

**CORRUPTION MONITORING OF
*COALITION 2000***

May 2003



2. METHODOLOGY

Sample: All of the surveys in the present paper were based on two-stage cluster sampling. The data is representative for the country's adult population. Sample size:

	Fieldwork period	Sample Size
1.	February 1999	1143
2.	April 1999 ã.	1122
3.	September 1999	1110
4.	January 2000	1144
5.	April 2000	1161
6.	September 2000	1158
7.	January 2001	1037
8.	October 2001	971
9.	January 2002	1148
10.	May 2002	1170
11.	October 2002	1079
12.	January 2003	1107
13.	May	1077

Survey method: Face-to-face interview.


Fieldwork: April 18, 2003 – May 15, 2003

1. PUBLIC IMPORTANCE OF CORRUPTION

Corruption continues to be perceived as one of the most critical problems faced by Bulgarian society. Ever since the beginning of the Corruption Monitoring of *Coalition 2000* it has inevitably been placed immediately after unemployment and the low standard of living of the population. The general ranking of the most important social problems does not display any major differences compared to January 2003 with the exception of the soaring importance of healthcare, the share of which has increased by more than 6 points. (Figure 1)

Figure 1.

Relative importance of the problems faced by society (May 2003, %)




Base: All respondents (N=1077)

The assessments of the importance of corruption as a problem and of its place among the other major public concerns have remained largely unchanged throughout the period monitored (1998-2003). By contrast, the media coverage of the subject has displayed abrupt fluctuations. In the past six months the number of corruption-related publications appears to have settled at a relatively high level. As evident from *Figure 2*, however, regardless of the attention devoted by the media to the problem of corruption, it tends to preserve its position within the general ranking of the top public concerns. This comes to confirm yet again that although the media no doubt have a considerable influence in shaping public perceptions, in the case of corruption the opinions registered are directly related to the actual evolution of the problem and largely reflect the respondents' personal experience.

Figure 2.

Dynamics of media coverage of corruption and assessments of the relative public importance of corruption as a social problem



Corruption continues to be perceived as a critical issue mainly by the people in high-ranking positions in the hierarchy of power and the business elite, by those with high social and financial standing, as well as the residents of the larger towns and the capital. (*Appendix 3, Table 1*) Those are the citizens who are most frequently confronted with corrupt practices and are the most affected by their proliferation.

2. LEVEL OF CORRUPTION

When considering the rate of corruption it is important to distinguish between the cases when “something” has been directly or indirectly requested or offered by either the officials or the citizens, and the number of actual corruption deals. The distinction between the so-called “real” and “potential” corruption is important because, regardless of whether or not an act of corruption is actually committed, the very “corruption offer” is itself part of the mechanism that reproduces corruption.

The level of real corruption is measured through the average monthly incidence of acts of corruption in which the citizens have self-reportedly been involved. Potential corruption refers to the sum of all instances when the citizens have been under corruption pressure (when the respective official asked for “something”).

REAL CORRUPTION


Although it cannot be measured in absolute terms, the actual number of acts of corruption in the course of the past one month is directly related to the rate of personal involvement of the respondents in various forms of corrupt behavior. Their self-reported involvement in such practices is reflected in the *Acts of Corruption Index*.

This is actually the index with the lowest values compared to all of the others, which is hardly surprising in view of the information it sums up. Compared to January 2003, there was a slight drop in May, reinforcing the general positive tendency towards slight restriction of corrupt practices. (Figure 3)

The approximate number of citizens who had been involved in acts of corruption in the past month fell by more than 3,000 corruption deals and was 87,770¹ (1.37% of the country's population aged 18 and over), i.e., an average monthly incidence of 87,770 actual corruption deals.

Figure 3.

Level of corruption (min=0, max=10)




Base: All respondents

Since the beginning of the current year there has been a considerable decrease of the share of instances of *corruption pressure* (instances when officials directly asked for, or indicated they expected, bribes) and of *acts of corruption* (bribes given in the form of money, gifts, or favors). The values of both indicators fell by half compared to the previous year and at present display a tendency towards stabilization at a relatively low level. (Figure 4)

¹This estimate is based on the data from the population census of March 2001, according to which the population aged 18 and over is 6,417,869, and 1% of the sample corresponds to 64,180 people.

Figure 4.

Average annual number of solicited and actually concluded corruption deals



Within a mere three months there has emerged an interesting phenomenon related to the “cost” of corruption. The so-called “small-scale” corruption is still more widespread than the informal payment of large amounts – in eight out of ten instances the bribes amount to less than 250 leva. Yet the “cost” of corruption has been on the rise – the share has increased significantly of the corruption deals involving bribes given in the past three months in the form of money, gifts, or favors, with a total value from 201 to 500 leva and from 1,001 to 5,000 leva. (*Appendix 3, Table 2*)

POTENTIAL CORRUPTION

The pressure exerted directly or indirectly by public sector employees over citizens to get money, gifts, or favors continues to be on the decline, as first registered its downward tendency of January 2003 and is now going back to its values of May 2002. (*Figure 3*)

It is still too early to draw any definitive conclusions about the impact of the implemented anti-corruption measures in view of the inconstant nature of the manifestations of open corruption coercion. Nevertheless, at the present time there emerges a clear-cut tendency towards decline, both of corruption pressure and of the instances when citizens give in and actually take part in some type of corruption deal.

CORRUPTION PRESSURE BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

Despite the drop in corruption pressure in general, as regards most occupational groups it has preserved its distribution and values.

The two surveys conducted in January and May of the current year showed serious fluctuations in the pressure exerted by the *officials in the judicial system*. In January the number of registered instances when bribes had been solicited by such officials fell by half. Yet only three months later there was another surge and the index values went back to last year’s

levels. It would seem that the intense public debate in the past few months on reforms in the judicial system and the need to crack down on corruption has only had an impact regarding the *administrative officials* working within the system. The instances when they had pressured citizens not only fell by half compared to the previous survey, but actually marked an all-time low for the entire period of the corruption monitoring. (*Appendix 3, Table 3*).

By contrast, *lawyers* regained a leading position in the general ranking after having been placed eighth in January, and *judges* moved up from the 19th to the 4th place, with the number of instances when they had exerted pressure increasing seven times and reaching its highest value since October 2002. A similar situation occurred with *investigators*, who moved up from the 16th to the 5th place, marking an all-time high for the entire period of the monitoring.

A steady tendency towards declining corruption pressure has emerged with regard to *customs officers*, *police officers*, and *tax officials*. These three occupational groups, traditionally associated with high corruption pressure, provide evidence that the implementation of systematic measures and the consistent efforts to ensure openness and transparency are indeed in position to reduce corruption.

A notable decrease in the number of instances of pressure was also registered with respect to *university professors* and particularly, *university officials*. The corruption pressure attributed to *ministry officials* also fell considerably – by more than three times – and from the 3rd place in the general ranking they moved down to the 15th.

It is worth noting the considerable corruption pressure by *members of parliament* registered in the course of the current year. Notwithstanding the slight decrease between January and May, the index values registered in early 2003 were the highest for the entire period monitored.


IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS

The reduced corruption pressure by officials and the smaller number of concluded corruption deals in turn affect the assessments of the performance of the government. Even if only slightly, confidence that corruption can be limited appears to be returning, particularly with respect to lower-ranking officials. There is reason to assume that in addition to indirect notions and perceptions, respondents' opinions are also shaped by direct interaction with administrative officials and reflect an actual decline in the corruption pressure exerted by them.

Notwithstanding any success achieved in terms of limiting the so-called “small-scale corruption”, the problem remains with big business and high-ranking state officials, where the “price” of the corruption deals is far higher. (*Figure 5*)

Figure 5.

Perceived impact of the government's anti-corruption measures *



* Relative share of those who answered, "The government is not doing anything"


3. EXPECTATIONS REGARDING THE CURBING OF CORRUPTION

Despite the actually smaller number of instances of pressure and of concluded corruption deals, in public perceptions corruption continues to be a grave problem with which Bulgarian society cannot seem to cope. Following a continuous decline, in the past six months the expectations that those in power will act consistently and resolutely have settled at their highest level for the entire period of the monitoring. (Figure 6)

Such a tendency is quite alarming. Up to a certain point it reflected popular disappointment with the new government's policy and failure to live up to its promises of "new moral norms". In the long term, however, scepticism regarding the government may be transferred to the very possibility of coping with the corruption problem, regardless of who is in power.

There is a risk, regardless of actual developments, for the problem of corruption to come to be perceived as insurmountable and impervious to any measures whatsoever. In turn this would "legitimize" corruption as something "normal" and irremediable. In view of the mutually beneficial nature of most corruption deals and the fact that the perceived practical efficiency of corruption is a decisive motive for engaging in such practices, the "legitimization" of corruption, even if only in people's minds, practically implies its acknowledgment as a "normal" means of addressing problems. That is why it is an important element of the fight against corruption not only to undertake, but also to actually publicize, any anti-corruption measures implemented. The coverage of any successful efforts to reduce corruption has a substantial impact both over the attitudes and behavior of the officials exerting pressure, and over citizens' readiness to engage in acts of corruption.

Figure 6.
Corruption-related expectations (min=0 max=10)




Base: All respondents

3. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

PERCEIVED SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

Similarly to the expectations regarding the curbing of corruption, popular perceptions of the scope of corruption remained largely unchanged from January, despite the actually decreasing instances of corruption. (Figure 7)

Figure 7.
Spread of corruption (min=0 max=10)



Base: All respondents

PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY OF CORRUPTION

The perceived practical efficiency of corruption also remains essentially unchanged, at a rather high level. (*Figure 7*) Neither has there occurred any notable change in the way corruption is perceived – as a common, and moreover effective, means of addressing problems.

In the presence of such attitudes it is important to establish the exact nature of these “problems” and how they arise. Because, while some of them may have objective causes – imperfect legislation or regulations, etc., another significant portion “arise” by the will of public officials. All too often the affected party is perfectly aware of this deliberate creation of a problem, but the corruption deal is nonetheless concluded with the assumption that it is the only way to rapidly and effectively solve the problem. It should be borne in mind that in the case of corruption, the perceptions and expectations underlying the act of corruption matter as much as the objective circumstances. As long as the popular assumption prevails that informal payments successfully “fix” arising problems, there are bound to be people who will take advantage of this opportunity.

SPREAD OF CORRUPTION BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

Since January 2003 there has been a tendency towards decline in the perceived spread of corruption by occupational groups. There has not been any notable reshuffling within the general ranking – *customs officers*, the *representatives of the judicial system*, and the *police* were again in the lead in May 2003. They were joined by *MPs* and *ministers*, two of the few groups that actually increased their shares compared to January 2003. (*Appendix 3, Table 5*)


Journalists, *teachers*, and *NGO representatives* are traditionally perceived as the least corrupt despite the slight increase compared to January 2003.

Certain divergences were again registered between the perceived spread of corruption in some occupational groups and the reported corruption pressure. This is understandable as regards the high-ranking government representatives – *politicians*, *ministers*, *MPs* – with whom respondents have little contacts. However, there are other groups, for ex. *doctors*, *tax officials*, *university professors*, for which it is important to clearly distinguish between perceptions and corruption pressure actually experienced by the citizens, as the two do not necessarily match.

The *media* continue to be the principal source of information about the spread of corruption, followed by *conversations with friends and business partners*. Though to a considerably lesser extent, the *discrepancy between the low incomes of officials and their high standard of living and personal experience* are also important in shaping popular perceptions of the respective occupational groups. (Figure 8)

Figure 8.

Relative share of the factors shaping the perceived spread of corruption



Base: All respondents

INSTITUTIONAL SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

Respondents' perceptions regarding corruption in the individual occupational groups are typically transferred over to the respective institutions. *Customs*, the *judicial system*, and the *police* again came out in the lead by perceived spread of corruption and preserved the high levels registered in January 2003. So did the *healthcare system*, which emerges as one of the chief problem areas at the present time. (Table 1)

Table 1.

“In your opinion, in which institutions is corruption most widespread?”

(Respondents could cite up to five answers under “Spread of corruption in general” and up to three answers under “Ministries and state agencies” and “Judicial system”, which is why the percentages do not sum up to 100)

	May 2002	October 2002	January 2003	May 2003
<i>Spread of corruption in general</i>				
In Customs. Among customs officers.	33.2	30.4	53.3	50.0
In court. In the judicial system. In the system of justice. Among lawyers.	23.5	28.5	48.2	42.9
In the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (including Traffic Police, the investigation service)	20.6	19.9	28.6	30.6
In the healthcare system. In medical care. In the National Health Service.	25.6	20.6	27.3	27.6
In the higher ranks of power (Parliament, the Presidency, the Government). Among the political elite.	24.1	30.3	24.7* 23.1** 1.3***	27.6* 27.5** 2.5***
<i>Ministries and state agencies</i>				
Customs Agency	12.6	10.9	31.2	31.2
Ministry of Justice	15.0	18.1	33.5	31.0
Privatization Agency	22.0	22.5	27.2	24.7
In all ministries and state agencies	-	-	19.6	21.8
Ministry of Internal Affairs	16.2	15.3	18.4	19.0
<i>Judicial system</i>				
Throughout the judicial system	3.5	5.4	33.5	34.4
The courts, the administration of justice	29.1	32.1	27.5	29.1
Prosecution	26.2	32.0	26.2	25.3
Lawyers, notaries public	15.3	16.2	24.9***** 7.4*****	21.8***** 8.0*****
Criminal investigation service	15.7	15.7	18.4	17.6

* Spread of corruption in the government / among ministers / among deputy ministers;

** Spread of corruption in the National Assembly / among MPs;

*** Spread of corruption in the presidency/ among officials at the presidency;

**** Spread of corruption among lawyers;

***** Spread of corruption among notaries public.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

The mechanisms accounting for the spread of corruption can be grouped together in several basic categories. Ever since the beginning of the corruption monitoring *fast personal enrichment sought by those in power* has inevitably been cited as the top reason (Table 2). Together with the *use of public office for personal gain* it forms the first set of explanations for the rampant corruption. The values of these two factors have remained relatively stable and establish them as the invariable popular explanation/justification of the “normality” of corruption, which essentially boils down to: “Wherever there is power and money there are bound to be corrupt officials who will take advantage of their public office”.

Table 2.

Relative share of the major factors accounting for the spread of corruption in this country (%)

	Feb '99	Apr '99	Sep '99	Jan '00	Apr '00	Sep '00	Jan '01	Oct '01	Jan '02	May '02	Oct '02	Jan '03	May '03
Fast personal enrichment sought by those in power	53.5	52.9	54.8	57.0	33.6	57.8	60.8	59.2	58.6	58.6	58.4	60.3	58.5
Imperfect legislation	41.1	38.8	37.8	35.1	13.6	40.5	39.1	38.0	43.0	39.7	39.2	34.9	38.0
Ineffectiveness of the judicial system	26.4	19.6	27.5	24.7	11.8	22.2	27.2	28.5	32.3	31.2	38.0	31.2	34.1
Lack of strict administrative control	35.2	36.4	33.8	30.8	-	32.3	31.8	35.2	34.5	38.9	34.5	32.3	31.2
Intertwinement of official duties and personal interests	25.1	25.8	28.3	28.3	-	32.6	25.8	31.7	26.7	26.9	28.8	29.1	30.6
Low salaries	51.9	51.5	43.6	47.2	20.9	41.6	33.7	32.3	38.5	36.0	36.6	31.2	27.6
Moral crisis in the period of transition	19.4	19.4	19.4	18.2	9.8	17.0	18.9	21.1	18.3	16.3	13.2	15.8	15.6
Specific characteristics of Bulgarian national culture	5.7	6.9	4.7	5.9	-	4.2	5.9	4.4	5.3	4.3	4.9	5.7	7.0
Problems inherited from the communist past	10.9	6.8	7.4	7.3	1.8	7.8	4.4	5.8	5.0	6.9	6.3	4.4	3.6

Base: All respondents

Following immediately behind the abuse of power and public office are the *imperfect legislation*, *lack of strict administrative control*, and *inefficiency of the judicial system*. Unlike the administrative control, where there tends to be a certain improvement, the imperfect legislation sustains high values ever since the beginning of the monitoring. Since January 2002 there has even been a steady tendency towards deepening critical attitudes as regards the efficiency of the judicial system.

The *low salaries of public sector employees* have been among the important corruption-generating factors cited by the respondents. With the gradual improvement of the remuneration of public officials this factor began to decline in importance and has currently reached one of its lowest values in four years.

Factors related to moral categories and cultural preconditions tend to be considered of minor importance and their values have remained relatively unchanged throughout the period. Ever lesser importance is attached to the *problems inherited from the communist past* and the *moral crisis in the transition period*. Society is beginning to let go the old stereotypes that used to encourage corruption and the use of personal “connections”.

4. VALUE SYSTEM AND MORAL PRECONDITIONS FOR CORRUPTION


ACCEPTABILITY IN PRINCIPLE

Notwithstanding the high perceived spread and proven practical efficiency of corruption, in terms of the prevailing value system it is persistently rejected as a means of addressing problems.

Besides displaying the lowest values of all the other indicators, the Acceptability in Principle Index has been showing a steady tendency towards decline over the past six months. (*Figure 9*) This is largely due to the anti-corruption initiatives launched in the past 2-3 years, as well as to the gradual establishment of more clear-cut rules in public administration and the business sector. The presence of legitimate, speedy, and efficient procedures is an important precondition for eliminating the need to resort to “alternative” ways of solving problems, including all types corrupt practices.

Figure 9.

Preconditions for the presence of corruption (min=0, max=10)



Base: All respondents

SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CORRUPTION

Unlike the acceptability in principle, citizens’ inclination to compromise on their values when forced by circumstances, monitored through the Susceptibility to Corruption Index, has displayed a tendency towards slight increase.

Traditionally the susceptibility to corruption has been twice as strong as the moral acceptability of corrupt practices. Regardless of their moral

principles citizens are inclined to give in to corruption pressure by the officials.

The people with a higher education level and better financial situation are typically inclined to react in two ways when directly asked for money by an official in order to have a problem of theirs solved: they would either try and deal with the problem by some other means without paying, or would always pay. Those are people who would rather pay a certain amount of money informally than waste precious time or risk a delay or undesirable outcome. By contrast, the respondents with a lower education level and more limited financial resources – housewives, retired, unemployed – firmly say they would not pay under any circumstances. (*Appendix 3, Table 6*)

These differences suggest that when undertaking anti-corruption measures it is important to consider the specific target groups. While to a retired person or housewife, for example, the possibility to file a complaint against a corrupt public official or to wait for another solution of an administrative problem may be an acceptable option and way of avoiding a corruption deal, to a businessman the loss of time and money proves greater than the cost of bribing the official. In this context, in order to truly reduce corruption it is necessary to systematically and consistently implement a wide range of selective measures.

APPENDIX 1

Theoretical framework

The Corruption Indexes summarize the basic indicators used by the Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of *Coalition 2000*. Each index sums up several questions posed to the respondents and allows comparative analysis over time. The Corruption Indexes assume values from 0-10. The closer the value of the indexes is to 10, the more negative are the assessments of the current state of corruption in Bulgaria. Index numbers closer to 0 indicate approximation to the ideal of a “corruption-free” society.

The Corruption Indexes are based on a system of indicators exploring corruption-related behavior and attitudes. The theoretical model of corruption underlying the CMS surveys distinguishes between the following aspects and elements of corruption:

1. Acts of corruption.

The acts of corruption fall into two basic types: giving a bribe and accepting a bribe. These occur in two basic kinds of situations: 1.) when citizens offer a bribe to get something they are entitled to by law (“greasing the wheels”), and 2.) when citizens offer a bribe to get something they are not entitled to by law. The registered frequency of acts of corruption shows the level of corruption in this country. The phrasing of the questions is essential when measuring the values of this index. In this respect CMS builds on a number of principles meant to ensure neutrality, objectivity, and anonymity: 1.) instead of using the term “bribe”, the questions refer to the “offer of money, gift, or favor”; 2) the questions focus on whether or not respondents did make such an “offer” and the latter are not asked to provide information concerning how much and whom they paid, etc., in order to have their problem addressed; 3) besides information about the “offer” of bribes, respondents are asked about the incidence of bribe solicitation, i.e., the amount of pressure exerted by public officials.

The Corruption Indexes formed on this basis are the following:

- Personal involvement. This index records the incidence of cases of “offer of money, gift, or favor” in order to have a problem solved as reported by the citizens themselves. Essentially this index registers the level of real corruption in this country over a given period of time.
- Corruption pressure. This index records the incidence of cases when citizens were reportedly asked for “money, gift, or favor” in order to have a problem solved. It measures the level of potential corruption in this country over a given period of time.

It should specifically be noted that the indicators concerning acts of corruption do not reflect evaluations, opinions, or perceptions, but the self-reported incidence of definite kinds of acts. This type of indicators underlies the methodology of the victimization surveys, which have a long history and are used to assess the real crime rate in a given country. The term “real” is essential since for a number of reasons not all crimes are registered by the police and only part of those reported to the police actually end up in court.

2. Value system and moral preconditions.

Although they do not directly determine the level of corruption, the value system and moral principles have a significant influence on citizens’ behavior. Of the numerous indicators in this area, CMS monitors the following corruption-related attitudes: 1.) the level of toleration of various forms of corruption; 2.) the degree of awareness of the various types of corruption; 3.)

citizens' inclination to resort to corrupt practices in order to address arising problems.

The Corruption Indexes produced on this basis are the following:

- Acceptability in principle. This index measures the toleration of a range of corrupt practices by MPs and ministry officials.
- Susceptibility to corruption. The index sums up a series of questions intended to assess citizens' inclination to resort to corruption in addressing their daily problems.

Both of the indexes from this group reflect assessments and opinions. Their positive dynamics are indicative of growing rejection of corruption and the reinforcement of moral norms proscribing involvement in acts of corruption.

3. Estimated spread of corruption.

Citizens' subjective assessments of the spread of corruption reflect the general social environment and prevailing outlook on corruption, as well as the related image of the institutions and basic occupational groups under the three branches of power. These assessments do not directly reflect the level of corruption since they are the outcome of perceptions and impressions produced by the ongoing public debate, media coverage of corruption, personal preconceptions, etc. In more general terms, they show the extent to which citizens feel that those in power protect public interests or take advantage of their official positions to serve private interests. This aspect of corruption is covered by two indexes:

- Estimated spread of corruption. This index sums up respondents' assessments of the extent to which corruption permeates society (as well as individual institutions and occupational groups).
- Practical efficiency. This index sums up respondents' assessments of the extent to which corruption is an efficient problem-solving instrument. Efficiency is another indicator of the spread of corruption: a high rate of efficiency makes it worth resorting to corruption and implies that corruption is in fact a commonly used means of addressing problems.

4. Corruption-related expectations.

The corruption-related expectations reflect the degree of public confidence that the problem of corruption can be dealt with. In this sense, the expectations are the combined reflection of respondents' perception of the political will demonstrated by those in power and their assessment of the magnitude and gravity of the problem of corruption.

APPENDIX 2

Corruption Indexes

Table 1. Acts of Corruption

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Jan '00</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>
<i>Personal involvement</i>	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3
<i>Corruption pressure</i>	1.3	1.2	1.5	0.8	1.4	1.4	1.0	1.4	1.0	1.0

Table 2. Value System and Moral Preconditions

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Jan '00</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>
<i>Acceptability in principle</i>	1.3	1.4	1.7	1.3	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.3	1.3
<i>Susceptibility to corruption</i>	2.9	2.7	2.8	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.8

Table 3. Perceived Spread of Corruption

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Jan '00</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>
<i>Perceived Spread of Corruption</i>	6.4	6.1	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.4	5.9	6.7	6.4	6.4
<i>Practical efficiency</i>	6.6	6.8	6.6	6.9	6.6	6.4	6.1	6.9	6.9	6.9

Table 4. Corruption-Related Expectations

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Jan '00</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>
<i>Corruption expectations</i>	5.5	5.5	5.4	5.6	4.9	5.1	5.2	5.6	5.9	5.8

APPENDIX 3

Table 1.

Assessments of the public importance of corruption as a problem of society by socio-demographic characteristics (May 2003; %)

	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Financial situation</i>		
1 Poor	78.8	21.2
2	63.5	36.5
3	62.0	38.0
4	44.4	55.6
5 Wealthy	-	100.0
<i>Social status</i>		
1 Lowest social status	79.9	20.1
2	64.6	35.4
3	61.0	39.0
4	46.5	53.5
5 Highest social status	-	100.0
<i>Principal occupation at present</i>		
1 Managers, professors, specialists	43.3	56.7
2 Administrative officials, employed in the retail and services sectors	60.1	39.9
3 Technicians, workers, farmers	61.5	38.5
4 Housewives, retired, unemployed	75.5	24.5
5 Students	60.4	39.6
6 Other employment	62.7	37.3
<i>You live in:</i>		
1 Sofia	51.7	48.3
2 Large town	62.7	37.3
3 Small town	69.8	30.2
4 Rural area, village	77.3	22.7

Table 2.

Total value of the informally paid bribes and/or gifts to public sector employees in the past 3 months (%)

	<i>January 2003</i>	<i>May 2003</i>
Up to 100 leva	65.4	50.0
101 to 250 leva	19.8	29.1
251 to 500 leva	5.4	8.4
501 to 1000 leva	8.2	3.8
1001 to 5000 leva	1.1	7.5
Over 5000 leva	-	1.2

Base: Respondents who have had contacts with public sector employees who asked for, or indicated they expected, money, a gift, or a favor. (January N=95, May N=77)

Table 3.

Corruption Pressure by Occupational Group (%)

	Jan '00	Apr '00	Sep '00	Jan '01	Oct '01	Jan '02	May '02	Oct '02	Jan '03	May '03
Lawyers	-	-	-	-	-	-		26,5	10,5	17,4
Customs officers	19.8	29.1	15.8	22.7	18.4	18.5	25.5	19.4	17.3	16.6
Police officers	23.4	19.5	24.0	18.9	18.5	19.9	15.2	22.3	12.0	14.1
Judges	6.9	7.7	9.1	5.8	6.8	7.8	10.7	16.6	2.0	14.0
Investigators	6.1	8.4	6.0	5.5	6.0	4.3	8.2	8.3	4.3	12.8
Doctors	20.0	18.6	22.1	6.1	22.3	18.0	20.2	20.3	12.9	12.8
University professors	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11.9	14.7	11.8
Bankers	8.1	1.8	2.9	4.1	4.1	4.1	5.6	3.9	5.1	9.9
Prosecutors	5.9	4.7	7.8	7.2	0.8	4.1	8.5	12.3	6.6	9.2
Businesspersons	13.7	11.9	9.7	11.6	13.4	10.8	9.4	9.6	7.0	9.1
Members of parliament	1.9	4.5	6.4	4.2	2.1	2.1	3.5	2.0	11.2	8.9
Municipal officials	11.3	11.7	10.3	11.2	11.3	10.0	5.5	10.9	4.4	8.4
Politicians and political party leaders	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.1	5.0	7.1
Administrative officials in the judicial system	18.5	10.4	11.5	13.3	11.3	9.4	11.0	15.9	8.5	4.9
Ministry officials	3.2	3.7	7.0	8.9	5.6	4.9	9.3	5.6	13.8	4.3
Mayors and municipal councillors	6.7	5.6	3.2	2.1	1.4	2.0	2.7	5.3	3.0	4.1
Representatives of non-governmental organizations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.0	-	4.0
Teachers	4.9	3.0	5.5	3.7	6.1	3.6	3.1	7.4	4.4	3.4
University officials	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.6	11.9	3.4
Ministers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.3	-	3.3
Tax officials	8.4	7.8	8.3	6.4	9.1	5.3	3.8	4.2	4.1	3.1
Journalists	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.8	1.4	0.0
University officials or professors	10.1	12.6	13.9	13.2	8.8	14.3	12.0	-	-	

**Relative share of those who have had contacts with the respective group and have been asked for money, gifts, or favors*

Table 4.

Factors for the Spread of Corruption by Socio-Demographic Groups – May 2003 (%)

	<i>Fast personal enrichment sought by those in power</i>	<i>Fast personal enrichment sought by those in power</i>	<i>Lack of strict administrative control</i>	<i>Low salaries</i>
<i>Highest level of completed education</i>				
1 Less than primary	41.3	19.1	15.0	3.7
2 Primary	58.7	22.2	18.0	20.6
3 Elementary	60.4	30.7	30.3	24.6
4 Secondary	63.1	42.3	32.4	30.0
5 College	47.0	41.2	43.1	30.5
6 University	43.5	53.5	37.1	34.2
<i>Financial situation</i>				
1 Poor	59.5	28.7	24.0	23.8
2	61.5	40.3	34.9	27.5
3	53.7	44.7	33.4	31.1
4	37.0	53.9	45.9	44.0
5 Wealthy	-	-	-	100.0
<i>Social status</i>				
1 Lowest social status	61.4	28.3	24.2	22.5
2	62.6	36.9	33.2	27.9
3	55.7	48.4	36.2	30.8
4	23.6	47.4	39.2	52.1
5 Highest social status	-	-	-	100.0
<i>Principal occupation at present</i>				
1 Managers, professors, specialists	41.8	52.1	35.1	41.5
2 Administrative officials, employed in the retail and services sectors	57.6	50.5	30.2	29.5
3 Technicians, workers, farmers	62.7	38.6	36.3	31.6
4 Housewives, retired, unemployed	58.5	32.2	28.8	24.4
5 Students	62.4	46.3	33.0	25.3
6 Other employment	73.9	57.8	32.8	9.0
<i>You live in:</i>				
1 Sofia	45.9	41.9	39.5	38.6
2 Large town	63.7	46.6	33.6	27.8
3 Small town	55.9	35.9	31.2	28.8
4 Rural area, village	59.8	29.3	25.7	22.3

Table 5.

Spread of Corruption by Occupational Group

<i>Relative share of those who answered, "All and nearly all are involved in corruption"</i>										
	<i>Jan '00</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>
Customs officers	77.0	78.6	75.2	74.3	77.3	74.2	70.8	79.2	76.6	74.3
Lawyers	54.8	51.9	52.9	50.3	55.0	55.5	52.5	62.3	60.1	60.0
Judges	48.5	56.0	50.1	50.6	56.4	55.0	50.8	63.0	62.2	59.6
Prosecutors	46.3	54.4	51.3	50.7	54.8	55.4	51.0	63.0	62.1	59.3
Police officers	51.9	50.5	54.3	51.0	53.7	47.0	50.7	59.6	57.7	57.7
Members of parliament	45.0	55.1	51.7	52.6	43.5	47.8	39.2	56.2	53.5	57.5
Investigators	41.0	48.0	43.8	43.5	48.4	48.0	43.1	57.5	55.4	53.6
Ministers	45.3	53.4	55.0	52.3	41.2	45.4	35.6	50.8	49.5	52.6
Tax officials	53.9	51.0	53.7	47.3	51.6	51.2	41.9	58.0	52.6	51.8
Politicians and leaders of political parties and coalitions	37.5	45.0	43.8	39.1	40.8	43.0	33.0	54.0	50.7	51.3
Businesspersons	48.5	51.4	42.3	43.6	42.2	41.6	41.4	48.9	52.7	50.9
Doctors	42.5	40.9	43.6	27.0	46.8	45.7	52.3	54.9	51.0	49.8
Ministry officials	47.9	55.1	49.7	43.9	45.8	47.1	36.7	48.3	44.6	44.4
Mayors and municipal councillors	32.5	35.2	32.1	30.9	26.3	31.8	23.4	48.3	45.7	43.6
Municipal officials	45.0	46.5	41.6	35.9	39.6	39.4	30.0	49.1	40.9	39.8
Administrative officials in the judicial system	42.0	45.2	40.2	36.8	41.7	41.1	36.5	45.0	42.4	37.5
Bankers	20.9	38.8	33.5	35.6	32.5	31.7	29.5	37.2	43.4	35.8
University professors or officials	29.4	29.3	28.1	21.6	27.4	27.7	29.8	33.4* 23.1**	30.8* 20.0**	31.7* 19.0**
NGO representatives	16.2	18.2	23.9	18.2	19.8	21.8	15.3	21.4	20.2	21.0
Journalists	10.6	14.1	13.9	11.3	10.5	12.2	9.5	15.3	12.1	13.3
Teachers	9.5	8.2	10.9	5.8	9.3	9.7	9.8	13.9	9.8	11.6
Local political leaders	31.7	36.4	36.8	34.2	35.1	34.4	27.1	-	-	-

* Assessment of the spread of corruption among university professors

** Assessment of the spread of corruption among university officials

Table 6.

“If you have an important problem and an official directly asks you for money to solve it, what will you do?” (distribution by socio-demographic group - May 2003ã.; %)

	<i>I will always pay</i>	<i>I will pay if I can afford it</i>	<i>I won't pay if I can solve the problem by some other means</i>	<i>I will never pay</i>	<i>DK/NA</i>
<i>Highest level of completed education</i>					
1 Less than primary	-	21.0	11.9	41.4	25.6
2 Primary	1.2	13.1	18.8	53.6	13.4
3 Elementary	1.4	24.6	30.1	37.3	6.7
4 Secondary	3.6	25.3	40.4	26.8	3.9
5 College	3.3	23.7	36.5	31.4	5.0
6 University	6.5	16.5	41.1	30.5	5.4
<i>Financial situation</i>					
1 Poor	1.7	22.2	23.1	43.0	10.0
2	3.1	23.3	39.0	29.8	4.9
3	4.8	24.0	41.5	25.9	3.8
4	-	27.2	55.6	17.1	-
5 Wealthy	-	-	100.0	-	-
<i>Social status</i>					
1 Lowest social status	1.4	23.5	23.9	42.4	8.9
2	4.1	25.8	35.8	30.4	3.9
3	3.8	21.7	42.4	27.0	5.1
4	-	14.2	49.1	27.4	9.3
5 Highest social status	-	-	100.0	-	-
<i>Principal occupation at present</i>					
1 Managers, professors, specialists	1.3	21.4	43.9	24.9	8.4
2 Administrative officials, employed in the retail and services sectors	4.6	26.1	49.5	18.3	1.5
3 Technicians, workers, farmers	5.4	31.2	40.2	17.4	5.8
4 Housewives, retired, unemployed	1.8	19.2	28.1	44.1	6.7
5 Students	-	33.1	40.1	11.8	15.0
6 Other employment	10.3	21.6	42.5	25.6	-
<i>You live in:</i>					
1 Sofia	3.7	20.8	37.6	31.2	6.7
2 Large town	2.9	23.9	37.2	31.0	5.0
3 Small town	4.1	24.1	35.5	30.7	5.6
4 Rural area, village	2.1	22.2	30.6	37.2	7.8