

Monitoring radicalisation risks in Central and Southeast Europe

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Addressing Radicalisation in Southeast and Central Europe

Thematic Focus

- Right and left wing radicalisation
- Islamist radicalisation
- Football Hooliganism

Objectives

- Baseline review of threats and trends; identified risk factors (BG, EL, CZ)
- Review of institutional needs and gaps in monitoring and countering radicalisation
- Tailored monitoring tools for practitioners, based on transferrable EU good practices





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Islamist radicalisation – a new threat for CEE/SEE?

External Threats

- ► <u>Terrorist activities</u> by international Islamist groups (EL, BG)
- ► Transnational terrorist fighters in TRANSIT (BG, EL, CZ)

Home-grown threats (highly debated)

Old Muslim minorities - 12 % (BG); 1,3 - 0.7% (EL) - Hanafi Sunni tradition Immigrant Muslims - 0.01% (BG and CZ); 1,8 - 2.8% (EL)

- ► <u>Salafi influences</u> (foreign emissaries, charitable aid, own preachers)
- Residents with <u>links to Jihadist groups</u> (200 in EL)
- Non-violent acts of approval of terrorist organisations (BG)
- ► Logistical support for FTFs (BG)



Radicalisation as a new policy issue in CEE/SEE

- History of right-wing and left-wing extremism (EL, CZ)
- Emerging external and internal risks of Islamist radicalisation (BG, EL, CZ)
- Institutional response dominated by national security considerations (mostly repressive)
- Lack of rigorous monitoring and evaluations of radicalisation factors and risks; early warning mechanisms
- Lack of reliable data and diagnostic mechanisms impede evidence-based formulation of measures
- Prevention not part of the overall strategic approach or the mandate of key practitioners



A monitoring toolkit model

Extremist activity

What: spread, nature, trends and threats of extremist acts and actors

How: criminal statistics, events, intelligence data, open source

Moving towards extremism

What: risk and vulnerability indicators - meso and micro level (behaviour, events, appearances)

Vulnerable individuals and groups

How: first-line practitioners, community actors, trained professionals

All members of society

What: Social polarisation vs cohesion, trust, social tensions and conflicts

How: surveys, opinion polls, media, socio-economic indicators

SITUATIONAL
REPORT ON
EXTREMIST TRENDS

RADICALISATION RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK



Situational Assessment of Extremist Trends

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SITUATIONAL REPORT ON EXTREMIST TRENDS

RADICALISATION RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK





Situational Assessment of Extremist Trends (2)

National significance

Active threat

High risk

Potential risk

1. Crimes (spread)

2. Crimes (nature 3.
Actions
(spread)

4. Actions (nature)

5. Approval/social penetration

Incidence (crimes) Share of crimes of interest in violent criminal activity

Share of crimes of interest in overall criminal activity

Proportion n of specific crime types

Number of notable events Average number of participan ts in notable

events

Events by type

Violent attitudes represent ed Members
hip in
extremist
and
support
organizati

people willing to provide active support beyond Share of people villing to provide electoral support

Share of people admitting general agreemen t with essential



Situational Assessment of Extremist Trends

Core Indicators (quantitative)

Criminal activity (active threat)

Actions / notable events (high risk)

Social penetration (potential risk)

Supplementary and thematic indicators

Right-wing extremism

Left-wing extremism

Islamist extremism



Trend analysis

Short term

Medium term

Long term



Application of the situational tool (BG, EL, CZ)

- Develop clear definitions and guidelines for statistical recording and classification of crimes of interest (police, prosecution, courts)
- Introduce a unified institutional mechanism for reporting, collection and analysis of relevant data
- Need for regular sociological surveys on attitudes and victimisation to measure supplementary indicators
- Assessment of available evidence and trend analysis should be become the primary source of strategic and operational decision-making



Monitoring radicalisation: A Framework for risk indicators for first line officers



AIMS

To monitor:

- Radicalisation processes and risk factors that have not yet led to violence
- Individuals or groups that are vulnerable to or moving towards extremism but have not yet committed criminal acts


To flag:

 Risks and vulnerabilities (not identify radicalised individuals) for the purposes of early prevention



A framework of radicalisation risk indicators

- * to be applied only in combination
- * to be assessed in light of the local context/ individual circumstances





Risks of Islamist Radicalisation in the case of the Iztok Neighbourhood of the City of Pazardzhik, BG



The Salafi community

- 100 600 members
- Mainly Turkish Roma (less converts)
- Labor migration to WE countries (AT, DE)
- Salafism penetrates since late 1990s
- Transnational community
- Average social status within the Iztok quarter
- Stratification
- Own mosque (2002)
- Presently younger age of followers (families)



FACTORS

- ➤ Labor migration contacts with the transnational umma
- **Powerful** leader
- > Robust social cohesion
- >Own mosque
- Avoiding the stigma of Roma identity

- Powerful leader
- ➤ Timeframe (rise of IS; 2nd trial against the group leader)
- Contacts with radical mosques in WE
- Individual "demand"
- Feeling of social "prestige"and aura of mysticism



Recommendations: monitoring of radicalisation risks and prevention in CEE/SEE

Develop institutional infrastructures

Early warning and referral mechanisms

Build knowledge, capacities and expertise

- Central coordination body
- Multi-agency structure at local level
- Clear division of roles

- Framework of indicators
- Risk/vulnerability assessment methodology
- Referral to tailored prevention measures
- Community engagement

- Train frontline practitioners; integrate prevention in daily tasks
- Expertise among key professionals
- Bridge academic knowledge and policy www.csd.bq



Ways forward

EU

- Consider the context specifics of CEE/SEE countries in formulating transferable best practices (indigenous communities vs migrant background)
- Greater involvement of practitioners from CEE/SEE in RAN

National governments CEE


- Develop CVE infrastructures
- Develop knowledge, capacities and expertise
- Put in place reliable diagnostic tools to guide policies
- Involve communities


Civil society, academia


- Awareness raising of local specifics
- Generate sound evidence and policy advice based on research findings
- Advocate for community involvement in prevention



Further reading: www.csd.bg









THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!

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