In July 1990 the Center for the Study of Democracy
carried out a post-election opinion poll study of the political
orientations of the Bulgarian electorate. The study used the method
of the direct questionnaire, carried out on a random sample of
about 3 000. Parallel with this study, the Center carried out a
testing for the values orientation of the respondents. The test was
a kind of continuation of the questionnaire, was targeted at the
same respondents at the same time as the poll itself.
In contrast with the multitude of opinion polls in
this country, aiming as they do at an "instant photograph" of the
state of the public mind at a certain time and in a certain
situation, the test attempts to capture a more long-term
orientation of Bulgarians vis-a-vis certain values and combinations
of values. This makes for a more thorough interpretation of the
results, for the outlining of a certain socio-psychological field
over which are played out the present day political processes of
this country. The testing was carried out also among par1iamentary
deputies at the Grand National Assembly with the aim of comparing
the values orientations of the electorate and of its elected
representatives. The primary analysis was focused on the different
pairs of answers, and then the data was generalized for a clearer
overview. The pairs analysis makes it possible to capture the
orientation of different communities (demographic and political) to
the basic values presented in the test. The analysis of the test as
a whole enabled us to come to a preliminary distribution of voters
and deputies along three basic groups, called by us "conservative",
"liberal" and "moderate".
The following analysis of the test is part of the
Center's program "Bulgarian Political Life".
The test contained nine pairs of opposing
statements: 1) Different enthnicity hinders (does not hinder) real
friendship; 2) The airing of French and American programs on
Bulgarian TV places us under foreign domination {expands our
knowledge of the world); 3) It is inadmissible (it is normal) for
journalists to reveal to the public the weaknesses and defects of
political leaders; 4) The introduction of strip-tease in the
country is immoral (normal); 5) Money corrupts (is the best of all
known stimuli); 6) The cohabitation of unmarried people of the
opposite sex is something quite normal (indecent); 7) In my work, I
prefer to define myself the aims and conditions of the work (I
prefer for others to set the working conditions and present me with
tasks); 8). The motherland is where one feels best (emigration saps
the prestige and is inimical to the national interests of
Bulgaria); 9) Private property everywhere and always leads to
exploitation (is the precondition for the free expression of the
individual).
One side of each pair of statements was intended to
be an indicator of a "conservative" inclination (a preference for
what is established, traditional), and the other, of a "liberal"
disposition (a preference for what is new, modern). The respondent
was asked to state the degree of agreement with one or the other.
At the directly evident level of "old-new" is situated the general
inclination towards the transcendence of the "settled reality" (of
the "old"), and towards a change aiming at a new state of affairs,
frequently seen as identified with the West, or, at least, with the
general knowledge about things in the West (the "new"). At a deeper
level ("modern-traditional") we believe that the responses reveal
dispositions towards an openness, respect of autonomy and personal
liberty, openness towards new values, towards the world - or, vice
versa, a striving for a "closed", "traditional" society.
As a first approach to the state of mind of the
nation, we will concentrate on the "new-old" aspect. For "old" we
take identification with the tenets of the old regime, underpinning
the authoritarian consensus which made the regime more or less
stable. Preference for the opposing values is taken to mean a
negation of the "old" and an orientation toward the "new".
VALUES AND POLITICAL CHOICE
The nine pairs of statements outline four "values
fields" that have been present in the minds of Bulgarians over the
last 100 or so years. At the same time, they continue to be present
in the political debate today, they form important.symbols of the
political struggle. The test aimed at capturing values connected
with the national idea, social authorities, morality and property.
In further analyses we will treat the test for other basic values
like freedom and justice.
THE NATIONAL IDEA
The na1ional idea has always been a painful tangle
in the mass mind and politics in this country from the Liberation
from Turkish rule onwards. Today, the problems relating to the
national unity and national identity have become exacerbated due to
the non-solution of national and ethnic problems, and as the
outcome of a political polarization in which various political
forces use nationalist motifs for their own political ends.
And yet, on the level of individual consciousness,
the "national problem" does not look a11 that dramatic. It is to be
noted that the different electorates, and parliamentarians as a
whole evince an enviable level of tolerance: all of these groups
overwhelmingly agree that different ethnicity cannot be a barrier
to friendship. And this kind of result is not surprising: Bulgaria
has a long history of ethnic tolerance (there is the mass sympathy
for Armenian refugees in the beginning of the century, the
defending of Bulgarian Jews during the Second World War, and the
absence of ethnic strife in the new history of the country). What
ethnic conflicts there are, they do not seem to start on a personal
level. For example, 85% of MRF* electors believe that
people belonging to different ethnic communities can be real
friends. The group contradictions between Bulgarians and ethnic
Turks are to a great extent the result of the policy of
"renaissance" (the forcible re-naming of ethnic Turks with
Christian names) of the old regime.
Nevertheless, the inter-personal level is subsumed
in artificially stirred intercommunal conflicts. Possibly because
of this, the attitude to the motherland becomes the most sensitive
element in the values profile of the political communities.
Deputies both from the BSP** and from the
UDF*** declare a greater "love for the motherland" than
their electors, choosing the option that emigration is inimical to
the national interests and saps the prestige of the country. This
may be interpreted in two ways: as a rejection of the freedom of
movement and domicile, or as the expression of the fear that mass
emigration may depopulate the nation. But the very choice of one or
the other interpretation is an indicator of a different type of
disposition: one that has as its starting point the interests of
the co11ective body (anti individualism), or of the state
(etatism). As a whole, the above statement is very popular in all
groups. The exception is the MRF electorate, but this is less
likely to be an expression of individualism than of a collective
psychological rejection of a state authority which is held
responsible for the suffering of the ethnic Turkish minority. The
forcefully expressed apprehension about the wholeness of the
motherland on the part of the two leading parliamentary groups (UDF
and BSP) is an indication of "statesman's thinking" as the result
of their presence in the structures of power. Apart from the
internalized responsibility for the fate of the whole, this may
also be an expression of the "managerial corporate spirit", of the
attempt to hold on to the mass of "ruled" sapped in numbers by
emigration.
The declared preference for living in one's home
country seems in conflict with the mass utopia called "Europe" (the
"common European home", "European United States" and other popular
ideas of that ilk). But the pair of statements which captures the
degree of openness to the world throws light on this contradiction.
The high percentage of people interested in foreign TV programs
points not only to the falling away of the ideological curtain, but
also to the age-old Bulgarian drive for integration into Europe
(the "complex of the periphery"). Between the two types of
integration - personal emigration and welcoming of foreign culture
- most Bulgarians choose the second: not for us BULGARIANS to go to
Europe, but to let EUROPE into our impoverished home. There is the
possibility of a third kind of interpretation of hostility towards
foreign culture: the opposition to the commercialization and
"Americanization" of culture. But this can only apply in the case
of a small group of intellectuals who have chosen the apparently
conservative option about foreign cultural dependence due to an
attempt to preserve the national cultural heritage and
identity.
SOCIAL AUTHORITIES
Until recently we all knew that "power belongs to
the people". Because of this tenet, many were inclined to forgive
the rulers their misdeeds, or simply to remain si1ent even when the
actions of the rulers violated the interests of the ruled. We all
expected constantly to "receive something", to be "given
something". The abandonment of this passive attitude is an
expression of a disposition in favour of the "new".
"I prefer to define myself the conditions and aims
of my work" - this is an active, searching option. From the point
of view of the "work discipline" propagated until recently, this is
an "underground" statement. Whereas the choice of the opposite is
almost certainly a preference for the old state of affairs, and for
the implicit acceptance of the authority of the powers that be.
The vast majority of BSP deputies (92%) arid of UDF
deputies (97%) prefer to be in charge of their working conditions
(leaders will be leaders...). But the electors of the BSP,
APU* and the MRF evince a more collectivistic
disposition, sharply contrasting with the electorate of the
UDF.
Something similar can be seen in the question about
the right of journalists to reveal weaknesses in leaders. Until
recently, the details of the private life of political 1eaders were
sacrosanct, and their revelation was actionable in law. 86% of UDF
deputies stand on the platform of public criticism and revelation
of weaknesses, followed by 80% of their electors. The voters of the
other three major political forces, and the BSP deputies evince a
more lukewarm attitude to the freedom of journalistic inquiry -
possibly influenced by the fear of de-heroization and the ultimate
threat of revelation that the King has no clothes on. On the other
hand, the high proportion of the electorate which demands to know
everything about the leaders is an indicator of a certain amount of
populism in the nation: the leaders are again set apart from other
people and are seen as something "unusual", "extraordinary". This
demand "to know a11" may also signify a lack of respect for the
autonomy and the secrets of the individual. We should be wary of
coming to a clear conclusion about people, possibly not very many,
who desire to shield from the glare of publicity the personal
weaknesses of political leaders.
MORALITY
The traditionalism of contemporary Bulgarian society
is possibly to be seen at its clearest in the responses concerning
strip-tease and cohabitation outside marriage. Strip-tease is seen
as amoral by 39% of respondents (the lowest proportion is among UDF
voters - 26%, and the highest, 51%, in the BSP "electorate).
Cohabitation outside marriage is rejected by 39% of the population,
with the highest percentage again being in the BSP electorate, 54%,
and the lowest, in the UDF electorate at 26%.
These subjects were treated firmly under the. old
regime. Striptease has always been connected with the image of the
"decadent West". In a way, striptease together with prostitution
(and in the public mind the two are often confused) was made a
symbo1 of exploitation. In this way, traditional morality had
become the official one.
Again, the cohabitation question a1so targets the
official morality of the old regime. The fami1y, even at the
expense of the official proclamations of the "founding fathers" of
communism, was proclaimed by the regime an almost official state
institution. ("the most fundamental cell of society").
In relation to these two questions, the BSP
electorate on the one hand, and the UDF electorate plus most
parliarnentarians on the other, represent two different cultural
standards: the first we could call "ascetic (tradi1ional) and the
second, "hedonistic" (modern).
From the point of view of the old/new divide, the
picture here is not all too clear. In the West itself, in this
country taken as the "new", the "modern", public opinion is split
on these issues. In our case it is important that personal
rejection does not take on the character of official
prohibition.
PROPERTY
As of at least 150 years, the question of property
has been the great divide in European societies. Today's Bulgaria
is no exception. Private property has sound grounds to claim to be
the basic va1ues divide in the nation: UDF electors who believe
private property to be a precondition for personal liberty are
two-fold over the proportion of BSP electors of the same opinion.
Despite the fact that in the BSP pre-election platform private
property was declared to have a legitimate presence in "democratic
socialism", most of the socialist electorate continues to associate
private property with exploitation. On the other hand, the UDF
electorate sees private property as a panacea for all national
ills.
To a great extent the attitude to private property
is similar to the attitude to money. BSP and UDF parliamentarians,
as well as the UDF e1ectorate are all agreed that money is the best
stimulus for human initiative. On the opposite pole cluster the
electorates of the BSP, MRF and APU, who tend to believe that money
corrupts. In this we see the traditional egalitarianism and the
moral approach to money. In our traditional culture, money is
endowed with mystic characteristics, it is seen to have a
hedonistic potential which threatens egalitarian inclinations. On
the other hand, the traditional socialist approach also condemns
money and aspires to do without it, driving society towards direct
exchange of produce as the means to overcome alienation. But the
"corruption" option is ambivalent: it may be that people believe
recipients of money to be already corrupted, that money is not a
stimulus, but the result of some immoral and corrupt
activities.
In this way, the attitude to private property and to
money is indeed the basic divide in the po1itical culture of the
country.
"CONSERVATIVES" AND "LIBERALS"
The political history of the modern Bulgarian state
begins with the struggles between liberals and conservatives in the
1880s. Over the 1ast four decades this tradition was somewhat
overshadowed under the totalitarian regime, but it was carried
across to today as a real psychologica1 and politica1 experience.
It would be very difficult today to say whether the average
Bulgarian is a conservative or a liberal. Recent studies have shown
that a great proportion of our nation desire to present themselves
as liberals, while at the same time carrying deep inside
traditionalism and a nostalgia for the "familiar past". And yet,
the instrumentarium of sociology does provide the potential for
unravelling the tangled question of "liberalism" and "conservatism"
in Bulgaria.
The primary analysis of the test eliminated all
"don't knows", and united all degrees of agreement into one single
category.
Ultimately, we discovered five categories of people.
The first includes people who have chosen completely conservative
options; the second includes "conservatives" who have chosen one or
two of the liberal options; the third includes people who stand
exactly mid-way between the two; the fourth and fifth categories
inc1ude, respectively, "liberals" who have chosen one or two
conservative assertions, and full liberals. The first and second
category may be thus said to cover "conservatives", the last two,
"liberals", and the middle option we have called "moderates".
The results here are not altogether unexpected. The
young age groups dominate the "liberal" category, the middle-aged
tend to be "moderate", and the older age groups cluster around the
"conservative" category. It was also not surprising that in Sofia
and the big to mid-size cities "liberals" dominate, whereas the
villages are staunchly "conservative".
On the basis of the data thus received we can
construct a "table of dispositions" in the political communities
(voters and parliamentarians):
Voters: |
Categories |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
BSP |
10.5 |
11.1 |
35.1 |
27.6 |
15.9 |
UDF |
0.8 |
2.9 |
15.7 |
27.8 |
52.8 |
APU |
7.4 |
14.7 |
30.5 |
28.9 |
18.4 |
MRF |
2.2 |
8.7 |
20.7 |
43.5 |
25.0 |
Total |
5.1 |
7.6 |
24.6 |
28.9 |
33.7 |
Parliamentarians: |
BSP |
0 |
6.8 |
13.6 |
42.4 |
37.1 |
UDF |
0 |
0 |
7.0 |
23.0 |
69.9 |
APU |
0 |
0 |
13.3 |
20.0 |
66.6 |
MRF |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46.6 |
53.4 |
Total |
0 |
3.2 |
10.4 |
33.3 |
53.0 |
The results of the test confirmed expectations as to
differences between the voters of the two greatest political forces
BSP and UDF. When we take account of all options stated (i.e.
non-generalized in the three composite categories), most of the BSP
voters (63%), choose options 3 and 4, whereas no less than 80% of
the UDF electorate tend towards more "liberal" peak achievements
(categories 4 and 5). It is worth noting that BSP members are more
"liberal" than its electorate, whereas in the case of the UDF there
is no difference between members and voters.
The electorates of the BSP, APU and the MRF as a
whole tend to exhibit the same characteristics. In the choice
between pairs 2,4,5,6 and 7 they tend towards the "conservative"
opinion (Western TV programs, striptease, cohabitation, money and
work). The three electorates are also similar in the attitude to
the great divide - private property. As a whole, the UDF electorate
is of the "liberal" ilk.
These conclusions are partially confirmed in the
generalized classification of the electorates along the three
categories outlined. About 44% of the BSP electorate and 47% of the
APU voters can be classed as "liberals". "Conservatives" are
respectively 21% and 20%. In the case of the MRF, almost 69% can be
classed in the "liberal" generalized category, with only 11% to be
found in the "conservative" camp. But once we split up the answers
along all the options, we see that the MRF electorate is closer to
the BSP and APU than, as first glance would have it, to the UDF
voters. The high "liberal" profile of the MRF electorate comes
primarily out of high "liberal" values registered on the
"ethnicity" options. The biggest categories in the BSP and APU
electorates are the "moderate" ones, respectively 35% and 30%. In
the case of the UDF, detailization. of the answers lead to 53%
being classed as pure "liberals" (compared to 80% of "liberals"
according to the more generalized category), with "conservatives" a
mere 4%.
The tables of "dispositions" show that the political
representation of the different parties in parliament is as a rule
more "liberal" than its respective electorates. The differences in
the acceptance of "liberal" options between voters and
parliamentarians are particularly pronounced in the case of the
BSP, APU and MRF (in the case of the BSP - 36 percentage points,
the APU - 39 percentage points, the MRF - 32 percentage points, and
the UDF - 12 percentage points, the mean difference between voters
and parliamentarians being 24 percentage points).
Consequently, on the one hand, the electoral bodies
of the BSP, APU and the MRF have similar characteristics, which are
on the whole tending to the "conservative" category, and, on the
other, their representatives in parliament have more pronounced
"liberal" characteristics. Up to a point, this discrepancy can be
explained in terms of differences in the levels of education, but
this is not the whole story. The reasons must also be looked for in
the specific characteristics of the present political
situation.
The discrepancies between the values systems of
voters and parliamentarians are the result of the intensive changes
in society, and in the public mind. This situation contains a
destabilizing potential and can, under certain circumstances,
result in a break down of the fragile bridges of trust existing
between voters and parliamentarians.
CONCLUSIONS
The generalized interpretation of the test makes it
possible to outline the social contours of three "values groups".
The first - the "liberals" - contains primarily people under 45,
living in Sofia or the big cities, with more clear individualistic
inclinations, voting for the UDF. The second group - the
"conservatives" - encompasses above all peop1e over 45, living
primarily in the villages and sensitized to collective norms of
life. These have voted as a rule for the BSP or the APU, but are
also present in the UDF electorate. The group of the "moderates"
(equally distributed between those attracted by the "old" as by the
"new", but seeming to be oriented to, above a11, a kind of
"present") are peop1e in the active age groups (26 - 60), living
above all in the smaller cities and voting for the BSP. There is
hardly a "Chinese wall" between all these groups, and in practice
they co-exist in every community. It would seem, at the end of the
day, that the question of prime importance is not "the new" or "the
old", but a search: "what should we take from the old?", and "what
should we take from the new"?
It would be premature to try and make clear-cut
conclusions. We have presented the above as a preliminary
information and food for thought. After we finished the study, we
came up with more questions than answers. How do interests and
values combine in determining the vote? Is it time to reject the
traditional scheme of the socio-group determination of political
behavior, and to replace this with the construction of
"values-groups" models? Are there any purely political dominants in
the act of the political choice? The answers to these, and a
multitude of other questions, requires much further study and
analysis.
Published in "Kultura", December 7, 1990 Sofia,
Bulgaria
|