CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY

Reports Анализи

Monitoring Radicalisation: A Framework for Risk Indicators

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MONITORING RADICALISATION

A FRAMEWORK FOR RISK INDICATORS

CENTER FOR
THE STUDY OF
DEMOCRACY

Radicalisation processes impacting on disaffected and indoctrinated persons and the later involvement of some of them in acts of terrorism are of growing concern for European citizens, their governments and the wider international community. Addressing this threat requires effective prevention policies which some EU member states have been proactive in developing. Effective policies need reliable diagnostic tools designed to identify individuals and groups who might pose a threat.

The publication provides a review of existing approaches and tools to identifying, monitoring and assessing radicalisation in Europe and beyond. It further offers a conceptual framework of radicalisation risk and vulnerability indicators and their interpretation as a basis for developing early-warning mechanisms for frontline practitioners in countries which are yet to develop specific prevention and counter-radicalisation policies. The target group of the guide are policymakers at national and EU levels, as well as practitioners directly involved in the prevention of radicalisation in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond.

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ACRONYMS

BE	Belgium
CoPPRA	Community Policing and the Prevention of Radicalisation & Terrorism project
CSD	Center for the Study of Democracy
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DE	Germany
DK	Denmark
ERG	Extremism Risk Guidelines
FR	France
IS	Islamic State
IVP	Identifying Vulnerable People
NL	Netherlands
SK	Slovakia
SPJ	Structured Professional Judgement
TerRa	Terrorism & Radicalisation project
VAF	Vulnerability Assessment Framework
VERA	Violent Extremism Risk Assessment
UK	United Kingdom

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Radicalisation processes impacting on disaffected and indoctrinated persons and the later involvement of some of them in acts of terrorism are of growing concern for European citizens, their governments and the wider international community. Addressing this threat requires prevention and de-radicalisation policies which some EU member states have been proactive in developing.

Effective policies need reliable diagnostic tools designed to identify individuals and groups who might pose a threat. This publication provides background knowledge on radicalisation and puts forward a **framework of risk assessment indicators** tailored to the institutional environment of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that are yet to develop specific counter-radicalisation measures. Drawing on experience generated elsewhere, and considering the need to adapt these practices to specific contexts, it throws a bridge between academic knowledge and empirical findings on the one hand, and policy practice, on the other. The framework of indicators put forward here will be particularly useful for policymakers at national and EU levels as well as practitioners directly involved in the prevention of radicalisation in several ways:

- to aid the understanding of risk factors and processes of radicalisation;
- as a review of existing approaches and tools to risk monitoring;
- as a system of vulnerability and risk indicators for an early-warning and monitoring tool for first-line practitioners and recommendations for the corresponding institutional mechanisms and stakeholder roles.

DEFINING RADICALISATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF MONITORING

Radicalisation risk assessment methods are usually based on a number of theoretical premises that aim to aid the understanding of the phenomenon of radicalisation. Given that not all who begin the process progress to the use of violence, an important differentiation in the conceptualisation of this phenomenon – one which needs to be operationalised into the indicators for monitoring – is between violent radicalisation and cognitive (non-violent) radicalisation.

Of the numerous forms of radicalisation – in terms of the underlying ideological justifications of violent actions – the framework presented here focuses on the early signs of right-wing radicalisation and Islamist radicalisation, as these phenomena present the greatest challenges to European societies today. The understanding of the term Islamist radicalisation is tied to the understanding of the terms Islamism and jihadism. Islamism is the view that Islam is not only a religion but also a social, legal and political code of conduct. Respectively Islamists aim to reorder government and society in accordance with the Islamic law, or Sharia

and do not accept the separation between religion and state. Islamism can be mainstream and peaceful but also violent. Far-right radicalisation encompasses a wide range of groups with different ideologies and is mostly associated with an extremist ideology espousing the myth of the homogenous nation and hostility to liberal, pluralistic democracy, with its underlying principles of individualism and universalism.



A key consideration when designing tools for monitoring radicalisation is knowledge of its causes and contributing factors. The monitoring framework presented in this publication takes as its premise that **radicalisation is a dynamic, multi-stage and multifaceted phenomenon that occurs at the intersection of individual push factors** (biographical exposure and personal trajectory, intrinsic motivations, grievances) **with pull factors** (such as exposure to ideologies and recruiters) **and occurring in an enabling environment**. It is also assumed that the process takes place at the individual, group/community and society level and often certain causal factors and drivers can resonate and work at all three levels: macro-level, i.e. role of government and society at home and abroad, the radicalisation of public opinion and party politics, tense majority-minority relationships, especially when it comes to foreign diasporas, and the lack of socio-economic opportunities for whole sectors of society; meso-level, i.e. the wider radical milieu – the supportive or even complicit social surround, which serves as a rallying point and is the "missing link" with the terrorists' broader constituency or reference group that is aggrieved and suffering injustices; micro-level, i.e. the characteristics and experiences of the individual, involving identity problems, failed integration, feelings of alienation, relative deprivation, etc.

DIAGNOSTIC AND MONITORING TOOLS IN EUROPE

The diagnostic mechanisms and assessment tools to measure radicalisation trends and risks used in Europe differ in terms of **what is measured and monitored** (risk behaviours and vulnerability factors or violent acts and manifestations of radicalisation), **at what level** (individual, group, organisational, society), and **for what purpose** (identifying individuals at risk in order to deploy interventions; horizontal assessment of trends for strategic priority-setting; training and guiding first-line officers to identify and respond to risks, etc.). The general trend in the EU, USA and Canada has been to expand the response beyond the exclusive focus on the immediate prevention of terrorist attacks, and rolling out a number of "soft" policies with the aim of identifying and reversing the radicalisation process which often precedes the use of violence. The choice of monitoring methods depends on a number of factors:

- Availability of quality data;
- Choice of units and levels of analysis;
- Sharing of information and division of responsibilities between relevant stakeholders (police, intelligence, community, social actors);
- Interpretation/analysis of this data (risk assessment methodologies and initial assumptions of how radicalisation comes about).

Monitoring at the **macro level** involves tools for assessing horizontal threats and trends in extremist activity, actors, drivers and determinants of radicalisation. A widely used method is the national threat assessment report as applied, for example, in the UK, Germany, the Czech Republic, Netherlands, etc. Another tool at this level are surveys which examine broader social trends and processes such as grievances, polarisation, tensions and trust, as well as activism and radicalism proneness among the general population.

At the **community level**, there are monitoring mechanisms of a more holistic nature, going beyond the purely methodological framework for risk identification and assessment, or general awareness raising material on risk indicators. They include a more elaborate system for collection and assessment of information on risks from various sources, or are complemented by an institutional infrastructure and procedures for vulnerability assessment by professionals, coupled with a referral, response and risk mitigation mechanism.

At the **level of the individual**, risk assessment methodologies include contextual factors, such as political views, religious tenets, along with psychological factors, environmental factors and social factors. These tools are usually aimed at or used by first line practitioners (including police officers, correctional personnel, teachers, social and health workers, etc.) or trained professionals (forensics, psychologists, etc.), depending on the aim of the assessment. Evaluating the effectiveness of these tools, however, has proved problematic because the nature of vulnerability indicators (most often observable behaviours and outer appearance) is generally more ambiguous in distinguishing worrying from normal behaviour, but also because frontline practitioners do not always have the necessary knowledge and understanding to judge the level of vulnerability of an individual or to access additional information to support their judgement of the complexity of a case and its root causes, beyond their observations of behaviour and appearances. The more recent tendency is to use indicators which are less focused on religious issues (such as flagging up orthodox religious practice as concern) and more on high-risk behaviours associated with readiness to commit violence or engage with terrorist and violent extremist groups, and also dealing with diverse types of radicalisation into violent extremism (not only religiously inspired, but also right and left-wing, separatist and nationalist, etc.).

Differences among countries in monitoring and assessment methods correspond to differences in the infrastructure of the implementing institutions. A coherent policy against radicalisation necessitates the clear designation of stakeholder roles, intra and inter-institutional mechanisms, channels of communication and cooperation between institutions working horizontally. As it currently stands, few countries have managed in establishing such an integrated approach; where integrated mechanisms exist, they build upon already well-established partnerships

and channels of cross agency collaboration, which are adapted for the purposes of counter-radicalisation. Effective policies against radicalisation requires that prevention – of which risk monitoring is a key component – be integrated as much as possible in the day-to-day work and regular responsibilities of those institutions and civil servants that are most likely to come into contact with potentially radicalised individuals.

A FRAMEWORK FOR RADICALISATION RISK INDICATORS

The rationale for risk indicators

In the ideal case, a mechanism for monitoring of radicalisation trends and risks would require the collation of data from a variety of sources, including official statistics, media, first-line respondents, reporting from members of the public, consultations with NGOs and community organisations, and with the vulnerable groups or victims themselves. Risk factors related to radicalisation that has not yet led to violence are more difficult to identify and interpret and require careful risk assessment by those coming into contact with at-risk individuals. Such a risk assessment would be ideally based not only on early-warning indicators observed and reported by frontline practitioners, but also complemented by sociological research, surveys and opinion polls, analysis of open source data.

Without the evidence base generated by a mechanism to identify, assess, understand and prioritise risk factors of radicalisation, prevention programmes and counter-radicalisation interventions risk identifying the wrong targets and problems and setting wrong or poorly understood objectives. This can also be made worse by the poor assessment of institutions' capabilities and their most appropriate roles in implementing such programmes. The detection of risk indicators by first line officers is an approach potentially useful in countries with limited or no experience with counter-radicalisation and prevention programmes, where understanding of risk factors and radicalisation processes is underdeveloped, and where available statistical evidence and analytical capacities of institutions is limited or unsystematic.

The approach advocated here is concerned with the early identification of far-right and Islamist radicalisation and its manifestations among individuals and groups that are vulnerable or are moving towards extremism but have not yet committed criminal acts. The development of radicalisation risk and vulnerability indicators is premised on the idea that processes of radicalisation would have certain manifestations in the actions, behaviour and attitudes of an individual, which can be noted by their social environment or by public sector employees (frontline practitioners) coming into contact with the person. The purpose of early-warning signs is to flag risks and vulnerabilities so that **early prevention** can be applied after a thorough assessment of individual cases. This understanding of the role of early warning for prevention purposes as means to tackle radicalisation is based on experiences with violent radicalisation processes and acts of terrorism in Europe.



The indicators are divided into the following categories and concern mainly the individual level: behavioural (including changes in practices, actions, appearance) and cognitive (expression of opinions, beliefs and attitudes at verbal level). In turn, they are divided into three categories – suggestive, red flags and high risk, depending on the degree of immediacy of risk they indicate.

STRUCTURE OF THE VULNERABILITY AND RISK INDICATORS



Suggestive indicators are signs of vulnerability and are intended to support a more in-depth, professional assessment of potential vulnerabilities and cannot be viewed in isolation from one another. They provide supportive information that may be useful in considering the complexity of a situation. Red flags are stronger indicators of risk-relevant behaviours and attitudes, but also need to be viewed in combination and put into context.

Cognitive indicators

Radicalisation research has identified a process associated with a so-called "cognitive opening" within which a person is becoming receptive to radical ideas including those allowing the use of violence for the achievement of certain (political) goals. Therefore, it is advised to consider certain cognitive indicators as different stages of advancement in receptiveness to extremist ideologies.

- **Suggestive**

  – Openly voicing grievances. This could be the first and more benign stage before expressing more aggressive attitudes (pro-violence, anti-targets, etc.). However, in countries experiencing economic difficulties or where corruption is high and trust in government is low, the expression of grievances may not be indicative of a process of individual radicalisation – be it Islamist or right-wing radicalisation. In such countries the expression of grievances towards authorities at local and national level may be common among various groups and individuals.
  – Expressing a dichotomous worldview (us versus them). While this may not be indicative of outright readiness to commit violence, it is a sign of the embrace of rhetoric that is characteristic for radicalised groups or individuals and may signify a risk to a path to potential radicalisation. It can be accompanied by insistently preaching religious and ideological ideas to others, rejecting alternative views, expressing polarised views of absolute truth, with a low (or no) tolerance for perceived theological deviation or other perspectives.
  – Expressing disrespect of or rejecting the legitimacy of (secular) authorities. This signifies a graver risk of radicalisation if it is tied to convictions and calls for the need of political and societal change. In the context of Islamist radicalisation such calls would be directed to the change of secular, democratic societies into ones under the religious values and norms of early Islam. In the context of far right radicalisation such calls would be directed to the overthrow of government, abolition of the political parties, arming of citizens, etc.
  – Hate speech towards different groups and individuals. The indicator can help make a more complete picture of the different aspects of, and the degree to which, an individual is embracing radical ideas at the cognitive level.

- **Red flags**

  – Propagating ideas for non-legitimate radical change of secular democratic societies.
  – Openly voicing support for terrorist organisations and causes. In order for such indicator to be recognised and correctly understood, a list of such organisations needs to be provided, ideally as an integral part of a training manual. A reliable reference in this respect is the EU List of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts and subject to restrictive measures.
  – Openly expressing certain attitudes supporting violence, or against an expressed target. The focus on violence presents an additional aggravating factor of the risk beyond more general sympathies with a terrorist cause or group. This might be expressed through or accompanied by speaking of the importance of action now, the imminence of harm from a hostile group and justifying breaking the law in the name of a cause or ideology.

Behavioural indicators

- **Suggestive**

  – Cutting ties with family and friends, socially withdrawn. Such behaviour could signify increased vulnerability to being drawn to extremist ideologies and that the person might be undergoing a process of search for meaning, purpose or answers. In countries of Central and Eastern Europe where empirical evidence on violent radicalisation is lacking, this indicator should be considered with the caveat that such behavioural changes might be the outcome of various other circumstances (such as family problems or abuse, addictions, experience of discrimination, etc.) and do not necessarily indicate risk of radicalisation.
  – Noticeable change in religious and other every-day routines. This would include a personal change from not practicing religion at all to suddenly paying attention to and strictly following rules of religious practice, to a point where these become central to someone's life and other regular activities (such as school, work, social activities, etc.) become secondary or are abandoned to accommodate the newly adopted practice. As changes in religious habits are rather difficult to observe by first line officers in their daily encounters with community members, these would be better identified by experts and researchers of the Islamic faith. When referring to far-right radicalisation, these indicators would include change in practices and the adoption of rituals relevant to right-wing extremist ideologies, such as commemoration of relevant dates/anniversaries or following military-style rules and practices in every-day life.
  – Having contacts with or being under the influence of a religious or ideological leader or recruiter. This might be manifested in the individual starting to mention new role models or ideological leaders (in school, at home, among friends or during conversations with pedagogical and social services staff) and rejecting advice from others.
  – Group isolation and capsulation. These do not automatically translate into exposure of members of such communities to radicalisation but, if compounded by other factors at the individual level, they could enhance the vulnerability to potential radicalisation.

- **Red flags**

  – Possessing or disseminating extremist propaganda materials, for example, glorifying violence or fighting for a terrorist cause. If literature possessed or disseminated contains information on military training, handling weapons or making explosives this points to even graver risk of radicalisation.
  – Organises, leads or attends rallies for extremist causes. The indicator is relevant for the professional group of first line police officers and those specialised in securing mass events. A more systematic approach to monitoring such events is necessary and greater awareness among community police officers of the different extremist groups active in the country.
  – Contacts with or membership in extremist groups abroad or at home. Associating with extremist groups would likely come in combination with

other indicators, such as changes in outer appearance, participating in the group's activities (such as rallies and demonstrations), going to certain places where the groups is known to convene, etc. Monitoring such contacts can only be part of the functions of intelligence services rather than a monitoring component in the daily routines of first line practitioners, although they may come across other warning signs associated with such engagement.

– Engaging in criminal activity. Criminal engagement can be both a contributing factor and a symptom of radicalisation process being underway. Criminality may also imply previous prison experience and poor reintegration into society which may make an individual vulnerable due to grievances, social isolation, lack of perspectives, but also given the potential access to criminal (and terrorist) networks and transfer of skills and contacts.

High-risk signs

- Travel to risk countries/conflict zones. This is not an early warning sign of radicalisation but a serious indication of intent to take part in terrorist activity, or at least to travel to countries where the risks of being drawn into it increase dramatically. To be able to recognise and correctly understand this indicator, a list of risk countries needs to be provided as an integral part of a future training manual.
- Taking part in combat/military training. This is primarily relevant for monitoring by intelligence officers or law enforcement specialists. Possible differentiators could be made based on training in the use of weapons as opposed to general physical fitness or combat training, or the intent and nature of the organisation or group providing the training.
- Buying weapons, explosives and related materials. The interception of activities relating to the acquisition of weapons, explosives and related materials fall directly in the functions of law enforcement officers who have the duty to exert control over the acquisition and use of weapons and can spot unusual or illegal activity in this respect.

THE REQUIRED INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

While monitoring and assessing risks related to criminal behaviour and violent extremist acts that are of serious threat to national security fall clearly within the remit of intelligence and security agencies, the **primary responsibility for identifying and addressing risks of radicalisation early on for the purposes of prevention most often lies at the local level.** Thus, ensuring a holistic policy approach to radicalisation necessitates the clear designation of stakeholder roles and inter-institutional mechanisms – channels of communication and cooperation between institutions working horizontally to address problems on a specific level, as well as vertically, at the intersections of different levels.

Currently, few countries have managed in establishing such an integrated approach. Where integrated mechanisms exist, they build upon already well-established

partnerships and channels of cross agency collaboration, which are adapted for the purposes of counter-radicalisation, instead of creating new arrangements and institutions and burdening the government administration with additional responsibilities.

In countries with limited experience in countering and preventing radicalisation, governments should focus first and foremost on **obtaining accurate evidence-based picture of the spread and nature of risks**, as well as on **enhancing institutional preparedness** to identify and respond to these risks. The indicator framework outlined in this paper requires a more pro-active approach by all concerned institutions, which should proceed from a proper recognition and prioritisation of radicalisation-related issues in strategic planning and day-to-day activities. To achieve this, the following policies could be brought forward:

- At the national level, a **central coordination body** on countering and preventing radicalisation can be created and tasked with providing guidelines and expertise, centralising information and analysing threats, coordinating the work of territorial structures involved in prevention, designing trainings and raising awareness, ensuring cooperation between relevant stakeholders, designing and evaluating prevention programmes.
- Develop a **multi-agency prevention and coordination mechanism at the local level** to identify, monitor and prevent radicalisation. The mechanism should include setting up expert groups or local multi-agency panels with clearly defined coordination roles.
- Develop an **early warning system** for identification and monitoring of radicalisation risks. This system should clearly define the mechanisms through which information on risk signs is reported and by whom; how and by whom are risks evaluated and prioritised, as well as on the follow-up procedures based on the needs of each individual case. Such a system would further require a framework of field-tested risk indicators for identifying, monitoring and assessing signs of radicalisation, based on empirically validated findings. The framework for key risk indicators outlined in this paper serves as a reference point and provides a solid starting basis on which to build such a system and develop further indicators tailored to the specific context.
- In order for preventive work to be gradually integrated in the day-to-day work of **frontline practitioners**, their **skills, knowledge and capabilities** to identify and address radicalisation should be significantly increased. This requires developing specialised education curricula, manuals and guidelines and delivering regular practical trainings.
- Facilitating research into the factors precipitating radicalisation, the paths to violence, the forms and manifestations of radicalisation, and the impact which various ideologies, internet recruitment and role models have in the local context. Research findings should be at the core of any early warning and intervention measures.

INTRODUCTION

The underlying radicalisation processes impacting on disaffected and indoctrinated young people and the later involvement of some of them in acts of terrorism is of growing concern for the international community, European citizens and their governments. Many EU member states have been proactive in countering this and have acquired substantial experience in developing a number of prevention and de-radicalisation policies and programmes. However, many countries have adopted a trial and error approach to this sensitive policy area, having to adopt untried and untested measures in the face of the threat and in response to public fears. The alternative approach of 'doing nothing' is neither viable nor acceptable. Consequently, some counter-radicalisation programmes have been criticised as relying upon limited empirical evidence and producing no sound assessment of the extent and nature of radicalisation processes. A variety of diagnostic tools and mechanisms designed to identify individuals and groups who might pose a threat have been deployed in a number of EU countries in attempts to make effective interventions.

Radicalisation presents a number of practical challenges for policymakers, some of which stem from the way this phenomenon is defined. Research on the topic, while valuable, can often bring about confusion rather than clarity to the operational level of the interventions. Definitions and classifications of relevant factors and indicators vary considerably.[1] The process of radicalisation has been studied from the point of view of different academic disciplines delivering a wide spectrum of overlapping, complementary and sometimes divergent analyses and explanations. Problems are compounded with regard to specific types of extremism determined by differences in ideological commitment (left/right-wing, Islamist, single issue, separatist) and actor involvement (lone-wolf or group). Partly because of previous concerns as well as from debates about encroachment on fundamental freedoms, determining the scope and reach of policies has proven difficult. Due to the difference between cognitive (beliefs and convictions) and behavioural radicalisation (actions), there has been a considerable disagreement among experts and policymakers about the extent to which measures need to be taken before an act punishable by law is committed. Nevertheless, there has been general consensus that factors and processes on three different levels need to be considered – namely the individual level (micro), group and community level (meso) and societal level (macro). A considerable body of academic and practical knowledge has been accumulated, both contributing to better understanding of radicalisation processes, but also with respect to lessons learned from the application of different approaches and the intervention methods.[2]

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[1] For a detailed review of theoretical approaches on radicalisation see CSD (2016) *Understanding Radicalisation: Review of Literature*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

[2] Ibid.

Today, it is known that processes of radicalisation are non-linear, context-specific and multidimensional and that they involve a number of variables at different levels of analysis which are often difficult to operationalise, measure and assess in a way that generates actionable advice for policy-making and guides operational planning. The availability and quality of data on radicalisation variables – crucial to shaping appropriate policy responses – present another significant challenge.[3] Even when data might be present, other issues such as data mining and analysis are still problematic. Therefore, the link between evidence, prioritisation of risks and actual design and delivery of interventions is not always straightforward.

This publication provides background knowledge and puts forward a framework of risk assessment indicators tailored to the institutional environment of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that are yet to develop specific counter-radicalisation measures and programmes. It will aid policymakers and practitioners in understanding and monitoring early signs **of Islamist and right-wing radicalisation, as these phenomena present the greatest challenges to European societies today**, but it is also relevant to other forms of extremism and radicalisation. Drawing on experience generated elsewhere, and considering the need to adapt these practices to specific contexts, it aims to build a bridge between academic knowledge and empirical findings on the one hand, and policy practice, on the other. For the countries from Central and Southeast Europe in particular, globally manifested new forms of radicalisation present a recent policy issue. Where practical experience with implementing such measures and programmes is limited, there are also many gaps and challenges associated with the collection of reliable data on both extremist actors and their activities (through criminal statistics), as well as on risk behaviour, risk factors and levels of vulnerability related to radicalisation.

As a basis for developing more comprehensive institutional approaches to identifying, understanding and monitoring radicalisation risks the framework of indicators described below will be particularly useful for policymakers at national and EU levels in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as practitioners directly involved in the prevention of radicalisation. It is intended to be used in the following ways:

- To aid the **understanding of risk factors and processes of radicalisation** necessary for developing practical methods in assessment and monitoring of radicalisation risks and trends.
- As a **review of existing approaches and tools** to identifying, monitoring and assessing radicalisation in countries with limited experience in this field.
- As a **framework of vulnerability indicators and risk signs** as the basis for developing an early-warning and monitoring tool for first-line practitioners for the purposes of prevention and **recommendations** for the appropriate institutional mechanisms and stakeholder roles that are needed to ensure a holistic and systematic approach towards identifying, monitoring and addressing radicalisation risks.

[3] Ramalingam, V. (2014) *Old Threat, New Approach: Tackling the Far Right Across Europe*. London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, p. 21.

The publication is therefore structured in three parts. Chapter 1 focusses on some key concepts of radicalisation found in the academic and policy literature, as well as an overview of the most significant factors and drivers associated with radicalisation. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the diagnostic mechanisms and assessment tools used by government agencies across the EU and beyond to identify processes and factors of radicalisation and measure radicalisation trends and risks, to identify vulnerable groups and people, as well as to monitor trends over time. Chapter 3 contains a framework for understanding and measuring radicalisation risks. It contains a review of risk indicators as basis for developing vulnerability assessment mechanisms tailored to specific contexts.

1. THE NATURE AND MANIFESTATIONS OF RADICALISATION

It is widely agreed in the literature that there is no single cause or a standard path of radicalisation into terrorism. Scholars studying radicalisation have in general focussed on answering two questions: why radicalisation happens (looking into the root causes, contributing factors, triggers and favourable conditions in an individuals' environment); how radicalisation happens to the extent that some people eventually engage in violent extremism or terrorism (for example, what are the stages of the process and under what circumstances is any transition to violence triggered or completed). The process of radicalisation that leads to violence involves a number of variables at different levels of analysis (individual, society, international) which are often difficult to assess for setting priorities in the policy-making process and then to operationalise. The following review is not exhaustive, and does not aim to reflect on the contested nature of different radicalisation concepts and theories. It highlights some common characteristics of radicalisation processes and factors derived from academic work and provides a basic analytical framework on which to base assessments of radicalisation processes and the risks involved. This will aid practitioners involved in counter-radicalisation to better understand the phenomenon and its associated risk factors.

1.1. DEFINITIONS

Developing radicalisation risk assessment methods is usually based on a number of theoretical premises that aim to aid the understanding of the phenomenon of radicalisation. This publication is premised on the definition of **radicalisation** as "the process whereby individuals come to hold radical views in relation to the status quo."[4] A radical stance is characterised by a "growing readiness to pursue and support far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to the existing order."[5] Not all who begin the process progress to the use of violence. Therefore, an important differentiation is often made between **violent radicalisation** and **cognitive (non-violent) radicalisation**. While cognitive radicalisation is associated with the process of adoption of radical ideas per se, violent radicalisation occurs when an individual takes the additional step of employing violence to further the views derived from cognitive radicalisation.[6] More recently, policy documents and academic studies employ the term **radicalisation into violent extremism and**

[4] Bartlett, J., Birdwell, J. and M. King (2010) *The Edge of Violence*. London, Demos, p. 1.

[5] Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2010) 'Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know.' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 3(9), 797-814, p. 798.

[6] Vidino, L. and J. Brandon (2012) *Countering Radicalisation in Europe*. London, ICSR, King's College, London, p. 9.

terrorism to introduce greater clarity and better reflect on the evolving nature of the phenomenon.[7]

A broader definition of violent radicalisation as the "process of socialisation leading to the use of violence"[8] provides a very useful perspective for the development of risk assessment tools that aim to identify behaviours and attitudes associated with violence as opposed to those associated with broader radical views. While individuals and groups may espouse radical and extremist views they do not necessarily use aggressive tactics or propagate the use of violence. At the same time, involvement in violent acts is not necessarily premised on or driven by adherence to radical beliefs and frames of thinking, but it may be motivated by personal or group loyalty or peer pressure.[9] Other scholars argue that while all committed terrorists have become radicalised, not all individuals who are radicalised go on to take part in terrorist attacks or become violent extremist.[10] In any case, it is important to remember that holding radical views does not automatically or inevitably lead to engaging in violence and indeed, the *European Convention on Human Rights* (ECHR) protects freedom of thought (Article 9) and freedom of expression (Article 10).

Violent extremism consists in promoting, supporting or committing acts which may lead to terrorism and which are aimed at defending an ideology advocating racial, national, ethnic or religious supremacy and opposing core democratic principles and values.[11]

There are numerous forms of radicalisation in terms of the underlying ideological justifications of violent extremist and terrorist actions, including religious, ethnic-nationalist, separatist, anarchist, single-issue, right-wing/left-wing, animal rights, etc. This framework is developed to aid the understanding and monitoring of early signs of **right-wing radicalisation** and **Islamist radicalisation**, as these phenomena present the greatest challenges to European societies today, but it is also relevant to other forms of extremism and radicalisation as well.

1.2. ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

The understanding of the term Islamist radicalisation is tied to the understanding of the terms Islamism and jihadism. Islamism is the view that Islam is not only a religion but also a social, legal and political code of conduct. Respectively

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[7] Clutterbuck, L. (2015) 'Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism: A Perspective on the Challenges and Benefits.' In: *Understanding Deradicalization: Pathways to Enhance Transatlantic Common Perceptions and Practices*. Middle East Institute. Available at: http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/Clutterbuck.pdf

[8] European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation (2008) *Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism*, submitted to the European Commission on 15 May 2008, p. 5.

[9] Della Porta, D. and LaFree, G. (2012) Guest Editorial: 'Processes of Radicalization and De-Radicalization.' *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 6(1), 4-10. p. 7.

[10] Clutterbuck (2015), p. 2.

[11] Council of Europe (2015) *Draft Guidelines for Prison and Probation Services Regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism*. Brussels, Council of Europe.

Islamists aim to reorder government and society in accordance with the Islamic law, or Sharia and do not accept the separation between religion and state.[12] Islamism can be mainstream and peaceful but also violent. Many moderate Islamist organisations such as the Welfare Party in Turkey (Refah), the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, the various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood movement or the Ennahdha Party in Tunisia demonstrate flexibility and readiness to participate in the party life and the political pluralism of the respective national state.[13]

Islamist ideas however, also serve to inspire various extremist Muslim organisations, many of which espouse militant jihadi ideology. While in the 1990s such organisations were focused on the defence of mainly national causes, since 2001 their ideology and actions have attained transnational character to evolve into the so called ideology of "global jihad" aiming at the establishment of global Caliphate and the institution of the Islamic law worldwide.

According to current jihadi ideology (and in contrast to the Salafi mainstream and other interpretations of Islam) any Muslim leader who does not implement and follow Islamic law is an apostate; the use of force is needed to help Islamic truth predominate and therefore jihad is to be waged to this aim; the killing of non-Muslim civilians is justified; and suicide bombings are legitimate martyrdom operations.[14] The main elements of the jihadi ideology can be summarised as being "centred on a narrative, which claims that Islam and Muslims are constantly attacked and humiliated by the West, Israel, and corrupt local regimes in Muslim countries. It claims that in order to return to a society of peace, harmony and social justice, Muslims need to unite and stand up for their faith. They need to fight the West and other corrupting influences. Violence, including violence against civilians, is a necessary and legitimate means given the superior military power of the West. The fight, which militant Islamism claims, is a religiously sanctioned fight, is an individual duty and an emancipatory journey, which brings the fighter closer to God."[15]

While militant jihadism is presently predominantly discussed as stemming from the jihadi branch of Sunni Salafism,[16] it is also characteristic for some Shi'a militant movements, such as Hezbollah's paramilitary wing, the Jihad Council.

One useful definition of the nature of the ideology associated with Islamist radicalisation describes the phenomenon as involving "the belief that, to recreate an Islamic state, Muslims must not only adhere to a strict *Salafist* or ultraconservative interpretation of Islam, but also wage *jihad*, defined as armed struggle against the enemies of Islam, including non-Muslim nations (especially the United States), and

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[12] For a definition of Islamism see for example PACE Resolution 1743 (2010), "Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe."

[13] Евстатиев, С. (2011) Религия и политика в Арабския свят. Ислямът в обществото. Изток-Запад – София, с. 267.

[14] Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005) 'A Genealogy of Radical Islam,' *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28: 76.

[15] Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2010) 'Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know,' *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33:9, p. 798.

[16] The other two branches of Salafism include: the (i) *purists* who put focus on non-violent methods of propagation, purification and education, and the (ii) *political,* whose followers advocate the application of the *Salafi* creed by political means and in the political arena.

the current rulers of Muslim states who have supplanted God's authority with their own."[17]

In terms of organisational forms, current radical Islamist networks often involve decentralised and highly mobile structures; undertaking training and combat travel to conflict areas (from Pakistan to Syria) and mixed composition cells (including immigrants, second or third generation descendants and converts).[18] The current phase also involves the plotting of attacks in Europe by returning fighters who are trained and indoctrinated, as well as less sophisticated/smaller-scale attacks perpetrated by relatively autonomous local cells. Other scholars point that the more traditional forms of organisation remain important. Presently there is a mixture of operational jihadist structures in Europe including newly emerged, fully or semi-autonomous home-grown cells, with loose structures and local leaders and those with links to external organisations and cells as part of a well-structured network and subjected to a hierarchy (often external). The change involves a shift from the hierarchically structured cells of the 1990s to more home-grown groups without a typical leader, clear division of roles and formal structure and every member being free to act on his own.[19] Another novel feature of the European jihadist networks is the growing presence of converts and women.

Patterns of recruitment have also shifted (the process through which a terrorist group opens its ranks to or makes operational use of an already radicalised individual). Before the turn of the century this often had been the result of personal interaction with preachers and recruiters in places such as prisons and radical mosques, while presently more self-radicalisation is being observed, often through the internet or in small groups of peers, although personal contact with radical individuals/recruiters, influencers and networks is still important. Changes in recruitment mechanisms can be explained with the more hostile environment to recruitment due to counter-radicalisation measures by governments and reactions of communities in Europe and the greatly increased exploitation by terrorists and violent extremists of internet and social media, which have now become available globally. The outcome is that recruitment is driven more by local activists and the internet rather than self-styled radical preachers or direct local contact with radical organisations.

It is important to stress that at present not every individual radicalised to Islamist violence does so through adherence to Salafi or Shia (militant) traditions. In the context of the existence of ghettoized neighbourhoods with poor, unemployed and highly transient populations such as Molenbeek in Brussels, individual's radicalization has evolved into a "process in hyperdrive" without particular turn to religion or observance of religious dogmas.[20]

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[17] Rabasa, A., Pettyjohn, S., Ghez, J., Boucek, C. (2010) *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*. Santa Monica (CA), RAND Corporation, pp. 2-3.

[18] Pisoiu, D. (2014) 'Radicalization,' In: J. Cesari (Ed.) *Oxford Handbook of European Islam*. Oxford, Oxford University Press. p. 773.

[19] Vidino, L. (2011) *Radicalisation, Linkage and Diversity: Current Trends in Terrorism in Europe*. Santa Monica, RAND, pp. 4-5.

[20] Levitt, M. (April 2016) The Islamic State, Extremism and the Spread of Transnational Terrorism. Testimony submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, p. 6. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/LevittTestimony20160412.pdf

1.3. FAR-RIGHT RADICALISATION

Far-right extremism encompasses a diverse range of groups with different ideologies, making it inherently difficult to define. They range from less ideological youth street gangs to neo-Nazi terrorist cells, to anti-Islam activists and registered parties seeking to affect change through the political system, and to informal groups gathering and mobilising around music and sports events. Right-wing radicalisation is often associated with an extremist "political ideology revolving around the myth of a homogenous nation – a romantic and populist ultra-nationalism hostile to liberal, pluralistic democracy, with its underlying principles of individualism and universalism."[21] This kind of right-wing extremism is evidenced in the current radical right that advocates the expulsion of foreigners and generally highly restrictive policies towards them. Racism, xenophobia, ultra-nationalism, and opposition to liberal democracy are commonly defining features of contemporary right-wing extremism.[22] While some argue that the new right-wing movements profess ideas and engage in forms of action that invoke close linkages with the fascist movements of the past,[23] others view the contemporary radical right's intellectual origins to lie in the New Right of the 1970s – 1990s. The New Right brought a renewal of fascist ideology by formulating the concept of "ethnopluralism" and demarcating its thinking from old-fashioned ideas of biological racism and white superiority.[24] As with other extremist ideologies, right-wing extremism has a distinct anti-system and anti-constitutional thrust.

The organisational variety of far right extremism ranges from electoral organisations, such as political parties, to various extremist organisations, informal groups and networks, such as youth gangs, white power and skinhead groups, sports and music groups, through to violent organisations, and terrorist cells. It encompasses lone actors, political movements and paramilitary groups, and nativist and anti-Islam movements.[25] Right-wing extremists engage in a wide range of activities: spontaneous hate crime, vandalism and hooliganism, racist and other abusive slogans and graffiti.[26] Right-wing extremists engage in street protest movements defined not by rigid membership structures but by a fluid "march and grow" strategy. They often commit low level acts of violence, which are unlikely to make headline news, but also occasionally commit deadly attacks, such as arson or violent assaults in areas and houses inhabited by migrants and ethnic minorities. Manifestations may include vandalising shops owned by foreigners, or attacking a person for racial or ethnic reasons.

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[21] Minkenberg, M. (2013) 'The European Radical Right and Xenophobia in West and East: Trends, Patterns and Challenges.' In Melzer, R. and Serafin, S. (Eds.) *Right-Wing Extremism in Europe – Country Analyses, Counter-Strategies and Labor-Market Oriented Exit Strategies*. Berlin, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, pp. 9-34, at 11.

[22] Ramalingam, V. (2014) *Old Threat, New Approach: Tackling the Far Right Across Europe. Guide for Policy Makers*. London, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, p. 7.

[23] Mammone, A., Godin, E. and Jenkins, B. (2013) Introduction. In Mammone, A., Godin, E. and Jenkins, B. (Eds.) *Varieties of Right-Wing Extremism in Europe*. London, Routledge. pp. 1-15.

[24] Minkenberg, M. (2013) *The European Radical Right and Xenophobia in West and East*, p. 19.

[25] Ramalingam, V. (2014) *Old Threat, New Approach: Tackling the Far Right Across Europe. Guide for Policy Makers*. London, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, p. 7.

[26] Mudde, C. (2007) *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge University Press.

The internet and social media have become the primary vehicles for propagating, communicating and disseminating right-wing extremist ideas through semi-public and password-protected forums.[27] The internet is the main medium for spreading ideas and attracting voters or adherents, as well as enabling individuals from across different countries and continents to build an imagined society and a collective identity.[28] The internet and social media are also instrumental in establishing and sustaining the transnational dimension of right-wing extremism. Right-wing radicals often present themselves as part of a growing transnational movement, building on the success of counter-jihad equivalents initiated in the US and attempting to use anti-Islam as a "hook".

1.4. RADICALISATION PROCESSES AND FACTORS

Academic literature and empirical studies discuss a number of categories and types of root causes and conducive factors of radicalisation.[29] The factors discussed here are mainly based on empirical evidence from countries in Western Europe and the USA.[30] While they can aid understanding of some general patterns and characteristics of radicalisation processes, risk factors and indicators for risk assessment are context specific and **need to be verified through empirical evidence derived from or closely related to the particular activities of interest**.

Although there is a vast body of literature by experts delving into the drivers and root causes of radicalisation, there is no fixed set of factors that lead from radicalisation into violence. In fact, it has proven academically difficult to isolate a "terrorist profile". Scholars agree that radicalisation "is not a deterministic and linear process, neither is it a simple and clear one", and that a combination of factors needs to be considered.[31] There is a wide consensus among scholars that radicalisation is a context-bound phenomenon following a non-linear, unplanned path, with sociological and political drivers playing as much a role as ideological and psychological ones.[32] It is the result of a convergence between an individual's path and a belief system that justifies recourse to violence, which

[27] Daniels, J. (2009) *Cyber Racism: White Supremacy Online and the New Attack on Civil Rights*. New York, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

[28] Caiani, M. and Parenti, L. (2013) The Italian extreme right and its use of the Internet: a 'bi-front' actor? In: Mammone, A., Godin, E. and Jenkins, B. (Eds.) *Varieties of Right-Wing Extremism in Europe*. London, Routledge, pp. 217-232.

[29] See further CSD (2016) *Understanding Radicalisation. Review of Literature*. Sofia, Center for the Study of Democracy.

[30] Furthermore, even when some factors were previously found to be related to radicalisation, the evidence base from which they were derived was not always solid and there was little clarity on how these "ingredients for radicalisation" interact and fit together**,** although some widely used models exist.

[31] Marret, J. L. (2013) *From Radicalisation Analysis to Deradicalisation: Policy and Field Recommendations*. 7th Framework Programme SAFIRE Project, Scientific Approach to Formulate Indicators & Responses to Radicalisation, p. 15. Available: http://www.safire-project-results.eu/documents/deliverables/6-from-radicalisation-analysis-to-deradicalisation-policy-and-field-recommendations.pdf

[32] European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation (2008) *Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism*, p. 7.

can be exacerbated by the perception of a threat to one's identity and morals, and fuelled by social networks (face-to-face or online).

The monitoring framework presented in this publication takes as its premise that radicalisation is a dynamic, multi-stage and multifaceted phenomenon that occurs **at the intersection of individual push factors** (biographical exposure and personal trajectory, intrinsic motivations, grievances) **with pull factors** (such as exposure to ideologies and recruiters) **and occurring in an enabling environment, conducive radicalisation setting or in the presence of favourable external influences**. Often certain structural and background conditions, as well as group dynamics and trigger events, can contribute to, accelerate or act as a catalyst for this process. Structural factors alone are insufficient to explain radicalisation as emphasis should also be placed on examining how the enabling environment resonates with the individual.[33] Propaganda and recruitment are often catalysts for this resonance.

Furthermore, it is assumed that the process can take place at the **individual, group/community and society level** and often certain causal factors and drivers can resonate and work at all three levels (e.g. social deprivation can affect individuals, but also whole groups of society; international events e.g. the conflict in Syria, can resonate with the individual, but also at the group level and act as catalyst or trigger for people to embrace radical ideas).

The monitoring framework outlined in Chapter 3 is based on a three-level model of analysis for factors and processes of radicalisation[34] that can lead to violence:

***Macro-level**, i.e. role of government and society at home and abroad*, the radicalisation of public opinion and party politics, tense majority – minority relationships, especially when it comes to foreign diasporas, and the lack of socio-economic opportunities for whole sectors of society which leads to mobilisation and radicalisation of the discontented, some of which might take the form of terrorism. The macro level further relates to international relations, poor integration, as well as processes and outcomes of globalisation and modernisation.

***Meso-level**, i.e. the wider radical milieu* – the supportive or even complicit social surround – which serves as a rallying point and is the "missing link" with the terrorists' broader constituency or reference group that is aggrieved and suffering injustices which, in turn, can radicalise parts of a youth cohort and lead to the formation of terrorist organisations or acts of terrorism. The meso level or the social level further relate to issues of social identity, social interaction and group processes.

***Micro-level**, i.e. the individual level* (personal characteristics and experiences), involving e.g. identity problems, failed integration, feelings of alienation, marginalisation, discrimination, relative deprivation, humiliation (direct or by proxy), stigmatisation and rejection, often combined with moral outrage and feelings of (vicarious) revenge.

[33] Schmid, A. (Ed.) (2011) *The Routledge Handbook on Terrorism Res*earch. London and New York, Routledge.

[34] Based on Schmid, A. P. (2013) *Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review*, p. 4.; Veldhuis. T. & Staun, J. (2009) Islamist Radicalisation: *A Root Cause Model*. The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, p. 24.

Many macro-level factors have a social or individual element to them.[35] For example, "poor socio-economic integration not only manifests itself at the macro level, but also in the social and individual sphere if groups or individuals experience social exclusion or rejection when, for example, entering the labour market […]. To a large extent the levels and causal factors overlap and there is a complex interplay between these factors being played out simultaneously across the global and local levels in and between different geographic contexts. In turn, this is reflected down to the individual level."[36]

This makes it difficult to isolate decisive factors across different contexts. A few examples of different categories of factors from academic literature are provided below. The following factors given as causal for (Islamist) radicalisation, based on the Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management[37] resonate with the three level model of (macro, meso and micro) analysis described above:

Causal factors at the macro level (external level):

- Problems of integration into host societies;
- Social marginalisation/exclusion;
- Poverty and deprivation;
- Discrimination;
- International politics/international conflicts in the Middle East;
- Globalisation and modernisation;
- Divergent interpretations of Islam and relating requests and expectations of the practice of religion between radical and moderate readings of Islam;
- Internet and access to Islamist propaganda over the internet.

Causal factors at the meso level (group, community, social network):

- Identity dynamics at the group level;
- Group dynamics: homophily, social influence, social rules, friendship bonds, peer pressure;
- Internet facilitating network and opinion formation;
- Prisons as serving breeding ground for radicalisation of inmates.

Causal factors at the micro level (individual level):

- Personal/psychological characteristics: e.g. depression, anxiety, aggression, identity seeking, impulsive, sensitive to humiliation, etc., fascination with spirituality/religion, search for meaning;
- Personal experiences: lead to the adoption of radical ideology (ideology itself is not a causal factor);
- Rationality: motivations for joining radical groups.

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[35] Veldhuis. T. and Staun, J. (2009) *Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model*. The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, p. 27.

[36] Ranstrop, M. (Ed.) (2010) *Understanding Violent Radicalisation. Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe*. London and New York, Routledge, p. 3-4.

[37] Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management (2008) *Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalisation Strategy*. Brussels, European Commission.

Certain background or structural factors contributing to this process can also be added to the analysis, including:[38]

- ***Structural causes***: demographic imbalances, globalisation, rapid modernisation, transitional societies, increased individualism with rootlessness, atomisation, relative deprivation, class structure, absence of a critical Muslim debate on Islamist terrorism, segregation and parallel society;
- ***Facilitating (or accelerator) causes*:** make terrorism possible and attractive (these include mobility, technology, transportation, publicity, weapons technology, weak state control of territory, etc.);
- ***Triggering causes***: such as a political or personal calamity, an outrageous act committed by the enemy, or some other event that calls for revenge or action; Western foreign policy and single provocative incidents, the myth of jihad, presence of a charismatic person or spiritual advisor.

The Dutch "supply-and-demand" scheme is a simple model to explain the situation and processes leading to radicalisation.[39] It is premised on the idea that radicalisation can arise when **demand meets supply** (causing a "**cognitive opening"**) in the presence of a suitable **breeding ground** and background conditions that contribute to and enable the process (see Figure 1). The demand

Figure 1. The Dutch model to understanding radicalisation



Source: Mellis, C. (2007) 'Amsterdam and radicalisation: the municipal approach.'

[38] Based on: Bjørgo, T. (ed.) (2005) *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward*. London, Routledge; Precht, T. (2007) *Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe. From conversion to terrorism*. Danish Ministry of Justice.

[39] Mellis, C. (2007) 'Amsterdam and radicalisation: the municipal approach,' In: The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Radicalisation in broader perspective*. Amsterdam, NCTb.

pertains to individual motivations and internal factors (such as seeking for answers on identity and belonging), while supply is the external influence and recruitment (internet, media, contact with preachers and radical leaders). In order to seriously expose oneself to the radical message there must be a "cognitive opening" to entertain views previously considered extreme, prompted by an experience of crisis or other trigger events that diminish resilience.

The **pathways and stages** approach to explaining the process of radicalisation has been used by many scholars to further the understanding of radicalisation and to illuminate how radicals turn to violence and to show how the process evolves through different stages. They usually suggest a transition from individual seeking of alternative truths – to general agreement with radical ideas and views – to engagement with like-minded people and groups – to increasing acceptance of violent means – through intent to act upon these views – and finally to action. During this process, the dominant political order, dialogue, compromise and tolerance as means to bring change are all rejected. Instead, violence is more and more adopted as an appropriate method to attain certain goals. Thus, at some point, radicalisation can (but does not necessarily) lead to violence and terrorism. This **process, however, is not linear and not necessarily sequential**. Some examples of different staged models to terrorism include:

- Taarnby's eight-stage recruitment process depicts the steps from intent to action: 1) individual alienation and marginalisation; 2) a spiritual quest; 3) a process of radicalisation; 4) meeting and associating with like-minded people; 5) gradual seclusion and cell formation; 6) acceptance of violence as legitimate political means; 7) connection with a gatekeeper "in the know," and finally 8) becoming operational.[40]

Figure 2. The 'staircase to terrorism' model



Source: Moghaddam, F. (2005) 'The Staircase to Terrorism. A Psychological Exploration'. *American Psychological Association,* 60(2), 161-169.

[40] Taarnby, M. (2005) *Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives*. Danish Ministry of Justice.

- Wiktorowicz's "al-Muhajiroun model" involves four dimensions of social influence on the individual towards radicalisation: 1) cognitive opening; 2) religious seeking; 3) frame alignment and 4) socialisation.[41]
- Moghaddam's "staircase to terrorism model" is conceived as having a ground floor and five higher floors, with behaviour on each floor characterised by particular psychological processes (Figure 2).

1.5. OVERVIEW OF OBSERVABLE INDICATORS

Based on the assumption that radicalisation processes have certain manifestations and symptoms, academic studies and practical guides on observable indicators of radicalisation risk and vulnerability distinguish between the following main categories of indicators: **behavioural, appearance-related** and **cognitive (attitudes, identity, ideology)**. Group behaviour indicators are also mentioned by some authors, although most approaches focus on the individual level. Another distinction is made depending on the level of risk between **signal indicators** and **red flag indicators**. The latter are mainly associated with the immediate pre-violence stage of the radicalisation process and require immediate intervention.

Often these factors overlap and it is hard to allocate them to a certain stage of radicalisation. Hence, they cannot be used directly for determining the level of risk with certainty. Furthermore, they can signify risk only when considered in combination.

While the table below contains examples of observable indicators mainly of Islamist radicalisation, some of the broader categories of indicators have also been found relevant for assessing other types of radicalisation behaviour.

Table 1. Examples of observable indicators of radicalisation

Behavioural (individual and group)	Appearance	Attitudes, identity, cognitive factors	High-risk factors (pre-violence)
• Scrupulous attention to what is haram and halal • Tensions or changes in family life • Withdrawal from previous relations, social isolation/polarisation.	• Change in physical appearance/attire (e.g. growing a beard, cutting back fingernails, wearing	• Change in personality and particular emotional expressions • Using aliases • Mentioning new role models or ideological leaders	• Death rhetoric • Member of extremist group • Contact with known recruiters/extremists • Advanced paramilitary training

[41] Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004) *Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam.* Department of International Studies, Rhodes College.

Table 1. Examples of observable indicators of radicalisation (continued)

Behavioural (individual and group)	Appearance	Attitudes, identity, cognitive factors	High-risk factors (pre-violence)
• Disconnecting with former community • Selective exposure to media • Dependence on communication technology • Engaging with propaganda material • Abrupt and noticeable change in religious practices • Forcing own (e.g. religious) beliefs, norms on others • Untouchable demeanour • Travel/residence abroad • Contact with extremist groups • Secret meetings (group) • Aggressive behaviour • Becoming violent • Minor crimes	traditional Islamic dress, wearing trousers until just above the ankles, refusing to wear shorts, refusing to have tattoos or hiding old ones for religious reasons, weight loss due to change in eating habits). *Note: Often these are just signs of increasing piousness.* – *Potential terrorists would avoid displaying these signs in order to avoid detection.*	• Doubts over identity • Strong devotion to a particular change • Newly discovered patriotism • Us versus them societal view • Critical expressions against government • Feelings of disconnection, change in personal narrative • Strong interest in the history and beginnings of Islam • Adopting a legalistic interpretation of Islam • Trusting only selected religious authorities • Perceived antagonism Islam vs. the West • Low tolerance for perceived theological deviance • Glorification of martyrdom and violence	• Overseas combat • Acquiring weapons, explosive materials • Organising protests inspired by extremist ideology • Taking part in criminal activity/problems with the law • Advocates violence • Attempts to conceal radical behaviour • Suspicious travel • Stores and collects hazardous materials • Looks for information on building weapons • Interested about public and government buildings • Acquiring currency and forged documents, organising transport

Source: Synthesis based on Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009)[42]; Jordan and Manas (2007)[43]; CoPPRa (2013)[44]; Pilner (2013)[45]; Cole et al. (2007)[46].

[42] Gartenstein-Ross, D. and Grossman, L. (2009) *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S and U.K: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process*. Washington DC, FDD Center for Terrorism Research.

[43] Jordan, J. and Manas, F. (2007) External Signs of Radicalisation and Jihadist Militancy. Athena Intelligence Journal, 2(1), Article 1/4.

[44] Community Policing Preventing Radicalisation & Terrorism (CoPRRa) (2013) *Manual for Trainers. 2nd Edition*. Brussels, Federal Police of Belgium.

[45] Pilner, J. (2013) *Observable Indicators of Possible Radicalisation*. ISCA, Safire Project.

[46] Cole, A. *et al.* (2009) *Guidance for Identifying People Vulnerable to Recruitment into Violent Extremism*. University of Liverpool.

2. MAPPING RADICALISATION DIAGNOSTIC TOOLS AND APPROACHES IN THE EU

2.1. TYPES OF DIAGNOSTIC AND MONITORING TOOLS

Governments in the EU and beyond use a range of diagnostic mechanisms and assessment tools to identify processes and factors of radicalisation and measure radicalisation trends and risks, to identify vulnerable groups and people, as well as to monitor trends over time. These are essential preconditions for devising tailored prevention measures or for counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation programmes. These differ in terms of what they measure and monitor (risk behaviours and vulnerability factors or violent acts and manifestations of radicalisation), at what level they do so (individual, group, organisational, society), and for what purpose (identifying individuals at risk in order to deploy interventions; horizontal assessment of trends for strategic priority-setting; training and guiding first-line officers to identify and respond to risks, etc.).

Among the tools reviewed here are some that have been recognised at EU level and implemented in a number of EU member states, such as the CoPPRA[47] and TerRA[48] early-vigilance manuals for frontline practitioners, as well as the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA)[49] guidelines based on structured professional judgement, used mainly in prison settings. Others have been developed in a specific national context relating to the nature of the threat and the specific organisational and institutional set-up.

Radicalisation diagnostic tools and policy approaches towards counter-radicalisation vary across EU member states. The general trend within the EU, USA and Canada has been to expand the response beyond the exclusive focus on the immediate prevention of terrorist attacks, and rolling out a number of "soft" policies in addition, with the aim of identifying and reversing the radicalisation process which often precedes the use of violence. Many European states have programmes targeting populations that are seen as vulnerable to radicalisation or where such processes are already underway. Programmes often target young people and prison populations. They use instruments such as education, mentoring, and positive religious instructions. Identifying, assessing and monitoring levels and nature of vulnerability, however, presents significant challenges.

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[47] Community Policing and the Prevention of Radicalisation & Terrorism, http://www.coppra.eu/

[48] Terrorism & Radicalisation (TerRa) project, http://www.terra-net.eu/pages/cont.php?id=1&menu=2

[49] Pressman, E. (2009) *Risk Assessment Decisions for Violent Political Extremism*. Ottawa, Public Safety Canada.

Vulnerability is determined through tools for risk assessment developed by academia and government agencies, which focus on: 1) identifying individual risk behaviour; 2) assessing the nature and extent of the risk; 3) deciding upon appropriate interventions (UK, NL, BE, FR, DK).[50] This is often closely tied to referral mechanisms within pre-defined responsibilities of the state and non-state actors involved. Frontline practitioners such as police officers, social and health workers, teachers, psychologists, prison staff, civil society and community representatives are trained to use risk indicators to detect and assess potential signs and observable indicators of radicalisation, or to recognise vulnerability on the part of individuals in the communities they work.[51]

There are several challenges associated with **identifying, understanding and monitoring radicalisation risks** factors and trends:

- Availability of quality data;
- Choice of units and levels of analysis;
- Sharing of information and division of responsibilities between relevant stakeholders (police, intelligence, community, social actors);
- Interpretation/analysis of this data (risk assessment methodologies and initial assumptions of how radicalisation comes about).

A major difficulty also relates to the distinction between **monitoring violent/criminal behaviour** – which mainly falls within the mandate of police and law enforcement – and **processes of radicalisation that might lead to such violence but have not done so yet**. Understanding such processes and the factors that might lead to violence are essential to designing specific prevention programmes and they should engage a wider array of state and non-state actors.

Diagnostic tools are in a broader sense instruments for generating data and increasing knowledge. It can be in the form of academic findings and information that is defined as intelligence or evidence. Its assessment and operationalisation in a way that can support and guide policy making processes can serve as a stepping stone for developing evidence-based policies or strategies or practical interventions at tactical and operational levels.

The diagnostic tools reviewed here encompass a wide array of methodologies or approaches for assessing and monitoring radicalisation levels. They include vulnerabilities, risks, threats and trends and early warning strategies that have been developed and/or used by national security/intelligence bodies and other relevant stakeholders involved in preventing and countering radicalisation, such as local authorities, social workers, academia, NGOs, etc. Depending on the level of measurement (micro, meso or macro), the type of information and the requirements for its analysis will differ.

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[50] HM Government (2012) *Channel: Vulnerability Assessment Framework*. London, HM Government; Municipality of Amsterdam (2007) *Amsterdam against Radicalisation*. Amsterdam, Municipality of Amsterdam.

Verhagen, A., Reitsma, M. and Spee, I. (2010) *Radicx. Vroegtijdige signalering van radicalisiering*. Utrecht, KPC Groep/APS.

[51] See also Pliner, J. (2013) *Observable Indicators of Possible Radicalisation*. FP-7 SAFIRE Project; Community Policing Preventing Radicalisation & Terrorism CoPPRa (2013) *Manual for Trainers*.

Diagnostics and monitoring tools in the field of radicalisation can be roughly distinguished along the policy objectives they are intended to serve, the type of decision-making they aim to aid, as well as the end-users (and decision-making levels) for which they are intended:

- **Policy objectives and decision-making levels**: With regard to radicalisation, three distinct but overlapping and interconnected categories of policy objectives can be distinguished – anti-radicalisation (preventing radicalisation from occurring at all within the general population), counter-radicalisation (stop or mitigate radicalisation among the vulnerable or those already on the path to radicalisation) and de-radicalisation (reversing radicalisation).[52] These policy objectives relate to the four-tier model of radicalisation and target groups as presented in Figure 3. Achieving these objectives requires identifying risks and contributing factors at the different levels and assessing them so that interventions can be designed. In line with these objectives, diagnostic tools can support and guide **strategic decision-making**[53] (measure and map the macro environment's conduciveness to radicalisation, highlight and assess trends in radicalisation processes and extremist activity) or **operational and tactical planning** (identify and monitor populations and groups at risk; spot individuals at serious risk for radicalisation, individuals who have already been radicalised, assess the risk that extremist offenders pose).

- **Levels and units of analysis:** Depending on the policy objectives, the information analysed, the unit and level of analysis will vary significantly. Anti-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation mostly entail broader policies[54] affecting the whole or large sections of the population (macro level), often associated with general developmental goals, which aim to prevent the emergence or stem the progression of nascent radicalisation. More targeted counter-radicalisation measures and interventions can be devised for specific groups and individuals (focus on the meso and individual level) identified as being particularly at risk of progressing towards violent extremism. De-radicalisation, dealing as it does with already radicalised individuals and less often groups is an intervention, largely geared towards the individual level. Identifying and monitoring risk factors at each of these levels would require different approaches. The data required can thus include detection and reporting on individual risk behaviour

[52] Clutterbuck, L. (2015) 'Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism: A Perspective on the Challenges and Benefits,' In: *Understanding Deradicalization: Pathways to Enhance Transatlantic Common Perceptions and Practices*, Middle East Institute. Available at: http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/Clutterbuck.pdf

[53] For more detail see Marret, J. L. (2013) *From Radicalisation Analysis to Deradicalisation: Policy and Field Recommendations*. 7th Framework Programme SAFIRE Project, Scientific Approach to Formulate Indicators & Responses to Radicalisation. Available: http://www.safire-project-results.eu/documents/deliverables/6-from-radicalisation-analysis-to-deradicalisation-policy-and-field-recommendations.pdf

[54] However, a number of EU member states have encountered problems stemming from broad counter-radicalisation policies and have since moved towards narrowing down the focus of their efforts in this area. The header "counter-radicalisation" now largely refers to initiatives targeted more specifically at the meso and individual level. Nevertheless, the societal level remains important as analysis of macro trends is crucial to identifying groups and individuals at risk and thus designing suitable targeted policy initiatives but the tools used on all three levels are rarely connected.

and appearances (micro level), activities of extremist groups (meso level), as well as levels of polarisation in the general population and aggregated statistical data on crime trends (macro level). The information sources will differ depending what the unit of analysis is. While horizontal assessments of threats at macro level for the purposes of strategic priority setting in countering radicalisation and violent extremism mostly utilise aggregate statistical data collected by government agencies, public records, open source and intelligence data, risk assessment for the purposes of targeted individualised interventions and would require local-level intelligence and/or information provided by frontline practitioners or community actors.

Figure 3. The UK PREVENT Pyramid



Source: ACPO Prevent strategy and delivery plan. In: Audit Commission (2008) Preventing Violent Extremism: Learning and Development Exercise. Report to the Home Office and Communities and Local Government, p. 12.

- **Stakeholders involved:** Generally, the collation and assessment of information and data on the risks of radicalisation is perceived as primarily the domain of intelligence services and law enforcement. Some countries (SK, DE, and NL) have specialised units within these institutions tasked with monitoring and analysing radicalisation trends and risks and generating the fact-based foundation necessary for strategic policy decisions about the design and objectives of interventions. However, monitoring risk factors for the purposes of prevention requires the involvement of other stakeholders, such as police, social services, healthcare, the school system, the penitentiary system, tax authorities, private companies, etc. Depending on the policy objective, level of analysis and application, the monitoring of risks, trends and manifestations might be carried

out initially by first line practitioners or at a higher level in institutions (e.g. by analysts, experts and professionals).

Depending on these differences, tools can vary significantly, ranging from first-line practitioner guides for early identification of vulnerable individuals by using observable indicators (behaviour, appearances, etc.); operational risk assessments and intelligence-based monitoring; sociological surveys among groups/communities or the wider population, and broader tools indicating the likelihood of radicalisation becoming a prominent problem. The following section sets out specific examples of such tools, with the focus on those that have been utilised in policy practice. Rather than map all available instruments, this review provides a classification and practical illustrations of some prominent examples.[55] Particular emphasis is placed on such monitoring and diagnostic tools that can aid strategic-level policy making through providing situational assessments of horizontal trends, as well as prevention planning at the operational level through individual vulnerability assessment.

2.2. ASSESSING HORIZONTAL THREATS AND TRENDS IN RADICALISATION AND EXTREMISM

The first category of diagnostic and monitoring tools presented here is related to monitoring and assessing trends and risks at the macro-level, namely horizontal threats and trends in extremist activity, actors, drivers and determinants of radicalisation processes and in particular violent acts and actors. A second category is related to tools examining broader social trends and processes such as grievances, polarisation, tensions and trust, as well as activism and radicalism proneness among the general population, through sociological surveys. These can help assess the level of penetration of radical ideas into society, or trends in the development of background factors and conditions that may play a role in radicalisation.

2.2.1. National threat assessments

Many European states carry out terrorism and extremism threat assessments and situational analyses, resulting in levels of threat (often publically communicated) and knowledge of the spread, nature and trends in extremist and terrorist activity

[55] It should be noted that while the terms "risk", "vulnerability" and "threat" are often confused and used interchangeably in practice, they are not synonymous. Generally, with regard to counter-terrorism, the following distinction is made (see also Willis, H. et al. (2005) *Estimating Terrorism Risk. Santa Monica* (CA), RAND Corporation): threat is external to the object that needs to be protected and can be defined as „any indication, circumstance, or event with the potential to cause the loss of, or damage to, an asset or population" (Cox, L. A. (2009) *Risk Analysis of Complex and Uncertain Systems*. Springer, p. 352), whereas vulnerability is internal, signifying the extent to which the object is resilient against the threat. Risk is the function of the threat and vulnerability. Consequences are also often taken into account, leading to the development of different risk scenarios. However, with regard to the tools discussed here, a complete review of the definitional and methodological approach behind the instruments proved to be beyond the scope of this paper. While the distinction is introduced here to avoid terminological confusion, the tools are presented with their original names and might not employ the same definitions and methodological approach.

(which may or may not be made public). Such situational reports are of interest for politicians, professionals from law enforcement and intelligence, but also other state and non-state bodies and practitioners, academia, civil society, media and the general public. They can be part of an overall assessment of security threats, or stand-alone annual reports. While it is within the main tasks of national intelligence and security agencies to monitor such trends, it is not always the case that such information is translated into analytical and strategic products that are used beyond tactical and operational goals of these agencies and that are used to inform broader government strategies and policy measures on counter-radicalisation through providing a situational picture of trends and related threats. Therefore, the focus here is on publically communicated situational analyses conducted by government agencies that (are likely to) feed into the strategic priority setting or guide policy-making.

A study by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism mapping EU countries' policy responses to the issue of foreign fighters identified the use of scales for terrorism threat in 14 member states.[56] More comprehensive analyses of horizontal trends and threats are produced on an annual basis by specialised intelligence and law enforcement agencies in countries like Germany, the Czech Republic, Netherlands, among others, providing statistical data and analysis of the scope of extremist violence and crimes committed over the preceding year. They often draw on a wide range of data and information sources, such as government statistics, media reporting, academic studies, surveys, etc.

However, not all countries publish such reports. Where this is the case, these reports often include information on the situation regarding extremist groups and radicalisation trends. The **Annual Threat Assessment** published by the Norwegian Police Security Service includes information on trends and risks posed by Islamist, far-right and far-left radicals in the country.[57] The **Czech Extremism Report**, published regularly since 1999 and the German Report on the Protection of the Constitution published since 1968 are other examples of a mapping of extremist groups and trends. The quarterly **Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands** has been published since 2005 and has included policy considerations since 2013. Often information on global developments as they pertain to the national context, is taken into account in these threat assessments. Some countries carry out a systematic mapping of international developments that impact on their national security – the Danish Defence Intelligence Service annual intelligence risk assessment is one example.[58]

Threat assessments are usually carried out by the police and/or intelligence services. The UK and Belgium are examples of a wider stakeholder involvement. In 2006, Belgium established a Coordinated Unit for Threat Assessment (CUTA). The Unit includes representation from a number of institutions in order to ensure

[56] ICCT (2016) *The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the EU: Profiles, Threats & Policies*. The Hague, ICCT. http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-April-2016_including-AnnexesLinks.pdf

[57] Norwegian Police Security Service (2014) *Annual Threat Assessment 2014*.

[58] Danish Defence Intelligence Services (2015) *Intelligence Risk Assessment 2015. An assessment of developments abroad impacting on Danish security*. https://fe-ddis.dk/SiteCollectionDocuments/FE/EfterretningsmaessigeRisikovurderinger/Risikovurdering2015_EnglishVersion.pdf

a comprehensive picture of the risk radicalisation and terrorism pose to Belgian society: the State Security, the Military Intelligence Service, the Integrated Police Service, the Federal Public Service of Home Affairs, the Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Public Service of Mobility and Transportation and the Federal Public Service of Finance. CUTA is involved in the preparation of the terrorism, extremism and radicalism section of the National Police Security Image which forms basis for the National Security Plan.

The **German Verfassungschutzbericht** (Report on the protection of the constitution)[59] is by far the most comprehensive annual report in terms of scope and depth of the data and analysis presented, including on:

- Overview of nature and quantity of politically and religiously motivated criminality and extremist acts, and trends over time.
- Analysis of main trends and developments pertaining to right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, Islamism and Islamist terrorism, the Salafi scene, foreign nationalist movements. The indicators analysed include supporters and sympathisers base of the extremist scene, use of violence and motivations.
- Analysis of main actors: extremist groups, organisations, movements and political parties (members, ideology and motivations, propaganda, recruitment and radicalisation factors, targets, weapons possession, mobilisation and threat potential).
- International conflicts and their domestic impact.
- Analysis of main repressive and preventive measures.

This data is provided by intelligence agencies mainly, but also by law enforcement bodies and other government agencies (most notably ministries of defence and foreign policy), judicial bodies (courts, prosecution, and probation services), academics and sociological researchers. Open source data (media, internet, opinion polls) and academic studies are complementary sources of information for the situation analysis. By collating this data a more comprehensive picture of the spread and nature of violent radical activities and the actors involved can be constructed.

Beyond the detailed overview and situational analysis of horizontal trends across consistent indicators, such reports can include two further aspects of particular added value for policymakers and operational planning: threat assessment and projections (estimative intelligence analysis). **Threat assessment of intent and capability** of extremist actors to cause harm should be ideally an integral component of such a situational analysis report. It allows the assessment of available intelligence, law enforcement information and open source data on the intent and capability of extremist actors to cause harm, or the immediate threats associated with extremist actors.

Methodologies for extremist and terrorist threat assessment in some cases are similar to the standard methodology for organised crime threat assessment and focus on the capability and intent of actors to cause harm. National agencies such

[59] Bundeministerium des Inneren (2015) *Verfassungschutzbericht 2014*. Berlin, Bundesminister des Innern.

as the UK National Crime Agency use unclassified annual threat assessments of organised crime to raise public awareness and law-enforcement sensitive versions to inform both law enforcement priorities for tackling serious organised crime and other relevant initiatives, such as changes in legislation, regulation or policy.[60] Similar reports exist also on the internal and external threats of extremism and terrorism. For example, the **Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report** (TE-SAT)[61] provides an overview of terrorist attacks, arrested suspects, convictions and penalties imposed, violent extremist activities related to religiously inspired terrorism, ethno-nationalism and separatism, right-wing, left-wing and anarchist terrorism and single issue terrorism in the EU.

Table 2. Assessment of capability, limitations and vulnerabilities of criminal groups



Source: Project SLEIPNIR: An Analytical Technique for Operational Priority Setting.

[60] Ratcliffe, A. (2008) *Intelligence-led Policing*. Oregon, Willian.

[61] Europol (2015) *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trends Report 2015*. Europol.

Another example from the USA is the **Virginia Terrorism Threat Assessment**[62] which provides specific analysis of "the presence of extremists, evidence of trends linked to terrorism, and the abundance of potential targets." It provides analysis of potential extremist and terrorist threat groups and makes projections on their attack capability, level of influence, fundraising and criminal activities.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police have developed an analytical technique for **Operational Priority Setting** known as SLEIPNIR.[63] It is used to rank-order organised criminal groups, as well as terrorist groups, in terms of their relative capabilities, limitations and vulnerabilities. As a component of strategic intelligence assessments, the tool is aimed at producing assessments to recommend strategic enforcement and criminal intelligence priorities to senior law enforcement officers.

At EU level, there are also a few instruments for regular monitoring of terrorist and extremist trends, the most important being the TE-SAT report of Europol. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance country reports take stock of extremism in the countries where these problems are prominent. Eurojust publishes the Terrorism Convictions Monitor, which gathers all convictions in the EU for terrorism or which are terrorism related, e.g. with regard to extremist propaganda.[64]

2.2.2. Surveys

Surveys measuring and monitoring factors such as attitudes and beliefs, grievances, social polarisation, social tensions, trust, activism and radicalism readiness among the population can be valuable tools complementing the assessment of radicalisation trends and conductive factors in the whole of society (macro-level) or in certain regions and localities. While unsuitable for identifying individuals at risk of radicalisation, such data can aid the analysis of societal level factors and predispositions that might play a role in radicalisation processes, and aid situational and threat assessments conducted by governments. Surveys can produce valuable insights into the level of and trends in penetration of radical ideas within society, the potential support for radicalism or other structural and situational factors that might have an impact on radicalisation processes. Data generated through surveys can also aid macro-analysis of driving factors and causal effects.

Examples from the UK include the **Citizenship Survey: Attitudes towards Violent Extremism**, as well as the **Youth Online Understanding Radicalisation Survey** conducted in 2011 and 2015 respectively. The former aims to assess the extent to which people reject the use of violence and what factors determine it. YOURS is a survey conducted by the UK National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters, focused on young people and their views on issues of radicalisation and travel to conflict zones.

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[62] Commonwealth of Virginia Department of State Police Virginia Fusion Center (2009) *2009 Virginia Terrorism Threat Assessment*. Virginia, Department of State Police Virginia Fusion Center.

[63] Strang, S. (2005) *Project SLEIPNIR: An Anlytical Technique for Operational Priority Setting*. Ontario, Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

[64] Eurojust (February 2014) *Terrorism Convictions Monitor,* Issue 18.

The **German "Mitte" – Studies on extreme right attitudes and authoritarian orientations** conducted at Leipzig University have been surveying right-wing attitudes every two years since 2002, utilising the Leipzig Scale on Right-Wing Extremist Attitudes.[65] Such a regular monitoring instrument allows for analyses of trends over time and contributes to better understanding of drivers and factors behind radicalisation into right-wing extremism.

Another example is the Czech Republic, where in 2010 the Ministry of the Interior commissioned a **survey on attitudes of the general public towards right-wing extremism, racist and xenophobic ideas**[66] in the context of the integration of minorities and foreign nationals. The study consisted of a representative population survey, in-depth interviews with experts, focus groups, analysis of extremist websites and media analysis. The findings were commented in the annual Situation Report on Extremism and complemented the assessment of levels of penetration and support for radical ideas within society, risk groups and localities, profile of extremist groups and their activities.

In the Netherlands, the Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics in cooperation with the Ministry for Safety and Justice have been carrying out the **Safety Monitor** (Veiligheidsmonitor) survey since 2008.[67] The survey is implemented by municipalities and the items focus on neighbourhood-level phenomena. The Safety Monitor also includes an instrument developed by the Verwey-Jonker Institute to measure polarisation and trust in neighbourhood communities. It is intended to serve as regular monitoring and early warning instrument to identify tensions, conflict potential and risk factors at the neighbourhood level. The survey includes the following clusters of indicators:

- Questions about how different population groups live with each other (signalling);
- Questions relating to the reasons behind tensions between population groups in the neighbourhood (risk factors);
- Questions relating to policy (that should be adopted) (protective factors);
- Questions on individual characteristics.

An example of a local survey is the **Amsterdam Citizen Monitor** (Amsterdamse Burgermonitor),[68] which forms a part of the city of Amsterdam's approach to addressing radicalisation. The survey measures experiences in a number of relevant areas such as solidarity with society and between different ethnic groups, knowledge of and participation in (local) politics, perceptions of influence in the political process, attitudes towards democracy, experiences of discrimination, etc.

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[65] Decker, O., Kiess, J. and Braehler, E. (eds) (2014) *Die stabilisierte Mitte. Rechtsextreme Einstellung in Deutschland 2014*. Kompetenzzentrum für Rechtsextremismus- und Demokratieforschung der Universität Leipzig (KReDo i. G.), Universität Leipzig.

Decker, O., Kiess, J. and Braehler, E. (eds) (2016) *Die enthemmte Mitte. Autoritäre und rechtsextreme Einstellung in Deutschland 2016*. Giessen, Psychosozialverlag.

[66] Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic (2010) *The Issue of Extremism in the Czech Republic in 2010*.

[67] http://www.veiligheidsmonitor.nl/

[68] Gemeente Amsterdam (2014) *Amsterdamse Burgermonitor 2013*. Bureau Onderzoek en Statistiek.

Within academic research a number of psychometric scales have been developed which try to measure intentions and attitudes in society, including related to readiness for activism and for participation in violent political actions. The **Activism and Radicalism Intention Scales** are one such example where preparedness for legal, non-violent political action and readiness to participate in violent, illicit acts are measured through eight statements (four options for each one) with regard to different group affiliations (country, ethnicity, family, etc.).[69] Another prominent example is the **Religious Fundamentalism Scale**[70] developed in 1992 and updated in 2004 with 12 statements measuring religious fundamentalism. They have been applied on ad-hoc samples and have been used for academic research mainly and not for regular monitoring purposes.

2.3. RISK AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT TOOLS AT INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

2.3.1. Risk assessment methodologies

A number of risk assessment methodologies for the purpose of identifying vulnerable individuals or assessing the likelihood of those already on the path towards extremism to commit violence are utilised in different countries. The policy objectives that these tools usually support are of an interventionist nature – diverting people from extremism or potential extremism or mitigating their vulnerability to it. For that purpose they focus on identifying and assessing factors and indicators at the individual level, although the environment (meso and macro) in which the individual process takes place is also taken into account. Risk assessment methodologies are premised on the idea that risk is contextual and dynamic, and is related to the environment in which the individual resides, while issues such as ideology, family, peer and community are important aspects of this environment.[71] Therefore, risk indicators include contextual factors, such as political views, religious tenets, ideological doctrine and reactions to geopolitical factors require consideration, along with psychological factors, environmental factors and social factors.

These tools are usually aimed at and/or used by first line practitioners (including police officers, correctional personnel, teachers, social and health workers, etc.) or trained professionals (forensics, psychologists, etc.), depending on the aim of the assessment. The main model on which many of the tools are based is the **Structured Professional Judgement** (SPJ).[72] SPJ was developed out of the need for a systematic manner to assess violence risk in individuals in correctional facilities

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[69] Moskalenko, S. and Mccauley, C. (2009) 'Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism,' *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21(2), 239-260.

[70] Altemeyer, B. and Hunsberger, B. (2004) 'A Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale: The short and sweet of It,' *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 14, 47-54.

[71] Pressman, E. (2009) *Risk Assessment Decisions for Violent Political Extremism*. Ottawa, Public Safety Canada.

[72] Webster, C., Haque, Q., Hucker, S. (eds) (2013) *Violence Risk-Assessment and Management: Advances Through Structured Professional Judgement and Sequential Redirections*, Second Edition. Wiley.

or mental health facilities.[73] SPJ instruments are primarily used for criminal and prison populations to support forensic investigations, probation and rehabilitation options.[74] The approach has been adapted by a few tools used with relation to violent extremism. SPJ involves the empirically guided assessment of risk by professionals that might come in contact with extremists or individuals at risk. Therefore, individual level risk assessment instruments often are comprised of sets of indicators for cross-referencing and a specific application methodology and protocol for the scoring of risk for each indicator. Such tools also often take into account both vulnerability and protective factors.

Tools differ in terms of whether they employ indicators to identify vulnerable individuals among the general population through early behavioural signs of radicalisation or to assess the probability of violence occurring in relation to high-risk target groups through more complex sets of factors (individuals and groups that have already been engaged in extremism and are in detention). They may also differ in the level of structured procedures, the objectives of the target group and those utilising the procedures – and can generally range from general awareness raising guides on observable risk signs for a wider group of frontline practitioners (usually for prevention purposes), to highly structured protocols for professional assessment of violence risk based on extensive evidence, conducted by psychologists or other trained professionals in correctional contexts.

2.3.2. Extremist violence risk assessment protocols

Risk assessment frameworks have been developed with regard to specific high-risk target groups, such as those already engaged in (or convicted for) extremism and terrorism offences, namely the upper tier of the radicalisation pyramid. These include structured guides and scales for violence risk assessment in relation to convicted extremist offenders that are most often applied in correctional and detention settings or in the context of de-radicalisation or social reintegration programmes. The aim of such screening methods can be twofold: 1) to assess the risk of recidivism and the level of the risk of violence among convicted extremists or terrorists, or assess radicalisation and related violence risks among those serving time for other offences (not related to extremism and terrorism); 2) determining appropriate interventions to mitigate the risk (support release decisions, treatment options, correctional measures, reintegration measures, de-radicalisation). Two prominent examples of such tools are the Canadian **Violent Extremism Risk Assessment** (VERA and VERA 2), as well as the UK's **Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG) 22+**, used across Europe and elsewhere, and verified through feedback from professionals and empirical findings. While these measures have been found to be useful in practice in supporting risk assessment decisions, **they need to be used with caution due to the lack of empirical validation of their efficiency.**

[73] Risk assessment methodologies used in the criminal justice system to determine risk of violence posed by individuals include clinical approaches using unstructured clinical judgment, actuarial approaches, and structured professional judgment methodologies. We focus here on the SPJ approach as it was found most relevant for application of risk assessment tools in the domain of violent extremism. See also Pressman (2009), p. 16.

[74] Dean, G. (2014) *Neurocognitive Risk Assessment for the Early Detection of Violent Extremists*. Springer. p. 3.

Individual risk assessment for violent extremists relate to the assessed propensity of an individual to engage in acts of violent extremism.[75] The two frameworks, VERA and ERG 22+, are based on a structured, professional judgment approach to risk assessment and draw on extensive terrorism literature reviews. They incorporate the four main categories of terrorism risk proposed by John Monahan – **ideologies, affiliations, grievances and moral emotions**.[76] They aim to assess the intention and the capacity of an individual to plan, be part of or execute a terrorist act. The **VERA tool** is a risk assessment guide comprising a defined set of risk factors believed to increase the chance of future terrorism and political violence.[77] It was developed by Elaine Pressman and introduced in 2009 through Public Safety Canada as a consultative tool. Two revised versions (VERA 2 and VERA + REM) were released since then in 2010 and 2015 based on feedback after its use in practice by correctional experts, forensic psychologists, psychiatrists and law enforcement.[78] Input has been received from experts and professionals in Canada, USA, Austria, UK and others. It includes 31 indicators from 5 categories, listed below.

Table 3. Violent Extremism Risk Assessment – indicators (VERA-2)

Beliefs and attitudes	Context and intent	History and capability	Commitment and motivation	Protective items
• Commitment to ideology • Victims of injustice and grievances • Dehumanisation of identified targets • Rejection of democratic society and values • Feelings of hate, discrimination, alienation • Hostility to national collective identity • Lack of empathy outside own group	• Seeker, consumer of violent extremist material • Identification of target in response to perceived injustice • Contacts with violent extremists • Anger and violent expressed intent • Desire to die for cause and martyrdom • Intent to plan violent action • Susceptible to influence, authority, indoctrination	• Early exposure to pro-violent militant ideology • Network involved in violent action family, friends • Prior criminal history of violence • Tactical, paramilitary, explosives training • Extremist ideological training	• Glorification of violent action • Driven by criminal opportunism • Commitment to group/ group ideology • Driven by moral imperative/ superiority • Driven by excitment, adventure	• Re-interpretation of ideology, less rigid • Rejection of violence to obtain goals • Change of vision of enemy • Involvement with non-violent, de-radicalisation, offence-related programmes • Community support for non-violence • Family support for non-violence

Source: Based on Pressman and Flockton (2012).

[75] Pressman, E. and Flockton, J. (2010) 'Calibrating risk for violent political extremists and terrorists: the VERA 2 structured assessment,' *The British Journal of Forensic Practice*, 14(4), 237-251.

[76] Monahan, J. (2012) 'The individual risk assessment of terrorism,' *Psychology, Public Policy and Law*, 18, 167-205.

[77] Dean, G. (2014) *Neurocognitive Risk Assessment for the Early Detection of Violent Extremists*. Springer.

[78] Pressman, E. and Flockton, J. (2010).

Each indicator is graded in terms of the level of risk (low, medium, high), based on a review of evidence available from intelligence, legal, law enforcement, correctional and other reports and scores are combined to produce and estimate of the likelihood of violence occurring. Direct access to the subject of the assessment is therefore not essential. The newest version of the tool is VERA+ REM adds three commitment/motivation items and is widely used in prisons in other countries, including the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and Belgium.[79]

The ERG 22+ indicators were developed by the UK National Offender Management Service, through primary research with extremist offenders and are currently used by penitentiary authorities to assess risk and guide decision making.[80] The **Extremism Risk Screen**, on the other hand, is a shortened version of the ERG 22+, used to assess risk regarding prisoners serving time for other offences, for whom there are concerns about possible radicalisation.[81]

Another SPJ conceptual framework for assessing group-based violence, known as **multi-level guidance,**[82] attempts to span risk indicators at the individual, meso and macro level. The tool was derived through an extensive review of the literature on group-based violence that considered a broad spectrum of manifestations of groups based on violence, including gangs, organised crime and cults.[83] The tool comprises a total of 20 factors grouped in four clusters – individual, individual-group, group and group-societal.[84] The factors include violent behaviour, victimisation, mental health problems, group identity, norms, commitment, cohesion and leadership, among others.

Two requirements to utilise these types of frameworks are that **professionals need to be trained** in order to perform the structured assessment and use the protocol, and they must have **knowledge of terrorism and violent extremism**. The process also presupposes a more contained environment in which the target (risk) group is already predefined by their previous behaviour. The next section focusses on more general early-warning tools usually applied in a wider context by frontline practitioners, used for the purposes of identifying vulnerable and at risk individuals so that preventive measures can be applied.

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[79] Ibid.

[80] Lloyd, M. and Dean, C. (2015) 'The development of structured guidelines for assessing risk in extremist offenders,' *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, 2(1), 40-52.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Cook, A. (2014) *Risk Assessment and Management of Group-Based Violence*. PhD Thesis, Simon Fraser University.

[83] Cook, A. N., Hart, S. D., & Kropp, P. R. (2013). *Multi-Level Guidelines for the assessment and management of group-based violence*. Burnaby, Canada: Mental Health, Law, & Policy Institute, Simon Fraser University.

[84] The tool is applied in six systematic steps: gathering information and opinions about a case; determination of presence of the risk factors on a three point scale (present, possibly or partially present, and absent) both for the recent and previous status of the cases; estimation of relevance of factors (relevant, possibly or partially relevant, and not relevant) and classification as motivators, disinhibiters or destabilisers; development of risk scenarios; development of management strategies; formulation of conclusions – prioritisation of case, risk of (life threatening, imminent) violence and likely victims. See Cook, A. (2014), p. 21-22.

2.3.3. Early vigilance tools for first-line practitioners

Governments across the EU and beyond have realised that protecting people and diverting them from radicalisation that may lead to extremism and terrorism requires identifying those vulnerable and at risk early on, so that the process can be stopped or reversed, thus reducing the potential for them to move on to commit illegal acts. The people best positioned to recognise such early signs of vulnerability are believed to be those public sector workers and community actors that come most frequently into contact with people at risk, or **frontline practitioners working with citizens and communities on a daily basis.** This gave rise to a number of risk and vulnerability assessment tools and training manuals for practitioners.[85] While the latter are not necessarily experts on radicalisation, they are best placed to spot warning signs and identify persons of concern among the general population that they come into contact with. This is done through raising their awareness and training them to identify certain observable signs through manuals and instructions. Locally-based and community-oriented instruments for monitoring and addressing radicalisation at an early stage can also go further by providing these practitioners with a standard protocol on assessing risks and putting in place a mechanism for referring the vulnerable individual towards the most suitable interventions.

Such tools are also based on the principles of professional judgement (structured to a different degree), requiring examination of individual cases by multi-agency panels and considering a multitude of indicators before being referred for intervention. However, they are of a much more practical nature, focusing on everyday behaviours and detectable signs which can be interpreted by frontline practitioners in their day-to-day work. Indicators are derived from literature and field observations, and some have been validated through practitioners' feedback, and are now part of internal procedures on risk assessment and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) infrastructures. However, while the violent risk assessment protocols and psychometric scales listed above have been tested and verified in prison settings and are empirically-driven, applying vulnerability assessment tools among the general population for the purposes of identifying target groups and individuals for prevention has proved more problematic in terms of evaluating their effectiveness, but also in terms of practical application.

This is because the nature of "vulnerability" indicators (most often observable behaviours and outer appearance) is generally more ambiguous in distinguishing worrying from normal behaviour, but also because frontline practitioners do not always have the necessary knowledge and understanding to judge the level of vulnerability of an individual or to access additional information to support their judgement of the complexity of a case and its root causes, beyond their observations of behaviour and appearances. This might reflect in practitioners' inability to identify early risk signs and adapt their behaviour accordingly or raise concerns, or, on the contrary, increase the feeling of stigmatisation and mistrust and prompt escalation through improper responses and discriminatory profiling.

[85] See also Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016) *RAN Collection. Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Approaches and Practices.*

Criticism has been raised towards many of the instruments for early warning applied across Western Europe since the mid-2000s, which prompted countries to adjust their approach and indicators. The more recent tendency is to use indicators that are not as much focused on religious issues (such as flagging up orthodox religious practice as concern) and broader extremist attitudes and beliefs, but narrowed down to **high-risk behaviours associated with readiness to commit violence or engage with terrorist and violent extremist groups**, and also dealing with diverse types of radicalisation into violent extremism (not only religiously inspired, but also right and left-wing, separatist and nationalist, etc.).[86] Nevertheless, the use of risk indicators for identifying people vulnerable to radicalisation remains a contentious issue.

Some examples of early-warning and risk assessment tools are provided here, adopted by governments as integral parts of their counter-radicalisation policy frameworks (such as the UK Channel programme or the Dutch Radix framework for the school system). Other tools are less specific on the structure and protocol of actions that need to be undertaken by practitioners as part of the risk assessment, but provide a more generic framework of guidelines for frontline practitioners (such as the CoPPRa and TerRa manuals), from which more context-specific institutional referral instruments can be developed.

In 2009, a guide for **Identifying Vulnerable People** (IVP) was developed by the University of Liverpool to steer the Prevent strand of the UK Contest strategy.[87] The guidance includes fifteen criteria and a set of red-flag behaviours, which require reporting to relevant authorities due to the high risk they present (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Identifying Vulnerable People Guidance



Source: Cole et al. (2009) Guidance for Identifying People Vulnerable to Recruitment into Violent Extremism. University of Liverpool.

[86] Brandon, J. and Vidino, L. (2012) *European Experiences in Counter-Terrorism*. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, CTC Sentinel, Vol 5, issue 6. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/CTCSentinel-Vol5Iss66.pdf

[87] Cole, A. *et al.* (2009) *Guidance for Identifying People Vulnerable to Recruitment into Violent Extremism*. University of Liverpool.

The IVP guidance has not been tested and validated in practice, but served as the basis for developing the **Vulnerability Assessment Framework** (VAF) as part of the official Channel Duty Guidance,[88] currently in use in the UK. It is concerned not only with risk assessment, but also with building CVE infrastructure and referral system at the level of local authorities. Channel is a programme which focuses on identifying and providing support to vulnerable individuals at an early stage, through a multi-agency approach. It consists of identifying vulnerable individuals through common indicators, assessing the nature and extent of the risk through multi-agency panels of professionals (police, local authorities, social services, schools, NGOs, etc.) and developing an individual support plan. The programme, which was piloted in 2009, revised and rolled out across England and Wales in 2012, is now a statutory duty, included in the Counter-Terrorism Act 2015. Therefore, local authorities are required to develop their own guides and instructions for the implementation of the programme and put in place multi-agency panels for risk assessment and referrals.[89]

VAF is used by **multi-agency panels** of public-sector workers to guide decisions about whether an individual needs support to address their vulnerability to radicalisation and the kind of support that they need. It comprises of 22 indicators that are grouped within three clusters (Table 4). The focus is on identifying

Table 4. CHANNEL Vulnerability Assessment Indicators[90]

Engagement with a group, cause or ideology	• Spending time with other extremists; changing style and looks to match group; behaviour centred around group, cause, ideology; loss of other interests • Possession of ideological materials, symbols; attempts to recruit
Intent to cause harm	• Identifying a group as threat, blaming, labelling • Speaking of importance of action now, imminence of harm from a hostile group; justifying offending in the name of a cause, ideology; supporting violence or harm; plotting and conspiring
Capability to cause harm	• History of violence, criminally versatile • Skills potentially supportive of terrorism (engineering, IT, chemicals, military training)

Source: Authors, based on HM Government (2012) Channel Vulnerability Assessment Framework.

[88] HM Government (2015) *Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism. Statutory guidance for Channel panel members and partners of local panels.* London, HM Government. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/425189/Channel_Duty_Guidance_April_2015.pdf

[89] For examples of such sector-specific guides see: Merton Safeguarding Children Board (2015) *Guidance for Working with Children and Young People who are vulnerable to the messages of Radicalisation and Extremism.* London Borough of Merton. Suffolk Safeguarding Children Board (2015) *Guidance on Safeguarding Individuals Vulnerable to Radicalisation (VTR) and Referral Process.* Suffolk Constabulary.

[90] HM Government (2012) *Channel Vulnerability Assessment Framework.* London, HM Government.

capability and intent to commit violent radicalisation. However, the indicators included in local level guides are often even fewer and described in a very general manner without the necessary explanations or examples how to distinguish normal from risk-relevant behaviour.

The Dutch **Radicx**[91] is a more comprehensive tool developed for teachers and other school personnel and aimed at enabling them to recognise early signs of radicalisation and distinguish it from other phenomena like teenage angst, drug/alcohol problems and mental disorders.[92] A more recent, extended practical guide for schools was released by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science in 2015.[93] It consists of a guide explaining the process of radicalisation, relevant factors and indicators and an explanation of the Dutch government approach to radicalisation, as well as on the role of frontline practitioners and the school in particular with respect to different stages of radicalisation and the appropriate measures. It also includes a procedure tool for school personnel on raising and discussing radicalisation-related concerns by assembling a team of relevant parties (they can be teachers, social service employees, police, multi-disciplinary teams), which then work with the tool to determine if there is actual cause for concern and agree upon a suitable action.

The **CoPPRA** (Community Policing Preventing Radicalisation & Terrorism) manual for trainers is an example of a more general and widely used tool for training and awareness raising among community police officers across the EU.[94] It was developed by the Belgian Federal Police in cooperation with police agencies from 11 EU member states. CoPPRA also provides explanations on what radicalisation is, its stages and factors, followed by indicators signifying risk, practical examples and the role of community policing in recognising these. Two sets of indicators are provided: for identifying radicalisation and for identifying preparation of terrorist acts (see Box 1).

CoPPRA goes one step further and provides brief profiles of internationally active violent extremist and terrorist groups (ethno-nationalist and separatists, left-wing, right-wing, religious, single issue) and offers visual examples of the logos and symbols most commonly used by them.

The **TerRA toolkit**[95] is a similar Europe-wide tool, designed for a broader group of community actors: police officers, teachers and youth workers, prison officers, religious leaders, journalists, local and national governments. It provides guidance on the community approach in addressing radicalisation risks and the roles of different stakeholders. The process of radicalisation, its phases and risk factors are explained, followed by an introduction to practical indicators for recognising early

[91] Verhagen et al. (2010) *Radicx. Vroegtijdige signalering van radicalisering*. Utrecht, KPC Groep and APS.

[92] Spee, I. and Reitsma, M. (2015) *Puberaal, lastig of radicaliserend?* Dutch Ministry of Education, Science and Culture.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Community Policing Preventing Radicalisation & Terrorism (CoPRRa) (2013) *Manual for Trainers. 2nd Edition*. Brussels, Federal Police of Belgium.

[95] Young et al. (2014) *TerRa Toolkit. Community Approach to Radicalisation*. Amsterdam, Impact.

Box 1. CoPPRA indicators on radicalisation and terrorism

(1) Indicators of radicalisation processes underway: identity, ideology, behaviour

- Changing names, clothing, physical appearance (beard, etc.), tattoos;
- Contact with extremist groups, possess propaganda material, secret meetings, change in religious practices;
- Glorification of martyrdom and violence, travel patterns, becoming outspoken with an extremist viewpoint, radical demonstrations;
- Social isolation, changed attitude towards others, minor crimes.

(2) Indicators for preparation of terrorist activity: residence, transport, currency, (forged) documents, objects, preparations.

warning signs. The added value of the toolkit is in providing practical guidance tailored to each stakeholder group on what their specific role should and should not be in dealing with radicalisation, how to work with risk indicators, as well as on possible "do's" and "don'ts" when encountering vulnerable individuals.

More simplified indicator scales of types of behaviours and signs associated with different levels of risk are provided by the Canadian **Behavioural Barometer**, produced by the Centre for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation.[96] It presents specific behaviours, based on literature and field observations, which might be signs of radicalisation leading to violence, ranked by seriousness. This is a very basic guide that is intended for raising public awareness.

What is common in these tools is that they attempt to convey an understanding of radicalisation as a complex, multi-staged process where a complexity of external and internal factors and circumstances play a role. Hence, this emphasises that indicators need to be taken into account together, and assessment needs to be done on a case-by-case basis, considering the specific individual context of each situation.

2.4. COMMUNITY-BASED MONITORING AND PREVENTION SYSTEMS

Some monitoring mechanisms were identified that are of a more holistic nature, going beyond offering purely methodological frameworks for risk identification and assessment, or general awareness raising material on risk indicators. They include a more elaborate system for collection and assessment of information on risks from various sources, or are complemented by an institutional infrastructure and procedures for vulnerability assessment by professionals, coupled with a

[96] Center for the Prevention of Violent Radicalization (2016) *Behavioural Barometer. How to recognize radicalisation behaviours leading to violence*. Montreal, CPVR.

referral, response and risk mitigation mechanism. In the ideal case, the monitoring approach embedded into such integrated models spans across several levels of analysis (individual, group/community, society) and taps into diverse sources and types of information to ensure that different factors are taken into account before formulation of case-by-case action courses. They also bridge between trend monitoring and analysis with action (interventions and prevention measures).

Some EU countries and localities have established such mechanisms, involving a number of public institutions in collaboration with community leaders and representatives, geared specifically towards early identification of a threat or vulnerability to radicalisation, or more broadly on any security issue relevant to the communities. Such mechanisms have been established locally in the Netherlands, in Amsterdam (Information House), in Rotterdam (Rotterdam Information SwitchPoint Radicalisation) and in the region of North Holland (Integrated Security Management Matrix).

The **Amsterdam Information House** is a case-level, municipal early-warning system that bridges the void between the repression of criminal deeds (intelligence counter-terrorism and policing measures) and general prevention.[97] It targets the two middle tiers of the radicalisation pyramid, namely the vulnerable and those on the path towards extremism but who have not committed a crime yet. There is a strict division of labour between municipality (cases limited to ideology) and police (cases with indications of preparatory actions towards violence). The Information House is a point of expertise responsible for analysis, early detection and intervention. It gathers and analyses information from various sources such as media, internet, literature, reporting from members of the public and input from stakeholders at the ground level based on formal and informal networks (police, hotlines, social services, schools, city administration, community organisations, and religious leaders). When reports of a potential case are received, case management teams analyse and evaluate available information, develop an individual intervention strategy and provide guidance and advice. This can include referral to key figures who can challenge the radical ideology, referral to existing programmes, etc.

The **Rotterdam Information SwitchPoint Radicalisation** (RISR) is a similar system/framework that gathers information from various sources (municipal services, education system, institutions of minority communities, etc.) on possible warning signs of radicalisation.[98] This information is analysed and then relayed to the appropriate institutions. The information in the SwitchPoint system is made up of three different work processes. If in the course of these three work processes there seem to be common threads, this information is distributed to the appropriate authorities.

- **Trends and analysis***:* follows national and international developments that may affect radicalisation and translates them into the local context. This is done

[97] Mellis, C. (2007) 'Amsterdam and Radicalisation: the Municipal Approach,' In: *The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Radicalisation in Broader Perspective*. Amsterdam, NCTV, pp. 40-48.

[98] Information Switchpoint (2006) *Radicalism in Rotterdam*. Available at: http://www.rotterdam.nl/Directie%20Veilig/PDF/Trendrapportage%20radicalisering%202006%20-%20Engels.pdf

Figure 5. Rotterdam Information SwitchPoint Radicalisation: work processes in monitoring radicalisation



Source: Authors, based on Information SwitchPoint (2006).

via the use of regular local research and monitoring, as well as issue-specific research and objectives.

- **People and objects***:* gathers reports at the Information SwitchPoint from individuals or organisations of possible radical behaviour by other individuals or groups. Various sorting methods are applied to distinguish if it is a credible threat, and seeks to assess the ability of the case to be dealt with locally (or without a direct law enforcement intervention).
- **Quick scan social unrest***:* the third work process concerns the response of the population to major incidents anywhere in the world that could possibly have repercussions on the atmosphere in the city. A network of key figures (called the Quick Scan Social Unrest network) is consulted to obtain a picture of the prevailing atmosphere and, if necessary, advice will be given for specific action to be taken. Usually these key figures are important people connected to different communities (Moroccans, Turks, Kurds, Somalis, etc.).[99] These people can be contacted and asked about their views on the atmosphere in different groups and thus about the risk of violence. Usually this is done in an informal fashion as personal contacts with the key figures are good. Nevertheless, the gradual professionalisation of the tool and its grounding in criteria for scientific robustness is envisioned. Quick Scan can be deployed on a regular basis, as well as before or after significant events. For example, Quick Scan was deployed after the publication of Prophet Mohammed cartoons in Denmark and before the release of *Fitna* – a movie critical of Islam.

The RISR has produced three detailed reports on the state of polarisation and radicalisation in Rotterdam, drawing on publicly accessible information from

[99] Information SwitchPoint Radicalisation (2008) *Radicalism in Rotterdam III.*

literature, police, judiciary, intelligence agencies (AVID) and the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, as well as the findings from its own work.[100]

Another example for monitoring trends, developments and risk factors at the level of communities is the **Community Mapping and Tension Monitoring Mechanism** in the UK.[101] While the mechanism is not specifically designed to monitor developments related to radicalisation, it can provide valuable early-warning alerts that can be useful for radicalisation preventative purposes, while the model is promising in terms of the wide range of information sources and data utilised for a more comprehensive assessment of community-level risks and developments, but also in terms of the multi-stakeholder engagement in the process. The approach, as applied in Wales, is made up of three activities:

- **Community mapping and profiling:** drafting and publishing a mapping report, summarising the composition, situation and experiences of each community, updated every five years. The report is based on official statistics, survey data, and information from local reporting systems, consultation with key personnel and with communities themselves.
- **Tracking cohesion***:* drafting an annual cohesion profile based on a survey of perceptions of cohesion and indicators of cohesion from administrative data.
- **Tension monitoring***:* drafting of regular tension monitoring reports and Community Impact Assessments based on data about community experiences and perceptions as well as statistics on relevant issues, e.g. crime. A tension monitoring group or groups are convened, composed of a wide variety of stakeholders as needed to suit the local context (police, youth service, housing authorities, education authorities, health care services, etc.). It is tasked with collecting, sharing and analysing information about community dynamics and possible tensions, preparing risk and community impact assessments, devising and reviewing interventions and coordinating the work of partner agencies.

2.5. INSTITUTIONAL AND STAKEHOLDER ROLES IN MONITORING RISKS AND PREVENTION

When reviewing different approaches and tools for monitoring and assessing radicalisation risks and trends, methodology and indicators form only one side of the story. The institutional infrastructure, the actors and the processes involved in implementing such assessments all deserve special attention. This poses a more fundamental question: whose primary responsibility should it be to monitor, prevent and counter radicalisation, especially in its early forms before a crime is committed?

The examples reviewed here show that while monitoring and assessing risks related to criminal behaviour and violent extremist acts that are of serious threat

[100] Ibid.

[101] Institute of Community Cohesion (2010) *Understanding and monitoring tension and conflict in local communities. A practical guide for local authorities, police service and partner agencies.* Coventry, Futures Institute.

to national security fall clearly within the remit of intelligence and security agencies (or dedicated counter-terrorism coordination centres), the primary responsibility for identifying and addressing risks of radicalisation early on for the purposes of prevention most often lies at the local level with leading roles being assigned either to the municipality or the police, although involvement of various groups of frontline practitioners and community actors is encouraged. In a few cases, a specialised agency or unit was established either at local or national level to provide analysis and information, operate phone helplines and coordinate multi-agency response and efforts on prevention and countering radicalisation (such as the Canadian Center for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence or the Amsterdam Information House).[102] In other cases, existing and well-established mechanisms, networks and institutional infrastructures, used in the context of crime prevention and addressing a wide range of social problems are being adapted to the objectives of counter-radicalisation.[103]

Ensuring a coherent and holistic policy approach to radicalisation necessitates the clear designation of policy objectives and stakeholder roles (both policy targets and implementers), intra and inter-institutional mechanisms – channels of communication and cooperation between institutions working horizontally to address problems on a specific level, as well as vertically, at the intersections of different levels. Furthermore, measures need to be based on evidence and sound empirical findings.

As it currently stands, few countries have managed in establishing such an integrated approach. Generally, tools are developed on an ad hoc basis to serve a particular purpose rather than as part of a comprehensive approach. Where integrated mechanisms exist, they build upon already well-established partnerships and channels of cross agency collaboration, which are adapted for the purposes of counter-radicalisation, instead of creating new arrangements and institutions and burdening the government administration with additional responsibilities.[104] Even in those cases, the use of risk assessment tools for identifying vulnerability early on can pose many challenges.

The idea is to integrate prevention as much as possible in the day-to-day work and regular responsibilities of those institutions and civil servants that are most likely to come into contact with potentially radicalised individuals. In many countries, well-established mechanisms of community policing, crime prevention, integration and social inclusion are mostly adapted and utilised also for counter-radicalisation purposes. Although this approach is not always unproblematic,[105] as front-line officers such as teachers, health and social workers have been used to inform the police about individuals at risk, the existence of mechanisms for cooperation between various state and non-state stakeholders at local level is certainly a

[102] Center for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence: https://info-radical.org/en/

[103] Change Institute (2008) *Study on the best practices in cooperation between authorities and civil society with a view to the prevention and response to violent radicalisation*. London, the Change Institute.

[104] Radicalisation Awareness Network (2014) *Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU's Response*. RAN Collection Approaches, lessons learned and practices. First Edition. RAN.

[105] Vidino, L. and Brandon, J. (2012) *Countering Radicalisation in Europe*. London, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence.

crucial factor in developing targeted interventions, as long as intelligence work is held separate from counter-radicalisation objectives.[106]

The next sections provide the basis for developing context-specific and practical tools in countries where counter-radicalisation and prevention programmes are yet to emerge or are in the early stages of development. Specific recommendations for policymakers are also provided, with focus on developing institutional preparedness to identify risks and prevent radicalisation.

[106] Brandon. J. and Vidino, L. (2012) "European Experiences in Counter-radicalisation," *CTC Sentinel,* 5(6), 16-18, Combatting Terrorism Centre, West Point; Butt, R. and Tuck, H. (2014) *European Counter-Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation: A Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany*. London, Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

3. DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR RISK AND VULNERABILITY INDICATORS OF RADICALISATION

3.1. TOWARDS HOLISTIC RISK MONITORING

The review of existing practices in monitoring and assessing radicalisation risks has shown that a number of approaches exist in identifying, monitoring and assessing both, vulnerabilities and risks of radicalisation, as well as the scope and nature of violent extremist acts.

In the ideal case, a mechanism for systematic monitoring of radicalisation trends and risks would require collation of data from a variety of sources, including official statistics, media, first-line respondents, reporting from members of the public, consultations with NGOs and community organisations, and with the vulnerable groups or victims themselves. It would also be conducted at multiple levels of analysis (individual, group/community, society), depending on the type of risk behaviour displayed by actors (vulnerable, moving towards radicalisation and extremist actors breaking the law), and based on rigorous professional assessment.

Table 5 below provides a generic framework of the different aspects of a more comprehensive approach to assessing radicalisation trends and risks, including the levels of analysis ((1) the whole of society, 2) vulnerable or at-risk individuals and 3) groups or extremist actors and perpetrators), the possible sources of information and assessment methods, as well as the potential analytical and practical outputs. Often, the lines between these different levels would be blurred and difficult to draw, but the framework provides some basic categorisation of possible approaches.

The individuals most actively breaking the law and engaging in violent extremist acts are best identified through analysis and monitoring of criminal statistics and intelligence data, but also by open source data, social media analysis and victimisation surveys. Radicalisation processes and risk factors that have not yet led to violence or other criminal acts are more difficult to identify and interpret and require careful risk assessment by those coming into contact with at-risk individuals. Such a risk assessment would be ideally based not only on early-warning indicators observed and reported by frontline practitioners, but also complemented by sociological research, surveys and opinion polls, analysis of open source data. A professional and objective risk assessment requires expert knowledge by those that conduct it on processes of radicalisation, its root causes and contributing factors.

Monitoring wider social developments such as processes of social polarisation and cohesion, social tensions and conflicts, socio-economic macro data, etc., could

Table 5. Framework of radicalisation monitoring levels as per target group, sources of information and possible outputs

Subject of monitoring (what)	Methods and sources (how)	Responsible agency (who)	Output
Spread, nature, trends and threats of extremism and violent radicalism (meso and macro level) • Extremist actors (groups and individuals) • Acts of extremism • Foreign events and influences • Threat assessment (internal and external)	Criminal statistics Other relevant statistical data Intelligence data (assessment of intent and capability of extremist actors) Data from government agencies Open source data: • Media monitoring • Secondary sources • Opinion polls • Victimisation surveys • Academic research • NGO data	Specialised government agencies or analytical centres	Situational reports, national threat assessments
Radicalisation processes and risk factors (meso and micro level) • Vulnerable individuals and groups • Individuals and groups moving towards extremism • Observable indicators on behaviour, attitudes, events and local developments	• Risk assessment based on early-warning indicators by frontline practitioners • Academic research • Surveys and opinion polls • Media and internet Reports from the community (e.g. through hotlines)	• Frontline practitioners • Sociological researchers • Intelligence community • Non-government/ community actors	Risk assessment tools
Wider societal developments and background conditions (macro level) (within the whole of society/ community) • processes of polarisation, discontent, social tensions and conflicts (ethnic, religious, social), protest potential	• Surveys and opinion polls • Other statistical data on socio-economic macro indicators • Media and internet	• Sociological researchers • Government agencies and analysts	Improved risk assessment and situational analysis

Source: Authors.

Figure 6. Levels and types of assessment approaches as per the risk level/levels of radicalisation[107]



Source: Authors.

potentially also flow into a more comprehensive analysis of structural drivers of radicalisation processes. Such analyses could serve as supportive evidence in more comprehensive risk assessment methods that also take into account factors at the macro-level. Such an endeavour, however, requires a good level of analytical capacity and resources, information exchange between stakeholders and availability of a wide range of statistical data, information and intelligence.

Applying a comprehensive approach to analysing and monitoring all different radicalisation factors and drivers can be challenging even in countries with developed evidence-based approaches to decision making.

A tailored monitoring and risk assessment tool would ideally enable relevant stakeholders to use empirically-validated and field-tested indicators and methods for analysis of radicalisation phenomena (including their root causes and drivers) and conduct in a systematic manner risk identification and assessment and monitor trends on a regular basis.

[107] The levels of radicalisation are based on the UK Prevent Pyramid model, where radicalisation is seen as a progressive movement within a pyramid-type model where higher tiers of the pyramid are associated with increased level of radicalisation (but with decreased numbers of those involved).

3.2. THE RATIONALE FOR STRUCTURED INDICATORS

In order for policymakers and relevant stakeholders to develop targeted prevention and counter-radicalisation policies, measures and programmes, they first need to be equipped with a mechanism to identify, assess, understand and prioritise risk factors of radicalisation, as well as to be able to monitor and evaluate risks and trends in a systematic manner. Without this evidence base, prevention programmes and counter-radicalisation interventions risk faulty targeting and delivery, imprecise definition of problems and the setting of wrong or poorly understood objectives. All this can also be made worse by the poor assessment of institutions' capabilities and their most appropriate roles in implementing such programmes. The detection of risk indicators by first line officers is an approach particularly useful in **countries with limited or no experience with counter-radicalisation and prevention programmes**, where understanding of risk factors and radicalisation processes is underdeveloped, and where available statistical evidence and analytical capacities of institutions is limited or unsystematic.

The framework of vulnerability and risk indicators presented here concerns the early identification of radicalisation processes and their manifestations. Its approach is concerned with those individuals and groups that are vulnerable or are moving towards extremism but have not yet committed criminal acts. An overview and discussion of basic risk indicators and their interpretation for the purposes of risk assessment is presented, aimed at sensitising and familiarising law enforcement and intelligence officers, policy makers and academics with the complexity of risk factors.

The indicators are related to risks associated with processes of right-wing and Islamist radicalisation. The development of radicalisation risk and vulnerability indicators is premised on the idea that processes of radicalisation would have certain manifestations in the actions, behaviour and attitudes of an individual, which can be noted by their social environment or by public sector employees (frontline practitioners) coming into contact with the person.

The framework below sets out and interprets indicators of radicalisation at the individual level that are most commonly used both in academic literature and in practical risk assessment tools deployed by governments in Europe to monitor radicalisation trends and identify vulnerable individuals for the purposes of prevention work. The purpose of early-warning signs is to flag risks and vulnerabilities so that early prevention can be applied after a thorough assessment of individual cases.[108] This understanding of the role of early warning for prevention purposes as means to tackle radicalisation is based on experiences with violent radicalisation processes and acts of terrorism in Europe.

Across Europe, first-line workers have been identified as a key group that can make a valuable contribution to identifying and preventing risks, although they do not always have sufficient knowledge of radicalisation and its warning signs,

[108] While the present framework can serve as a reference point, indicators and risk signs of radicalisation are always context-specific and must be viewed in light of the complexity of each individual situation.

or know how to respond to it.[109] Therefore, raising their awareness and skills is paramount before implementing more systematic monitoring and risk assessment mechanisms and prevention programmes. The following discussion can sensitise and familiarise law enforcement and intelligence officers, policy makers as well as academics with the complexity of factors of vulnerability and risk related to radicalisation and their different nuances.

3.3. RISK AND VULNERABILITY INDICATORS

There is no single profile of a radicalised individual or group, nor is there a "typical extremist". Radicalisation incorporates a multitude of factors, including individual vulnerabilities, outside influences, triggers and group dynamics. Most importantly, the process is very context-specific. The following indicators are

Figure 7. Analytical framework: contributing factors, manifestations and observable indicators of radicalisation



Source: Authors.

[109] Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016) *RAN Collection. Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Approaches and Practices.* http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf

Table 6. Overview of vulnerability and risk indicators

	Suggestive	Red flags	High-risk
Behavioural	• Cutting ties with family and friends, socially withdrawn • Noticeable change in religious (e.g. ultra-religiosity) and other every-day routines • Having contacts with or being under the influence of a religious or ideological leader or recruiter, espousing radical rhetoric • Group isolation and capsulation	• Possessing or disseminating extremist literature, propaganda materials; online content • Organises, leads or attends rallies for extremist causes • Contacts with or membership in extremist groups (abroad or at home) • Engaging in criminal activity/gangs	• Travel to risk countries/conflict zones • Taking part in combat/military training • Buying weapons, explosives and related materials
Cognitive	• Openly voicing grievances • Expressing dichotomous worldview (us versus them) • Expressing disrespect for or rejecting the legitimacy of (secular) authorities • Statements dehumanising groups like unbelievers, gays, or other ethnicities or religions, etc.	• Expressing and propagating ideas for non-legitimate radical change/abolition of secular democratic societies • Openly voicing support for terrorist organisations and causes • Openly expressing certain attitudes supporting violence, or against an expressed target	

Source: Authors.

not a checklist for diagnosing it and none of them can serve as evidence that radicalisation is actually taking place, but applied in combination they allow for initial assessment.

Such indicators need to be interrogated in light of the specific local context and additional information must be acquired where appropriate to get a more complete picture of the specific case. An important distinction is to be made between indicators related to expressing radical views and attitudes and expressing support or participating (or preparing to participate) in violent actions or terrorist groups and causes, although this transition is not always linear and clear.

The **aspect of change** is also very important when working with early-warning indicators. Some of the behaviours suggestive of risks might be part of someone's usual conduct.[110] Different indicators may refer to different stages of radicalisation, as it is understood as an individual process, which however can be strongly influenced by group dynamics and the social environment; it can also have

[110] Young et al. (2014) *TerRa Toolkit. Community Approach to Radicalisation.* Burobraak, Amsterdam.

multiple phases and is not always linear. These phases usually include an **individual vulnerability** (push factors or internal motivations for developing an interest in or becoming increasingly receptive to radical ideas), seeking and developing interest and sympathies with radical ideas and causes, coming into contact with **external pull factors** (recruiters, radical preachers and ideological leaders, internet), accepting, adopting or internalising ideologies and beliefs, joining extremist groups and engaging in their activities, etc.

The indicators below are divided into the following categories and concern mainly the individual level: **behavioural** (including changes in practices, actions, appearance) and **cognitive** (expression of opinions, beliefs and attitudes at verbal level). In turn, they are divided into three categories – **suggestive**, **red flags and high risk,** depending on the degree of immediacy of risk they indicate. Suggestive indicators are signs of vulnerability and are intended to support a more in-depth, professional assessment of potential vulnerabilities and cannot be viewed in isolation from one another. They provide supportive information that may be useful in considering the complexity of a situation. Red flags are stronger indicators of risk-relevant behaviours and attitudes, but also need to be viewed in combination and put into context.

3.3.1. Cognitive indicators

Radicalisation research has identified a process associated with a so-called "cognitive opening" within which a person is becoming receptive to radical ideas including those allowing the use of violence for the achievement of certain (political) goals.[111] This may be manifested in certain identity changes or in the use of words. While it is very difficult to detect and assess someone's personal attitudes, what is realistic for the purposes of early warning is to consider various nuances in speech and expression of opinion. Therefore, it is advised to consider the cognitive indicators below as different stages of advancement in receptiveness to extremist ideologies.

The cognitive aspect of Islamist radicalisation comprises of internalising a set of beliefs and a militant mindset that embrace the idea of (violent) jihad as the paramount test of one's faith. While the ideas of militant jihad and global jihad have been associated with Sunni Muslim militant ideologies and evolved from the Salafi taught, Salafism as a movement has three main branches among which only the third one feeds the ideas of Islamist radicalisation. The first branch is represented by the so called purists who put focus on non-violent methods of propagation, purification and education. The followers of the second, or the so called political branch, advocate the application of the Salafi creed in the political arena. Only the followers of the third, or the jihadist branch, take a militant position arguing that the current context calls for violence and revolution. The third branch provides particular interpretations of the ideas of apostasy and jihad, and forwards the claims for the permissibility of targeting civilians and the legitimacy of suicide bombings. As regards apostasy, the extreme jihadi taught

[111] See Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004) *Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam*. Department of International Studies, Rhodes College.

postulates that any Muslim leader who does not implement and follow Islamic law is considered an apostate, including those who use non-Islamic legal codes.[112]

As regards the concept of jihad, it is understood as a necessary use of force (armed struggle) to help Islamic truth predominate and establish an Islamic state (re-establish the Caliphate). In addition, the Jihadi-Salafi ideology justifies the killing of non-Muslim civilians and views suicide bombings as legitimate martyrdom operations, and acts of sacrifice in the name of the martyr's religion.[113] Presently the Islamic State adopts a severe version of Jihadi-Salafism emphasising a number of doctrinal concepts: all Muslims must associate exclusively with fellow "true" Muslims and dissociate from anyone not fitting this narrow definition; failure to rule in accordance with God's law constitutes unbelief; fighting the Islamic State is tantamount to apostasy; jihad should not only be defensive but more importantly offensive to involve attacking apostates and unbelievers in their home territory in order to make God's word most high; secularism is flagrant unbelief, nullifying Islam and expelling one from the religion.[114]

With the proclamation of the Caliphate by IS in June 2014, a number of important messages were dispatched linked to IS' claim to religious authority based on political control: all Muslims in the world were declared obliged to pledge allegiance and support to the new caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghadadi (named Caliph Ibrahim); all able Muslims were called to emigrate to the territory under the control of IS with emigration termed obligatory; all supporters were called to kill Westerners arbitrarily throughout the world – Americans, Canadians, Australians, and their allies, both civilians and military personnel.[115] It should be stressed that for some individuals ideology is paramount in the process of radicalization while for other it is not. The second has been identified to be the case for individuals attracted by and committing violence in the name of IS.[116]

The cognitive aspect of far-right radicalisation involves the internalisation of a number of distinct pools of ideas. First, proponents of the far right cherish a restrictive notion of citizenship, according to which true democracy is based on a homogeneous community (termed by some "organic democracy"). According to this notion only long-standing citizens are full members of civil society and society's benefits should only accrue to them. Adherents to such views demand the expulsion of unemployed foreigners and foreigners charged with having committed a crime, an immediate stop to all transfer payments to refugees and asylum-seekers, and the "repatriation" of asylum-seekers whose applications have been denied. Additional defining features of contemporary right-wing extremism include racism, xenophobia, ultra-nationalism, and opposition to liberal democracy.

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[112] Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005) A Genealogy of Radical Islam. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28, 75-97, pp. 78-80.

[113] This account of the contemporary ideological base of Islamist radicalism is based on a review of literature in this respect. See Mancheva, M. (2016) 'Islamist Radicalisation,' In: CSD (2016) *Understanding Radicalisation: Review of Literature*, pp. 40-43).

[114] Bunzel, C. (2015) 'From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,' *Analysis Paper*, No. 19, The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, pp. 9-10; 39.

[115] Ibid, pp. 31-32; 36.

[116] Levitt, M. (April 2016) The Islamic State, Extremism and the Spread of Transnational Terrorism. Testimony submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, p. 6.

Right-wing activists often see themselves as protecting the nation against outsiders such as Jews, migrants, homosexuals or women. Some of their prime targets appear to be migrants and various kinds of minorities (ethnic, religious, sexual) who are stigmatised as cultural threats. Right-wing extremism has a distinct anti-system and anti-constitutional thrust, even among some political parties that are elected in parliament. While they do not necessarily reject the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic state (but they may), they criticise established parties for allegedly not representing the people belonging to the dominant nation. Characteristic features of right-wing parties are their espousal of populist tactics and rhetoric and their reliance on the mobilisation of popular resentment.[117]

Suggestive

Openly voicing grievances

In the context of a potential radicalisation process, the open voicing of grievances may be the first and more benign stage before expressing more aggressive attitudes (pro-violence, anti-targets, etc.). At the same time, the expression of grievances in general may be the outcome of various societal and personal circumstances and may never lead to a person becoming radicalised.

However, in countries experiencing economic difficulties or where corruption is high and trust in government is low, the expression of grievances may not be indicative of a process of individual radicalisation – be it Islamist or right-wing radicalisation. In such countries the expression of grievances towards authorities at local and national level may be common among various groups and individuals.

This indicator might be relevant in Islamist radicalisation if grievances are only expressed through the prism of dichotomous worldview rhetoric, or expression of disrespect or rejecting the legitimacy of authorities because they are secular, or through statements dehumanising groups of individuals. In this case however, the indicator **"**Expressing dichotomous worldview (us versus them)" may be more relevant and specific (see the following indicator).

When it comes to monitoring far right radicalisation, the indicator needs to be accompanied with an explanation about the types of grievances usually voiced by far right actors in a certain country – e.g. grievances against minorities, foreigners, refugees and government or state institutions accused of acting in their favour or doing little to "save the nation." The indicator might be considered in the context of radicalisation if it is combined with behavioural indicators and other cognitive indicators listed in this section and used to gain a more comprehensive picture of a person's attitudes and convictions.

[117] This account of the contemporary ideological base of far right radicalism is based on D. Anagnostou's review of literature in this respect. (Anagnostou, D. (2016) 'Right Wing and Left Wing Radicalisation,' In: CSD (2016) *Understanding Radicalisation. Review of Literature*, pp. 55-56).

Expressing dichotomous worldview (us versus them)

The expression of a dichotomous worldview is characteristic for militant Islamists and it entails a number of particular oppositions: anti-Western vs. pro-Muslim discourses; infidels vs. true believers discourses and a worldview which places Muslims and Muslim nations as victims of the Western world. These oppositions derive from an ideological narrative, which claims that Islam and Muslims are constantly attacked and humiliated by the West, Israel, and corrupt regimes in Muslim countries. It claims that in order to return to a society of peace, harmony and social justice, Muslims need to fight the West and other corrupting influences and that this is religiously sanctioned.[118]

At the same time, right-wing ideologies are based on the perceived oppositions between different ethnicities, nationalities or religions. Right-wing ideas often reject difference in general (be it ethnic, religious and cultural) and espouse homogeneous, authentic and rightful culture, ethnicity or religion.

While this may not be indicative of outright readiness to commit violence, it is a sign of the embrace of rhetoric that is characteristic for radicalised groups or individuals and may signify a risk to a path to potential radicalisation. It can be accompanied by insistently preaching religious and ideological ideas to others, rejecting alternative views, expressing polarised views of absolute truth, with a low (or no) tolerance for perceived theological deviation or other perspectives.

Expressing disrespect of or rejecting the legitimacy of (secular) authorities

There might be many different nuances associated with the expression of disrespect or the rejection of the legitimacy of authorities. In the context of radicalisation processes, expressing disrespect of or rejecting the legitimacy of official institutions and authorities may be an early sign that someone is experiencing grievances and injustice and hence is more receptive to alternative legitimisation narratives.

The expression of disrespect or rejecting the legitimacy of official authorities and rules because they are secular might be an indication of some degree of affiliation with Salafi interpretations of Islam but still not an outright sign of radicalisation. As regards far-right radicalisation the expression of disrespect to authorities or of statements rejecting the legitimacy of authorities might be tied to claims for "defence of the interests and rights of citizens" or "defence of national ideals" supposedly not fulfilled by these authorities.

However, the expression of such ideas signifies a graver risk of radicalisation if it is tied to convictions and calls for the need of political and societal change. In the context of Islamist radicalisation such calls would be directed to the change of secular, democratic societies into ones under the religious values and norms of early Islam (7th century). In the context of far right radicalisation such calls

[118] Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2010) 'Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33:9, p. 798.

would be directed to the overthrow of the (il)legitimate (democratically elected) government, abolition of the political parties, arming of citizens "to defend their home, country, rights, freedom, national ideals…".[119]

Given the fine nuances between pious and extremist Salafi doctrines, it is advised that this indicator be used with caution and considered it only in conjunction with other indicators present in the list, especially in countries of widespread mistrust of public authorities.

Statements dehumanising groups like unbelievers, gays, or other ethnicities or religions

Hate speech towards groups and individuals, considered "others" can be used both by adherents to right-wing ideas as well as persons embracing militant interpretations of Islam. In the case of persons leaning to the right-wing, hate speech will be directed towards Muslims, foreigners, ethnic minorities, Jews or gays. In the case of persons potentially leaning towards extreme Salafi interpretations of Islam hate speech will be directed towards Christians, gays, westerners as such, or generally to unbelievers (or infidels), including Muslims. Hate speech can be used by both common individuals or group leaders. The indicator can help make a more complete picture of the different aspects of, and the degree to which, an individual is embracing radical ideas at the cognitive level.

Being able to recognise such behaviour and rhetoric can aid professional assessment and understanding of risk signs in the context of radicalisation. It is a matter for law enforcement to deal with when such behaviour is detected.

Red flags

Expressing and propagating ideas for non-legitimate radical change/abolition of secular democratic societies

The expression or propagation of ideas for radical change of secular, democratic societies constitutes a red flag for radicalisation.

In the context of Islamist radicalisation such ideas are usually tied to a dogmatic narrative about the establishment of the Caliphate to encompass secular, democratic societies into a world empire organised along the religious values and norms of the early days of Islam.

As regards far-right radicalisation, the propagated means to achieve societal change may include the overthrow of the (democratically elected) government, abolition of the political parties and the arming of citizens to defend their home, country, rights, freedom, national ideals, etc.

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[119] Ibid.

Openly voicing support for terrorist organisations and causes

The voicing of support for terrorist organisations and causes is a red flag indicator that a person embraces and identifies with the causes and ideas of such organisations. In order for such indicator to be recognised and correctly understood, a list of such organisations needs to be provided, ideally as an integral part of a training manual. A reliable reference in this respect is the **EU List of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts and subject to restrictive measures** (as of December 2015).[120]

At the same time, there might be different grades of the support expressed for such organisations, ranging from general positive mentioning of the group to voicing strong commitment to their cause, including readiness to participate in their activities. Therefore, this indicator should be viewed in conjunction with others to make a more informed and comprehensive assessment of the potential risk.

Openly expressing certain attitudes supporting violence, or against an expressed target

The expression of attitudes supporting violence against specific targets (be it human or infrastructure) can be a signifier of a potential path to radicalisation but needs to be weighted very carefully. In countries where trust in public institutions is low and there is widespread corruption, the expression of attitudes of violence (be it against the political elite or against certain institutions) is not uncommon. Such speech however, is a matter of venting of tensions related to social and economic injustice and is not very often tied to any intentions of transforming speech into action.

For this purpose it is useful to clarify further the potential targets of declared intentions of violence. In the case of Islamist radicalisation they may involve Western countries, "the West" in general, non-Muslim leaders, Muslim leaders or Muslims accepting secular societal order, or all those (non-Muslims and Muslims) who do not pledge allegiance to IS or other Islamist militant organisations. In the case of far-right radicalisation targets may include foreigners, government/s supporting asylum seeking or open immigration, police, minority members, Muslims, Jews and their religious institutions or cemeteries. A possible concretisation of this indicator can be offered in the context of narratives and causes of contemporary terrorist and violent extremist groups. For example, IS supporters and members often voice appeals to others to join the global jihad and fight for their cause through violent means. Openly voicing support or approval of such acts or intent to take part in them or support them in any way constitutes a red flag. The focus on violence presents an additional aggravating factor of the risk beyond more general sympathies with a terrorist cause or group. This might be expressed through or accompanied by speaking of the importance of action now, the imminence of harm from a hostile group and justifying breaking the law in the name of a cause or ideology.

With these caveats, the indicator should be used with caution and with the awareness that it might signify potential risk only if combined with other (behavioural and cognitive) indicators in the list.

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[120] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D2430&qid=1457362568874&from=EN

3.3.2. Behavioural indicators

Suggestive

Cutting ties with family and friends, socially withdrawn

Empirical studies from across Europe show that many young people that have been drawn into radicalisation under the influence of recruiters, peers or the internet have showed a pattern of disassociation with their social environment. This might include abandoning old friends and seeking new ones, or becoming quiet and withdrawn, suddenly disengaging from their usual social activities. This can be accompanied by refusal to participate in group activities or interact with certain individuals due to the latter's religion, race, skin colour, gender or sexual orientation. Such behaviour could signify increased vulnerability to being drawn to extremist ideologies and that the person might be undergoing a process of search for meaning, purpose or answers. This could include faith, belonging and identity, where the existing environment is perceived as unable to provide the answers, hence creating a sense of misplacement, rejection and non-belonging.

In countries of Central and Eastern Europe where empirical evidence on violent radicalisation is lacking, this indicator should be considered with the caveat that such behavioural changes might be the outcome of various circumstances (such as family problems or abuse, addictions, but also experience of discrimination, personal trauma feeling of failure, frustration and grievances, or something less worrying) and do not necessarily indicate risk of radicalisation. Therefore, this indicator could be considered to signify risk of potential radicalisation, or rather vulnerability, only if other behavioural or cognitive indicators are present.

Noticeable change in religious (e.g. ultra-religiosity) and other every-day routines

In Europe, this indicator is included in risk assessment tools in relation to (young) people who undergo a personal change from not practicing religion at all to suddenly paying attention to and strictly following rules of religious practice, to a point where these become central to someone's life and **other regular activities** (such as school, work, social activities, etc.) **become secondary** or are abandoned to accommodate the newly adopted practice (also called **hyper-religiosity**).[121] In conjunction with other factors such as social isolation, family problems, drug abuse or crime history, trauma or crisis event, sense of alienation and discrimination, this might be an early sign of possible radicalisation being underway. However, an outsider would find it difficult to assess the meaning of these practices to

[121] See for example: Rahimullah, R. (2013) 'Understanding Violent Radicalization amongst Muslims: A Review of the Literature,' *Journal of Psychology and Behavioral Science*, 1(1), pp. 19-35. "Transitional religious experiences (TREs) have been identified to commonly precede radicalization (Awan, 2008). Two forms are associated with radicalization because they eventuate in hyper-religiosity: intensification and adoption/transition. Intensification is an escalated movement in religious commitment, i.e. becoming more religiously observant. Adoption/transition is a movement from no religious belief or conviction, to belief and conviction, such as in conversion. Such a change could be sudden or gradual. TREs are in exact predictor of radicalization. However, they are observed to occur in the background of known radicals" (p. 22).

the person concerned. Some studies show that turning to religion can under certain circumstances be a protective factor for young people at risk (engaged in criminality, drugs).[122] Change in religious practices might also be just a sign of strong piousness. Experience elsewhere has shown that even family members have often failed to interpret correctly this indicator. Foreign tools recommend that it be used in vulnerability assessments only in conjunction with all the other suggestive behaviours and cognitive factors to be able to construct a more complex picture of the particular situation. It needs to be stressed that most recent pathways to the commitment of Islamist violence do not involve adherence to the Salafi or Shia (militant) traditions and many of the newly radicalised individuals do not become particularly religious or observant.

The adoption of religious practices described above is not in itself an indication of radicalisation. Only upon the presence of additional indicators and respective analysis by well-informed professionals of the context in which the change takes place can it be interpreted as a signifier of a risk of increased vulnerability to being drawn towards militant Islamist or extremist ideologies and causes. Changes in religious habits, however, are rather difficult to observe by first line officers in their daily encounters with community members, as they are often retained to the more private sphere of spiritual life. Therefore, such changes would be better observed and analysed by experts and researchers of the Islamic faith in the respective country.

When referring to far-right radicalisation, these indicators would include change in practices and the adoption of rituals relevant to right-wing extremist ideologies, such as commemoration of relevant dates/anniversaries or following military-style rules and practices in every-day life. Other types of behaviour include a sudden increase or decrease in alcohol consumption, sudden and visible change in physical appearance as the result of fitness, martial arts training or the use of steroids.

Having contacts with or being under the influence of a religious or ideological leader or recruiter, espousing radical rhetoric (Islamist or right-wing)

Many individuals, especially young, may seek answers on religious, identity or political questions. Some of these individuals could become vulnerable to influences provided by extremist religious or ideological interpretations and narratives, provided that there are certain individual predispositions and increased receptiveness to such ideas. If there are other vulnerabilities present and if “demand” (individual seeking, feeling of disappointment and grievances) is met by “supply” of extremist ideological narratives and answers (through contact with terrorist recruiters or extremist preachers, exposure to extremist influences through internet, peers or visiting certain places), then a higher level of vulnerability may be present. This might be manifested in the individual starting to mention new role models or ideological leaders (in school, at home, among friends or during conversations with pedagogical and social services staff) and rejecting advice from others. This alone is not yet an indication of the person embracing the extremist or militant

[122] Meah, Y. and Mellis, C. (2009) *Recognising and Responding to Radicalisation. Considerations for policy and practice through the eyes of street level workers.* The RecoRa Institute.

ideas that he/she encounters, but when other factors are also present (such as change in appearance, change in rhetoric, alienation from social environment, etc.), it might assist in evaluating the complexity of a particular case.[123]

Box 2. Case in point: venues of exposure to radical influences and ideologies in Bulgaria

According to the publically available risk assessment provided by the intelligence services in Bulgaria, possible external channels of influence pertain mainly to the potential for infiltration of radicalised persons and terrorists through the intensified inflows of irregular migrants, as well as in relation to foreign terrorist fighters travelling through Bulgaria to and from conflict zones.[124] Another risk is identified in relation to the influence that institutions of higher religious educational abroad might exert over Bulgarian citizens who graduate from them. The internal security risks identified by experts are associated with the social deprivation and exclusion of some communities which could make some members of these communities vulnerable to extremist or militant (religious) ideologies; the accessibility through the internet of extremist propaganda; and the potential of provocation and spread of Islamophobic and xenophobic attitudes.[125] Still, exposure to external influences in itself does not necessarily mean that someone would embrace the ideas encountered, or that such an exposure should translate into any actions or changes in a person's behaviour. Other factors must be in place as well, such as internal seeking and predisposition (push factors), as well as a favourable environment.

Encounters with members of right-wing organisations who propagate far-right ideology. Government analyses show that various groups and organisations subscribing to far-right, ultra-nationalist or neo-Nazi views have become more active since the mid-2000s. They seek to recruit young people at 14-20 years of age, including through universities and schools under the pretext of delivering patriotic lectures on historical events. Furthermore, paramilitary groups providing combat and military training are becoming more popular. They actively recruit volunteers for anti-immigrant border patrols via social media.

Religious education in the Middle East. This factor might become relevant if an individual seeking religious education abroad comes under the influence of religious establishments and preachers associated with extremist ideologies that prompt a cognitive opening towards embracing some extremist ideas. However, this factor remains hypothetical without the presence of any additional concrete behavioural or cognitive signs being displayed by the individual. Therefore, further clues must be present, for example if returning graduates from foreign religious schools display some of the other described behavioural and cognitive changes from the list of indicators. At the same time, it should be also noted that evidence from recent cases of terrorist suspects in Western Europe and the Western Balkans[126]

[123] For an explanation regarding the main ideas and rhetoric related to Islamist or right-wing radicalisation turn to the introductory part of Cognitive Indicators.

[124] For more information see CSD (2015) *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia, CSD.

[125] Strategy for Countering Radicalization and Terrorism 2015 – 2025, Draft, pp. 4-5; Николов, Й., Росен Б., „Има ли пряка опасност за България", в. *Капитал*, 9.01.2015.

[126] Numerous media reports in the aftermath of the 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels attacks. For more detail on the Western Balkans – see Kursani, S. (2015) *Report inquiring into the causes and consequences of Kosovo citizens' involvement as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq*. Occasional Paper 04/2015. Pristina, KCSS.

Box 2. Case in point: venues of exposure to radical influences and ideologies in Bulgaria (continued)

demonstrate that they had been self-educated in Islam and often had superficial knowledge of the religion, which makes them vulnerable to simplified and manipulated interpretations (a situation that can also apply to converts to Islam).

In Bulgaria, some Muslims are granted scholarships to receive their religious education in countries from the Middle East (such as Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, etc.)[127] because the High Islamic Institute in the country is not accredited by the Bulgarian authorities, hence its diplomas are not recognised. In addition, the fact that the training in the Islamic Institute is provided in the Turkish language makes the Institute less accessible to Muslims whose mother tongue is not Turkish. The lack of adequate opportunities for high religious education creates a certain vacuum prompting some young Muslims to seek an alternative educational path. It has to be stressed, however, that not all High Islamic Educational Institutions in the Middle East follow curricula based on Salafi interpretations of Islam and those that follow such curricula do not necessarily expose students to militant extremist readings of Salafism. For this purpose, this indicator can be operationalised for monitoring if only it is accompanied by additional explanation about the particular universities in particular countries with teaching curricula involving more extreme readings of Islam. The best source for obtaining such information is the Chief Mufti Office in Bulgaria, which is the institution that manages the tuition grants for students in foreign university as well as the registers of the education of all certified and acting imams and vaiz (preachers) in the country. Respectively, this type of information might be obtained by official request to the Chief Muftiate on the part of the Directorate of Denominations at the Council of Ministers.[128] Gathering of such data can provide information about the presence of Muslims religious leaders (imams, vaiz and muezzins) who potentially deliver their religious services among local communities along the Salafi interpretations of Islam, which in itself is no indication of potential radicalisation. It is worth stressing once more that Salafism is in no way identical to violent Islamist extremism. While it is associated with a more strict and dogmatic interpretation of Islam it is not to be conflated with violent jihadism.

Contact with extremist Islamic preachers in mosques abroad. The presence of extremist Islamic preachers in mosques of countries in Western Europe, but also in the Western Balkans has been reported and discussed in numerous accounts.[129] The establishment of contacts, communication and exposure of Bulgarian citizens to such preachers might be considered an indicator of potential vulnerability to radicalisation. Such information could best be acquired by intelligence services in cooperation with counterpart institutions in the respective European countries. Presently, however, there is little knowledge

[127] According to Ahmed Ahmedov, Chief Secretary of the Chief Muftiate, the number of graduates from foreign Islamic Universities in 2014 amounted to 300 persons, of whom about 70 % graduated in Turkey, 10 % in Jordan, 10 % in Saudi Arabia and the rest in Egypt and other countries of the Arab world. (Зорница, С. „Какво патриотично има в това да изправяш хората едни срещу други", в. *Капитал*, 28.03.2014).

[128] According to the *Law on Denominations*, the Directorate on Denominations at the Council of Ministers is the institution that coordinates the relationship between the executive authorities and the denominations in Bulgaria (art. 35 (1)).

[129] See Bundeministerium des Inneren (2015) *Verfassungschutzbericht 2014*. Berlin, Bundesminister des Innern.

Kursani, S. (2015) *Report inquiring into the causes and consequences of Kosovo citizens' involvement as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq*. Occasional Paper 04/2015. Pristina, KCSS.

Box 2. Case in point: venues of exposure to radical influences and ideologies in Bulgaria (continued)

about the scope and dynamics of the practices of religious tourism by Muslims from Bulgaria (Bulgarian-speaking Muslims and Roma) to mosques in Germany, France or the United Kingdom.[130]

Foreign religious emissaries active locally. Since the fall of the Berlin wall and the opening of borders Bulgaria was targeted like other Balkan states hosting Muslim minorities (and like Western European countries since the 1980s) by Muslim charitable aid from Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Iran. Such aid involved the work of both emissaries and foundations and proselytism of "true" interpretations of Islam and of practices of orthodox Islamic profession (Salafi interpretations of Islam). A more recent phenomenon involves visits to villages populated by Bulgarian-speaking Muslims of Islamic worshipers and preachers from Western European countries. The monitoring of such emissaries and the analysis of whether their activity might be conducive to (cognitive or behavioural) Islamist radicalisation is part of professional law enforcement and intelligence work.

Access to extremist propaganda on the internet. The internet and social media have become prime and little regulated vehicles of propagating, communicating and disseminating right-wing or Islamist extremist ideas through semi-public and password-protected forums, propaganda videos, official sites and the like. For example, jihadist websites use marketing techniques through multimedia formats aiming to formulate identities, both collective and individual. The marketing techniques combine established forms of rhetoric and propaganda with new ways to reach the targeted public through both popular culture and religious ideologies. 1) A rhetoric of ''symbolic crusades'' – provides political arguments aiming to convince the audience of the legitimacy of jihadists' goals; 2) Conception and dichotomisation of believers and nonbelievers – viewed through the prism of the Ummah the potential public is divided into believers and infidels; 3) A binding of propaganda to the sacred script is used as a technique to legitimise the ideology of extremism by continuously using elements from the holy script and extremist ideologies, thereby interweaving Jihadist ideas with Islamic concepts; 4) A "displacement of responsibility'' is propagandised as violence is deemed as the only possible means to deal with and defeat the enemy.[131]

Charity/aid organisations with hidden Islamist agenda active in asylum centres. Law enforcement data from some EU countries (Germany or Belgium for example) points to the presence of Islamic charitable organisations active in asylum centres where asylum seekers are accommodated. According to this data, some of these charities have an ideological agenda promoted in parallel to their humanitarian activities, aimed at winning followers for the causes of (militant) Islamist organisations. Therefore, it is worthwhile tracing the presence of such organisations in asylum centres in Bulgaria but presently it might be more appropriate to trust this work to intelligence services. At the same time, it is advisable to consider providing targeted training to public employees working in asylum centres and coming into regular contact with asylum seekers and refugees on the potential risks associated with the penetration of such organisations into places where they might come into contact with asylum seekers and refugees.

[130] This indicator needs to be clearly distinguished from the dynamic and intensive processes of emigration to Western Europe that have affected all strata of Bulgarian society since 1989. Seasonal, temporary or long term labour migration is practiced by significant proportions of all ethnic and religious communities in the country with frequent and regular returns to Bulgaria.

[131] Bhui, K.& Ibrahim, Y. (2013) 'Marketing the "radical": Symbolic communication and persuasive technologies in jihadist websites,' *Transcultural Psychiatry*, 50(2), 216-234.

Group isolation and capsulation

Processes of isolation and capsulation at community or sub-group level, the outcome of unfavourable economic and social conditions, as well as of experiences of discrimination may in combination with other factors make certain individuals vulnerable to potential radicalisation. Poverty, social isolation and marginalisation of some communities can generate risks to radicalisation by increasing the vulnerability of individuals from such communities to radical ideologies. Social isolation and capsulation at community level do not automatically translate into exposure of members of such communities to radicalisation. However, if compounded with other factors at the individual level, the marginalisation and capsulation of a community may enhance the vulnerability to potential radicalisation.

Red flags

Possessing or disseminating extremist literature, propaganda materials and paraphernalia; consuming or disseminating extremist online content

People attracted to extremist ideas are likely to engage with different ideological or propaganda content either online or in real life and share it with others. This can include literature, informational and advertising brochures and pamphlets, different paraphernalia displaying symbols or texts associated with the idea or cause in which they believe. The possession of extremist literature and other content might be an indication of interest in the ideas propagated by this literature and its dissemination might be an indicator of a desire to share these ideas with others. They can also try to reinforce their beliefs through regular consultation of extremist internet forums and websites (videos, discussion forums, social media, extremist websites, etc.) or through their own creation and sharing of such online content.

However, frontline practitioners might find it difficult to recognise the extremist nature of such materials or content, especially when it comes to ideological literature; or because often the literature espousing militant Islamist ideas is to be found either in Arabic or sometimes in Turkish. It needs to be stressed that the having an interest in specific types of ideological literature might come out of different motivations and is not in itself an illegal activity.

One way to distinguish whether such material is of extremist and terrorist nature is whether it emphasises violence or contains common symbols of known violent extremist and terrorist groups such as IS, Nusra Front and other al Qaeda groups. For example, possessing or disseminating literature/propaganda material glorifying violence or fighting for a terrorist cause is a red flag for radicalisation. Such materials could be related to combat activities, videos and pictures of beheadings and killings, other violent acts and appeals associated with an ideological/terrorist narrative, as well as manuals on building explosives, handling weapons, military/combat training materials, especially if associated with (or produced by) a terrorist group. Training curricula for frontline practitioners should be developed, including

practical examples, so that they can be made aware and more capable to recognise such content.

As regards far-right radicalisation, interest in lone actor attacks such as 'single shooters', materials with strong violent or hate speech rhetoric might be relevant risk signs along this indicator.

If literature possessed or disseminated contains information on military training, handling weapons or making explosives this points to even graver risk of radicalisation.

Organises, leads or attends rallies for extremist causes

Participation in rallies for extremist causes (associated with either far right ideas or Islamist ideas) can certainly be a strong risk factor of potential radicalisation. Especially at the local level it might be worthwhile to monitor extremist rallies and their organisers and leaders as well as the approximate attendance by individuals (locals or coming from the outside). The indicator is relevant for the professional group of first line police officers and those specialised in securing mass events. A more systematic approach to monitoring such events is necessary and greater awareness among community police officers of the different extremist groups active in the country. There are specialised police units tasked with monitoring and ensuring public safety in relation to sports events and other mass gatherings, but they need to extend their focus towards more systematic monitoring and analysis of extremist protests, rallies, demonstrations and other public events. In the context of Islamist radicalisation, organising or participating in demonstrations, marches or other public gatherings in support for terrorist causes or organization (potentially recognisable by displaying certain symbols/signs used by the organisation) is also considered a red flag.

In the context of Islamist radicalisation extremist causes might include: establishment of the Caliphate as functional political entity with the religious norms of Islam to substitute national law and secular order; overthrow of the established government to be replaced with Islamic state (caliphate); imposition of Sharia law to substitute national law; abolition of the secular constitutional order for one based on Islamic principles.

In the context of far right radicalisation extremist causes might include: expulsion of all foreigners, exclusion of minorities from political life; abolition of the constitution or the acting democratically elected government under claims for not representing the interests of the nation; change of liberal democracy to authoritarian or overtly egalitarian rule (direct democracy); restriction or abolition of the cultural or religious rights of country's minority or immigrant communities.

Contacts with or membership in extremist groups (abroad or at home)

People in more advanced stages of radicalisation would seek to interact with or join extremist groups whose cause they support. However, in some instances an individual may be drawn into such groups not out of inner convictions, but under peer pressure and through contacts in their social environment. Professionals working with young people should be alert of this indicator in

the context of right-wing radicalisation. The strong association with extremist groups would likely come in combination with other indicators, such as changes in outer appearance, participating in the group's activities (such as rallies and demonstrations), going to certain places where the groups is known to convene, etc. Practitioners (especially social and school workers) should be made aware of the main extremist groups operating in the country through trainings and informational materials.

The maintenance of contacts with extremist groups abroad (right-wing or Islamist) (by internet, phone or through intermediaries) can indicate that radicalisation is highly probable. However, the monitoring of such contacts can only be part of the functions of intelligence services rather than a monitoring component in the daily routines of first line practitioners, although they may come across other warning signs associated with such engagement.

Engaging in criminal activity/gangs

Criminal engagement can be both a contributing factor and a symptom of radicalisation process being underway. Empirical analysis of committed acts of violent radicalisation in countries of Western Europe and the USA shows that in many instances perpetrators have had histories of violence, criminal engagement and gang involvement.[132] According to recent findings, "criminal and terrorist groups [in Europe] have come to recruit from the same pool of people, creating (often unintended) synergies".[133] Therefore the participation of individuals in such activities (in combination with other relevant indicators) might constitute a potential contributing factor to or a signal of radicalisation.

Violent extremist ideologies and causes attract people from the criminal milieu, but may also push them into criminality, for several reasons. Being part of a criminal environment or gang can provide a breeding ground/favourable conditions for someone to be drawn into radicalisation – criminal gangs may have contacts to extremists due to smuggling of weapons and other illegal goods. Furthermore, analysis of committed acts of violent radicalisation reveals that some of the perpetrators of Islamist related violence in Western Europe have "evolved" through the so called path "from zero to hero". The involvement in acts of violence based on extremist Islamist ideology becomes a way for them to divert from their criminal environment and identify with a glorified cause and new identity which provides them with a narrative and justification for their crimes committed or to be committed or as an excuse to continue committing crimes however, in the name of a "legitimate cause".[134] According to Basra et al.: "Jihadism offered redemption for crime while satisfying the same personal needs and desires that led them to become involved in it, making the 'jump' from criminality to terrorism smaller than is commonly perceived".[135]

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[132] Basra, R., Neumann, P. and Brunner, C. (2016) *Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus*. London, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence.

[133] Ibid, p. 3.

[134] For similar conclusions on foreign fighters from Kosovo see – Kursani (2015).

[135] Ibid, p. 3.

Criminality may also imply previous prison experience and poor reintegration into society which may make an individual vulnerable due to grievances, social isolation, lack of perspectives, but also given the potential access to criminal (and terrorist) networks and transfer of skills and contacts. Prisons in themselves are well-attested places of vulnerability for extremist recruitment.

At the same time, some tools with observable indicators of radicalisation also suggest that people may start displaying offending behaviour as a symptom of radicalisation and rejecting the legitimacy of authorities.[136]

3.3.3. High-risk signs

The following are not early-warning indicators, but signify criminalised behaviours that in the context of radicalisation into violence bear a high risk and require immediate attention from law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

Travel to risk countries/conflict zones

Travel to risk countries or conflict zones, such as Syria or Iraq, has been identified as a signifier of an adopted path to supporting or committing jihadist activity. Therefore, it is worthwhile monitoring such travel. It is not an early warning sign of radicalisation, but a serious indication of intent to take part in terrorist activity (or at least to travel to countries where the risks of being drawn into it increase dramatically). To be able to recognise and correctly understand this indicator, a list of risk countries needs to be provided, ideally as an integral part of a future training manual.

However, while activity can be intercepted and analysed by the intelligence, in countries with a large number of nationals that had recently travelled abroad to join terrorist groups' combat activities it was often people from their family, social environment and local frontline practitioners that signalled to authorities about the intention or actual travel of the respective individual. Therefore we need to be aware of this indicator as potentially strong signifier of radicalisation, especially in the context of the current conflict in Syria and the region and the activities of members and recruits of militant Islamist organisations in other conflict zones, e.g. Yemen, Somalia.

Taking part in combat/military training

This is an indicator of imminent radicalisation, as it might signify preparation or intent by individuals or groups to take part in illegal combat activities. It is primarily relevant for monitoring by intelligence officers or law enforcement specialists. Military training provision can be distinguished from normal physical training activity (e.g. martial arts). Possible differentiators could be made based on training in the use of weapons as opposed to general physical fitness or combat training, or the intent and nature of the organisation or group providing the

[136] Community Policing Preventing Radicalisation & Terrorism (CoPRRa) (2013) Manual for Trainers. 2nd Edition. Brussels, Federal Police of Belgium. p. 24.

training. However, it should be also noted that in some countries there are groups and clubs of former military personnel or hunters which continue organising and taking part in such events and activities involving handling of legal weapons and other training techniques, which does not necessarily imply intent to utilize these skills in illegal activities.

Buying weapons, explosives and related materials

The interception of activities relating to the acquisition of weapons, explosives and related materials fall directly in the functions of law enforcement officers who have the duty to exert control over the acquisition and use of weapons and can spot unusual or illegal activity in this respect. They should be aware that in the context of radicalisation this indicator is of increased gravity, although additional information will have to be verified that the weapons are acquired with a particular purpose.

3.4. THE REQUIRED INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

In countries with limited experience in countering and preventing radicalisation, governments should focus first and foremost on obtaining accurate evidence-based picture of the spread and nature of risks, as well as on enhancing institutional preparedness to identify and respond to these risks. A multi-partner approach in which actors have the ability, the knowledge and the capacity to identify and support individuals at risk is essential for making such a framework of indicators operational. Such an approach requires: a) sound and up-to-date evidence on the nature and scope of the phenomenon, utilising the proper tools to diagnose, assess, prioritise and monitor the related risks; b) sufficient capacities of government institutions to allow them to understand and respond to radicalisation risks. Furthermore, increasing administrative and expert capacity of key frontline practitioners must be complemented by a counter-radicalisation infrastructure and mechanisms for multi-agency cooperation, information sharing and support for those at risk.

Box 3. Case in point: policies and government institutions in Bulgaria

In response to the changing external security environment, the Bulgarian government has adopted a number of security measures to better monitor, prevent and respond to potential terrorist threats and radicalisation processes, and to counter more effectively the transit of transnational fighters through its territory. While the government response so far has been mainly focussed on better equipping security agencies to enforce counter-terrorism measures and controls, a new national *Strategy on Countering Radicalisation and Terrorism 2015 – 2020* and an action plan drafted in 2015 envisage also the designing of "soft" policies and measures for early identification and prevention of radicalisation before it turns to violence, including through multi-agency and community engagement. While this is undoubtedly a

Box 3. Case in point: policies and government institutions in Bulgaria (continued)

development in the right direction, any soft policies and measures need to be designed on the basis of monitoring of groups at risk and investigation of the complex social dynamics and motivating factors that serve as drivers to potential radicalisation.

Radicalisation is not sufficiently understood at the level of government institutions and practitioners on the ground, including the pull and push factors involved, pathways and vulnerabilities of individuals or groups of people; consequently there is not enough knowledge on how to prevent and address such issues. Relevant authorities are in the very early stages of developing working methods for identifying, preventing and countering processes and manifestations of radicalisation. While law enforcement and intelligence bodies have occasionally been active in applying monitoring, repressive and deterrence actions towards radicalisation, there is a lack of any systematic and organised institutional effort towards early recognition and prevention of such trends. Furthermore, the involvement of other key public bodies such as the educational and social systems in these efforts is limited. The educational and social systems, with potentially important role in prevention, do not recognise the phenomenon as a priority in their work, and hence have limited preparedness to identify, assess and address risks. Measures that are solely repressive are not sufficient to prevent or counteract processes that have complex social roots. Law enforcement and security agencies play an important role in countering violent radicalisation, but their intervention should be the last resort of government response.

The measures envisioned in the *Draft Plan for Implementing the Strategy for Countering Radicalisation and Terrorism* (2015 – 2025) are ambitious and cover several essential elements required for a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach to counter-radicalisation. However, there are several challenges to the development of effective, context- and needs-based prevention and counter-radicalisation policies in Bulgaria.

The indicator framework outlined above requires a more pro-active approach by all concerned institutions, which should proceed from a proper recognition and prioritisation of radicalisation-related issues in strategic planning and day-to-day activities. To achieve this, the following policies could be brought forward:

Multi-agency coordination at the national and local levels

- At the national level, a **central coordination body on countering and preventing radicalisation** can be created. It would primarily focus on coordinating the implementation of a national strategy and action plan. It could be further tasked with providing guidelines and expertise, centralising information and analysing threats, coordinating the work of territorial structures involved in prevention, designing trainings and raising awareness, ensuring exchange of information and cooperation between relevant stakeholders, designing and evaluating prevention programmes. The primary focus of such a structure would be on prevention and early identification of risks.
- Develop (or adapt existing ones) a **multi-agency prevention and coordination mechanism at the local level** (depending on the country structure) to be able to identify, monitor and prevent radicalisation. The mechanism should include

setting up expert groups or local multi-agency panels with clearly defined coordination roles. These multi-agency panels can be composed of representatives of local authorities, police, health workers, social workers, juvenile delinquency commissions, youth correctional officers, educators and psychologists, civic/community organisations and others. Their main task is to discuss and exchange information on early risk signs and vulnerable persons to assess the need for targeted prevention and decide on the nature of measures.

- Provide clear instructions on the **division and scope of responsibilities, tasks and ownership** of the respective state and non-state actors in preventive counter-radicalisation work (information gathering and analysis, evaluation and referral of individual cases, formulation and delivery of prevention measures). Intelligence gathering should be strictly separated from exchange of information for the purposes of prevention work.

Early identification of risks and prevention measures

- Develop an **early warning system** for identification and monitoring of radicalisation risks. This system should clearly define the mechanisms through which information on risk signs is reported and by whom (e.g. by first line practitioners, as well as channels for reporting by members of the public, family members and relatives of vulnerable individuals); how and by whom are risks evaluated and prioritised, as well as on the follow-up procedures based on the needs of each individual case. Such a system must be flexible, under regular review, and subject to close oversight in terms of data collection and analysis. The feedback loop from that data analysis to policy prescription must be clear and built into the system. Such a system would further require:
- A **framework of field-tested risk indicators** for identifying, monitoring and assessing signs of radicalisation, based on empirically validated findings. The present framework of key risk indicators serves as a reference point and provides a solid starting basis on which to build such a system and develop further indicators tailored to the specific context. Developing a **risk/vulnerability assessment methodology** to assess the individuals at risk, as well as to analyse relevant trends and developments at community, regional and national level, to be conducted by trained professionals/analysts.
- Putting in place **a mechanism for referring vulnerable individuals** towards appropriate prevention measures. These measures should be adopted after wide consultations with different stakeholders, as well as on the basis of empirical findings on the root causes and factors of radicalisation processes in the country. These measures should include providing advice and mentorship, referral to specific psychological, social or other assistance and support for vulnerable individuals and their friends and families, etc.
- **Community engagement in prevention:** strengthen relationships between civil society and local authorities who know more about communities, local dynamics and relationships than law enforcement and the intelligence agencies. Potential home-grown Islamist or right-wing radicalisation cannot be addressed and counteracted without the involvement of local communities. For example, prevention policies need to be designed in such a way as to engage the moderate Muslim leaders in controlling Muslim communities in denominational matters and in providing for a dignified and satisfactory religious life and education, free from non-transparent funding sources from aboard.

Building knowledge, awareness, capacities and expertise

- In order for preventive work to be gradually integrated in the day-to-day work of **frontline practitioners**, their skills, knowledge and capabilities to identify and address radicalisation should be significantly increased. This requires developing specialised education curricula, manuals and guidelines and delivering regular practical trainings. Such materials should clearly articulate the risks of radicalisation based on solid evidence, ways of identifying the risks, and models of working with individuals from the point of view from various agencies across sectors. Such materials and trainings can build on the present practitioners' guide.
- Developing expertise among specialised law enforcement and intelligence professionals, as well as analysts and other employees in the state administration, the security agencies, the judiciary, on the issues of radicalisation and how to address it.
- Facilitating research into the factors precipitating radicalisation, the paths to violence, the forms and manifestations of radicalisation, and the impact which various ideologies, internet recruitment and role models have in the local context. Research findings should be at the core of any early warning and intervention measures.

ANNEX. EXAMPLES OF RADICALISATION MONITORING AND RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS

1. VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS

Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA)	
Type	Risk assessment tool
Level of analysis	Individual
Level of application	Operational
Organisation/country	Developed by Public Safety Canada; used in Canada, Europe, Australia, Southeast Asia
Stakeholders involved	Penitentiary authorities, law enforcement, forensic psychologists, psychiatrists (can be used by each separately)
Target groups	Individuals with history of extremist violence; individuals convicted for extremist offences
Short summary of approach	The Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA) tool has three versions including sets of factors in five categories (beliefs and attitudes, context and intent history and capability, commitment/motivation and protective factors). The assessor rates the presence of the factors on a three level scale (low/medium/high) and makes a judgement regarding the risk posed (low/high/medium). A standardized framework with coding form has been developed to assist in assessment. VERA should be used in conjunction with all other available information to ensure as informed a judgement as possible.



Multi-level Guidelines (MLG)	
Type	Risk assessment tool
Level of application	Individual/group
Organisation/country	Mental Health, Law and Policy Institute, Fraser University, Canada
Stakeholders involved	Intended for law enforcement and mental health professionals
Target groups	Extremist groups and individuals; individuals at risk
Short summary of approach	The tool comprises a total of twenty factors grouped in four clusters – individual, individual-group, group and group-societal. The tool is applied in six systematic steps: gathering information and opinions about a case; determination of presence of the risk factors on a three point scale (present, possibly or partially present and absent) both for the recent and previous status of the cases; estimation of relevance of factors (relevant, possibly or partially relevant and not relevant) and classification as motivators, disinhibiters or destabilizers; development of risk scenarios; development of management strategies; formulation of conclusions – prioritization of case, risk of (life threatening, imminent) violence and likely victims.

Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG 22+)	
Type	Risk assessment tool
Level of analysis	Individual
Level of application	Operational
Organisation/country	England and Wales
Stakeholders involved	National offender management service
Target groups	Extremist offenders
Short summary of approach	Twenty two indicators grouped in three clusters (engagement with a group, cause or ideology; intent to cause harm; capability to cause harm). The ERG manual includes an overview of limitations and applications, administration procedures and a justification and explanation of risk and protective factors. The assessor does simply tally up the number of present and absent factors, but instead should exercise sound judgment and should consider four broad questions in assessing a case: 1. What contextual factors played a part in the offending? 2. What personal characteristics contributed to offending? 3. What did the offender get out of the act? 4. What personal characteristics and contextual factors can guard against future offending?[137]

[137] The Development of Structured Guidelines for Assessing Risk in Extremist Offenders.

Extremist Risk Screening (ERS)	
Type	Risk assessment and monitoring tool
Level of analysis	Individual
Level of application	Operational
Organisation/country	England and Wales
Stakeholders involved	National Offender Management Service
Target groups	Offenders incarcerated for offenders other than extremism
Short summary of approach	The ERS is a shortened version of the ERG 22+ used to determine the risk of radicalisation among the general prison population. While no exact information is available on application, it is likely it is similar to ERG+ implementation.

2. EARLY VIGILANCE MANUALS AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT TOOLS FOR FRONTLINE PRACTITIONERS

COPPRA: Community Policing and the Prevention of Radicalisation	
Type	Trainers' manual and pocket guide for community police; good practices collection
Level of analysis	Individual
Level of application	Operational
Application	In use in several EU Member States
Organisation/country	CEPOL, EUROPOL, Belgian Federal Police; 15 EU Member States
Stakeholders involved	First line police officers
Target groups	(Vulnerable) communities, where first line police officers operate
Short summary of approach	First line police officers are trained on different types of extremism, the process of and indicators showing possible radicalisation and preparation of terrorist attacks. The pocket guide includes a list of symbols associated with known extremist groups, which can easily be spotted by officers.

Radicx	
Type	Risk assessment and monitoring tool
Level of analysis	Individual
Level of application	Operational
Organisation/country	The Netherlands
Stakeholders involved	Teachers, school psychologists, other school personnel
Target groups	School pupils, youth at risk of becoming radicalised
Short summary of approach	Radicx comprises six steps during which concerns related to four domains (behavior, contacts, cultural/religious expressions and political/ideological expressions) are raised, inventorised and discussed by school professionals and a suitable action is agreed upon. Radicx is part of an approach to identifying and assessing warning signs integrated into a guide explaining the process radicalisation, relevant factors and indicators.

CHANNEL Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF)	
Type	Vulnerability assessment tool, part of Channel
Level of analysis	Individual
Level of application	Operational
Organisation/country	The UK
Stakeholders involved	Channel coordinator (usually a police officer) and multi-agency panels (can comprise a multitude of institutions – youth offender services, social services, health services, schools, universities, etc. depending on local approach)
Target groups	Individuals at risk of becoming radicalised
Short summary of approach	The VAF is composed of twenty two indicators grouped in three clusters (engagement with a group, cause or ideology; intent to cause harm; capability to cause harm), derived from the ERG 22+ and are thus very similar.[138]

[138] Some differences exist, however, for example, ERG 22+ factors such as "need to redress injusice and express grievance", "need to defend against threat" are worded in VAF as "feelings of grievance and injustice" and "feeling under threat". For a detailed account of differences, the two instruments can be compared; http://course.ncalt.com/Channel_General_Awareness/01/resources/docs/vul-assessment.pdf (VAF) and The Development of Structured Guidelines for Assessing Risk in Extremist Offenders (ERG).

3. BROADER COMMUNITY-BASED MONITORING MECHANISMS

Rotterdam Information Switch Point	
Type	Integrated monitoring mechanism
Objective	Monitor macro and meso trends, identify radicalised persons or persons at risk
Level of analysis	Macro, meso and micro
Level of application	Tactical
Organisation/country	Rotterdam municipality, the Netherlands
Stakeholders involved	Multiple (e.g. municipal services, education, minority institutions and other institutions)
Target groups	Communities and individuals at risk
Short summary of approach	The Rotterdam Information Switch Point is a system/framework which gathers information from various sources on possible threats of radicalisation. This information is then organised/analysed and then relayed to the appropriate institutions. The information Switch Point system is made up of three different work processes. If in the course of these three work processes there seem to be common threads, this information is distributed to the appropriate authorities. • Trends and analysis: This follows national and international developments that may affect radicalisation and translates them into the local context. • People and objects: this work process gathers reports at the ISP from individuals or organisations of possible radical behaviour by other individuals or groups. It then puts in place various sorting methods to distinguish if it is a credible threat, and seeks to assess the ability of the case to be dealt with locally (or without a direct law enforcement intervention). • Quick scan social unrest: the third work process concerns the response of the population to major incidents anywhere in the world that could possibly have repercussions on the atmosphere in the city. A network of key figures (called the Quick Scan Social Unrest network) is consulted to obtain a picture of the prevailing atmosphere in specific communities. Usually these key figures are important people connected to different communities (Moroccans, Turks, Kurds, Somalis etc.).

Integrated Security Management Matrix	
Type	Integrated monitoring mechanism
Level of analysis	Macro, meso
Level of application	Tactical
Organisation/country	North Holland, the Netherlands
Stakeholders involved	Local police offices, local community representatives
Target groups	Local communities
Short summary of approach	Integrated Security Management Matrix ("Matrix Integrale Veiligheidszorg") is a platform used by local authorities and community police officers in the North Holland region of the Netherlands to identify, prioritize and address safety and security issues in partnership with community stakeholders. In collaboration with local authorities, community police officers organize a meeting bringing together representatives of the community to identify the most significant safety and security issues affecting the municipality or a particular neighbourhood. The community police officers contribute to the discussions by sharing an analysis they have prepared drawing on their personal knowledge of the community, available demographic and socio-economic data, as well as information from police records, such as crime data. The objective of the meeting is for all partners to identify a number of priorities they will seek to tackle together over a given period of time. For each priority, the partners brainstorm to agree on a description of the issue, the desired outcome(s) and the role and responsibilities of the different stakeholders who will be actively involved in solving the issue. The agreed-upon problem solving approach is summarized in the format of an integrated security management matrix. The matrix provides a clear schematic representation of the contribution of all partners (who, what, where, when and how) towards an integrated solution. Two follow -up meetings are held during the period agreed upon to tackle the issue in order to discuss the efforts undertaken, the possible results achieved and to review the matrix.

4. SURVEYS

Amsterdam Citizen Monitor	
Type	Social survey mapping possible inter-group tensions and other problems
Level of analysis	Societal
Organisation/country	Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Stakeholders involved	Municipality of Amsterdam
Target groups	Population of Amsterdam
Short summary of approach	The Amsterdam Citizen Monitor is a part of the city of Amsterdam's approach towards addressing radicalisation and measures experiences in a number of relevant areas such as solidarity with society and between different ethnic groups, knowledge of and participation in (local) politics, perceptions of influence in the political process, attitudes towards democracy, experiences of discrimination etc.

Safety Monitor	
Type	Social survey mapping possible inter-group tensions and other problems
Level of analysis	Societal
Organisation/country	The Netherlands
Stakeholders involved	Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics
Target groups	Population of the Netherlands
Short summary of approach	Applied since 2008. The survey is implemented by the municipalities and the items focus on neighbourhood-level phenomena. The Safetymonitor also includes an instrument developed by the Verwey Jonker Institute to measure polarization and trust in neighbourhoods. From 2008 until 2010 there were eight items in the survey that focused on polarization and trust in neighbourhoods. In 2012, the structure and content of the survey was changed and polarization is measured by four clusters of questions (not present in last version and possibly discontinued). • Questions over how different population groups live with each other (signalling) • Questions relating to the reasons behind tensions between population groups in the neighbourhood (risk factors) • Questions relating to policy (that should be adopted) (protective factors) • Questions on individual characteristics

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