

CORRUPTION MONITORING BY
COALITION 2000

November 2004



I. METHODOLOGY

Sample: All of the surveys referred to in the present paper were based on random two-stage cluster sampling. Survey universe: the country's population aged 18 and over. Sample size:

	Fieldwork period	Size of the sample
1.	February 1999	1143
2.	April 1999	1122
3.	September 1999	1110
4.	January 2000	1144
5.	April 2000	1161
6.	September 2000	1158
7.	January 2001	1037
8.	October 2001	971
9.	January 2002	1148
10.	May 2002	1170
11.	October 2002	1079
12.	January 2003	1107
13.	May 2003	1077
14.	July 2003	1057
15.	October 2003	1098
16.	March 2004	1080
17.	November 2004 г.	966

Method of registration: Face-to-face interview.

Fieldwork: November 18 – 29, 2004.

II. FINDINGS

1. PUBLIC IMPORTANCE OF CORRUPTION


In the course of the past year, the changes in the assessments of the problems perceived by the public as crucial to the country have primarily been associated with the *economic situation*. It is worth noting that the majority of the adult population believes there has been a decline in *unemployment* and *poverty* and yet the correlation between the *prices of goods and services* and the *low incomes of the population* still remains quite unfavorable (Figure 1). This differentiation in the assessments indicates that public opinion reacts perceptively and promptly enough to the objective changes in the country.

Both *corruption* and *crime* retain their importance as existing problems with the former even marking a slight increase from the month of March. The absence of any positive change over the past year in the assessments of these two phenomena suggests the formation of stable popular attitudes. This signals that the anti-corruption efforts of the government, the media, and civil society have not been producing any popularly recognized favorable changes.

The remaining problems noted as significant by the population do not display any changes from October 2003.

Figure 1.

Relative importance of the problems faced by society (%)



Base: All respondents


(October '03 N=1098; March '04 N=1080; November '04 N=966)

The data from the surveys conducted do not point to any significant connection between the media coverage of the subject of corruption and its perceived relative importance as set against the remaining social problems (Figure 2).

Nevertheless, the media play an all too important role in shaping attitudes to corruption. As evident from the Figure below, in the past 4 years (November 2000 – November 2004), there has been a gradual and steady increase in the amount of corruption-related publications.

On the other hand, placed in perspective, the perceived importance of corruption as a problem to Bulgarian society has been declining gradually. This indicates that, even if they cannot directly solve the problem, the media exert a substantial impact in terms of fostering an anti-corruption environment and intolerance to the various forms of corruption. (Figure 2)

Figure 2.
Dynamics of media coverage of corruption and assessments of the relative public importance of corruption as a social problem



As observed in the preceding surveys, the tendency persists for those with higher social and financial status to be more likely to view corruption as a significant problem to society. (Appendix 3, Table 1)

2. LEVEL OF CORRUPTION

When considering the level of corruption in the country, it is crucial to distinguish between its two basic components – the levels of *real* and *potential* corruption. In terms of the reproduction of corrupt practices, the “corruption deal offer” itself (requesting or offering to “give something”) is just as important as the very act of “giving or taking” (whether money, a gift or a favor). The committed acts of corruption are designated as “real corruption” and the solicited corruption deals, as “potential corruption”.

The average monthly incidence of acts of corruption in which the citizens have self-reportedly been involved make up the level of real corruption. Potential corruption is measured through the sum of all instances when the citizens have come under corruption pressure (when the respective official asked for “something”).

REAL CORRUPTION

The chief problem in assessing the level of real corruption stems from the delicate nature of the information collected on particularly sensitive issues. Although it cannot be measured with absolute precision, the actual number of acts of corruption committed in this country in the course of the past one month directly corresponds to the level of personal involvement of the respondents in various forms of corrupt behavior.


Despite the slight increase of the indicator measuring the **level of real corruption deals** compared to the month of March, the overall tendency has been towards a gradual decline in acts of corruption among the population. (*Figure 4*)

In absolute terms, the indicator marks an increase by about 20,000 cases from the month of March – as of the present time this involves 1.6% of the adult population or about 103 000 cases¹ (by comparison, the average monthly number of citizens involved in such acts in March 2004 was about 80 000). Nevertheless, the level is lower than in the same period in 2003, when the **average monthly rate** was 114 000 cases. (*Figure 3*)

¹ This estimate is based on the data from the population census of March 2001, according to which the population aged 18 and over was 6,417,869, and thus 1% of the sample corresponds to 64,180 people.

Figure 3.

Average monthly number of actually concluded corruption deals




Base: All respondents

The rate of **corruption pressure** exerted by officials, as well as the number of **actually concluded corruption deals** are reverting to the higher average values characteristic of 2003 after the significant drop registered in March 2004 (*Figure 4*). As has been the case up to now, the proportion of cases when bribes were solicited directly or it was indicated that some extra, unregulated payment was expected is approximately twice as high as the one for actual corruption-related payments.

Figure 4.

Level of corruption (min=0, max=10)



Base: All respondents

The rise in the value of concluded corruption deals registered in March is continuing – nearly one-third of the bribes offered in one form or another range between 100 and 500 Leva. This proportion is actually twice as high as in October 2003 when eight out of ten deals amounted to under 100 Leva. (*Appendix 3, Table 2*)

This increase in corruption “rates” for the various public services indirectly points to a certain increase in incomes and the possibilities to ask for larger amounts for the same favor. As in the same period of the previous year, no bribes exceeding 1,000 Leva were registered among the general public as opposed to the business community. This is another confirmation that there have in fact not occurred any major changes in the type of corruption deals concluded, but only in their value.

POTENTIAL CORRUPTION

Notwithstanding the decline in **potential corruption** recorded in the month of March, there has been a reversion to higher values for the **corruption pressure** exerted directly or indirectly over the citizens by public sector employees.

What is noteworthy in this case is that the value registered in the latest survey is even higher than the average level of corruption pressure throughout 2003. It remains to be seen whether this will prove a momentary fluctuation or permanent reversal of the positive tendency that had begun. (*Figure 3*)

In 2004, there continued the active efforts to introduce various anti-corruption measures such as codes of ethics and rules for interacting with the public. There were also a number of disclosures concerning corrupt officials, some of whom duly punished. This inevitably affected public attitudes to corruption. The question is, however, to what extent these measures are in position to seriously change the corruption environment and the objective preconditions for the spread of corruption. It is the only way to permanently transform the perceptions of the public and of public sector employees, as well as to curb possibilities for corruption deals in the area of public services.

CORRUPTION PRESSURE BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

The past one year has been marked by dynamic changes among the various occupational groups in terms of the corruption pressure exerted over the citizens.

Some groups, e.g. *university teachers, customs officers, and bankers*, at particular times were associated with sharp escalation of the pressure exerted, yet subsequently the values reverted to the customary levels for these categories. (*Appendix 3, Table 3*)

This suggests that the fact that a particular group should come out in the lead in the general ranking by occupations should not be absolutized. Rather, this is a warning signal that a certain corruption problem is present in the respective group and calls for attention.

In the latest survey, one such group are *doctors*, who **not only revert to the higher levels of corruption pressure of 2002 but actually come out on top of the ranking**. A similar situation was registered with respect to *police officers*, who follow closely behind in terms of the corruption pressure exerted. (*Appendix 3, Table 3*)

Unlike the beginning of the year, when there was a drop in corruption pressure by the different representatives of the ***judicial system, as of the present, there has been a rise in the values registered***. This applies primarily to *prosecutors, investigators, and administrative court officials*, and to a lesser extent, to *lawyers*. It is worth noting that, by contrast, the corruption pressure exerted by *judges* appears to have dropped nearly by half from the month of March.

The latest survey registered another interesting result – ***a rise in corruption pressure on a local level***, among *municipal officials* and among *mayors and municipal councilors* (*Appendix 3, Table 3*). This is probably related to the reallocation of larger financial resources to the local government authorities and the initiated process of administrative and financial decentralization. It remains to be seen whether this will prove a lasting tendency or a momentary fluctuation.

The level of corruption pressure remained unchanged throughout the past year for the remaining occupational groups.


IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS

Although in the long term the tendency is still positive, public assessments of government anti-corruption efforts have been ambivalent and have tended to vary significantly over the past two or three years (*Figure 5*).

At present, there appears to be stronger sentiment that the government is not doing enough to curb corruption in the *business community* and the *higher ranks of power*.

The noted vacillations in popular assessments point to their variability and susceptibility to external influence. In turn, this indicates that in order to have a lasting impact, government anti-corruption measures should be consistent and systematic, rather than campaign-driven.

Figure 5.
Perceived impact of the Government's anti-corruption measures *



* Relative share of those who answered, "The government is not doing anything"

Base: All respondents


3. EXPECTATIONS REGARDING THE CURBING OF CORRUPTION

After nearly a year marked by more favorable and optimistic popular assessments of the potential of society to cope with corruption, in late 2004, the value of this indicator again proved on the rise.

The adoption of a number of anti-corruption measures in 2003 and the achievement of specific results led some of the respondents to believe that there truly had begun a process of "rehabilitation" of the public sector that would bring down corruption to a more acceptable and "normal" level. (Figure 6)

The latest survey, however, breaks off this positive tendency and signals that the Government should continue and reinforce its anti-corruption policy. The implementation of certain "softer" anti-corruption measures, such as the adoption of codes of ethics for some occupational groups, as well as the exposure of a number of corrupt officials, do not exhaust the possibilities for effective counteraction of corruption and lasting transformation of the social environment.

Figure 6.
Corruption-related expectations (min=0 max=10)




Base: All respondents

4. SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

PERCEIVED SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

Similarly to the other indicators, the perceived spread of corruption appears to be reverting to higher values compared to the previous year of 2003 (Figure 7). On the whole, opinions about the spread of corruption tend to remain at their customary high levels and there still does not appear any notable public reaction to the measures undertaken to date by the Government.

Figure 7.
Spread of corruption (min=0 max=10)



Base: All respondents

PRACTICAL EFFICIENCY OF CORRUPTION

The public seems to be growing accustomed to corruption-related “talk” on many and different occasions. The wide discussion of the subject, accompanied by sporadic cases of exposure of corrupt officials, and in the absence of a consistent anti-corruption policy is turning the problem into a backdrop for the newscasts. This trivialization of corruption is producing the dangerous sense of something normal, "in the order of things", an intrinsic part of the relations between the public and public sector employees.

In this context, it is hardly surprising that the perceived practical efficiency of corruption remains as high as it is. This way of regulating various kinds of public-private relations continues to work well despite the common discussions on the subject and the public anti-corruption rhetoric. (*Figure 7*)

SPREAD OF CORRUPTION BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

The latest survey registered significant differences in the ways in which public opinion about the corruptibility of the particular occupational groups is changing.

Some of these groups, for ex. *businesspersons, ministers, and customs officers*, not only appear to be more favorably perceived in terms of the spread of corruption within them, but also display a steady positive tendency over the long-term. (*Appendix 3, Table 5*)

With others, such as *tax officials, prosecutors, and ministry officials*, notwithstanding a slight increase in values compared to the previous survey, the overall tendency is still rather a positive one.

In line with the increased corruption pressure attributed to *local government representatives*, the assessments of the spread of corruption among these officials (mayors, municipal councilors, and municipal officials) are growing ever more unfavorable.


Doctors, police officers, and administrative court officials can be grouped together in a separate category characterized by persistently high perceived spread of corruption.

The ranking of the top positions remains unchanged yet again – customs officers, the representatives of the judicial system, and police officers are still perceived as the most corrupt by the population. The difference is found in the presence of *doctors*, who move up several positions, and whose increased real corruption pressure clearly affects popular perceptions of the spread of corruption in this group (*Appendix 3, Table 5*).

After the slight decline in the month of March of the role of *personal experience and conversations with family and friends* in shaping people’s perceptions of the corruptibility of particular occupational groups, this factor again appears to rise in importance. Conversely, the role of the media appears to be declining and there has been a stabilization of the number of respondents choosing the DK/NA option.

Gradually, the subject of corruption is leaving the sphere of influence of the media and personal impressions and observations are beginning to play an ever more important role. Attitudes to the problem are now shaped by several critical factors, which is a precondition for a more objective and realistic outlook (*Figure 8*). The experience gained in recent years, both in discussing the subject and in achieving tangible results in the fight against corruption, facilitates its “demythologization” and less emotional perception.

Figure 8.
Relative share of the factors shaping the perceived spread of corruption



Base: All respondents

SPREAD OF CORRUPTION BY INSTITUTIONS

Similarly to the vacillating assessments of corruption in the different occupational groups, opinions regarding its spread within *institutions* are not straightforward. This calls for interpreting the data over the longer term rather than compared to March 2004 alone.

The data suggest the conclusion that in the past two years there has been a gradual weakening of the conditions conducive to corruption and hence of its perceived spread within the *Privatization Agency (Table 1)*.

The attempts to achieve greater transparency and the adoption of a number of specific measures in the various state agencies have produced generally more favorable opinions regarding the spread of corruption in *all ministries and government agencies, and specifically in the top ranks of power (parliament, the presidency, and the government)*. This suggests that although it seems a formidable task curbing corruption is nevertheless not impossible in the presence of a clear-cut strategy and consistent policy.

A slight drop in the perceived spread of corruption is also noticeable regarding the different sectors of the *judicial system* but it is yet to be seen whether it is based on the objective curbing of corruption in this sphere or is rather due to the wide discussion of the issue and the need to undertake anti-corruption measures in the judicial system.

A slight increase in negative assessments appears with respect to the *Interior Ministry system (incl. the Traffic Police and the Investigation)*. ***Over the longer term, however, there has been a more notable increase in the sphere of healthcare (Table 1)***. It is consistent with the increased pressure on the part of doctors, which does not allow drawing the conclusion that the heightened media interest is the only reason for the higher perceived spread of corruption.

Table 1.

“In your opinion, how widespread is corruption in the following institutions?”

(Respondents could give up to five answers under “Spread of corruption in general” and up to three answers under “Ministries and state agencies” and “Judicial system”, which is why the percentages do not sum up to 100)

	Oct 2002	Jan 2003	May 2003	Jul 2003	Oct 2003	Mar 2004	Nov 2004
Spread of corruption in general							
In Customs. Among customs officers.	30,4	53,3	50,0	54,1	49,5	46,3	50,9
In court. In the judicial system. In the system of justice. Among lawyers.	28,5	48,2	42,9	45,3	42,0	39,8	40,8
In the healthcare system. In medical care. In the National Health Service.	20,6	27,3	27,6	30,9	27,8	26,7	35,2
In the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (including Traffic Police, the investigation service)	19,9	28,6	30,6	30,9	33,9	26,9	33,8
In the higher ranks of power (Parliament, the Presidency, and the Government). Among the political elite.	30,3	24,7* 23,1** 1,3***	27,6* 27,5** 2,5***	28,5* 28,2** 1,7***	26,1* 26,3** 1,9***	22,8* 24,0** 1,6***	16,9* 19,3** 1,1***
Ministries and government agencies							
Customs Agency	10,9	31,2	31,2	31,5	32,4	28,4	33,8
Ministry of Justice	18,1	33,5	31,0	32,1	30,3	26,4	27,9
In all ministries and government agencies	-	19,6	21,8	24,6	25,4	23,7	21,2
Ministry of Internal Affairs	15,3	18,4	19,0	18,5	21,2	16,9	20,8
Ministry of Healthcare	16,6	16,7	17,0	17,7	14,4	18,8	18,0
Privatization Agency	22,5	27,2	24,7	21,8	21,7	19,2	13,4
Judicial system							
Throughout the judicial system	5,4•	33,5	34,4	33,3	37,6	39,8	30,6
The courts, the administration of justice	32,1	27,5	29,1	32,5	30,5	24,9	23,8
Prosecution	32,0	26,2	25,3	30,0	22,9	19,1	20,1
Lawyers, notaries public	16,2	24,9♦ 7,4♦♦	21,8♦ 8,0♦♦	22,5♦ 7,4♦♦	19,7♦ 8,5♦♦	17,1♦ 5,9♦♦	15,9♦ 7,9♦♦
Criminal investigation service	15,7	18,4	17,6	21,5	15,3	12,0	15,7

Base: All respondents

* Spread of corruption in the Government / among Ministers / among Deputy Ministers;

** Spread of corruption in the National Assembly / among MPs;

*** Spread of corruption in the Presidency/ among officials at the Presidency;

• The question in that survey was open-ended and that refers to the difference in the data in comparison to the following surveys

♦ Spread of corruption among lawyers;

♦♦ Spread of corruption among notaries public.

FACTORS FAVORING THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION

After the rise registered in the month of March in the importance of the basic factors that according to the population account for the spread of corruption in the public sector (*fast personal enrichment sought by those in power and the use of public office for personal gain, ineffectiveness of the judicial system, lack of strict administrative control, and imperfect legislation*), the values now appear to be “going back to normal” and their average levels in the past two years (*Table 2*).

It is worth noting that while the factor “*low salaries of public sector employees*” had lost some of its relevance during these past two years, in the latest survey it regains importance in accounting for corruption. Just like the “fast enrichment sought by those in power”, this is largely a matter of subjective perceptions and personal judgment of employees and is difficult to control by specific measures. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the overall ranking of the factors remains unchanged, which is another indicator of their relative stability.

Table 2. Relative share of the major factors accounting for the spread of corruption in this country (%)

	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>Jul '03</i>	<i>Oct '03</i>	<i>Mar '04</i>	<i>Nov '04</i>
Fast personal enrichment sought by those in power	57,8	60,8	59,2	58,6	58,6	58,4	60,3	58,5	61,7	62,0	65,1	58,0
Imperfect legislation	40,5	39,1	38,0	43,0	39,7	39,2	34,9	38,0	40,9	32,6	37,1	35,2
Ineffectiveness of the judicial system	22,2	27,2	28,5	32,3	31,2	38,0	31,2	34,1	37,1	29,9	42,6	35,0
Lack of strict administrative control	32,3	31,8	35,2	34,5	38,9	34,5	32,3	31,2	33,7	38,6	37,3	32,9
Low salaries of officials	41,6	33,7	32,3	38,5	36,0	36,6	31,2	27,6	28,9	28,3	27,0	30,9
Intertwinement of official duties and personal interests	32,6	25,8	31,7	26,7	26,9	28,8	29,1	30,6	31,6	33,5	36,7	27,1
Moral crisis in the period of transition	17,0	18,9	21,1	18,3	16,3	13,2	15,8	15,6	14,4	16,9	16,2	15,7
Specific characteristics of Bulgarian national culture	4,2	5,9	4,4	5,3	4,3	4,9	5,7	7,0	7,2	5,3	5,8	5,4
Problems inherited from the communist past	7,8	4,4	5,8	5,0	6,9	6,3	4,4	3,6	4,3	6,0	5,0	4,6

Base: All respondents


5. VALUE SYSTEM AND MORAL PRECONDITIONS FOR CORRUPTION

ACCEPTABILITY IN PRINCIPLE

There has been a slight increase in the acceptability in principle of corruption but over the long term there is reason to speak of a generally favorable tendency towards rejection of corruption on a moral level (Figure 9). In itself, this fact is a good precondition for continuing the efforts to restrict corruption, particularly on a low, mass level.

Figure 9.

Preconditions for the presence of corruption (min=0, max=10)



Base: All respondents

SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CORRUPTION

Regarding susceptibility to corrupt practices, the fluctuations are more noticeable compared to the acceptability in principle but the overall tendency has again been rather a positive one in the past two years (Figure 9).

The susceptibility to corruption is tangibly affected by the nature of public-private interrelations and the existence of certain institutional and regulatory deficits. In the presence of clear-cut and coherent laws and administrative regulations, as well as with the increased transparency of the interaction between the citizens and the public officials, the inclination to engage in corruption can be significantly restricted. It would be worthwhile to *target part of the anti-corruption efforts at the citizens and their rights as public service consumers, rather than the work of public sector employees only*. Raising public awareness and limiting the situations in which citizens directly depend on the goodwill of the respective official would inevitably lead to a more critical attitude to the services provided and to fewer opportunities for occurrence of corruption.

One positive outcome of the heightened presence of the subject of corruption in public space is the ever more pronounced tendency to refuse to pay extra or to seek alternative ways of dealing with arising problems with public sector employees and officials. The respondents ready in any case to pay the amount requested are growing fewer in all socio-demographic groups. The respondents with *higher education* and *the better off* are definitely ***more inclined to seek other ways of dealing with the problem***, while *those with a lower level of education* or *unfavorable financial and social situation* would simply ***refuse to pay the requested amount***. In both cases these attitudes are indicative of gradually increasing awareness of civic rights and growing disapproval of extra payments for public services citizens are entitled to by law (*Appendix 3, Table 6*).

APPENDIX 1

Theoretical framework

The Corruption Indexes summarize the basic indicators used by the Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of *Coalition 2000*. Each index sums up several questions posed to the respondents and allows comparative analysis over time. The Corruption Indexes assume values from 0-10. The closer the value of the indexes is to 10, the more negative are the assessments of the current state of corruption in Bulgaria. Index numbers closer to 0 indicate approximation to the ideal of a “corruption-free” society.

The Corruption Indexes are based on a system of indicators exploring corruption-related behavior and attitudes. The theoretical model of corruption underlying the CMS surveys distinguishes between the following aspects and elements of corruption:

1. Acts of corruption.

The acts of corruption fall into two basic types: giving a bribe and accepting a bribe. These occur in two basic kinds of situations: 1.) when citizens offer a bribe to get something they are entitled to by law (“greasing the wheels”), and 2.) when citizens offer a bribe to get something they are not entitled to by law. The registered frequency of acts of corruption shows the level of corruption in this country. The phrasing of the questions is essential when measuring the values of this index. In this respect CMS builds on a number of principles meant to ensure neutrality, objectivity, and anonymity: 1.) instead of using the term “bribe”, the questions refer to the “offer of money, gift, or favor”; 2) the questions focus on whether or not respondents did make such an “offer” and the latter are not asked to provide information concerning how much and whom they paid, etc., in order to have their problem addressed; 3) besides information about the “offer” of bribes, respondents are asked about the incidence of bribe solicitation, i.e., the amount of pressure exerted by public officials.

The Corruption Indexes formed on this basis are the following:

- Personal involvement. This index records the incidence of cases of “offer of money, gift, or favor” in order to have a problem solved as reported by the citizens themselves. Essentially this index registers the level of real corruption in this country over a given period of time.
- Corruption pressure. This index records the incidence of cases when citizens were reportedly asked for “money, gift, or favor” in order to have a problem solved. It measures the level of potential corruption in this country over a given period of time.

It should specifically be noted that the indicators concerning acts of corruption do not reflect evaluations, opinions, or perceptions, but the self-reported incidence of definite kinds of acts. This type of indicators underlies the methodology of the victimization surveys, which have a long history and are used to assess the real crime level in a given country. The term “real” is essential since for a number of reasons not all crimes are registered by the police and only part of those reported to the police actually end up in court.

2. Value system and moral preconditions.

Although they do not directly determine the level of corruption, the value system and moral principles have a significant influence on citizens’ behavior. Of the numerous indicators in this area, CMS monitors the following corruption-related attitudes: 1.) the level of toleration of various forms of corruption; 2.) the degree of awareness of the various types of corruption; 3.)

citizens' inclination to resort to corrupt practices in order to address arising problems.

The Corruption Indexes produced on this basis are the following:

- Acceptability in principle. This index measures the toleration of a range of corrupt practices by MPs and ministry officials.
- Susceptibility to corruption. The index sums up a series of questions intended to assess citizens' inclination to resort to corruption in addressing their daily problems.

Both of the indexes from this group reflect assessments and opinions. Their positive dynamics are indicative of growing rejection of corruption and the reinforcement of moral norms proscribing involvement in acts of corruption.

3. Estimated spread of corruption.

Citizens' subjective assessments of the spread of corruption reflect the general social environment and prevailing outlook on corruption, as well as the related image of the institutions and basic occupational groups under the three branches of power. These assessments do not directly reflect the level of corruption since they are the outcome of perceptions and impressions produced by the ongoing public debate, media coverage of corruption, personal preconceptions, etc. In more general terms, they show the extent to which citizens feel that those in power protect public interests or take advantage of their official positions to serve private interests. This aspect of corruption is covered by two indexes:

- Estimated spread of corruption. This index sums up respondents' assessments of the extent to which corruption permeates society (as well as individual institutions and occupational groups).
- Practical efficiency. This index sums up respondents' assessments of the extent to which corruption is an efficient problem-solving instrument. Efficiency is another indicator of the spread of corruption: a high rate of efficiency makes it worth resorting to corruption and implies that corruption is in fact a commonly used means of addressing problems.

4. Corruption-related expectations.

The corruption-related expectations reflect the degree of public confidence that the problem of corruption can be dealt with. In this sense, the expectations are the combined reflection of respondents' perception of the political will demonstrated by those in power and their assessment of the magnitude and gravity of the problem of corruption.

APPENDIX 2

Corruption Indexes

Table 1. Acts of Corruption

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>	<i>Oct '03</i>	<i>Mar '04</i>	<i>Nov. '04</i>
<i>Personal involvement</i>	0,7	0,8	0,4	0,8	0,7	0,4	0,5	0,4	0,3	0,4	0,4	0,3	0,5
<i>Corruption pressure</i>	1,2	1,5	0,8	1,4	1,4	1,0	1,4	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,1	0,8	1,3

Table 2. Value System and Moral Preconditions

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>	<i>Oct '03</i>	<i>Mar '04</i>	<i>Nov. '04</i>
<i>Acceptability in principle</i>	1,4	1,7	1,3	1,2	1,5	1,4	1,6	1,3	1,3	1,4	1,4	1,4	1,4
<i>Susceptibility to corruption</i>	2,7	2,8	2,5	2,6	2,5	2,5	2,7	2,7	2,8	2,6	2,5	2,4	2,7

Table 3. Perceived Spread of Corruption

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>	<i>Oct '03</i>	<i>Mar '04</i>	<i>Nov. '04</i>
<i>Spread of corruption</i>	6,1	6,5	6,5	6,5	6,4	5,9	6,7	6,4	6,4	6,6	6,5	6,3	6,6
<i>Practical efficiency</i>	6,8	6,6	6,9	6,6	6,4	6,1	6,9	6,9	6,9	6,9	6,6	6,5	7,0

Table 4. Corruption-Related Expectations

<i>Index value</i>	<i>Apr '00</i>	<i>Sep '00</i>	<i>Jan '01</i>	<i>Oct '01</i>	<i>Jan '02</i>	<i>May '02</i>	<i>Oct '02</i>	<i>Jan '03</i>	<i>May '03</i>	<i>July '03</i>	<i>Oct '03</i>	<i>Mar '04</i>	<i>Nov. '04</i>
<i>Corruption-related expectations</i>	5,5	5,4	5,6	4,9	5,1	5,2	5,6	5,9	5,8	5,6	5,6	5,5	5,7

APPENDIX 3

Table 1.

Assessments of the public importance of corruption as a problem of society by socio-demographic groups (November 2004; %)

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
<i>Highest level of education completed</i>		
1 Less than primary	0,2	99,8
2 Primary	1,2	98,8
3 Elementary	15,4	84,6
4 Secondary	58,1	41,9
5 College	6,5	93,5
6 University	17,7	82,3
<i>Financial situation</i>		
1 Poor	23,9	76,1
2	31,2	68,8
3	39,5	60,5
4	2,8	97,2
5 Wealthy	-	-
<i>Social status</i>		
1 Lowest social status	15,8	84,2
2	30,8	69,2
3	43,2	56,8
4	6,4	93,6
5 Highest social status	-	-
<i>Principal occupation at present</i>		
1 Managers, professors, specialists	10,3	89,7
2 Administrative officials, employed in the retail and services sectors	16,7	83,3
3 Technicians, workers, farmers	20,3	79,7
4 Housewives, retired, unemployed	44,5	55,5
5 Students	6,3	93,7
6 Other employment	1,9	98,1
<i>You live in:</i>		
1 Sofia	16,8	83,2
2 Large town	40,3	59,7
3 Small town	24,3	75,7
4 Rural area, village	18,6	81,4

Table 2.

Total amount of the informally paid bribes and/or gifts to public sector employees in the past 3 months (%)

	<i>January 2003</i>	<i>May 2003</i>	<i>July 2003</i>	<i>October 2003</i>	<i>March 2004</i>	<i>November 2004</i>
Up to 100 Leva	65,4	50,0	68,6	83,6	65,6	64,9
101 to 250 Leva	19,8	29,1	11,7	10,8	22,3	20,6
251 to 500 Leva	5,4	8,4	10,6	5,6	8,3	10,7
501 to 1000 Leva	8,2	3,8	9,2	-	1,5	3,9
1001 to 5000 Leva	1,1	7,5	-	-	1,3	-
Over 5000 Leva	-	1,2	-	-	-	-

Base: Respondents from whom public sector employees asked for, or indicated they expected, money, a gift, or a favor (January '03 N=95, May '03 N=77, July '03 N=71, October '03 N=77, March '04 N=72; November '04 N=65)

Table 3.

Corruption pressure by occupational group (%)

	Sep '00	Jan '01	Oct '01	Jan '02	May '02	Oct '02	Jan '03	May '03	July '03	Oct '03	Mar '04	Nov '04
Doctor	22,1	6,1	22,3	18,0	20,2	20,3	12,9	12,8	15,7	16,6	13,2	22,5
Police officer	24,0	18,9	18,5	19,9	15,2	22,3	12,0	14,1	17,8	13,9	13,1	22,2
Lawyer	-	-	-	-	-	26,5	10,5	17,4	13,1	13,8	12,9	16,5
Customs officer	15,8	22,7	18,4	18,5	25,5	19,4	17,3	16,6	16,4	15,3	22,3	13,8
University professors	-	-	-	-	-	11,9	14,7	11,8	21,5	16,6	12,7	12,6
Municipal official	10,3	11,2	11,3	10,0	5,5	10,9	4,4	8,4	6,9	6,4	4,7	10,3
Administrative court official	11,5	13,3	11,3	9,4	11,0	15,9	8,5	4,9	7,7	9,0	1,8	9,4
University employees	-	-	-	-	-	5,6	11,9	3,4	10,9	9,0	8,1	9,0
Businessperson	9,7	11,6	13,4	10,8	9,4	9,6	7,0	9,1	13,6	8,3	10,5	8,3
Mayors and municipal councilors	3,2	2,1	1,4	2,0	2,7	5,3	3,0	4,1	3,4	3,3	3,1	6,6
Ministry official	7,0	8,9	5,6	4,9	9,3	5,6	13,8	4,3	10,1	8,2	4,9	6,3
Teacher	5,5	3,7	6,1	3,6	3,1	7,4	4,4	3,4	3,4	5,6	3,9	6,2
Judge	9,1	5,8	6,8	7,8	10,7	16,6	2,0	14	6,9	8,5	10,7	5,8
Tax official	8,3	6,4	9,1	5,3	3,8	4,2	4,1	3,1	3,7	5,9	3,8	5,1
Prosecutor	7,8	7,2	0,8	4,1	8,5	12,3	6,6	9,2	8,2	4,2	1,8	5,1
Politicians and political party leaders	-	-	-	-	-	7,1	5,0	7,1	6,3	4,1	4,5	5,0
Investigator	6,0	5,5	6,0	4,3	8,2	8,3	4,3	12,8	2,5	9,6	1,7	5,0
NGO representative	-	-	-	-	-	5,0	-	4,0	2,6	1,4	-	1,3
Journalist	-	-	-	-	-	1,8	1,4	-	-	-	-	-
MP	6,4	4,2	2,1	2,1	3,5	2,0	11,2	8,9	-	-	-	-
Ministers	-	-	-	-	-	6,3	-	3,3	3,4	4,8	-	-
Banker	2,9	4,1	4,1	4,1	5,6	3,9	5,1	9,9	1,2	4,2	8,3	-
University professor or employee**	13,9	13,2	8,8	14,3	12,0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

**Relative share of those who have had contacts with the respective group and have been asked for money, gifts, or favors*

*** Since October 2002, the option has been divided into two separate ones: "University employees" and "University professors".*

Table 4.

Factors for the spread of corruption by socio-demographic groups – November 2004. (%)

	<i>Fast personal enrichment sought by those in power</i>	<i>Ineffectiveness of the judicial system</i>	<i>Imperfect legislation</i>	<i>Lack of strict administrative control</i>	<i>Public officials' low salaries</i>
Highest level of education completed					
1 Less than primary	39,0	9,9	14,6	6,8	6,1
2 Primary	52,1	33,3	26,4	24,3	21,2
3 Elementary	54,5	26,5	30,6	30,8	26,1
4 Secondary	58,5	39,4	36,9	34,9	35,0
5 College	81,7	37,9	34,8	36,5	19,6
6 University	56,0	36,2	43,5	34,3	35,4
Financial situation					
1 Poor	59,4	33,6	31,6	30,5	27,3
2	57,2	38,5	35,6	32,6	29,3
3	56,7	33,1	38,6	34,1	36,9
4	74,7	35,7	32,0	52,9	28,0
5 Wealthy	-	-	-	-	-
Social status					
1 Lowest social status	62,6	34,5	30,2	28,9	25,5
2	57,6	37,0	37,8	32,7	26,5
3	55,3	35,2	39,0	34,2	37,9
4	71,1	24,3	27,2	45,2	33,6
5 Highest social status	-	-	-	-	-
Principal occupation at present					
1 Managers, professors, specialists	73,0	39,9	33,1	39,4	31,8
2 Administrative officials, employed in the retail and services sectors	58,2	37,1	50,3	29,3	45,3
3 Technicians, workers, farmers	61,3	36,7	33,3	30,7	33,3
4 Housewives, retired, unemployed	54,4	33,9	33,3	32,1	26,0
5 Students	57,0	32,4	37,4	40,7	31,6
6 Other employment	65,4	9,6	18,7	49,4	36,2
You live in:					
1 Sofia	54,2	28,8	27,5	42,6	39,6
2 Large town	60,2	40,7	40,4	34,7	33,8
3 Small town	65,1	35,4	37,3	34,4	25,8
4 Rural area, village	51,6	31,0	31,2	24,1	26,7

Table 5.

Spread of corruption by occupational group

<i>Relative share of those who answered, "Nearly all and most are involved in corruption"</i>												
	Sep '00	Jan '01	Oct '01	Jan '02	May '02	Oct '02	Jan '03	May '03	July '03	Oct '03	Mar '04	Nov '04
Customs officers	75,2	74,3	77,3	74,2	70,8	79,2	76,6	74,3	76,9	74,5	70,6	70,3
Police officers	54,3	51,0	53,7	47,0	50,7	59,6	57,7	57,7	61,4	59,2	52,3	58,8
Judges	50,1	50,6	56,4	55,0	50,8	63,0	62,2	59,6	61,8	57,3	56,0	56,1
Doctors	43,6	27,0	46,8	45,7	52,3	54,9	51,0	49,8	53,4	52,9	46,7	55,4
Prosecutors	51,3	50,7	54,8	55,4	51,0	63,0	62,1	59,3	60,6	55,7	54,1	55,3
Lawyers	52,9	50,3	55,0	55,5	52,5	62,3	60,1	60,0	57,5	55,8	53,8	54,9
Investigators	43,8	43,5	48,4	48,0	43,1	57,5	55,4	53,6	55,4	49,2	48,2	51,7
MPs	51,7	52,6	43,5	47,8	39,2	56,2	53,5	57,5	56,9	54,5	50,8	50,7
Politicians and leaders of political parties and coalitions	43,8	39,1	40,8	43,0	33,0	54,0	50,7	51,3	50,8	47,6	51,0	50,5
Tax officials	53,7	47,3	51,6	51,2	41,9	58,0	52,6	51,8	54,1	49,3	43,0	49,9
Mayors and municipal councilors	32,1	30,9	26,3	31,8	23,4	48,3	45,7	43,6	45,0	43,4	37,9	47,0
Ministers	55,0	52,3	41,2	45,4	35,6	50,8	49,5	52,6	54,9	52,6	47,2	45,4
Municipal officials	41,6	35,9	39,6	39,4	30,0	49,1	40,9	39,8	42,2	36,5	31,6	44,3
Ministry officials	49,7	43,9	45,8	47,1	36,7	48,3	44,6	44,4	45,1	40,1	36,5	42,6
Administrative court officials	40,2	36,8	41,7	41,1	36,5	45,0	42,4	37,5	37,9	33,5	33,2	42,2
Businesspersons	42,3	43,6	42,2	41,6	41,4	48,9	52,7	50,9	48,7	47,6	41,2	38,5
University professors and officials	28,1	21,6	27,4	27,7	29,8	33,4*	30,8*	31,7*	34,1*	36,5*	28,9*	33,1*
						23,1**	20,0**	19,0**	21,2**	23,2**	16,3**	26,1**
Bankers	33,5	35,6	32,5	31,7	29,5	37,2	43,4	35,8	37,1	37,3	31,2	30,6
NGO representatives	23,9	18,2	19,8	21,8	15,3	21,4	20,2	21,0	21,6	22,3	21,6	23,7
Teachers	10,9	5,8	9,3	9,7	9,8	13,9	9,8	11,6	10,9	11,0	8,6	14,0
Journalists	13,9	11,3	10,5	12,2	9,5	15,3	12,1	13,3	12,9	14,6	9,9	11,4
Local political leaders	36,8	34,2	35,1	34,4	27,1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

* Assessment of the spread of corruption among university professors

** Assessment of the spread of corruption among university officials

Table 6.

“If you had an important problem and an official directly asked you for money to solve it, what would you do?” (Distribution by socio-demographic group – November 2004; %)

	<i>I will always pay</i>	<i>I will pay if I can afford it</i>	<i>I won't pay if I can solve the problem by some other means</i>	<i>I will never pay</i>	<i>DK/NA</i>
<i>Highest level of education completed</i>					
1 Less than primary	-	23,8	31,6	25,8	18,8
2 Primary	1,8	26,2	13,8	40,7	17,4
3 Elementary	2,8	16,2	31,7	37,5	11,8
4 Secondary	4,9	19,6	36,1	29,5	10,0
5 College	3,3	15,6	45,5	30,4	5,2
6 University	3,3	14,0	36,6	30,0	16,1
<i>Financial situation</i>					
1 Poor	2,4	18,8	27,3	41,5	10,0
2	3,6	17,1	38,9	29,5	10,9
3	5,0	18,7	38,3	26,3	11,6
4	9,8	27,2	28,6	26,8	7,7
5 Wealthy	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Social status</i>					
1 Lowest social status	2,3	18,9	30,8	38,2	9,7
2	3,0	17,9	33,9	33,0	12,2
3	5,9	18,7	37,5	28,0	9,9
4	2,2	17,0	43,6	25,2	12,0
5 Highest social status	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Principal occupation at present</i>					
1 Managers, professors, specialists	7,6	9,3	51,6	19,5	12,1
2 Administrative officials, employed in the retail and services sectors	6,3	21,3	42,3	20,6	9,5
3 Technicians, workers, farmers	7,6	22,3	32,0	25,9	12,2
4 Housewives, retired, unemployed	1,7	17,0	30,2	38,9	12,3
5 Students	2,0	22,7	40,2	28,2	6,9
6 Other employment	-	19,6	43,4	37,0	-
<i>You live in:</i>					
1 Sofia	3,7	19,5	36,5	23,6	16,7
2 Large town	3,0	16,4	35,0	37,4	8,2
3 Small town	6,5	12,9	38,8	31,7	10,0
4 Rural area, village	2,6	23,8	29,6	29,5	14,5