations, 29% see
good and bad features of the society, and only 22% of them consider
it better than the Western societies.
Negative evaluation from supporters of the UDF
dominate in 82% of given responses, and only 19% see some features
giving advantages compared to the West. Among the opinions given
most frequently are those confirming the absence of freedom and
justice, as well as "the verbal equality" and the indisputable
acknowledgment that "the life in the West is better". This kind of
data lead to the opinion that political separation in Bulgaria is
considerably less ideological than observed in the everyday life -
people are oriented to specific, earthly issues.
THE BLAME FOR THE CRISIS
UDF sympathizers find the blame mostly in the
"communist party (now BSP)", 64%. About a third of APU voters a1so
adopt this statement as closest to the truth, while only 7% of the
sympathizers of the BSP see the blame in the party preferred by
themselves. Considerable variations exist also with respect to the
statement "the blame lies in our connections with the USSR". This
is supported by 35% of the voters of the UDF and only by 8% of
those of the BSP. Relatively high agreement meets only the
statement "guilty are Todor Zhivkov and his mafia". This answer is
approved by 60% of potential voters of the BSP, and by 64% of the
UDF. 69% of the sympathizers of the APU also prefer this
answer.
The least accused of the current crisis is the
opposition, by 5% of the voters of the BSP and 2% of those of the
APU. The nostalgia for "real socialism" is rarely represented. "The
reforms of Gorbachev, weakening socialism", and "the actions of
wor1d imperialism" are mentioned respectively by only 7% and 6% of
the responses as the preferred answer by sympathizers of the
BSP.
Most valued in this context should be the.reaction
to the statement "we all share the blame, though some to a smaller
extent, and others to a larger". Willing to share the
responsibility for the crisis are 60% of the voters of the BSP, 34%
of those of the UDF, and 44% of those of the APU.
LOYALTY TO ESTABLISHED AUTHORITY
Loyalty to established authority is a crucial
problem from the viewpoint of manageability of a society. In the
conditions of shattered authorities and polarized political
prejudices, power is frequently associated with violence. Various
attitudes arise thereof on the condition which party is in power,
one's "own" or the opponent. The major political forces show
margina1 intolerance to the possible rule of opponent parties. The
parts of sympathizers of BSP, APU, and UDF declaring that they will
hamper the government of the political opponent as far as possible,
in order to cause extraordinary elections, are very small. The part
of obeying opponents rule, but opposing everything in their
politics they don't accept will be 70% of BSP members, 52% of APU
members, and 75% of the UDF members. This somehow indicates larger
inclination to opposition activity among the supporters of the UDF.
On the contrary, only 6% of the UDF members would obey the
opponents on1y because these are at power. The latter percentage
for the members of the BSP is 25, and for the members of the APU,
45.
EXTENT OF PARTY POLITICAL A11EGIANCE
To the question, would you take part in a mass
action of your party you don't approve of, 31% of those decided to
vote for the BSP answer in the positive because "unity is
important", 13% because "leaders certainly know better", and 49%
wouldn't take part for they stick to their own opinion, but would
continue to support their party. Among the potential voters of the
APU, the answers are similar: 27% for the first one, 18% for the
second, and 42% for the third. The picture is significantly
different among the sympathizers of the UDF. For the sake of the
unity, willing to take part in an action they don't approve of are
22%, only 9% would obey 1eaders' authority, and 57% wouldn't
participate, but wou1d continue to support their organizations.
Unpopular action of the respective party would be a reason to
abandon it to avoid further compromise for 3% of BSP supporters, 7%
of APU sympathizers, and 9% of UDF supporters.
SELF-CONFIDENCE AND SELF-DECEPTION
The representatives of various political forces show
various extents of confidence in the victory of their own party.
The information for this is provided by the comparison of the
answers about the attitudes of the questioned, and their prognoses
for the probable winner in the forthcoming elections. Most
se1f-confident in this respect are the sympathizers of the BSP, 96%
of these are of the opinion that BSP would win. A victory of the
UDF expect only 3% of future BSP voters.
Somewhat more withdrawn in this respect are the
supporters of the UDF. Among the people intending to vote for the
UDF, a victory is expected by 82%, and 16% expect a victory of the
BSP. Apart from realism, this speaks also for an ideological
motivation of their pre-election attitudes. They have made their
decision in favour of the UDF completely consciously, accepting the
possibility of a defeat of the supported political force.
MAIN FEATURES OF THE SOCIO1OGICAL STRUCTURE
Although in rough contours, the poll does present
some major features of the sociological structure of the main
groups of voters. The first conclusion in this direction is that
workers in the production sphere (industry, transportation,
agriculture, construction, etc.) are the basic and almost equal
constituent of the leading political forces. In the BSP these are
42%, in the UDF, 44%, and in the APU, 42%.
Similar proportions are found also for the group of
state administration. Its representatives constitute 11% of the
voters of the BSP, 11% of the voters of the UDF, and 10% of the
voters of the APU. The two main political forces are almost equa1ly
represented among the technical and engineering intelligentsia,
teachers, architects, etc.
The collected data give no basis to a conclusion
concerning correlations of social or professional status and
attitudes to support one or another political force.
The educational structure of the voters of the two
major political is of definite interest, since a clear correlation
is observed between the educational level and political attitudes.
In general, preferences for the BSP decrease with higher
educational level. Increased educationa1 level, vice versa,
correlates with increased preferences for the UDF. High school
licentiates, supporting the BSP, are by 13% less than those with
only basic education and the same political orientation. High
school licentiates, supporting the UDF, are respectively by the
same percentage more than the supporters with basic education. 50%
of the questioned high school licentiates prefer the UDF against
39% preferring the BSP. Relatively similar are the political
attitudes among the gymnasium and technical gymnasium absolvents,
while 52% of those with basic education declare support for the
BSP.
There is relatively clear interdependency of
political membership and age. Increased age correlates with
increased number of supporters of the BSP. This is reflected also
in the educational level: those with only basic or lower
educational level are in their majority elder peop1e. Among the
supporters of the UDF is valid the opposite correlation. The voters
under 45 constitute 72% of the total amount of its supporters among
the questioned. Below the same level of age are 48% of the
supporters of the BSP.
Intelligentsia Facing the Choice
Agrarian Popular Union |
5.4% |
Alternative Socialist Party |
3.0% |
Bulgarian Socialist Party |
39.1% |
Union of Democratic Forces |
50.2% |
Published in "Kultura", June 7 1990,
Sofia, Bulgaria
|